首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Entitativity perception refers to the perception of a collection of individuals as a group. The authors propose 2 perceptual-inferential bases of entitativity perception. First, perceivers would expect a collection of individuals with similar physical traits to possess common psychological traits. Second, perceivers watching a group of individuals engage in concerted behavior would infer that these individuals have common goals. Thus, both similarity in physical traits (e.g., same skin color) and concerted collective behavior (e.g., same movement) would evoke perception of group entitativity. Results from 5 experiments show that same group movement invariably leads to common goal inferences, increased perceived cohesiveness, and increased perceived entitativity. Moreover, same skin color evokes inferences of group traits and increases perceived homogeneity and perceived entitativity but only when skin color is diagnostic of group membership. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

2.
The authors investigated the effects of perceived entitativity of a group on the processing of behavioral information about individual group members and the extent to which such information was transferred to other group members. The results of 3 experiments using a savings-in-relearning paradigm showed that trait inferences about a group member, based on that member's behavior, were stronger for low entitative groups and for collections of individuals. However, the transference of traits from 1 group member to other members of the group was stronger for high entitative groups. These results provide strong evidence that the perception of high entitativity involves the abstraction of a stereotype of the group and the transfer of that stereotype across all group members. Implications for group impression formation and stereotyping are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

3.
It is hypothesized that perceptions of entitativity (i.e., seeing social targets as possessing unity and coherence) have important implications for how one organizes information about, and forms impressions of, individual and group targets. When perceivers expect entitativity, they should form an integrated impression of the target, resulting in on-line judgments. However, when perceivers expect little entitativity, they should not process target-relevant information in an integrative fashion, resulting in memory-based judgments. Although many factors affect perceptions of entitativity, the current study focused on expectations of similarity and behavioral consistency. It was predicted that in general, perceivers expect greater entitativity for individual than group targets. However, when explicitly provided with similar expectancies of entitativity, information processing would be similar for both individual and group targets. Two experiments supported these predictions, using recall, memory-judgment correlation, and illusory correlation measures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

4.
Compared with nonentitative groups, entitative targets are considered to elicit more elaborative processing because of the singularity or unity they represent. However, when groups serve as sources of persuasive messages, other dynamics may operate. The current research suggests that entitativity is intrinsically linked to perceptions of a group’s efficacy related to the advocacy, and this efficacy combines with the position of the appeal to determine message elaboration. When messages are counterattitudinal, entitative (efficacious) sources should elicit greater processing than nonentitative groups because of concern that the entitative sources may be more likely to bring about the negative outcomes proposed. However, when appeals are proattitudinal, sources low in entitativity (nonefficacious) should initiate more elaboration due to concern that they may be unlikely to facilitate the positive outcomes proposed. These hypotheses were supported in a series of studies. Preliminary studies established the entitativity–efficacy relation (Studies 1A and 1B). Primary persuasion studies showed that manipulations of source entitativity (Studies 2 and 3) and source efficacy (Studies 4A and 4B) have opposite effects on processing as a function of message discrepancy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

5.
Three experiments were conducted to assess the effects of perceiver group identity and expectancies on whether social information is organized at the level of the individual or the social category. In all 3 experiments, participants viewed a videotaped discussion among 6 people whose category identity was signified by sweatshirt color. In Experiment 1, performance on an identification test was affected by meaningfulness of the category distinction. Results of Experiment 2 indicated that intracategory confusions were higher under conditions of competitive interdependence between groups than under mere categorization or category salience conditions alone. Experiment 3 demonstrated that members of minority categories are individuated less than members of majority categories, except by members of the minority in-group. Results of the 3 experiments are discussed in relation to the concept of perceived "entitativity" of social categories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

6.
Three studies examined perceptions of the entitativity of groups. In Study 1 (U.S.) and Study 2 (Poland), participants rated a sample of 40 groups on 8 properties of groups (e.g., size, duration, group member similarity) and perceived entitativity. Participants also completed a sorting task in which they sorted the groups according to their subjective perceptions of group similarity. Correlational and regression analyses were used to determine the group properties most strongly related to entitativity. Clustering and multidimensional scaling analyses in both studies identified 4 general types of groups (intimacy groups, task groups, social categories, and loose associations). In Study 3, participants rated the properties of groups to which they personally belonged. Study 3 replicated the results of Studies 1 and 2 and demonstrated that participants most strongly valued membership in groups that were perceived as high in entitativity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

7.
Social knowledge may affect not only people's thoughts and judgments but also their actual perceptions of physical magnitude. The physical magnitude of a stimulus is perceived in a relative way, comparing the magnitude of the target surrounding context stimuli. Because similar objects invite comparison processes more easily than dissimilar objects ("similarity breeds comparability"), social knowledge can affect judgments of physical magnitude by determining what is perceived as (dis) similar. In Experiment 1, the authors show that social categorizations that are based on physical cues (e. g., gender) may affect the magnitude of perceptual contrast effects (the Ebbinghaus illusion). More important, in Experiment 2, the influence of social categorizations that have no physical bases is shown to affect the magnitude of perceptual contrast effects. Implications of these findings for theories of social knowledge effects are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

8.
9.
[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 78(4) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2007-17406-001). In this article, Table 3 (p. 987) contained an error. The row "Number of subgroups" was inadvertently omitted. The corrected table appears in this erratum.] Three experiments showed increases in the perceived variability of social groups after perceivers received stereotype-incongruent information about group members. In Experiment 1, participants generated flatter distributions after exposure to incongruent information, compared with equally deviant congruent information, in the form of typical verbal materials. Experiment 2 indicated similar changes in dispersion after the presentation of numeric information about a single group member. In Experiment 3, the authors manipulated cognitive load at encoding or at the time group judgments were requested. Under conditions of cognitive constraint, stereotype-incongruent information ceased to promote more dispersed group representations. These results are consistent with the idea that incongruent information triggers more deliberative and comprehensive retrieval and generation of exemplars. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for stereotype change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

10.
Previous research has documented that basic-level object categories provide an initial foundation for mapping adjectives to object properties. Children ranging from 21 months to 3 years can successfully extend a novel adjective (e.g., transparent) to other objects sharing a salient property if the objects are all members of the same basic-level category; if the objects are members of different basic-level categories, they fail to extend adjectives systematically (R. S. Klibanoff & S. R. Waxman, 2000a; S. R. Waxman & D. B. Markow, 1998). The present study proposed that the process of comparison is instrumental in children's ability to move beyond this foundation. To promote comparison, 2 target objects were introduced to 3-year-olds. In Experiment 1, the targets had contrastive properties (e.g., 1 transparent and 1 opaque object); in Experiment 2, the targets had consistent properties (e.g., 2 transparent objects). The results of both experiments illustrate that comparison—a general psychological process—operates in conjunction with naming to support the extension of novel adjectives to properties of objects from diverse basic-level categories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

11.
Reports an error in "The impact of stereotype-incongruent information on perceived group variability and stereotype change" by Leonel Garcia-Marques and Diane M. Mackie (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1999[Nov], Vol 77[5], 979-990). In this article, Table 3 (p. 987) contained an error. The row "Number of subgroups" was inadvertently omitted. The corrected table appears in this erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1999-01257-006.) Three experiments showed increases in the perceived variability of social groups after perceivers received stereotype-incongruent information about group members. In Experiment 1, participants generated flatter distributions after exposure to incongruent information, compared with equally deviant congruent information, in the form of typical verbal materials. Experiment 2 indicated similar changes in dispersion after the presentation of numeric information about a single group member. In Experiment 3, the authors manipulated cognitive load at encoding or at the time group judgments were requested. Under conditions of cognitive constraint, stereotype-incongruent information ceased to promote more dispersed group representations. These results are consistent with the idea that incongruent information triggers more deliberative and comprehensive retrieval and generation of exemplars. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for stereotype change. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

12.
In 3 studies, the authors tested the hypothesis that Chinese participants would view social groups as more entitative than would Americans and, as a result, would be more likely to infer personality traits on the basis of group membership--that is, to stereotype. In Study 1, Chinese participants made stronger stereotypic trait inferences than Americans did on the basis of a target's membership in a fictitious group. Studies 2 and 3 showed that Chinese participants perceived diverse groups as more entitative and attributed more internally consistent dispositions to groups and their members. Guided by culturally based lay theories about the entitative nature of groups, Chinese participants may stereotype more readily than do Americans when group membership is available as a source of dispositional inference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

13.
Repeated statements receive higher truth ratings than new statements. Given that repetition leads to greater experienced processing fluency, the author proposes that fluency is used in truth judgments according to its ecological validity. Thus, the truth effect occurs because people learn that fluency and truth tend to be positively correlated. Three experiments tested this notion. Experiment 1 replicated the truth effect by directly manipulating processing fluency; Experiment 2 reversed the effect by manipulating the correlation between fluency and truth in a learning phase. Experiment 3 generalized this reversal by showing a transfer of a negative correlation between perceptual fluency (due to color contrast) and truth to truth judgments when fluency is due to prior exposure (i.e., repetition). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

14.
Two experiments examined developmental changes in the accuracy of children's judgments about their physical abilities. Experiment 1 showed that 6- and 8-year-olds overestimated their ability to perform tasks just beyond and well beyond their ability. Adults only had difficulty making judgments about tasks just beyond their ability. Experiment 2 investigated how experience with performing activities influences judgments about physical abilities. Six-year-olds again overestimated their ability to perform tasks just beyond and well beyond their ability. Eight-year-olds were more accurate about tasks well beyond than just beyond their ability. In both experiments, overestimation of ability was associated with accidental injuries for 6- but not for 8-year-olds. The discussion focuses on children's overestimation of physical abilities and the relation between overestimation and accident proneness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

15.
The degree to which repetition priming is perceptually specific is informative about the mechanisms of implicit memory as well as of perceptual processing. In 2 sets of experiments with pictures as stimuli, we tested the effects of color and pattern manipulations between study and test on implicit memory (i.e., naming facilitation) and explicit memory (i.e., 2 forms of recognition). These manipulations did not affect priming. However, participants were able to explicitly detect stimulus changes at above-change levels. changes in color also produced small decrements in participants' ability to judge that repeated stimuli were old on a recognition tests. Experiment 2 showed diminished priming with changes in the stimulus exemplar (i.e., a different picture of the same named object) from study to test, which demonstrated that the picture-naming paradigm is sensitive to changes in physical attributes. The results suggest that physical attributes that are not essential to the formation of a shape representation do not influence repetition priming in a basic identification paradigm. Suggestions for how priming may be mediated are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

16.
Two experiments explored the formation of context-dependent attitudes about a single social target. One such mechanism for the development of differential attitudes toward a target in different contexts is illusory correlation formation. It was proposed that within-target illusory correlations (i.e., perceiving unwarranted associations between salient target behaviors and distinctive domains in which the target is observed) can result in biased evaluations of a social target in different domains (e.g., home vs. work). When memory-based (vs. on-line) judgments were induced, perceivers formed context-dependent attitudes for both group (Experiment I) and individual (Experiment 2) targets. These findings are consistent with theories regarding multiply categorizable attitude objects. Further, they suggest that some apparent discrepancies between attitudes and behavior may reflect holding multiple context-dependent attitudes about social targets. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

17.
Two interlocking experiments simulated the transmission of hearsay from children to adult hearsay witnesses and from the hearsay witnesses to jurors. Thirty-one children (ages 5–6 years) each observed a janitor either clean or play with toys in a laboratory. Each child was interrogated about the janitor in either a neutral manner that elicited an accurate account or a suggestive manner that elicited an inaccurate account of what the janitor had done. In Experiment 1, adult "witnesses" (N?=?112) each observed one of these interrogations and then recounted what the child had said. In Experiment 2, a 2nd group of adults in the role of jurors (N?=?104) each heard the account of one of the hearsay witnesses then made judgments about what the janitor had done. Jurors were sensitive to the quality of the hearsay evidence. They gave no weight to hearsay that recounted the inaccurate statements of a child who was questioned suggestively but gave appropriate weight to hearsay that recounted the accurate statements of children questioned in a neutral manner. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

18.
The accuracy of depth judgments that are based on binocular disparity or structure from motion (motion parallax and object rotation) was studied in 3 experiments. In Experiment 1, depth judgments were recorded for computer simulations of cones specified by binocular disparity, motion parallax, or stereokinesis. In Experiment 2, judgments were recorded for real cones in a structured environment, with depth information from binocular disparity, motion parallax, or object rotation about the y-axis. In both of these experiments, judgments from binocular disparity information were quite accurate, but judgments on the basis of geometrically equivalent or more robust motion information reflected poor recovery of quantitative depth information. A 3rd experiment demonstrated stereoscopic depth constancy for distances of 1 to 3 m using real objects in a well-illuminated, structured viewing environment in which monocular depth cues (e.g., shading) were minimized. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

19.
Three experiments examined metamemory for categorized lists of items. Judgments of learning (JOLs) were obtained from college students either immediately after study or following a brief (at least 30-s) delay. In contrast to past findings (e.g., T. O. Nelson & J. Dunlosky, 1991), no advantage was found for delayed JOLs in Experiment 1, using a standard, prediction-based metamemory cue. In Experiment 2, knowledge-based judgments were elicited, and delayed JOL accuracy improved significantly. The relative efficacy of 4 different metamemory cues was examined in Experiment 3. An interaction between the timing and phrasing of JOL cues was detected: Delayed JOLs were more accurate than immediate JOLs only when knowledge-based cues were used. These results are interpreted in A. Koriat's (1997) cue-utilization framework for JOL accuracy, and they show that the phrasing of metamemory cues can have a substantial impact on monitoring accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

20.
Two experiments investigated children's implicit and explicit differentiation between beliefs about matters of fact and matters of opinion. In Experiment 1, 8- to 9-year-olds' (n = 88) explicit understanding of the subjectivity of opinions was found to be limited, but their conformity to others' judgments on a matter of opinion was considerably lower than their conformity to others' views regarding an ambiguous fact. In Experiment 2, children aged 6, 8, or 10 years (n = 81) were asked to make judgments either about ambiguous matters of fact or about matters of opinion and then heard an opposing judgment from an expert. All age groups conformed to the opposing judgments on factual matters more than they did to the experts' views on matters of opinion. However, only the oldest children explicitly recognized that opinions are subjective and cannot be "wrong." Implications of these results for models of children's reasoning about epistemic states are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号