Reasoning counterfactually: Making inferences about things that didn't happen.

The authors investigated the relationship between reasoners' understanding of subjunctive conditionals (e.g., if p had happened, then q would have happened) and the inferences they were prepared to endorse. Reasoners who made a counterfactual interpretation of subjunctive statements (i.e., they judged the statement to imply that p and q did not happen) endorsed different inferences than those who did not. Those who made a counterfactual interpretation were more likely to (a)judge the situation in which p and q occurred to be inconsistent with the conditional statement and (b) make negative inferences such as modus tollens (i.e., – q therefore – p ). These findings occurred with familiar and unfamiliar content, affirmative and negative conditionals, and conditional and biconditional relations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Representations as mediators of adolescent deductive reasoning

In Experiment 1, preadolescents, middle adolescents, and late adolescents were presented 3 deductive reasoning tasks. With some important exceptions, conditional reasoning improved with age on problems containing permission conditional relations, and reasoning fallacies increased with age on problems containing causal conditional relations. The results of Experiments 2a and 2b indicated that problem type (i.e., permission or causal) does not mediate the activation of conditional reasoning skills. Rather, valid conditional inferences are more common on problems for which plausible alternative antecedents can be generated than on problems for which alternative antecedent generation is difficult. Conditional rules for which alternative antecedent generation is difficult may be misrepresented as biconditionals, resulting in biconditional rather than conditional reasoning.     

The negated conditional: A litmus test for the suppositional conditional?

Under the suppositional account of conditionals, when people think about a conditional assertion, "if p then q," they engage in a mental simulation in which they imagine p holds and evaluate the probability that q holds under this supposition. One implication of this account is that belief in a conditional equates to conditional probability [P(q/p)]. In this paper, the authors examine a further implication of this analysis with respect to the wide-scope negation of conditional assertions, "it is not the case that if p then q." Under the suppositional account, nothing categorically follows from the negation of a conditional, other than a second conditional, "if p then not-q." In contrast, according to the mental model theory, a negated conditional is consistent only with the determinate state of affairs, p and not-q. In 4 experiments, the authors compare the contrasting predictions that arise from each of these accounts. The findings are consistent with the suppositional theory but are incongruent with the mental model theory of conditionals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditions for the Acceptance of Deontic Conditionals.

Recent psychological research has investigated how people assess the probability of an indicative conditional. Most people give the conditional probability of q given p as the probability of if p then q. Asking about the probability of an indicative conditional, one is in effect asking about its acceptability. But on what basis are deontic conditionals judged to be acceptable or unacceptable? Using a decision theoretic analysis, we argue that a deontic conditional, of the form if p then must q or if p then may q, will be judged acceptable to the extent that the p & q possibility is preferred to the p & not-q possibility. Two experiments are reported in which this prediction was upheld. There was also evidence that the pragmatic suitability of permission rules is partly determined by evaluations of the not-p & q possibility. Implications of these results for theories of deontic reasoning are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conversational comprehension processes are responsible for reasoning fallacies in children as well as adults: If is not the biconditional.

Proposes that children do poorly on reasoning from premises of the form if p then q not because they construe if as a biconditional but rather because they use discourse comprehension processes that lead them to accept the invited inferences if not p then not q and if q then p. This hypothesis predicts that children should respond appropriately to premises in which the invited inferences are countermanded. In Exp I, 24 undergraduates and 44 10-yr-olds were given conditional reasoning problems. Some of these had a major premise consisting of a single if–then sentence, while others had a more elaborate major premise in which the invited inferences were explicitly countermanded. In Exp II, Ss were 24 undergraduates, 20 10-yr-olds, and 34 7-yr-olds. In some problems the major premise consisted of a single if–then statement; in others, the major premise consisted of 3 such statements, 2 of which shared the same consequent, thus implicitly countermanding the invited inferences. In both experiments, all age groups committed the fallacies in the simple condition but not in the more complex condition. It is concluded that children's representation of if distinguishes necessary from merely invited inferences. Data suggest a collection of countermandable context-dependent inferences of varying degrees of invitingness associated with if. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditional reasoning with inducements and advice

In an earlier study of conditional reasoning, Newstead et al. [Newstead, S.E., Ellis, C.E., Evans, J.St.B.T., Dennis, I., (1997). Conditional reasoning with realistic material. Thinking and Reasoning 3, 49-96] found that people drew more inferences from conditionals framed as inducements (threats and promises) than from conditionals phrased as advice (tips and warnings). The present study was designed to test the hypothesis that this difference arose from the fact that the speaker of an inducement is normally seen to have control over the consequent event whereas the giver of advice does not. In the experiment reported here, inducement and advice conditionals were constructed in brief contexts such that in either case the speaker could be seen to have high or low control. Participants drew many more conditional inferences of all kinds for high control than for low control conditionals in either context. A second finding of interest was that participants drew many more forward (antecedent to consequent) inferences than backward inferences with these kinds of realistic conditionals.     

"The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities": Correction to Oberauer and Wilhelm (2003).

Reports an error in "The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities" by Klaus Oberauer and Oliver Wilhelm (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2003[Jul], Vol 29[4], 680-693). On page 684, Table 4, all correlations should have been identified as having a p2003-06626-018.) Five experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that people understand conditional statements ("if p then q") as indicating a high conditional probability P(q|p). Participants estimated the probability that a given conditional is true (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3) or judged whether a conditional was true or false (Experiments 2 and 4) given information about the frequencies of the relevant truth table cases. Judgments were strongly influenced by the ratio of pq to p?q cases, supporting the conditional probability account. In Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3, judgments were also affected by the frequency of pq cases, consistent with a version of mental model theory. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results to thematic conditionals and showed that the pragmatic utility associated with believing a statement also affected the degree of belief in conditionals but not in logically equivalent quantified statements. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Deductive rationality in validating and testing conditional inferences.

We asked people to validate conditional inferences (e.g., "A, therefore C" with "if A then C"). People are more likely to look for falsifications ("A and not-C") versus confirmations ("A and C") given a forced choice. Second, falsification rates are lower for logically valid versus invalid inferences. Logically valid inferences are inferences that follow necessarily. Experiment 1 (N = 96) shows that emphasising this logicality constraint increases falsification rates in the validation task and corroborates that validation-by-falsification increases logically correct inference evaluations. Experiment 2 (N = 41) corroborates the other way round that people who are more likely to make logically correct evaluations, show higher falsification performance in the validation task. The results support mental-models theory and suggest alternative theories similarly need to specify how people would go about looking for counterexamples. We proffer such a specification for two alternatives to the model theory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Processing of logically valid and logically invalid conditional inferences in discourse comprehension.

Two competing theories of processing of conditionals (if-then) were tested. Syntactic theories posit that people only draw inferences conforming to the logically valid modus ponens (MP) schema. Mental models theories predict that people draw MP and invalid affirming-the-consequent (AC) inferences. Three experiments tested these predictions. Participants read short stories that conformed to either the MP or AC form but without conclusions, and they completed either priming or recognition tasks. Results indicate that both MP and AC inferences occur during discourse processing: MP and AC premise forms prime their respective conclusions, participants erroneously judged that they had read the conclusions to MP and AC arguments, and AC inferences did not stem from a biconditional interpretation of conditionals. Findings support mental models theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Counterfactual and Semifactual Conditionals Prime Alternative Possibilities.

The authors examined in 3 experiments the comprehension of counterfactuals, such as "If it had rained, the plants would have bloomed," and semifactuals, such as "Even if it had rained, the plants would have bloomed," compared with indicative conditionals, "If it rained, the plants bloomed." The first experiment showed that people read the negative conjunction, "not p and not q" faster when it was primed by a counterfactual than when it was primed by an indicative conditional. They read the affirmative conjunction, "p and q" equally quickly when it was primed by either conditional. The 2nd experiment showed that people read the negated-antecedent conjunction, "not p and q" faster when it was primed by a semifactual conditional. The 3rd experiment corroborated these results in a direct comparison of counterfactuals and semifactuals. The authors discuss the implications of the results for the mental representations of different conditionals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How people interpret conditionals: Shifts toward the conditional event.

We investigated how people interpret conditionals and how stable their interpretation is over a long series of trials. Participants were shown the colored patterns on each side of a 6-sided die and were asked how sure they were that a conditional holds of the side landing upward when the die is randomly thrown. Participants were presented with 71 trials consisting of all combinations of binary dimensions of shape (e.g., circles and squares) and color (e.g., blue and red) painted onto the sides of each die. In 2 experiments (N? = 66, N? = 65), the conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and material conditional responses were negligible. In both experiments, the percentage of participants giving a conditional event response increased from around 40% at the beginning of the task to nearly 80% at the end, with most participants shifting from a conjunction interpretation. The shift was moderated by the order of shape and color in each conditional's antecedent and consequent: Participants were more likely to shift if the antecedent referred to a color. In Experiment 2 we collected response times: Conditional event interpretations took longer to process than conjunction interpretations (mean difference = 500 ms). We discuss implications of our results for mental models theory and probabilistic theories of reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The personality of familiar and significant people: The lay perceiver as a social–cognitive theorist.

When are perceivers guided more by implicit social-cognitive theories of personality and when more by trait theories? As perceivers become more familiar with a person they infer relatively more psychological mediating variables (e.g., construals, goals) that underlie the person's behavior and relatively fewer broad, uncontextualized traits such as aggressive or friendly (Study 1). The effects of familiarity are moderated by the importance of the target to perceivers (Study 2). Specifically, perceivers make relatively more inferences using mediating variables and fewer inferences with traits as the target becomes more familiar, if and only if the target plays an important role in their lives. The findings indicate that psychological mediating variables play a significant role in lay perceptions of people and specify conditions in which perceivers function like implicit social-cognitive theorists, namely, when the perceived is familiar and important to the perceiver. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The contribution of extracurricular activities to adolescent friendships: New insights through social network analysis.

Extracurricular activities are settings that are theorized to help adolescents maintain existing friendships and develop new friendships. The overarching goal of the current investigation was to examine whether coparticipating in school-based extracurricular activities supported adolescents' school-based friendships. We used social network methods and data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health to examine whether dyadic friendship ties were more likely to exist among activity coparticipants while controlling for alternative friendship processes, namely dyadic homophily (e.g., demographic and behavioral similarities) and network-level processes (e.g., triadic closure). Results provide strong evidence that activities were associated with current friendships and promoted the formation of new friendships. These associations varied based on school level (i.e., middle vs. high school) and activity type (i.e., sports, academic, arts). Results of this study provide new insight into the complex relations between activities and friendship that can inform theories of their developmental outcomes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Multiple inference-inviting properties" of interpersonal verbs: Event instigation, dispositional inference, and implicit causality.

The properties of interpersonal verbs (e.g., help, dislike, etc.) that systematically influence "implicit causality" are analyzed in 3 studies. It is argued that interpersonal verbs have a set of properties (multiple inference-inviting properties [MIIPs]) that are differentially elicited as a function of the type of property primed by the type of inference request. Study 1 distinguishes event instigation as a property that is systematically influenced by verb type: Action verbs induce subject inferences, and state verbs induce object inferences. Study 2 shows that dispositional inferences are mainly mediated by action verbs and the referentiality (sentence subject or object) of adjectives that are morphologically derived from verbs. Study 3 shows that studies of implicit causality have confounded event instigation and dispositional inferences in their operationalizations and Study 3 suggests that inferences of dispositionality and event instigation are orthogonal factors contributing differentially to what has to date been referred to as "implicit causality." The implications of these findings are discussed in terms of the interface between language and social cognition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The meaning(s) of conditionals: Conditional probabilities, mental models, and personal utilities.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 29(6) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2007-16865-001). On page 684, Table 4, all correlations should have been identified as having a pp then q") as indicating a high conditional probability P(q|p). Participants estimated the probability that a given conditional is true (Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3) or judged whether a conditional was true or false (Experiments 2 and 4) given information about the frequencies of the relevant truth table cases. Judgments were strongly influenced by the ratio of pq to p?q cases, supporting the conditional probability account. In Experiments 1A, 1B, and 3, judgments were also affected by the frequency of pq cases, consistent with a version of mental model theory. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the results to thematic conditionals and showed that the pragmatic utility associated with believing a statement also affected the degree of belief in conditionals but not in logically equivalent quantified statements. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Incorporating If...Then...Personality Signatures in Person Perception: Beyond the Person-Situation Dichotomy.

Three studies investigated conditions in which perceivers view dispositions and situations as interactive, rather than independent, causal forces when making judgments about another's personality. Study 1 showed that perceivers associated 5 common trait terms (e.g., friendly and shy) with characteristic if...then... (if situation a, then the person does x, but if situation b, then the person does y) personality signatures. Study 2 demonstrated that perceivers used information about a target's stable if...then... signature to infer the target's motives and traits; dispositional judgments were mediated by inferences about the target's motivations. Study 3 tested whether perceivers draw on if...then... signatures when making judgments about Big Five trait dimensions. Together, the findings indicate that perceivers take account of person-situation interactions (reflected in if...then... signatures) in everyday explanations of social behavior and personality dispositions. Boundary conditions are also discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Parental divorce and adolescent delinquency: Ruling out the impact of common genes.

Although the well-documented association between parental divorce and adolescent delinquency is generally assumed to be environmental (i.e., causal) in origin, genetic mediation is also possible. Namely, the behavior problems often found in children of divorce could derive from similar pathology in the parents, pathology that is both heritable and increases the risk that the parent will experience divorce. To test these alternative hypotheses, the authors made use of a novel design that incorporated timing of divorce in a sample of 610 adoptive and biological families. They reasoned that if genes common to parent and child mediate this association, nonadopted youth should manifest increased delinquency in the presence of parental divorce even if the divorce preceded their birth (i.e., was from a prior parental relationship). However, should the association be environmental in origin, the authors reasoned that adolescents should manifest increased delinquency only in response to divorce exposure, and this association should not vary by adoption status. Results firmly supported the latter, suggesting that it is the experience of parental divorce, and not common genes, that drives the association between divorce and adolescent delinquency. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theories relating mental imagery to perception.

Reviews contemporary theories of relations between mental imagery and perception in terms of structural, functional, and interactive theories. Structural theories propose that mental images exhibit the same spatial and pictorial properties as real physical objects. Functional theories propose that the formation and transformation of mental images contribute to object recognition and comparison. Interactive theories propose that imagery contributes directly to ongoing perceptual processes. The evidence for each type of theory is critically evaluated in view of the following alternative accounts: task-induced demand characteristics, experimenter bias, tacit knowledge, and eye movements. Efforts to rule out these alternatives have had varying degrees of success, with the consequence that the 3 types of imagery theories differ in the extent to which they have been confirmed (i.e., none of the 3 types of imagery theories is universally free from challenges from at least some of the alternative accounts). (4 p ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of construal processes in overconfident predictions about the self and others.

Overconfident behavioral predictions and trait inferences may occur because people make inadequate allowance for the uncertainties of situational construal. In Studies 1–3, Ss estimated how much time or money they would spend in various hypothetical, incompletely specified situations. Ss then offered associated "confidence limits" under different "construal conditions." In Study 4, Ss made trait inferences about someone they believed had responded "deviantly," again with situational details unspecified and construal conditions manipulated. In all 4 studies, Ss who made predictions or trait inferences without being able to assume the accuracy of their situational construals offered confidence limits no broader than those of Ss who made their responses contingent on such accuracy. Only in conditions where Ss were obliged to offer alternative construals did they appropriately broaden their confidence limits or weaken their trait inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

HIV prevention interventions: The effects of role-play and behavioural commitment on knowledge and attitudes.

Investigated the effects of active versus passive participation, as well as behavioral commitment, on the knowledge and attitudes of adolescents in an HIV-prevention intervention. Following completion of an HIV attitudes and knowledge test, a group of 144 9th grade students were randomly assigned to 1 of 4 treatment conditions that included either role-play, video, lecture, or no treatment. Half the participants in each condition were required to commit to attend to HIV-prevention information and educate another student about such issues. A post-test conducted at 4-wk follow-up indicated that students in the active participation condition (i.e., role-play) demonstrated increased knowledge about AIDS and HIV. Behavioral commitment to further HIV-prevention information did not moderate (i.e., enhance) the effects of active participation; however, commitment did lead to more positive attitudes toward HIV-prevention. The findings suggest that a role-play intervention may be a viable alternative to traditional lecture and video methods for enhancing knowledge towards HIV-prevention in adolescents. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)