Ethnopsychologies: Reply to Wellman (1998) and Gauvain (1998).

Four main issues are considered in response to H. M. Wellman (see record 1997-42548-002) and M. Gauvain (see record 1997-42548-003): the relevance of adult data, the source of evidence for theories of mind, explaining development, and the proper focus of theory of mind research. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Promoting father involvement: An analysis and critique: Comment on Silverstein (1993).

In analyzing the forces that undermine greater fathering involvement in American society, L. B. Silverstein (see record 1994-17264-001) critiques the views of R. Trivers (1972), J. Belsky, L. Steinberg, and P. Draper (1991), and many sociobiological thinkers regarding the determinants of parenting. Despite the shared view regarding the value of promoting greater father involvement, there are several problems with Silverstein's analysis: (1) casting conservatives as extremists who deny the role of environment in shaping fathering; (2) omitting from the analysis of sociobiology the core notion that organisms adjust their behavior in response to environmental forces in the service of biological, that is, reproductive-fitness, goals; and (3) characterizing the Belsky et al theory of socialization as one that minimizes the role of the environment and implies that intervention efforts to foster father involvement are ineffective for biological and developmental reasons. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to comments on Lipsey and Wilson (1993).

Replies to comments by H. J. Eysenck, D. Sohn, and H. Cooper et al (see PA, Vol 82:22192, 22208, and 22189, respectively) regarding Lipsey and Wilson's (see record 1994-18340-001) meta-analysis of meta-analyses. Both Sohn and Eysenck seem to be concerned with how theory is developed, but they may be confused about the role of meta-analysis in that process. It is argued that the purpose of meta-analysis is to develop generalizations about research findings across different studies. The extension of the analysis by Cooper et al reminds researchers that meta-analysis can be subject to error and bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Nonlinear dynamic modeling and social contagion: Reply to Stoolmiller (1998).

M. Stoolmiller's (1998) comments about the authors' epidemic models of the onset of social activities (EMOSA models) and about nonlinear modeling in general further stimulate the developmental community to give more attention to this class of methods. The authors review and comment on Stoolmiller's criticisms. Following, they discuss the idea of social contagion as a general theoretical tool. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conducting and comprehending cross-cultural comparisons: Reply to Stigler and Miller (1993).

J. W. Stigler and K. F. Miller (see record 1994-07531-001) critiqued the matching methodology and theoretical interpretation reported in the R. E. Mayer et al (see record 1991-19796-001) study of mathematical problem solving in Japan and the US. In this reply, the authors explain why they disagree with Stigler and Miller's comments concerning (1) the reliability of the matching methodology used, (2) the correctness of hypotheses concerning the relative effectiveness of US and Japanese schools, (3) reporting of the relative problem-solving performances of US and Japanese students, (4) whether Mayer et al are guilty of drawing causal conclusions from correlational data, and (5) whether the results are best explained by differences in intelligence. Finally, the authors call for recognizing the legitimacy of multiple research perspectives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Associative versus contingency accounts of category learning: Reply to Melz, Cheng, Holyoak, and Waldmann (1993).

E. R. Melz et al (see record 1994-24205-001) argue that the partial blocking of cue A that was previously reported (D. R. Shanks; see record 1991-26433-001) when Ss were presented with intermixed AB?→?1, B?→?1 category learning trials is not consistent with the associative Rescorla-Wagner (R-W; 1972) theory analysis that was offered, given that the theory predicts complete blocking at asymptote. However, this claim assumes that Ss were trained to asymptote in these experiments, and there is no reason to believe this was the case. Melz et al further argue that there has been no reported evidence of complete blocking in associative learning tasks, which is incorrect. It is shown that, on the contrary, there is abundant evidence of it. The R-W theory analysis of the results is therefore sound. The results reported were inconsistent with contingency theories as they are normally formulated. Melz et al propose a revised contingency theory which, they argue, can account for data from a range of learning tasks. In particular, they claim that their theory can accommodate the results. It is shown that the theory can be refuted… (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Empirical constraints on theories of scientific reasoning: Reply to Baron (1990).

J. Baron (see record 1990-27432-001) makes two assertions concerning our research on reflectiveness in scientific reasoning (D. Duemler and R. E. Mayer; see record 1989-14366-001): (a) His theory, particularly as stated in Baron (1988), predicts our findings, and (b) we have misnamed the independent variable in our study as reflectiveness. In this essay, we briefly respond to each assertion and call for three improvements in theories of scientific reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Potential power of coding particular experiences: Reply to Mathews and Roussel (1993).

R. C. Mathews and L. G. Roussel (see record 1993-44092-001) argued that it is more fruitful to understand memory as a "conceptualizer," which enables the organism to interact efficiently with its environment, than as a simple "warehouse" for storing the details of past experience. The authors completely agree. However, Mathews and Roussel believe that the human capacity to acquire sensitivity to general properties of the environment requires a memory system that chronically abstracts regular aspects of the general structure of experience. It is argued that such abstraction is unnecessary. Instead, encoding particular experiences of encountering the members of a domain accidentally makes memory sensitive to the general structure of that domain. In effect, simply coding particular experiences grants memory the potential to interact efficiently with complex and unanticipated aspects of its environment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mentalism, mechanisms, and medical analogues: Reply to Wakefield (1998).

J. C. Wakefield's (1998) critique of W. C. Follette and A. C. Houts's (1996) article is addressed by raising questions about (a) mentalism as a framework for studying psychopathology, (b) the nature of inferred mechanisms and the process of making such inferences, and (c) the accuracy of claiming that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association) expansion is analogous to the success of physical medicine. The authors argue that Wakefield's analysis of mental disorders leads to the conclusion that the modern DSMs are not reflective of the progress of physical medicine. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Dissociating the wheat from the chaff in theories of hypnosis: Reply to Kihlstrom (1998) and Woody and Sadler (1998).

Although there are noteworthy commonalities among disparate theories of hypnosis, they are neither as readily integrated nor as complementary as J. E Kihlstrom (1998) and E. Woody and P. Sadler (1998) implied. All current theories of hypnosis, including our social cognitive model, are provisional and incomplete, and each has something of value to offer. However, the multiple streams of consciousness hypothesis and the hypnotic state hypothesis should be abandoned because they are neither well supported by data nor consistent with current research and theory in social and cognitive psychology. In their place, the authors propose theoretical formulations based on such concepts as response sets, hierarchical control systems, associative memory networks, automatic activation of behavior, motivation, intention, and response expectancy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Distinguishing unconscious from conscious cognition—Reasonable assumptions and replicable findings: Reply to Merikle and Reingold (1998) and Dosher (1998).

S. C. Draine and A. G. Greenwald (see record 1999-10824-004) demonstrated replicable unconscious semantic priming by combining a response window procedure, which increases priming effects by requiring rapid responding, and a regression analysis in which the regression intercept is a marker for unconscious cognition. The commentaries by B. A. Dosher (see record 1999-10824-006) and by P. M. Merikle and E. A. Reingold (see record 1999-10824-005) raise two questions about conclusions based on these methods: (a) Did Draine and Greenwald (1998) demonstrate an indirect effect (subliminal priming) in the absence of a direct effect (i.e., visibility of the subliminal priming words)? and (b) Did Draine and Greenwald (1998) demonstrate dissociation of conscious from unconscious cognition? The first question has reassuring responses that are reviewed here. The second question is answered by pointing out that although Draine and Greenwald (1998) did not claim to have established such dissociation, they provided data that advance the plausibility of that conclusion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Association between conscious knowledge and performance in normal subjects: Reply to Cohen and Curran (1993) and Willingham, Greeley, and Bardone (1993).

Several studies (e.g., M. J. Nissen & P. Bullemer, 1987) have claimed that reaction times (RTs) to a repeating sequence may improve although Ss are not aware of the repeating sequence. P. Perruchet and M. A. Amorim (see record 1992-37919-001) pointed out that the measure of awareness involved in these studies was inadequate (e.g., Ss were not even explicitly asked to retrieve the repeating sequence), and they showed that the dissociation in normal Ss no longer held when awareness was assessed by recall or recognition tests. In this reply, it is shown that A. Cohen and T. Curran's (1993) criticisms of the validity of Perruchet and Amorim's tests and of the theoretical implications of their results are either without foundation or unfalsifiable. Further, it is shown that the new experiment by D. B. Willingham et al (1993) does not demonstrate dissociation. Both comments further illustrate the widespread uncritical acceptance of dissociation, which probably originates from, but is not theoretically justified by, evidence available for dissociation in amnesic patients. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

K-means clustering and mixture model clustering: Reply to McLachlan (2011) and Vermunt (2011).

McLachlan (2011) and Vermunt (2011) each provided thoughtful replies to our original article (Steinley & Brusco, 2011). This response serves to incorporate some of their comments while simultaneously clarifying our position. We argue that greater caution against overparamaterization must be taken when assuming that clusters are highly elliptical in nature. Specifically, users of mixture model clustering techniques should be wary of overreliance on fit indices, and the importance of cross-validation is highlighted. Additionally, we note that K-means clustering is part of a larger family of discrete partitioning algorithms, many of which are designed to solve problems identical to those for which mixture modeling approaches are often touted. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Evaluating the interpersonal stage model: A reaction to Tracey (1993).

T. J. Tracey's (see record 1994-06606-001) interpersonal stage model of change in counseling is evaluated for its conceptual clarity, empirical support, and potential for stimulating research on interpersonal change processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Selective attention and the formation of linear decision boundaries: Reply to Maddox and Ashby (1998).

In this reply to W. T. Maddox and F. G. Ashby's (see record 1997-38560-018) commentary, the author argues that (a) Maddox and Ashby's current stance represents a marked departure from their previously published claims about the unimportance of selective attention in categorization, (b) they are inconsistent with their own work when they criticize S. C. McKinley and R. M. Nosofsky's (see record 83-21759) tests of the linear-boundary models, (c) their arguments about modeling averaged data have no bearing on the central conclusions reached by McKinley and Nosofsky, and (d) they make incorrect assertions regarding the application and predictions of the exemplar model. Finally, the author defends the theoretical progress that has been made in recent years with the exemplar model and argues instead that it is the decision-bound theory of Ashby and Maddox that is in need of greater constraints. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

List-strength and list-length effects: Reply to Shiffrin, Ratcliff, Murnane, and Nobel (1993).

R. M. Shiffrin et al (see record 1994-24299-001) claimed that the theory of distributed associative memory (TODAM) is unable simultaneously to predict an absent (or negative) list-strength effect (LSE) and a positive list-length effect (LLE). However, Shiffrin et al failed to distinguish between situations in which lag (i.e., number of items intervening between study and test) is controlled and situations in which it is not. The authors stand by their previous conclusion: TODAM can explain why there is little or no LSE when at the same time there is an LLE when the LLE is studied under the standard conditions. It is argued that there are no published studies where lag has been controlled. However, this simplified version of TODAM cannot explain an LLE when a scoring window is used. Whether such a result would be inconsistent with a more complete version of TODAM remains to be seen. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessment of the state of menstrual synchrony: Reply to comment by Arden and Dye (1998).

M. Arden and L. Dye (see record 1998-10816-010) commented that for the state of menstrual synchrony to reliably persist for a prolonged period, "mean cycle lengths of synchrony partners" should be "approximately equal and vary only minimally around the mean" (p. 323). They implied that this may not have been the case in our sample of Bedouin families (A. Weller & L. Weller, see record 1997-06365-004). A reanalysis of our data shows very low variability of family cycle lengths: Median differences were only 1.4 and 1.3 days. Therefore, Arden and Dye's model (which was based on large variability in cycle lengths) is not appropriate for the Bedouin sample that they criticize, and our reliability criterion of 2 out of 3 months appears to be appropriate. Thus, the Bedouin sample provides conclusive evidence for menstrual synchrony both by the traditional measure of close menstrual onset differences and by Arden and Dye's newly suggested criterion: similar cycle lengths among synchrony partners. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An attentional learning account of the shape bias: Reply to Cimpian and Markman (2005) and Booth, Waxman, and Huang (2005).

Recently, Developmental Psychology published 2 articles on the shape bias; both rejected the authors' previous proposals about the role of attentional learning in the development of a shape bias in object name learning. A. Cimpian and E. Markman (2005; see record 2005-14938-017) did so by arguing that the shape bias does not exist but is an experimental artifact. A. E. Booth, S. R. Waxman, and Y. T. Huang (2005; see record 2005-05098-004), in contrast, concluded that the shape bias (and its contextual link to artifact categories) does exist but that the mechanisms that underlie it are conceptual knowledge and not attentional learning. In response, in this article the authors clarify the claims of the Attentional Learning Account (ALA) and interpretations of the data under question. The authors also seek to make explicit the deeper theoretical divide: cognition as sequestered from processes of perceiving and acting versus as embedded in, and inseparable from, those very processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Alternative views of Bashore and Rapp's (1993) alternatives to traditional polygraphy: A critique.

Rosenfeld critiques an article on deception detection by T. T. Bashore and P. P. Rapp (1993) that appeared earlier in this journal. These authors reviewed the field of traditional polygraphy, coming to the conclusion that traditional autonomic nervous system (ANS) indices of psychological events thought to be directly or indirectly involved in deception-related processes have limitations that might not apply to the representation of these processes in brain activity. Rosenfeld criticizes what he sees as a relatively one-sided presentation of traditional ANS polygraphy by Bashore and Rapp. He also reconsiders Bashore and Rapp's preference for brain activity indices over ANS indices in deception detection. Finally, he attempts to correct Bashore and Rapp's inaccurate and incomplete review of approaches to deception detection based on brain activity measures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)