容量约束对电力市场均衡的影响

输电容量约束是电力市场的重要特征,同时也深刻影响着电力市场运行。针对协同进化算法能够求取纯策略纳什均衡,多项式方程系统算法能够计算策略式博弈的所有纳什均衡,本文提出一种基于协同进化算法联同多项式方程系统算法的研究方法来分析电力市场纳什均衡,分析输电容量约束对电力市场均衡的作用。文中对一个3机5节点的电力市场进行了实验分析,结果表明该方法能有效求取纯策略市场均衡,同时能够求取一定条件下的混合策略均衡。输电容量约束不仅影响了市场均衡的分布,而且决定了纳什均衡的存在形式。     

发/供电公司市场均衡及竞价策略

在批发竞争的电力市场中,不仅发电公司要竞价上网,而且供电公司也要竞价购电。文中给出了批发竞争电力市场模式下发电商和供电商竞价模型,推导出了完全信息情况下发电商和供电商最优竞价策略的解析解,并用协同进化算法模拟了此模式下考虑功率约束时市场的运营,求得了市场均衡。通过算例说明了所提出算法的有效性,其结果表明市场均衡状态下发／供电公司竞价策略即为它们的最优报价策略。     

协同进化算法及其在电力系统中的应用前景

协同进化算法是一种新的进化算法框架，该算法借鉴自然界中的协同进化机制，在传统单物种进化算法的基础上引入生态系统的概念。生态系统中多个物种相互作用，共同进化，从而使整个系统不断演进。将应用领域待求解的问题映射为生态系统，以生态系统的进化来达到问题求解的目的。协同进化算法符合进化博弈论的理论框架，对于各种不同领域问题的求解都取得成功。文中综述了国内外协同进化算法的发展状况，介绍了协同进化算法的基本理论，探讨了该算法在电力系统和电力市场中的可能应用。将该算法引入电力系统和电力市场的研究，可以为电力系统的优化规划和运行、电力市场的竞价机制设计和投标策略优化以及电力市场计算机模拟提供新的方法。     

基于多群体协同进化的电力市场均衡模型

可再生能源配额制及绿证制度作为一种新型的市场交易政策,能够极大地促进新能源的消纳。考虑配额制及绿证制度引入后,电力批发市场和绿证交易市场存在耦合的影响关系,市场中发电商存在相互博弈行为。基于电力市场均衡策略,建立了两个市场协同下的多寡头非合作博弈模型。在电力批发市场中,发电商以古诺形式参与市场竞争。在绿证市场中,绿电商以供给函数形式进行绿证竞争。针对博弈模型,采用多群体协同进化算法对纳什均衡点进行求解,重点对两种市场交互下的发电商策略性行为进行分析。仿真结果表明了模型的有效性及算法的可行性。     

电网约束条件下基于古诺博奕的市场力分析

针对不完全信息下的双边竞争市场,研究建立了古诺(Cournot)博奕模型来分析发电商在最大经济利益的驱动下行使市场力的策略竞标行为.考虑输电网络约束后,提出运用两层优化搜索策略计算古诺纳什均衡的方法进行市场力评估.在IEEE30节点的算例分析中,以完全竞争市场下的均衡电价为基准,分析比较了完全信息和不完全信息两种不同条件下寡头竞争市场的市场力,仿真结果表明该市场力分析方法有助于市场监管人员测算与控制市场力,加强市场监督.     

基于改进萤火虫算法的电力市场多因素博弈均衡研究

针对电力市场均衡与动态发展问题,本文首先建立了能够直接反映市场均衡的利益与报价行为变化的非合作博弈双层模型。然后,采用改进的萤火虫算法求解该模型,并与经典萤火虫算法进行对比验证其先进性。最后,综合考虑负荷变化、竞价策略调整、差价合同及合作行为等多种影响因素,通过对建立的双层均衡模型进行仿真对比分析,得出不同因素与市场均衡动态发展的内在联系,进而为引导市场均衡提供理论参考依据。     

电力寡头垄断市场的均衡分析

电力市场是一个不完全竞争的市场,模拟这类市场成员策略使用较多的模型有古诺模型、供应函数均衡模型等.该文根据电力市场的特点,提出一种新的博弈模型来模拟发电商的策略行为,推导了该模型的纳什均衡解.最后通过算例比较了该模型与现有模型均衡解的区别,并分析了电力需求弹性和发电容量约束等因素对市场均衡状态的影响.     

考虑输电约束古诺模型的均衡分析

电力市场是一个不完全竞争的市场，模拟这类市场成员策略使用较多的模型有古诺模型、供应函数均衡模型等。该文利用古诺模型模拟电力市场中发电商的策略行为，模型中考虑了输电网络约束的影响。首先建立了考虑网络约束的Cournot模型，接着利用一简单两节点网络详细分析了输电网络约束对发电商纯策略均衡解的影响，然后利用一个三节点环网分析了发电商纯策略均衡解存在的条件，最后通过算例具体计算了输电网络约束对发电商纯策略均衡解的影响。结果表明考虑输电容量约束后，有可能存在不同的纯策略均衡；并且为得到与不考虑输电容量约束相同的均衡解，该线路容量约束将远大于均衡时的线路潮流，所提出的均衡分析方法是有效的。     

基于协同进化的两种电力市场出清机制分析

基于协同进化算法,对电力市场统一出清机制与一种新的双侧等效PAB(pay as bid)出清机制进行了对比分析。作为一种人工智能算法,近几年来协同进化算法逐渐成为理论分析与工程实践的热点。由于其符合进化博弈理念,并能够充分反映市场动态情况,该算法在电力市场研究中已得到广泛应用。在借鉴PAB出清方式与2016年广东市场出清方式的基础上,提出一种阶梯型报价方式下的双侧等效PAB出清机制,并运用协同进化算法对统一出清机制与双侧等效PAB出清机制进行对比验证。仿真实验结果表明相较于采用统一出清机制,采用双侧等效PAB出清机制的市场更为稳定,且市场出清结果更加贴合市场实际供需曲线交点,能够更好地反映市场的真实情况。     

基于Pareto协同进化算法的多个FACTS元件协调控制

针对多个FACTS装置的控制器之间存在的负交互影响,提出一种基于Pareto协同进化算法的协调控制方法.利用协同进化算法对控制器参数进行种群划分,对各种群采用遍历组合法构造新的个体并计算目标函数值.采用多种群合作策略进行非支配排序,取排序后的最优个体进行遗传操作,最后得到一组Pareto最优解集.与常规多目标优化算法相比,避免了一般多目标优化进化算法中难以处理的适应度值的分配问题,且利用协同进化算法的并行性大幅提高了收敛速度.利用该方法对静止同步串联补偿器(SSSC)与静止同步补偿器(STATCOM)2种典型FACTS装置的协调控制器进行了设计,并通过仿真验证了设计的协调控制器的控制效果良好.     

Nash-Cournot equilibrium of a deregulated electricity market using competitive coevolutionary algorithms

In this paper, a competitive coevolutionary approach is used to find out the Nash-Cournot equilibrium of an oligopolistic electricity market based on either centralized or bilateral structure, where the transmission constraints are considered. We consider a market game played by bounded evolutionary agents, adapting their strategies to maximize their profits in a competitive environment. Under the effect of the competition, the coevolved agents are led toward an equilibrium point where each agent population is invaded by an Evolutionary stable Strategy.     

Analyzing oligopolistic electricity market using coevolutionary computation

This paper presents a new unified framework of electricity market analysis based on coevolutionary computation (CCEM) for both the one-shot and the repeated games of oligopolistic electricity markets. The standard Cournot model and the new Pareto improvement model are used. The linear and constant elasticity demand functions are considered. Case study shows that CCEM is highly efficient and can handle the nonlinear market models that are difficult to be handled by conventional methods. The framework presented in this paper can help to overcome the difficulties of demand function specification encountered by the Cournot models. CCEM is found to be an effective and powerful approach for electricity market analysis.     

Analyzing Two-Settlement Electricity Market Equilibrium by Coevolutionary Computation Approach

Forward contracts play an important role for market power mitigation and risk hedging in electricity markets. In this paper, a two-settlement electricity market including a forward market and a spot market is formulated as a two-stage game. The linear supply function equilibrium (LSFE) model and Cournot model are used to model strategic bidding for the spot market, while the forward market is modeled by Cournot model. A coevolutionary genetic algorithm (CGA) is employed to determine the market equilibrium. The paper then examines the question whether generation companies (GenCos) would voluntarily enter forward markets due to economic inspiration and studies theoretically and numerically the factors which can affect the bidding behaviors of GenCos. The effectiveness of CGA in determining the market equilibrium is investigated and demonstrated based on two test examples. The studies show that GenCos' decisions on the participation in forward markets depend significantly on the type of competition that they have in the spot market. Moreover, GenCos' bidding behaviors in the forward market can be affected by their cost parameters and the slope of system demand function significantly.      

电力市场均衡模型述评

传统的电力系统运行模型缺乏对参与者市场行为的考虑,不适应于新的市场环境,需要结合市场的竞争性研究电力市场的建模问题.对电力市场均衡模型在国内外研究的进展进行了较为全面的总结.对两类常用的电力市场模型Cournot模型和供给函数均衡模型,从应用领域到求解方法进行了评述.总结了两类模型在分析市场不完善性、市场仿真以及风险分析等方面取得的成果,指出了均衡模型存在的缺陷和改进的方法,充分考虑发电公司的市场行为,提高假设条件的准确性和模型的实用性.     

A coevolutionary approach to analyzing supply function equilibrium model

This paper presents a coevolutionary approach to analyzing supply function equilibrium (SFE) models of an oligopolistic electricity market. Both the affine supply function model and the piece-wise affine supply function model are considered. Different parametrization cases of the affine supply function model are analyzed. The piece-wise affine supply functions that have a large number of pieces are used to numerically estimate the equilibrium supply functions of any shapes. Simulation cases of the piece-wise affine supply function model with different peak loads, nonquadratic and nonconvex costs, and different demand elasticities are studied. An example based on the cost data from the real-world electricity industry is used to validate the approach presented in this paper. Simulation results show that the coevolutionary approach rapidly converges to SFE in the affine supply function model simulation and robustly converges to SFE in all cases of the piece-wise affine supply function model simulation. The approach is robust and flexible and has the potential to be used to solve the complicated equilibrium problems in real-world electricity markets.     

A development of an equilibrium analysis model between electricity retailers under competitive environment

This paper provides a novel equilibrium model for analyzing behaviors of the electric retailers under competitive environment. In the deregulated electricity retail market, the retailers purchase the electricity power and sell it to consumers at the competitive prices. According to their risk attitudes, the retailers optimize the selling prices and the purchase allocation between a day‐ahead market and forward contracts. Without the regulation, an equilibrium by those selfish decision‐making processes of multiple retailers would cause an adverse impact on the electricity market and also the power system. From stable and economical viewpoints, it is important to analyze the unfavorable equilibrium. The selfish behaviors of retailers are modeled as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints in this paper and formulated as a mixed integer linear programming problem to obtain a generalized Nash equilibrium by commercial solvers efficiently. Through computational examples, the proposed model and formulation are validated.     

基于博弈论的降低市场力策略

在电力市场中的一个很重要的研究课题就是如何有效的控制和降低市场力，杜绝各种不同合理现象的发生，博弈论就是一个很有效的方法，本文主要针对基于博弈论的降低市场力的策略进行了探讨，提出了工于博弈论的降低市场力模型，并通过该模型对差价和约进行了分析。     

考虑系统运行不确定性的电力市场均衡模型

电力系统运行与规划过程中存在众多不确定性因素,这给电力市场分析带来挑战.针对负荷不确定性与随机线路故障停运,建立了考虑系统运行不确定性的电力市场线性供给函数均衡模型.在该模型中,通过枚举所有可能的系统运行场景来处理不确定性因素.由于各系统运行场景的出现概率不同,发电厂商在各系统运行场景的收益不尽相同,因而面临相当大的决策风险.针对随机市场博弈的特点,扩展改     

碳市场背景下发电商竞价策略及电力市场均衡分析

碳市场交易提高了传统化石能源机组的发电成本,进而影响其在电力市场的竞价行为,电力市场均衡也随之发生改变。文章针对碳市场背景下的电力市场均衡问题建立了双层均衡模型,上层模型为考虑碳成本的发电商最优竞价模型,下层模型为考虑碳配额总量约束的电力市场出清模型,通过最优性条件理论以及二进制展开法、大M法等线性化手段将双层模型转化为混合整数线性规划,基于PJM 5节点系统,求解了多市场环境下有无碳市场的电力市场均衡,分析了碳市场对电力市场均衡状态的影响;同时,基于碳配额总量对电力市场均衡的灵敏度分析发现碳配额总量需适度收紧才能最大程度实现电力低碳减排作用。