In defense of diligence: A rejoinder to Pelham and Carvallo (2011).

In Simonsohn (2011) I reported the results from 14 studies that suggest all existing evidence of implicit egotism in marriage, job, and location decisions is spurious. Lack of diligence by Pelham and colleagues explains in great part why the confounds behind their findings were not addressed in time. They almost never included controls, were dismissive of blatant alternative explanations, and on occasion misreported factual information that made confounds appear less important. Their rebuttal is similarly lacking in diligence. The specific empirical concerns it raised are contradicted by evidence, logic, or both. It reported misleading examples and inaccurate facts (some regarding the authors' own data). In this rejoinder I address all specific issues they raised about the empirics of my article. I then provide perhaps the most striking example of lack of diligence in their earlier work. I close on a constructive note, providing 2 concrete suggestions on how to analyze data in future implicit egotism studies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

How Do I Love Thee? Let Me Count the Js: Implicit Egotism and Interpersonal Attraction.

From the perspective of implicit egotism people should gravitate toward others who resemble them because similar others activate people's positive, automatic associations about themselves. Four archival studies and 3 experiments supported this hypothesis. Studies 1-4 showed that people are disproportionately likely to marry others whose first or last names resemble their own. Studies 5-7 provided experimental support for implicit egotism. Participants were more attracted than usual to people (a) whose arbitrary experimental code numbers resembled their own birthday numbers, (b) whose surnames shared letters with their own surnames, and (c) whose jersey number had been paired, subliminally, with their own names. Discussion focuses on implications for implicit egotism, similarity, and interpersonal attraction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing the Validity of Implicit Egotism: A Reply to Gallucci (2003).

B. W. Pelham, M. C. Mirenberg, and J. T. Jones (see record 2002-12744-001) argued that most people prefer stimuli that are associated with the self, a preference they called implicit egotism. In support of implicit egotism, Pelham et al presented evidence from 10 archival studies showing that people gravitate toward careers and places of residence that resemble their names or birthday numbers. M. Gallucci (see record 2003-09138-001) argued that alternate analyses of the same data provide strong evidence against implicit egotism. Whereas Gallucci was correct that Pelham et al's original analyses were flawed, their results remain significant even when more conservative tests are used. The authors also present new data in support of implicit egotism, including exhaustive studies of (a) common surnames and US city names and (b) common surnames and street names. The new studies also revealed that as sample sizes grow larger, studies are more likely to produce evidence of implicit egotism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why Susie sells seashells by the seashore: Implicit egotism and major life decisions.

Because most people possess positive associations about themselves, most people prefer things that are connected to the self (e.g., the letters in one's name). The authors refer to such preferences as implicit egotism. Ten studies assessed the role of implicit egotism in 2 major life decisions: where people choose to live and what people choose to do for a living. Studies 1-5 showed that people are disproportionately likely to live in places whose names resemble their own first or last names (e.g., people named Louis are disproportionately likely to live in St. Louis). Study 6 extended this finding to birthday number preferences. People were disproportionately likely to live in cities whose names began with their birthday numbers (e.g., Two Harbors, MN). Studies 7-10 suggested that people disproportionately choose careers whose labels resemble their names (e.g., people named Dennis or Denise are overrepresented among dentists). Implicit egotism appears to influence major life decisions. This idea stands in sharp contrast to many models of rational choice and attests to the importance of understanding implicit beliefs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit self-esteem: Nature, measurement, and a new way forward.

Gaining insight into the nature and consequences of people's global self-evaluations (i.e., their self-esteem) has been fraught with difficulty. Nearly 2 decades ago, researchers suggested that such difficulties might be addressed by the development of a new class of measures designed to uncover implicit self-esteem. In this article, we evaluate the construct validity of the 2 most common measures of implicit self-esteem, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and Name–Letter Test (NLT). Our review indicates that the research literature has not provided strong or consistent support for the validity of either measure. We conclude that both tests are impoverished measures of self-esteem that are better understood as measures of either generalized implicit affect (IAT) or implicit egotism (NLT). However, we suggest that there surely are aspects of self-esteem that people are unwilling or unable to report and suggest a general approach that may allow researchers to tap these unspoken aspects of self-esteem. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Spurious? Name similarity effects (implicit egotism) in marriage, job, and moving decisions.

Three articles published in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology have shown that a disproportionate share of people choose spouses, places to live, and occupations with names similar to their own. These findings, interpreted as evidence of implicit egotism, are included in most modern social psychology textbooks and many university courses. The current article successfully replicates the original findings but shows that they are most likely caused by a combination of cohort, geographic, and ethnic confounds as well as reverse causality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

I Sell Seashells by the Seashore and My Name Is Jack: Comment on Pelham, Mirenberg, and Jones (2002).

According to a new hypothesis based on implicit egotism, people gravitate toward cities, states, and careers with names similar to their own names. To support this hypothesis, B. W. Pelham, M. C. Mirenberg, and J. T. Jones (see record 2002-12744-001) reported a series of results regarding distributions of names in different cities, states, and jobs. In the present article, new analyses of the original data are reported, showing that the hypothesis is not supported for the large majority of names considered by the authors, and for some names even the opposite result is found. In addition, a meta-analysis reveals that either the data are unreliable, or the hypothesis cannot be supported in the whole population of names. Overall, the original data give no support of the idea that implicit egotism influences major life decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Multifinality in implicit choice.

This research examines the possibility that people's choices in the service of an explicit focal goal may also reflect their tendency to fulfill implicit background goals and in that sense are multifinal. We carried out 5 experimental studies to investigate this notion. In Experiment 1, a primed implicit goal affected individuals' choices even when those avowedly served an explicit “focal” goal. Experiment 2 replicated this finding with a different type of implicit goals. Experiment 3 found that primed implicit goals had no effect on choices where the options that served them undermined the explicit goal. Experiment 4 found that a primed implicit goal served by a multifinal option does not privilege it over a unifinal option if that goal had been already attained by a different means. Finally, Experiment 5, via 3 types of control groups, showed that choices were affected by both the explicit and implicit goals in isolation, and they shifted toward multifinality when these goals were conjointly present. The discussion considers the integrative potential of the multifinality framework and its implications for a variety of phenomena in the domain of motivated cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Use of implicit measures for organizational research: An empirical example.

An increasing amount of attention is being paid by social and cognitive psychologists to implicit processing, which has ubiquitous effects on attitudes and behaviours. Unfortunately, organizational scholars have tended to focus almost exclusively on explicit processing, which limits understanding of how employees function at work if implicit processing does indeed play a role. In this article, the authors argue that implicit processing is likely prevalent in organizational settings and discuss ways that it can be measured. The authors then present the results of an experiment that suggests that organizational justice—an important work-based variable—has implicit effects on motivation. Moreover, the magnitude of explicit and implicit effects was moderated by need for cognition, a stable individual difference variable. These results support the need to examine implicit processing and its effects in organizations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit and explicit preferences for physical attractiveness in a romantic partner: A double dissociation in predictive validity.

Five studies develop and examine the predictive validity of an implicit measure of the preference for physical attractiveness in a romantic partner. Three hypotheses were generally supported. First, 2 variants of the go/no-go association task revealed that participants, on average, demonstrate an implicit preference (i.e., a positive spontaneous affective reaction) for physical attractiveness in a romantic partner. Second, these implicit measures were not redundant with a traditional explicit measure: The correlation between these constructs was .00 on average, and the implicit measures revealed no reliable sex differences, unlike the explicit measure. Third, explicit and implicit measures exhibited a double dissociation in predictive validity. Specifically, explicit preferences predicted the extent to which attractiveness was associated with participants' romantic interest in opposite-sex photographs but not their romantic interest in real-life opposite-sex speed-daters or confederates. Implicit preferences showed the opposite pattern. This research extends prior work on implicit processes in romantic relationships and offers the first demonstration that any measure of a preference for a particular characteristic in a romantic partner (an implicit measure of physical attractiveness, in this case) predicts individuals' evaluation of live potential romantic partners. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Memory systems do not divide on consciousness: Reinterpreting memory in terms of activation and binding.

There is a popular hypothesis that performance on implicit and explicit memory tasks reflects 2 distinct memory systems. Explicit memory is said to store those experiences that can be consciously recollected, and implicit memory is said to store experiences and affect subsequent behavior but to be unavailable to conscious awareness. Although this division based on awareness is a useful taxonomy for memory tasks, the authors review the evidence that the unconscious character of implicit memory does not necessitate that it be treated as a separate system of human memory. They also argue that some implicit and explicit memory tasks share the same memory representations and that the important distinction is whether the task (implicit or explicit) requires the formation of a new association. The authors review and critique dissociations from the behavioral, amnesia, and neuroimaging literatures that have been advanced in support of separate explicit and implicit memory systems by highlighting contradictory evidence and by illustrating how the data can be accounted for using a simple computational memory model that assumes the same memory representation for those disparate tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Separating Multiple Processes in Implicit Social Cognition: The Quad Model of Implicit Task Performance.

The authors argue that implicit measures of social cognition do not reflect only automatic processes but rather the joint contributions of multiple, qualitatively different processes. The quadruple process model proposed and tested in the present article quantitatively disentangles the influences of 4 distinct processes on implicit task performance: the likelihood that automatic bias is activated by a stimulus; that a correct response can be determined; that automatic bias is overcome; and that, in the absence of other information, a guessing bias drives responses. The stochastic and construct validity of the model is confirmed in 5 studies. The model is shown to provide a more nuanced and detailed understanding of the interplay of multiple processes in implicit task performance, including implicit measures of attitudes, prejudice, and stereotyping. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can “pure” implicit memory be isolated? A test of a single-system model of recognition and repetition priming.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 65(1) of Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale (see record 2011-05804-006). In the article there was an error in Equation B2 in Appendix B.] Implicit memory is widely regarded as an unconscious form of memory. However, evidence for what is arguably a defining characteristic of implicit memory—that its contents are not accessible to awareness—has remained elusive. Such a finding of “pure” implicit memory would constitute evidence against a single-system model of recognition and priming that predicts that priming will not occur in the (true) absence of recognition. In three experiments, using a rapid serial visual presentation procedure at encoding, we tested this prediction by attempting to replicate some previous studies that claimed to obtain pure implicit memory. We found no evidence of priming in the absence of recognition; instead, priming and recognition were associated across experiments: when priming was absent, recognition was also absent (Experiments 1 and 2), and when priming was reliably greater than chance, recognition was similarly greater than chance (Experiment 3). The results are consistent with the prediction of a single-system model, which was fit to the data from all the experiments. The results are also consistent with the notion that the memory driving priming is accessible to awareness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

A comparison of egotism, negativity, and learned helplessness as explanations for poor performance after unsolvable problems.

After people work on unsolvable problems, they often perform poorly on a subsequent task. Egotism explains this decrement as the result of a strategy of low effort designed to blunt an attribution of poor ability should failure occur on the new task. The egotism explanation predicts that adding an element alleged to inhibit performance allows Ss to try without fear of an attribution of low ability. In contrast, learned helplessness predicts that adding an allegedly inhibitory element should lower the expectancy of control, making performance worse than usual. A 3rd explanation is "negativity." Like egotism, it predicts improved performance if an element said to inhibit performance is introduced, but for a different reason: to produce results opposite to the experimenter's suggestion. Unlike egotism, the negativity hypothesis predicts that adding an allegedly facilitating element will worsen performance. 50 college students were given either solvable or unsolvable concept formation problems and then worked on anagrams with or without music said to be distracting. In addition, there was a 5th condition in which Ss were given unsolvable problems followed by music said to facilitate performance. The performance decrement occurred only in the no-music condition, supporting the egotism explanation. (21 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit Self-Attitudes Predict Spontaneous Affect in Daily Life.

In 2 studies, the authors examined the degree to which implicit self-attitudes predicted people's spontaneous affective experiences in daily life. Across both studies, implicit attitudes toward the self (as measured by Implicit Association Tests) strongly predicted negative feeling states (as measured by computerized experience-sampling procedures), suggesting that implicit self-attitudes may be linked to changes in undifferentiated negative affect. Explicit attitudes toward the self generally did not account for these relations. Findings extend understanding of the factors that contribute to experienced affect and are the first to empirically link implicit self-attitudes with phenomenological affective experience in real-life settings over time. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Premature dissemination of advice undermines our credibility as scientists: Reply to Brown (2011) and to Collins, Martino, and Elliott (2011).

In our reanalysis of data from the Brown et al. (2006) study (Steinberg & Monahan, 2011), we found no support for the contention that adolescents' exposure to sexy media content hastens their sexual debut. In their critiques of our article, Brown (2011) and Collins, Martino, and Elliott (2011) both questioned some of the decisions we made with respect to how our propensity score analyses were conducted. We point out that the way in which we conducted our analyses is consistent with standard practice in the field. More important, we argue that when small variations in data analytic strategies make significant findings appear and disappear, it is premature to issue advice to parents, practitioners, and policymakers. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Berry et al. (2010).

Reports an error in "Can “pure” implicit memory be isolated? A test of a single-system model of recognition and repetition priming" by Christopher J. Berry, David R. Shanks, Selina Li, Luke Sheridan Rains and Richard N. A. Henson (Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue canadienne de psychologie expérimentale, 2010[Dec], Vol 64[4], 241-255). In the article there was an error in Equation B2 in Appendix B. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-26226-002.) Implicit memory is widely regarded as an unconscious form of memory. However, evidence for what is arguably a defining characteristic of implicit memory—that its contents are not accessible to awareness—has remained elusive. Such a finding of “pure” implicit memory would constitute evidence against a single-system model of recognition and priming that predicts that priming will not occur in the (true) absence of recognition. In three experiments, using a rapid serial visual presentation procedure at encoding, we tested this prediction by attempting to replicate some previous studies that claimed to obtain pure implicit memory. We found no evidence of priming in the absence of recognition; instead, priming and recognition were associated across experiments: when priming was absent, recognition was also absent (Experiments 1 and 2), and when priming was reliably greater than chance, recognition was similarly greater than chance (Experiment 3). The results are consistent with the prediction of a single-system model, which was fit to the data from all the experiments. The results are also consistent with the notion that the memory driving priming is accessible to awareness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: Experimental and longitudinal evidence.

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Egotism versus generalization-of-uncontrollability explanations of helplessness: Reply to Snyder and Frankel (1989).

M. L. Snyder and A. Frankel (see record 1990-09504-001) argue that our experiments (M. Kofta and G. S?dek; see record 1989-24900-001) were inadequate for testing the egotism theory of helplessness because they did not directly address the role of threat to self-esteem, the process held responsible for helplessness deficits by this theory. We reply that failure experience—the chief manipulation in these experiments—is critical for arousing threat to self-esteem. Therefore, our findings—that (a) noncontingency, not ego-threatening failure, is specifically responsible for helplessness deficits, and (b) availability of excuse for failure in the test phase augments performance deficits instead of mitigating them—call into question the validity of the egotism explanation of helplessness. We conclude that by and large, our study lends support to the original learned helplessness theory of Seligman and his associates. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit sequence learning and contextual cueing do not compete for central cognitive resources.

Sequence learning and contextual cueing explore different forms of implicit learning, arising from practice with a structured serial task, or with a search task with informative contexts. We assess whether these two learning effects arise simultaneously when both remain implicit. Experiments 1 and 2 confirm that a cueing effect can be observed under a continuous setting and that there is no interference between contextual cueing and sequence learning. Experiments 3a and 3b tested whether an interference arises specifically when the sequence becomes explicit. Results show that the expression of contextual cueing disappeared in those conditions but that context information is still acquired, and it affects performance when the sequence is removed. The results are discussed in relation to the current debates about the automaticity of implicit learning, and about the role of attention in the acquisition and expression of contextual cueing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)