Reasoning counterfactually: Making inferences about things that didn't happen.

The authors investigated the relationship between reasoners' understanding of subjunctive conditionals (e.g., if p had happened, then q would have happened) and the inferences they were prepared to endorse. Reasoners who made a counterfactual interpretation of subjunctive statements (i.e., they judged the statement to imply that p and q did not happen) endorsed different inferences than those who did not. Those who made a counterfactual interpretation were more likely to (a)judge the situation in which p and q occurred to be inconsistent with the conditional statement and (b) make negative inferences such as modus tollens (i.e., – q therefore – p ). These findings occurred with familiar and unfamiliar content, affirmative and negative conditionals, and conditional and biconditional relations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Partition-Edit-Count: Naive Extensional Reasoning in Judgment of Conditional Probability.

The authors provide evidence that people typically evaluate conditional probabilities by subjectively partitioning the sample space into n interchangeable events, editing out events that can be eliminated on the basis of conditioning information, counting remaining events, then reporting probabilities as a ratio of the number of focal to total events. Participants' responses to conditional probability problems were influenced by irrelevant information (Study 1), small variations in problem wording (Study 2), and grouping of events (Study 3), as predicted by the partition-edit-count model. Informal protocol analysis also supports the authors' interpretation. A 4th study extends this account from situations where events are treated as interchangeable (chance and ignorance) to situations where participants have information they can use to distinguish among events (uncertainty). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Putting Ifs to Work: Goal-Based Relevance in Conditional Directives.

Conditional directives are used by speakers to instruct hearers which actions are to be taken should certain events occur. The authors demonstrate that conditional directives are distinct from indicative conditionals in which speakers predict what is likely to be observed should certain events occur. The 1st set of experiments shows that goal structure determines what information speakers will select to test whether conditional directives have been followed but that these selections do not reflect their interpretations of the deontic necessity and sufficiency of the conditional relation. The 2nd set of experiments shows that formulations of conditional directives differ in how clearly speakers consider them to express their situation-specific intentions and that hearers accurately perceive what speakers intend them to do as a result of these formulations. The authors' findings illustrate a form of social rationality common in everyday interaction, which broadens normative conceptions of conditionals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditions for the Acceptance of Deontic Conditionals.

Recent psychological research has investigated how people assess the probability of an indicative conditional. Most people give the conditional probability of q given p as the probability of if p then q. Asking about the probability of an indicative conditional, one is in effect asking about its acceptability. But on what basis are deontic conditionals judged to be acceptable or unacceptable? Using a decision theoretic analysis, we argue that a deontic conditional, of the form if p then must q or if p then may q, will be judged acceptable to the extent that the p & q possibility is preferred to the p & not-q possibility. Two experiments are reported in which this prediction was upheld. There was also evidence that the pragmatic suitability of permission rules is partly determined by evaluations of the not-p & q possibility. Implications of these results for theories of deontic reasoning are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Defining the boundary: Age-related changes in childhood amnesia.

Childhood amnesia refers to the inability of adults to recall events that occurred during their infancy and early childhood. Although it is generally assumed that children and adolescents also experience childhood amnesia, with limited exceptions, most empirical research on the phenomenon has focused exclusively on adults. Here, we developed a new Timeline procedure to directly compare the early memories reported by children, adolescents, and adults. Overall, the proportion of memories reported before the age of 3 years was greater for the children and adolescents relative to the adults. In addition, the single earliest memory reported by children and adolescents was at a younger age than that reported by adults. In fact, the earliest memories reported by the children and adolescents, but not the adults, were significantly younger than the traditional 3 ?-year-old boundary of childhood amnesia. Regardless of the age of the rememberer, participants' early memories had the same episodic characteristics. We conclude that the boundary and the density of childhood amnesia may increase over the course of human development and that age-related changes in basic memory mechanisms make an important contribution to our understanding of the source of childhood amnesia. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can being scared cause tummy aches? Naive theories, ambiguous evidence, and preschoolers' causal inferences.

Causal learning requires integrating constraints provided by domain-specific theories with domain-general statistical learning. In order to investigate the interaction between these factors, the authors presented preschoolers with stories pitting their existing theories against statistical evidence. Each child heard 2 stories in which 2 candidate causes co-occurred with an effect. Evidence was presented in the form: AB→E; CA→E; AD→E; and so forth. In 1 story, all variables came from the same domain; in the other, the recurring candidate cause, A, came from a different domain (A was a psychological cause of a biological effect). After receiving this statistical evidence, children were asked to identify the cause of the effect on a new trial. Consistent with the predictions of a Bayesian model, all children were more likely to identify A as the cause within domains than across domains. Whereas 3.5-year-olds learned only from the within-domain evidence, 4- and 5-year-olds learned from the cross-domain evidence and were able to transfer their new expectations about psychosomatic causality to a novel task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The emergence of children's causal explanations and theories: Evidence from everyday conversation.

This research examines the content of explanations that 4 English-speaking children gave or asked for in everyday conversations recorded from 2? to 5 years of age. Analyses of nearly 5,000 codable explanations (identified by markers like why or because) focused on the entity targeted for explanation (e.g., person, animal, object), the explanatory mode of causal reasoning (e.g., psychological, physical), and interrelations between these elements. Children's explanations focused on varied entities (animals, objects, and persons) and incorporated diverse modes (psychological, physical, social-conventional, and even biological reasoning). Children's pairings of entities with explanatory modes suggest appropriately constrained yet flexible causal reasoning. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that young children draw on several complementary causal-explanatory theories to make sense of real-life events. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Aging and Conditional Probability Judgments: A Global Matching Approach.

Age differences in bias in conditional probability judgments were investigated based on predictions derived from the Minerva-Decision Making model (M. R. P. Dougherty, C. F. Gettys, & E. E. Ogden, 1999), a global matching model of likelihood judgment. In this study, 248 younger and older adults completed frequency judgment and conditional probability judgment tasks. Age differences in the frequency judgment task are interpreted as an age-related deficit in memory encoding. Older adults' stronger biases in the probability judgment task point to age differences in criterion setting. Age-related biases were eliminated when age groups were equated on memory encoding by means of study time manipulation. The authors conclude that older adults' stronger judgment biases are a function of memory impairment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Redux of Cognitive Consistency Theories: Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction.

The authors suggest that decisions made from multiple pieces of evidence are performed hy mechanisms of parallel constraint satisfaction, which are related to cognitive consistency theories. Such reasoning processes are bidirectional--decisions follow from evidence, and evaluations of the evidence shift toward coherence with the emerging decision. Using a factually complex legal case, the authors observed patterns of coherence shifts that persisted even when the distribution of decisions was manipulated (Study 1) and influenced by the participants' attitudes (Study 2). The evaluations of the evidence cohered with the preferred decision even when participants changed their preference (Study 3). Supporting the bidirectionality of reasoning. Study 4 showed that assigning participants to a verdict affected their evaluation of the evidence. Coherence shifts were observed also in related background knowledge. This research suggests that cognitive consistency theories should play a greater role in the understanding of human reasoning and decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Logic, beliefs, and instruction: A test of the default interventionist account of belief bias.

According to dual-process accounts of thinking, belief-based responses on reasoning tasks are generated as default but can be intervened upon in favor of logical responding, given sufficient time, effort, or cognitive resource. In this article, we present the results of 5 experiments in which participants were instructed to evaluate the conclusions of logical arguments on the basis of either their logical validity or their believability. Contrary to the predictions arising from these accounts, the logical status of the presented conclusion had a greater impact on judgments concerning its believability than did the believability of the conclusion on judgments about whether it followed logically. This finding was observed when instructional set was presented as a between-participants factor (Experiment 1), when instruction was indicated prior to problem presentation by a cue (Experiment 2), and when the cue appeared simultaneously with conclusion presentation (Experiments 3 and 4). The finding also extended to a range of simple and more complex argument forms (Experiment 5). In these latter experiments, belief-based judgments took significantly longer than those made under logical instructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for default interventionist accounts of belief bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning rats: Forward blocking in Pavlovian animal conditioning is sensitive to constraints of causal inference.

Forward blocking is one of the best-documented phenomena in Pavlovian animal conditioning. According to contemporary associative learning theories, forward blocking arises directly from the hardwired basic learning rules that govern the acquisition or expression of associations. Contrary to this view, here the authors demonstrate that blocking in rats is flexible and sensitive to constraints of causal inference, such as violation of additivity and ceiling considerations. This suggests that complex cognitive processes akin to causal inferential reasoning are involved in a well-established Pavlovian animal conditioning phenomenon commonly attributed to the operation of basic associative processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference.

The authors outline a theory of conditionals of the form If A then C and If A then possibly C. The 2 sorts of conditional have separate core meanings that refer to sets of possibilities. Knowledge, pragmatics, and semantics can modulate these meanings. Modulation can add information about temporal and other relations between antecedent and consequent. It can also prevent the construction of possibilities to yield 10 distinct sets of possibilities to which conditionals can refer. The mental representation of a conditional normally makes explicit only the possibilities in which its antecedent is true, yielding other possibilities implicitly. Reasoners tend to focus on the explicit possibilities. The theory predicts the major phenomena of understanding and reasoning with conditionals. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Development of categorization and reasoning in the natural world: Novices to experts, naive similarity to ecological knowledge.

Two experiments investigate the role of similarity and causal-ecological knowledge in expert and novice categorization and reasoning. In Experiment 1, university undergraduates and commercial fishermen sorted marine creatures into groups; although there was substantial agreement, novices sorted largely on the basis of appearance, whereas experts often cited commercial, ecological, or behavioral factors, and systematically subdivided fish on the basis of ecological niche. In Experiment 2, experts and novices were asked to generalize a blank property or novel disease from a pair of marine creatures. Novices relied on similarity to guide generalizations. Experts used similarity to reason about blank properties but ecological relations to reason about diseases. Expertise appears to involve knowledge of multiple relations among entities and context-sensitive application of those relations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning about emotional contents following shocking terrorist attacks: A tale of three cities.

The authors examined reasoning following the terrorist attacks carried out in London in July 2005. They tested participants in London (United Kingdom), Manchester (United Kingdom), and London (Canada) within 1 week of the attacks and again 6 months later. Participants reasoned about syllogisms of 3 types: neutral, generally emotional, and emotionally related to terrorism. Participants also provided self-reports of emotion and risk estimates. Participants generally reasoned more accurately on neutral problems, compared with generally emotional and terrorism-related problems. However, participants in London (United Kingdom) provided more logically valid answers when reasoning about problems related to terrorism and were less likely to answer on the basis of beliefs, despite reporting higher levels of emotions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reasoning With Premises That Are Not Empirically True: Evidence for the Role of Inhibition and Retrieval.

Two studies examined conditional reasoning with false premises. In Study 1, 12- and 16-year-old adolescents made "if-then" inferences after producing an alternative antecedent for the major premise. Older participants made more errors on the simple modus ponens inference than did younger ones. Reasoning with a false premise reduced this effect. Study 2 examined the relation between performance on a negative priming task (S. P. Tipper, 1985) and reasoning with contrary-to-fact premises in 9- and 11-year-olds. Overall, there was a correlation between the relative effect of negative priming on reaction times and the number of knowledge-based responses to the reasoning problems. The results of these studies are consistent with the idea that reasoning with premises that are not true requires an interaction between information retrieval and inhibition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of psychotherapy for depression in children and adolescents: A meta-analysis.

Serious sequelae of youth depression, plus recent concerns over medication safety, prompt growing interest in the effects of youth psychotherapy. In previous meta-analyses, effect sizes (ESs) have averaged .99, well above conventional standards for a large effect and well above mean ES for other conditions. The authors applied rigorous analytic methods to the largest study sample to date and found a mean ES of .34, not superior but significantly inferior to mean ES for other conditions. Cognitive treatments (e.g., cognitive-behavioral therapy) fared no better than noncognitive approaches. Effects showed both generality (anxiety was reduced) and specificity (externalizing problems were not), plus short- but not long-term holding power. Youth depression treatments appear to produce effects that are significant but modest in their strength, breadth, and durability. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The prevention of depressive symptoms in children and adolescents: A meta-analytic review.

Research on the prevention of depressive symptoms in children and adolescents was reviewed and synthesized with meta-analysis. When all 30 studies were included, selective prevention programs were found to be more effective than universal programs immediately following intervention. Both selective and indicated prevention programs were more effective than universal programs at follow-up, even when the 2 studies with college students were excluded. Effect sizes for selective and indicated prevention programs tended to be small to moderate, both immediately postintervention and at an average follow-up of 6 months. Most effective interventions are more accurately described as treatment rather than prevention. Suggestions for future research include testing potential moderators (e.g., age, gender, anxiety, parental depression) and mechanisms, designing programs that are developmentally appropriate and gender and culturally sensitive, including longer follow-ups, and using multiple measures and methods to assess both symptoms and diagnoses. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Implicit and explicit personality: A test of a channeling hypothesis for aggressive behavior.

D. G. Winter, O. P. John, A. J. Stewart, E. C. Klohnen, and L. E. Duncan (1998) proposed that self-beliefs about personality influence the channels through which people express their implicit motives. On the basis of this hypothesis, the authors predicted that self-beliefs about aggressiveness would influence the channel(s) through which people express their aggressive motive and the justification mechanisms they use to defend expression of this motive. For example, the authors predicted that people who were implicitly prepared to rationalize a desire to harm others would engage in (a) overt aggression if they viewed themselves as aggressive or (b) passive aggression if they viewed themselves as nonaggressive. The implicit aspects of aggressiveness were measured via conditional reasoning (L. R. James et al., 2005). Results based on intramural basketball players supported the channeling hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developmental reversals in false memory: A review of data and theory.

Can susceptibility to false memory and suggestion increase dramatically with age? The authors review the theoretical and empirical literatures on this counterintuitive possibility. Until recently, the well-documented pattern was that susceptibility to memory distortion had been found to decline between early childhood and young adulthood. That pattern is the centerpiece of much expert testimony in legal cases involving child witnesses and victims. During the past 5 years, however, several experiments have been published that test fuzzy-trace theory's prediction that some of the most powerful forms of false memory in adults will be greatly attenuated in children. Those experiments show that in some common domains of experience, in which false memories are rooted in meaning connections among events, age increases in false memory are the rule and are sometimes accompanied by net declines in the accuracy of memory. As these experiments are strongly theory-driven, they have established that developmental improvements in the formation of meaning connections are necessary and sufficient to produce age increases in false memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)