Automatic Mediation or Absence of Mediation? Commentary on Crutcher and Ericsson (2000).

R. J. Crutcher and K. A. Ericsson (2000; see record 2000-05419-014) showed that subjects stopped reporting mnemonic mediation in a recall task after sufficient practice. They concluded that subjects continued to use the mediator indefinitely but that its execution eventually became automatic and no longer required access to working memory. Their article thus supports the more general hypothesis that multistep cognition can take place without awareness. In this article the authors evaluate that conclusion on both conceptual and empirical grounds and report results of a new experiment that indicate that a qualitative shift to direct, unmediated recall can occur for at least some tasks. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Roles of Social Pain and Defense Mechanisms in Response to Social Exclusion: Reply to Panksepp (2005) and Corr (2005).

In comments on G. MacDonald and M. R. Leary (2005), J. Panksepp (2005) (see record 2005-01973-005) argued for more emphasis on social pain mechanisms, whereas P. J. Corr (2005) (see record 2005-01973-006) argued for more emphasis on physical defense mechanisms. In response to the former, the authors clarify their positions on the topics of anger, the usefulness of rat models, the role of analgesic mechanisms, and basic motivational processes. In response to the latter, the authors clarify their positions on the topics of the relation of social exclusion to fear, the value of the pain affect construct, and the nature of the social pain experience. The authors conclude that consideration of the roles of both social pain and defense mechanisms is essential to best understand human response to social exclusion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Validity of the salience asymmetry account of the Implicit Association Test: Reply to Greenwald, Nosek, Banaji, and Klauer (2005).

In their comment on K. Rothermund and D. Wentura (see record 2004-14313-001), A. G. Greenwald, B. A. Nosek, M. R. Banaji, and K. C. Klauer (see record 2005-09704-008) agreed that salience asymmetries can be a source of Implicit Association Test (IAT) effects. The authors applaud this conclusion but point to problems with the other points that Greenwald et al. made. The authors have difficulties understanding the nominal feature account that Greenwald et al. put forward and have doubts about the usefulness of their broad conception of the concept association. The authors also argue that existing evidence concerning the construct validity of the IAT does not allow one to discriminate between the association and the salience accounts. In addition, the new studies that were presented by Greenwald et al. do not provide insights into what the IAT measures because they are either irrelevant for a decision between the different accounts or contain methodological problems that prevent a meaningful interpretation in terms of the models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

McSweeney, Murphy, and Kowal: Reply to Branch (2005), Rowlett (2005), and Siegel (2005).

The authors thank M. N. Branch (see record 2005-10634-002), J. K. Rowlett (see record 2005-10634-003), and S. Siegel (see record 2005-10634-004) for their comments. Branch's commentary contains many misconceptions. The authors try to clarify these issues. They agree with Rowlett that converging approaches to understanding drug consumption will ultimately yield the best results. The authors also agree that measuring reinforcer effectiveness is difficult. New techniques such as probe preference tests make this task more manageable. The authors thank Siegel for describing recent changes in his model. Nevertheless, the authors believe that their discussion of his compensatory response model helps to clarify their own model. They also believe Siegel defines homeostasis somewhat differently than they do; thus, their positions may be more similar than they appear. The details of their model remain to be worked out, but the authors believe that it provides a testable and parsimonious model for the regulation of drug consumption. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How independent are parallel memory systems? A theoretical comment on Gibson and Shettleworth (2005).

Using only behavioral manipulations, B. M. Gibson and S. J. Shettleworth (2005) (see record 2005-03585-021) have shown that rats can simultaneously acquire both place and response information. Experiments in which these 2 kinds of information are presented sequentially (response followed by place), provide some evidence for blocking of place learning, suggesting an influence of information acquired by a response-learning system on the subsequent acquisition of information by a place-learning system. A detailed examination of the results in the context of information about the kinds of learning that take place on a maze suggests that the memory processes underlying the rats' behavior in this experiment were considerably more complex than is acknowledged by Gibson and Shettleworth. The discussion illustrates the importance of considering both behavioral and physiological information for understanding how learning and memory functions are organized in the brain. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The relation between source memory and episodic memory: Comment on Siedlecki et al. (2005).

On the basis of an interesting structural equation analysis, K. L. Siedlecki, T. A. Salthouse, and D. E. Berish (see record 2005-02476-002) argued that "it may not be meaningful to refer to source memory as a construct distinct from episodic memory" (p. 31). This commentary highlights that this same point could also be made on conceptual grounds. To suggest that source and episodic memory are distinct concepts would confound tasks with theoretical constructs. All episodic tasks involve making attributions about the origin of mental experiences (source monitoring). Conversely, source memory tasks are designed to investigate episodic memory. No task is special, but each may be useful, depending on the focus of interest. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Working Memory and Intelligence: Different Constructs. Reply to Oberauer et al. (2005) and Kane et al. (2005).

The authors address agreements and disagreements with the M. J. Kane, D. Z. Hambrick, and A. R. A. Conway (2005; see record 2004-22408-004) and K. Oberauer, R. Schulze, O. Wilhelm, and H.-M. Sü? (2005; see record 2004-22408-003) commentaries on P. L. Ackerman, M. E. Beier, and M. O. Boyle (2005; see record 2004-22408-002). They discuss the following issues: (a) the relationship between working memory (WM) and general intelligence (g), (b) the reanalyses included in the comments, (c) the use of a fixed-effects model versus a random-effects model for the meta-analysis, (d) the use of structural equation modeling analyses and structural coefficients as equivocal evidence for the relationship between WM and intelligence, and (e) the problem of confirmation bias in research on WM. Although the authors disagree with their commentators about the magnitude of the relationship between WM and g, in the final analysis it appears that all concerned parties agree that WM and intelligence are different constructs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Maternal employment and child cognitive outcomes: The importance of analytic approach.

J. Brooks-Gunn, W. J. Han, and J. Waldfogel (2002; see record 2002-17576-005) and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development Early Child Care Research Network (ECCRN; 2000b; see record 2000-02736-015) came to different conclusions about the effects of maternal employment--although they were addressing similar questions using the same data set. Brooks-Gunn et al. concluded that maternal employment in infancy has a negative effect on children's cognitive abilities at age 3, whereas the ECCRN found that early nonmaternal care is not related to children's cognitive abilities in their first 3 years. The authors account for this difference by comparing 2 approaches to data analysis: a top-down testing of continuous variables (the approach used by the ECCRN, 2000b) and an a priori comparison approach that involves pairwise testing of specific dichotomous contrasts (the approach used by Brooks-Gunn et al., 2002). This comparison illustrates the critical importance of analytic approach. It also suggests that Brooks-Gunn et al.'s conclusion from this data set is overstated and should not be used on its own as the basis for practical or policy decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Pancultural self-enhancement reloaded: A meta-analytic reply to Heine (2005).

C. Sedikides, L. Gaertner, and Y. Toguchi (2003; see record 2002-08440-007) reported findings favoring the universality of self-enhancement. S. J. Heine (2005; see record 2005-13803-005) challenged the authors' research on evidential and logical grounds. In response, the authors carried out 2 meta-analytic investigations. The results backed the C. Sedikides et al. (2003) theory and findings. Both Westerners and Easterners self-enhanced tactically. Westerners self-enhanced on attributes relevant to the cultural ideal of individualism, whereas Easterners self-enhanced on attributes relevant to the cultural ideal of collectivism (in both cases, because of the personal importance of the ideal). Self-enhancement motivation is universal, although its manifestations are strategically sensitive to cultural context. The authors respond to other aspects of Heine's critique by discussing why researchers should empirically validate the comparison dimension (individualistic vs. collectivistic) and defending why the better-than-average effect is a valid measure of self-enhancement. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A step backward in the recovered memory debate.

Comments on the critical issues raised in B. P. Karon & A. J. Widener's (see record 1998-12169-012) response to the criticisms of the present authors (see record 1998-12169-009) in response to Karon and Widener's (see record 1997-04849-007) article discussing the memories of WWII veterans in the context of the recovered memory debate. The authors suggest that by treating the lifting of repressions as synonymous with all forms of remembering, and repression as synonymous with all forms of nonreporting, Karon and Widener render the concept of repression so broad as to be virtually meaningless. This is a step backward in the complex debate concerning the existence of repressed and recovered memories of wartime trauma. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Variability in the likelihood of automatic attitude activation: Data reanalysis and commentary on Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto (1992).

Addresses the conclusion by J. A. Bargh et al (see record 1992-33847-001) that automatic attitude activation depends not on the idiosyncratic strength of the association in memory between an attitude object and an individual's evaluation of the object but on normative considerations constant across individuals. A variety of difficulties with the bases for this conclusion are discussed. Moreover, additional analyses of the Bargh et al data reveal the superiority of an idiosyncratic measure of associative strength (a given individual's latency of response to an attitudinal inquiry) in predicting automatic attitude activation over the various normative measures (latency, extremity, ambivalence, polarization, and consensus or consistency) that were examined. These results support the theoretical premise that attitude activation varies as a function of position along an idiosyncratically defined attitude–nonattitude continuum. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Updating a cautionary tale of masked priming: Reply to Klapp (2005).

The commentary by S. T. Klapp (see record 2005-09704-010) on our recent article (A. Lleras & J. T. Enns, [see record 2004-21166-001]) proposes that the empirical finding of negative compatibility in masked priming be attributed to 2 distinct theoretical constructs: (a) perceptual priming through object updating, as described in our article, and (b) nonperceptual priming based on inhibited unconscious response tendencies. The authors argue that this 2nd construct is not supported by either the new data the authors report or the extant literature. Instead, the negative compatibility effect in masked priming is influenced by perceptual interactions among stimuli that appear in the same spatial location, and the authors believe it is this process that deserves further systematic study. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Individual differences in judging deception: Reply to O'Sullivan (2008) and Pigott and Wu (2008).

C. F. Bond and B. M. DePaulo (see record 2008-08177-001) reported a quantitative synthesis of individual differences in judging deception. Here, the authors respond to a pair of commentaries on this synthesis: a statistical critique by T. D. Pigott and M. J. Wu (see record 2008-08177-003)and a narrative reaction by M. O'Sullivan (see record 2008-08177-002). In response to suggestions made by Pigott and Wu, the authors conduct several alternative analyses of individual differences in judging deception. Without exception, these yield results similar to those that the authors reported earlier. In response to O'Sullivan's questions, the authors point to their meta-analyses of relevant moderator variables. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Internet use and ties that bind.

Replies to comments by T. Silverman (see record 1999-11125-007), J. Rierdan (see record 1999-11125-008), and J. S. Shapiro (see record 1999-11125-009) regarding the original article by Kraut et al (see record 1998-10886-001) on the impact of Internet usage on social relations and depression. The authors respond to the concerns of the previous authors. In response to Silverman, they note that most online relationships formed by participants in their study resulted primarily in informational rather than emotional support, unlike the participants in Silverman's group. In response to Rierdan, the authors argue that the importance of results was not in the size of the effects, but in their direction; even small negative changes experienced by many people using the Internet can be significant. The authors also respond to Shapiro's methodological concerns and her alternative explanation of results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Cognitive-behavioral stress management intervention decreases the prevalence of depression and enhances benefit finding among women under treatment for early-stage breast cancer": Reply.

Replies to comments offered by J. C. Coyne and A. Kagee (see record 2001-05135-009) on the M. H. Antoni et al (see record 2000-14051-003) study on cognitive-behavioral stress management intervention's role in decreasing the prevalence of depression among women being treated for breast cancer. The authors of this article dispute the claim that patients in need cannot access interventions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The value of a comparative perspective: Theoretical comment on Pearce et al. (2005).

J. M. Pearce, D. N. George, M. Haselgrove, J. T. Erichson, and M. Good (2005) (see record 2005-13804-017) report that damage to the hippocampus does not impair either delay conditioning, a biconditional discrimination, or a series of complex visual and spatial discriminations that require feature binding, but does impair trace conditioning and the ability to perform a working and reference memory maze task. The J. M. Pearce et al. study highlights the value of a comparative perspective and the value of appreciating the multiple ways in which animals can solve tasks, which together will provide a deeper understanding of the function of the hippocampus. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Realistic and Unrealistic Self-Change Efforts.

Responds to comments by M. Lowe (see record 2003-08988-018), C. R. Snyder and K. L. Rand (see record 2003-08988-019) and A. M. Fletcher (see record 2003-08988-020) on the article by J. Polivy and C. Herman (see record 2002-15790-001) regarding false hopes of self-change. In this response, the authors address the aforementioned criticisms and questions raised. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Depression and the response of others: Is the effect specific?

Discusses the previous failure of the authors (see record 1985-06798-001) to replicate J. C. Coyne's (see record 1976-22455-001) finding regarding depression and the response of others. Methodological issues are discussed that have been neglected in previous research and that contribute to discrepant interpretations of this literature. (13 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Abilities, motives, and personal styles: Reply.

Responds to the comments of P. L. Ackerman (see record 2006-12925-012), D. Y. Dai (see record 2006-12925-013), and M. C. Gridley (see record 2006-12925-014) on E. S. Spelke's original article "Sex differences in intrinsic aptitude for mathematics and science? A critical review" (see record 2005-15840-001). Here, the current authors first consider Ackerman's criticism of IQ measures of cognitive sex differences, as well as his suggestion that Advanced Placement tests be used as a second measure. Next, the authors discuss Dai's suggestion that cognition and motivation, abilities and strategies, are inseparably bound in any meaningful measure of aptitude for mathematics and science. Finally, the authors address Gridley's suggestion that differences in men's and women's thinking styles and preferences explain gender disparities in math and science fields. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

False memories and statistical design theory: Comment on Miller and Wolford (1999) and Roediger and McDermott (1999).

In an analysis of H. L. Roediger and K. B. McDermott's (see record 1995-42833-001) false-memory paradigm, M. B. Miller and G. L. Wolford (see record 1999-13930-007) argued that falsely recognized items occur because a bias toward calling such items "old" is created by their membership in a studied category. This interpretation was contested by Roediger and McDermott (see record 2000-15248-006). The authors of this article approach this issue as a statistical decision problem and observe that an explanation of false memory based on stored strengths and one based on decision process can have identical implications for data. Problems with equivalent formal models of this type can frequently be resolved by looking at the effects of other variables on the fitted estimates. The authors illustrate this analysis by examining the effects of presentation duration on the parameter estimates produced by models that instantiate the 2 explanations. Although the question remains open, the storage-based interpretation was found to be somewhat more plausible. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)