价格随机条件下看涨期权折扣契约的应急供应链协调研究

在突发事件造成市场需求与市场价格均随机波动的条件下,将期权与数量折扣契约融合,形成一种新的期权折扣契约,并用看涨期权折扣契约模型来协调供应链。通过海塞矩阵判断得知供应链存在最优决策,并进行算例分析。结果表明：当突发事件引起市场需求增加时,看涨期权折扣契约和数量折扣契约均能有效地提升供应链收益,且看涨期权折扣契约提升的幅度更大;当突发事件引起市场需求缩小时,2种契约均不能扭转整个供应链收益大幅下降的局面,且看涨期权折扣契约下降的幅度更大。为获取超额利润,决策者必须充分获取市场信息并对市场需求进行准确的预测才能使新的契约机制更有效。在新的前提条件下,看涨期权折扣契约模型能有效地协调供应链并提高整个供应链系统的绩效。该契约实现了风险共担和收益双赢,在一定程度上提升了供应链的柔性。     

不确定条件下供应链期权契约风险分担模型

供应链期权契约是应对市场需求不确定性的一种重要途径,然而期权价格又给供应链带来了新的风险。针对供应链期权契约的风险分担问题,提出了根据谈判能力协商确定期权价格从而达到风险分担的方法。在市场不确定条件下,以单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链为研究对象,建立了基于谈判能力的供应链期权契约风险分担模型,分析了谈判能力对供应链订购量、生产安排以及期望收益的影响。研究发现,期权契约可以提高供应链各成员的期望收益,随着制造商谈判能力的增强,零售商的订单数量增加,期权数量减少,制造商的谈判能力降低了供应链的总期望收益。通过数值仿真分析,进一步验证了通过谈判分担期权契约风险的有效性,获得了对制定供应链期权价格具有指导意义的研究结论。      

大宗商品的供应链期权契约影响因素研究

供应链中大宗商品的期权定价通常采用Black-Scholes期权定价模型,但该模型没有考虑资金时间成本、现货价格波动风险和期权期限三方面因素对期权定价的影响.所以在传统的供应链期权契约模型基础上引进市场利率、现货价格波动率和期权期限三个主要市场因素,对供应链期权契约模型进行扩展,更符合现代经济情况对期权定价的要求.经过模型推导进一步分析供应商主导型供应链期权契约的决策机制,计算出使供应链整体利润优化的供应商和零售商最优定价策略和最优采购决策,最后采用灵敏度分析的方法找到主要影响因素,计算出影响程度.     

随机产出和紧急订购价格下基于期权契约的供应链生产与订购策略

针对一个由制造商-零售商组成的双层供应链系统,假定产品的终端市场需求与生产制造环节均存在随机不确定性,零售商在销售期之前采用双向期权契约向制造商订货,在销售期内市场需求实现之后还可向制造商发起紧急订购,紧急订购价受当时市场供需环境的影响也将表现出随机变动性。在此基础上,建立了双向期权契约机制下供应链上下游之间的博弈决策模型,研究了制造商的最佳生产计划与零售商的最优订购策略;并通过详细的数值算例揭示了双向期权契约参数的变化、终端市场需求的不确定性、成品产出的随机波动性以及紧急订购价的变动性对供应链上下游企业运作策略及运营绩效的影响。     

基于期权契约的低碳化供应链协调

在供应链低碳化背景下,基于“总量限制交易”模式,研究了由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的两级供应链期权契约协调问题.将批发价格契约作为参照点,采用合作博弈的方法,构建了期权契约模型.通过证明得到了期权契约得以实施的参数范围及考虑决策主体风险偏好和谈判能力时的利润分配方案.结论表明,与参照点相比,期权契约可以有效协调供应链并具有鲁棒性,决策主体的风险偏好对利润分配产生重要影响.     

价格柔性契约下需求依赖价格的供应链策略研究

利用Stackelberg博弈模型研究价格柔性契约下零售商和供应商的策略。由于产品市场价格的波动,零售商和供应商签订价格柔性契约来应对市场价格波动带来的利润风险,零售商面临的市场需求依赖于其销售价格,供应商决定价格柔性契约的参数。首先,零售商根据价格对需求的影响大小和签订的价格柔性契约参数决定产品的零售价格,然后供应商根据零售商的零售价格决定柔性契约的价格风险分担系数。考虑了加和型和乘积型价格影响需求两种情况,计算得出价格柔性契约下零售商的最优定价以及供应商的最优价格风险分担系数。研究结果可以为价格柔性契约下需求依赖价格的供应链成员决策提供理论和方法指导。     

面对价格敏感性突变的供应链协调应对策略研究北大核心CSSCI

研究突发事件造成需求的价格敏感性突变时,供应链的协调应对问题。采用线性函数的形式衡量突发事件造成的额外成本,分析得到供应链的最优生产计划调整策略和最优价格调整策略,从而获得突发事件后供应链的最优利润。并设计了全单位数量折扣契约和限值线性价格契约,激励供应商和零售商实现协调应对,并满足按批量进行数量折扣的运营需求。此外,还对比分析了供应链在市场规模突变与价格敏感性突变下应对规律的异同。最后,通过数值仿真计算,展示结论的应用。     

面对价格敏感性突变的供应链协调应对策略研究

研究突发事件造成需求的价格敏感性突变时,供应链的协调应对问题。采用线性函数的形式衡量突发事件造成的额外成本,分析得到供应链的最优生产计划调整策略和最优价格调整策略,从而获得突发事件后供应链的最优利润。并设计了全单位数量折扣契约和限值线性价格契约,激励供应商和零售商实现协调应对,并满足按批量进行数量折扣的运营需求。此外,还对比分析了供应链在市场规模突变与价格敏感性突变下应对规律的异同。最后,通过数值仿真计算,展示结论的应用。     

突发事件且非对称信息下的供应链回购契约模型

考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,在随机市场需求下,分析了回购契约对供应链的协调作用;探讨了突发事件导致市场需求和零售商边际成本同时变化且变化后的零售商边际成本是不对称信息时回购契约对供应链的协调作用,研究表明：基准的回购契约对突发事件下的供应链不再发挥协调作用,为此,给出了供应链应对突发事件的最优应对策略,并调整了原来的回购契约使其具有抗突发事件性。用一个算例对比加以说明。      

公平偏好下考虑双边保鲜努力的生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

针对供应商主导的生鲜农产品供应链,建立Stackelberg博弈模型;在考虑供应商、零售商双边保鲜努力水平影响生鲜农产品新鲜度和市场需求的情况下,分析零售商公平偏好对生鲜农产品供应链双边保鲜努力水平和供应链协调性的影响;采用委托代理模型对“批发价格 + 转移支付”的组合契约协调机制进行研究,旨在增加供应链整体利益及其稳定性,更好地协调成员之间的利益。研究表明,无论是否考虑零售商公平偏好,批发价格契约均无法实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,且零售商公平偏好会进一步降低双边保鲜努力水平、使供应链偏离最优。最后基于“批发价格 + 转移支付”的组合契约不仅能使双边保鲜努力水平达到集中决策下最优,实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,还能实现供应链成员利润的帕累托改进。     

Supply chain coordination by risk sharing contracts under random production yield and deterministic demand

From numerous contributions to literature we know that properly designed contracts can facilitate coordinated decision making of multiple actors in a supply chain (SC) so that efficiency losses for the whole SC can be avoided. In a newsvendor-type SC with stochastic demand it is well-known that the double marginalization effect hampers the simple wholesale price contract to achieve coordination. More complex contracts however can bring about coordination, especially those which enable appropriate sharing of risks between the actors. While the effectiveness of risk sharing contracts is well understood for SC situations with random demand and reliable supply, less is known about respective problems if demand is deterministic but supply is unreliable due to random production yield. This paper shows how in a buyer-supplier SC the distribution of risks affects the coordination of buyer’s ordering and supplier’s production decision in a basic random yield, deterministic demand setting. Both parties are exposed to risks of over-production or under-delivery, respectively, if a simple wholesale price contract is applied. The resulting risk distribution always impedes SC coordination. However, more sophisticated contract types which penalize or reward the supplier can change risk distribution so that SC coordination is possible under random yield. Additionally, it is proven that the wholesale price contract will guarantee SC coordination if the supplier has a second (emergency) procurement source that is more costly, but reliable. Moreover, it is shown that under wholesale price contracts it can be beneficial to utilize this emergency source even if it is unprofitable from a SC perspective. However, if such an emergency option is available to the buyer as opposed to the supplier, a wholesale price contract will not be able to coordinate the SC.     

Inventory misplacement and demand forecast error in the supply chain: profitable RFID strategies under wholesale and buy-back contracts

We investigate RFID adoption strategies under wholesale price and buy-back contracts in a supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer who faces inventory misplacement and demand forecast error. RFID can alleviate the misplacement problem, and can reduce demand forecast error by shortening order lead time. By a newsvendor model, we characterise the optimal contract terms in the supply chain without and with RFID adoption, respectively. We further analyse how the contract terms depend on RFID-related parameters (e.g. salable rate and demand forecast error). We find that both without and with RFID, the wholesale price contract will lead to the double marginalisation problem, while the buy-back contract can coordinate the supply chain. We show that the supply chain adopts RFID if and only if the tagging cost is below a threshold; the threshold is in negative correlation to the demand forecast error. The supply chain is more willing to adopt RFID under the buy-back contract than under the wholesale price contract. RFID adoption can sometimes lessen the double marginalisation problem under the wholesale price contract, improving the supply chain efficiency. A smaller RFID tagging cost or a reduced forecast error do not necessarily lead to higher supply chain efficiency.     

Coordinating a trust-embedded two-tier supply chain by options with multiple transaction periods

Trust widely works in supply chain practices and deeply affects supply chain decisions. Full trust in transactions and inaccurate demand forecasts are most likely to lead to biased decisions and low supply chain performances. Therefore, we propose a trust updating model to quantify decision-maker’s trust. The model presents the variation of trust over time and is helpful to evaluate decision-maker’s trust level in each transaction. In the model, a coordination mechanism with contract is designed to mitigate each supply chain partner’s ordering risk. Optimal order strategies of both manufactures and retailers in a supply chain under a bidirectional option contract are analysed in this paper. We find the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity is positively affected by penalty price in the contract and its bounds are given by simulation analysis. Our findings in this paper indicate that the proposed coordination mechanism with bidirectional option contract is profitable to all supply chain partners in long-term transactions. Meanwhile, the coordination mechanism helps the supply chain partners to catch up with marketing fluctuations and enhances the supply chain trust and partnerships. Finally, some simulation experiments are employed to obtain more observations.     

不同契约下考虑公平偏好的供应商创新投入研究

针对一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链,研究供应商公平偏好对其创新投入的影响。引入公平偏好理论,运用Stackelberg博弈,建立批发价格契约、研发成本分担契约和收益共享契约3种契约下的供应链决策模型,对比分析不同契约下公平偏好系数对供应链均衡信息的影响。研究表明,研发成本分担契约下的供应商创新水平、供应链中成员效用及供应链整体效用总高于其他2种契约;收益共享契约下的供应商创新水平和供应链整体效用高于批发价格契约;批发价格契约和收益共享契约下的制造商效用和供应商效用的大小与供应商公平偏好系数以及收益共享契约下的供应商保留效用的大小有关。     

考虑销售努力和运输时间的农产品供应链弹性契约

目的 进一步实现农产品供应链数量弹性契约利润最大化。方法 在市场需求随机的条件下,考虑销售努力和运输时间为影响需求的关键变量,建立起由供应商和零售商组成的农产品供应链数量弹性契约模型。基于该模型引入奖励与惩罚策略,以实现农产品供应链弹性契约的一致性和有效性。结果 结合农产品特征,通过具体的模型优化方法和算例分析得出最优值以及各变量与最优销售努力水平、最优运输时间、最优订货量和整体农产品供应链利润之间的相关关系。结论 农产品供应链弹性契约能实现协调下的利润最大化,对农业经营主体企业开展农产品供应链弹性研究具有重要的理论和实践价值。     

Supply chain models with corporate social responsibility

Currently, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a critical issue because more than 88% of consumers think companies should try to achieve their business goals while improving society and the environment. This paper focuses on a CSR supply chain where an Original Equipment Manufacturer’s (OEM’s) sales can be significantly reduced because of its oversea supplier’s social misconduct. Specifically, as in a conventional wholesale price contract the supplier determines its wholesale price and the OEM decides its order quantity, but in a CSR supply chain, the supplier can autonomously change its CSR cost once a minimum requirement is satisfied. A higher CSR cost means that the supplier invests more in its corporate social responsibility and the OEM’s sales will be less likely to be influenced by negative CSR events. The equilibrium solutions show an important dilemma – although the supplier’s profit increases in the basic CSR requirement, the supplier will always use the minimum CSR cost under the conventional wholesale price contract, which eventually leads to a low supply chain profit. Thus, we introduce two different contracts to handle this problem: the flexible quantity contract and the wholesale price incentive contract, which are, respectively, a ‘tough’ way and a ‘beneficent’ way for the OEM to solve the problem. Although the two ways cannot (always) coordinate the supply chain, we show that they both will significantly improve the supply chain performance. Our results also show that in some conditions, one strategy will dominate, whereas in different conditions the other strategy dominates.     

碳税情形下考虑低碳偏好的收益共享契约协调模型

研究考虑碳税和消费者具有低碳偏好情形的供应链碳减排的协调问题,得到实现供应链碳减排协调的必要条件。通过引入数量折扣策略,构建供应链碳减排的收益共享契约协调模型,解决纯粹的收益共享契约无法协调供应链碳减排的问题,并给出契约参数需要满足的条件。在消费者的低碳偏好以加法形式来影响市场需求时,通过模型优化,给出供应链的最优产品订购量和最优碳排放水平的确定方法。研究发现,在供应链协调时,供应商提供给制造商的批发价格是碳税的减函数,是碳排放水平的增函数;供应链系统的订购量与碳税成反比,而碳减排水平与碳税成正比,与碳减排系数成反比。     

需求依赖于价格环境下的批发价格契约

研究需求依赖于价格环境下的批发价格契约,建立了由单个零售商和单个制造商组成的供应链模型。该模型中零售商决定商品的订货量和销售价格,制造商决定商品的批发价格。以集中决策系统下供应链的利润、销售价格和销售量作为基准,研究分散情况下供应链的效率、销售价格以及销售量的变化,同时考虑在此情况下制造商提供的批发价格构成,在此基础上进一步探讨价格弹性对供应链效率和供应链利润分配比例的影响。