基于策略消费者风险偏好的供应链协调研究

在传统的策略消费者的报童模型基础上,探讨了消费者风险偏好对供应链协调的影响,引入消费者风险偏好系数,证明了在此影响下销售商的最优定价和订货量会降低,从而减少了供应链的收益。为改善这种状况,提出两部定价法,同样考虑消费者的风险偏好,得出了在相同的风险偏好下,这种批发价格随着订货量递减的两部定价策略与单一线性价格策略相比,前者的销售商的最优订货量会增加,最优销售价格会降低,使消费者获得更多的剩余价值,从而使供应链整体的效益提高。通过算例对结论进行了验证。     

带服务水平和容量约束的扩展报童模型研究

主要针对具有服务水平约束和容量约束的扩展报童问题展开研究,首先建立了带服务水平约束和容量约束的扩展报童模型,给出了两种情形下的最优订货量的表达式,并分析了最优解的性质。在此基础上建立了容量有限的带服务水平约束的扩展报童模型,给出了最优解的表达式,并分析了服务水平、库存容量对最优订货量及报童利润的影响,最后通过算例对模型进行了分析和验证。     

CVaR准则下季节性产品市场运作策略

研究了风险规避型零售商在面对季节性产品随机市场需求受销售价格和广告费用共同影响时的最优运作策略。通过乘法需求形式将销售价格、广告费用对需求的影响引入报童问题中,以CVaR作为风险度量准则,建立了风险规避型零售商销售价格、广告费用及订货量联合决策的随机模型;并进一步揭示了零售商的风险规避程度对其最优运作策略的影响;通过数值实例对模型的求解过程和理论结果进行了验证分析。研究结果为季节性产品零售商市场运作策略的制定提供了一定的参考。     

理性与经验决策者订货差异性及其原因分析

应用实验室和心理测量等方法,在高利润环境下研究了理性与经验决策者对于报童问题的订货决策差异及其原因。研究发现:相对于弱理性风格决策者,强理性风格决策者的订货量更接近最优订货量,所获得的期望利润更高,且表现出更低的需求追逐、中心化锚定和过度自信偏好;而相对于弱经验风格决策者,强经验风格决策者的订货量更偏离最优订货量,所获得的期望利润更低,且表现出更高的需求追逐、中心化锚定以及过度自信偏好。这些研究发现可为相关管理人员的选择及其订货决策的改善,提供理论支持和实践指导。     

易逝品地方广告与订货的供应链协调研究

对垂直广告合作进行了研究,发现常用的制造商广告费分担策略在需求量含随机因素下无法使渠道最优,在订货量最优时,广告费投入过大;在广告费投入最优时,订货量过小.基于此,提出了收益分享加广告费分担的联合契约,该契约可以使系统达到协调.最后用数例证明了结论的有效性.     

基于生产不确定和需求不确定的供应链协调研究

基于生产不确定和市场需求不确定分析供应链的协调问题.重点分析了供应商的生产决策和销售商最优订货量之间的关系,供应商的利润如何随着二级市场价格的变化而变化,特别是二级市场的销售与采购价格比例如何影响供应商的最优生产量与销售商的最优订货量之间的比例关系.研究表明供应商的最优生产决策与销售商的最优订货量有非线性正相关,且供应...     

双渠道供应链的库存与定价策略研究

针对由传统零售渠道和网络直销渠道组成的双渠道供应链模型,考虑批发价格和传统零售价格确定情况下,同时市场需求随机且受价格影响时,对制造商在直销渠道上的最优定价和库存量决策,以及零售商在传统分销渠道上的最优订货量进行研究。通过模型分析和数值仿真说明：当需求分配比例处在一定范围内时,存在可行的直销价格。当加入直销价格不小于批发价格的约束条件后,在更小的需求分配比例范围内能够找到均衡解。且在此合理的区域内,传统零售渠道订货量减少,直销渠道库存量增大,但供应链总的销售量基本不变。零售商的期望收益有所增加,对于供应商,其来自于零售渠道的期望收益减少,来自于直销渠道的收益以及总收益增多。整个供应链的收益得到提高。     

延期支付条件下多产品定价与订货联合策略研究

研究了多个供应商和单个零售商出售多产品的供应链。假定产品需求为产品售价的线性函数,建立了延期支付条件下允许缺货的决策模型,给出了零售商的最优定价与订货策略。通过算例验证了模型的有效性,并对模型中的主要参数进行了灵敏度分析。研究发现,当产品全部售出所需时间的最优值不在给定的范围内时,最优值总是取允许范围内的最大值;产品的需求价格弹性越大,零售商的总利润越小,且需求价格弹性的变化只影响产品自身的订货量。     

回购激励和广告投入下的供应链协调研究

在假设零售商的广告投入能提高需求期望但不会增加需求方差的前提下,以供应链的最大期望利润为目标,针对由单一供应商和单一零售商所组成的两级供应链,运用Stackelberg博弈方法,分别研究了在有无广告投入的条件下,集中式和分散式决策两种模式下的零售商的最优订货量和最佳广告投入的决策,并探讨了供应商销售奖励的回购契约协调机...     

电力物资复合泊松需求下的最优订货量

以上海电力公司的物资供应体系为背景,给出了（T,Q）库存策略下服从复合泊松分布的电力物资最优订货量的算法。建立复合泊松分布下的库存成本模型,对此模型用闭式算法求得其最小库存成本下的最优订货量,将该算法应用于电力物资进行实证分析。数值结果表明,与传统的报童模型相比,本文提出的最优订货量算法更适用于间断需求。     

The newsboy problem with multiple demand classes

We consider the single item newsboy problem, where the item can be sold to different demand classes at different prices. The demands are realized sequentially over time. That is, the newsboy purchases newspapers at the beginning of the day and sells them in the morning and in the afternoon with different prices. We analyze two cases where the prices are either decreasing or increasing; the former case applies, for example, to fashion goods retailing, while the latter to airlines and hotels. In the decreasing price case, we find the optimal order quantity to maximize the expected profit with independent multiple demands. We show numerically that aggregating the multiple demands with a single average price or applying the single demand newsboy model separately to multiple demand classes may lead to large sub-optimality. In the increasing price case, we analyze a two demand class model in which a fraction of the unsatisfied lower fare demand diverts to the high fare class, thus causing dependent sales. We follow a policy of protecting the sales in the higher fare class by limiting the sales in the lower fare class. We derive both the fare allocation limit and the initial capacity, and discuss managerial implications. For both models, we give bounds on the optimal order quantity.     

Impact of demand price elasticity on advantages of cooperative advertising in a two-tier supply chain

This paper focuses on pricing and vertical cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain. Using a Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as the game leader and the retailer acts as the game follower, we obtain closed-form equilibrium solution and explicitly show how pricing and advertising decisions are made. When market demand decreases exponentially with respect to the retail price and increases with respect to national and local advertising expenditures in an additive way, the manufacturer benefits from providing percentage reimbursement for the retailer’s local advertising expenditure when demand price elasticity is large enough. Whether the manufacturer benefits from cooperative advertising is also closely related to supply chain member’s relative advertising efficiency. In the decision for adopting coop advertising strategy, it is critical for the manufacturer to identify how market demand depends on national and local advertisements. The findings from this research can enhance our understanding of cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain with price-dependent demand.     

Joint pricing and advertising strategy with reference price effect

Consumers are susceptible to reference price effects when they make purchase decisions for a certain product. Meanwhile, the sales price and advertisement are the determinable factors that have impact on consumers’ reference price which are also fundamental marketing strategies. Therefore, how to determine an appropriate sales price and advertising effort level to maximise firms’ profits is an essential task. A joint pricing and advertising problem for a monopolistic firm with consideration of reference price effect is investigated, where consumer demand rate is price-sensitivity and depends on the gap between the sales price and the reference price in consumers’ mind. An optimisation model is established to maximise the firm’s total profit by making a joint pricing and advertising strategy. The static and dynamic joint strategies are obtained by applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle. Results show that the dynamic strategies dominate the static ones. Furthermore, the dynamic pricing and dynamic advertising strategies are strategic complements. Additionally, the length of the sales period plays a key role in determining the superiority of the two dynamic strategies. Specifically, a relatively short sales period highlights the value of the dynamic advertising while a long sales period strengthens the function of the dynamic pricing.     

The Generalized Newsboy Problem, Contract Negotiations and Secondary Vendors

The single period inventory model, known as the newsboy problem, has been extended by considering the supply of inventory as a random variable. A rule for acceptance of inventory from the primary vendor (supplier) is given. Analyses for the newsboy's use in contract negotiations with his supplier are presented. The analyses ensure that the newsboy suffers no decrease in expected revenue by determining values for fixed and proportional penalties when shortages exist. In addition, the unit cost that the newsboy can afford to pay to purchase the excess supply is determined so that there is no decrease in expected revenue. The optimal use of secondary vendors is derived when the specific amount of shortage is known and when the specific amount (if any) of shortage is not known. Illustrative distributions for supply and demand and specific numerical cases are given.     

广告视角下智能小区实时定价博弈分析

考虑连续时间内供电商对用户的争抢行为，将广告微分博弈引入智能电网系统中以刻画供电商之间的相互竞争，并建立多供电商多用户Stackelberg博弈模型研究智能电网实时定价问题。通过求解用户侧优化问题及供电商之间非合作微分博弈纳什均衡，最终获得供电商与用户之间Stackelberg博弈均衡，以此得到供电商广告竞争下的智能电网实时电价。数值仿真结果表明：采取广告行为供电商的最大支付随其广告成本和定价先增后减，而随用户规模扩大而递增；另外，随着单位广告成本的增加，供电商统一电价逐渐降低，带来用户效用提高，且拥有较低广告成本的供电商售电较多。     

潜在市场需求不确定下的风险厌恶供应链决策

考虑新产品投入市场时潜在市场需求不确定下的供应链风险厌恶,构造了一个考虑制造商和零售商的效用函数,建立了基于广告费用、服务水平以及销售价格的最优短期决策模型,分析了需求风险和供应链成员风险容忍水平对供应链最优短期决策的影响,采用数值仿真分析了供应链最优长期决策。研究结果表明：最优广告费用分别是需求风险和风险容忍水平的单调递增和递减函数,最优销售价格和服务水平则因行业等因素不同与需求风险和风险容忍水平呈U型或倒U型关系;当市场环境变化时,销售价格和服务水平在不同市场条件下应做出不同调整,而广告费用调整与市场特征无关;从长期来看制造商可以达到效用最大化,而零售商效用只能次优。a     

考虑网络零售商有限IT服务能力的产品定价与广告策略分析

研究了网络零售商有限IT服务能力下产品定价与广告投入问题。首先,建立垄断市场中零售商决策模型,研究发现：零售商广告投入水平、零售价格以及消费者剩余都与零售商IT服务能力正相关。其次,在竞争市场中运用博弈论分别建立了两个零售商Nash静态和Stackelberg动态博弈模型。结果显示,零售商动态博弈中所制定的零售价格高于静态博弈时零售价格,而广告投入水平低于静态博弈时的广告投入水平,并且动态博弈时消费者剩余较小。对于零售商1而言静态博弈时最优服务能力大于动态博弈时的最优服务能力,而零售商2结论相反。最后,分析了消费者时间敏感性和广告敏感性对零售商利润以及最优服务能力的影响。     

Optimal advertising outsourcing strategy with different effort levels and uncertain demand

This paper studies the issue of advertising outsourcing and production planning for a manufacturer facing asymmetric advertising cost and uncertain market demand. To improve product sales, a manufacturer would hire an advertising agency to provide professional service on product advertising before the production takes place. A contract taking into account both advertising effort level and payment is introduced to incentivize the advertising agency to report the exact cost to the manufacturer. Furthermore, a model with the goal of maximising the manufacturer's net profit is proposed, in which both product demand and payment to the advertising agency are affected by the advertising effort level. Analytical solutions of the optimal strategies including the optimal advertising effort level and the optimal payment to the advertising agency are derived. Optimal retail price and the optimal production quantity are also obtained for the manufacturer in making managerial decisions.