Support schemes and vertical integration—Who skims the cream?

This paper examines how the effectiveness of feed-in tariffs for distributed generators, producing renewable electricity, depends on industry structure, i.e., vertical integration vs. unbundling. A stylized analytical model with a monopolist and a competitive fringe (distributed generators) will be developed to analyze the impact of feed-in tariffs on renewable power production. The vertically integrated monopolist maximizes profits by setting the electricity price for residual demand and a network access charge incurred by the fringe. The fringe receives a fixed feed-in tariff per unit of electricity produced. Under vertical integration, a rise in the feed-in tariff induces the monopolist to raise access charges for fringe firms and skim part of their additional income. This partially offsets the supply increase of the fringe firms stimulated by the feed-in tariff. However, in the case of effective unbundling with an externally set access charge, there is no possibility for the monopolist to extract part of the fringe's profit. Then, the feed-in tariff fully accrues to the competitive fringe, and its supply will further increase. This setting will be extended to horizontal expansion when the monopolist also enters the renewable production segment. The effects on prices and output will be derived and compared.     

Benefits from coordinating congestion management—The Nordic power market

We consider the possibility of improving the utilization of the capacity of the Nordic transmission grid, by improving on the methods for congestion management. We use a simplified model of the Nordic power market, and different load-scenarios are developed in order to illustrate the effects. By improving the coordination of the system operator function, we may achieve that the actual bottlenecks, both as regards to the location and capacity, form the basis for the definition of price areas. This may result in a better partition of the grid, not necessarily following the borders between the control areas of today's system operators. We also consider solving intra zonal bottlenecks “directly”, through the area prices and “indirectly” by “moving” internal capacity constraints to the borders between price areas. The examples illustrate that this “indirect” congestion management may be costly, and result in larger price differences than necessary.     

A decarbonization strategy for the electricity sector: New-source subsidies

An expedient phase-out of carbon emissions in the electricity sector could be facilitated by imposing carbon fees and applying the revenue exclusively to subsidize new, low-carbon generation sources. Since there would initially be no “new sources,” fees would be substantially zero at the outset of the program. Nevertheless, the program would immediately create high price incentives for low-carbon capacity expansion. Fees would increase as new, low-carbon sources gain market share, but price competition from a growing, subsidized clean-energy industry would help maintain moderate retail electricity prices. Subsidies would automatically phase out as emitting sources become obsolete.     

Deregulating with no regulator: Is the German electricity transmission regime institutionally correct?

From 1998 to 2005, the German transmission grid has been put under a self-regulated arrangement. It seems hard to believe that transmission lines can be opened to “third-party access” only with a “negotiated access regime” and no regulator supervision. It seems contradictory with the notion of “ex post contractual hazards” promoted by V. Goldberg and O. Williamson. If a weak institutional arrangement is implemented, one might assume that it has to be harmful to network and market access. If it is not to be inefficient, why and how could it work? When looking at rules and prices for accessing the transmission network and the corresponding wholesale markets in Germany, the “club” arrangement for transmission opening does not appear so harmful. Accordingly, we have to reconsider the ex ante and ex post institutional mechanism of such a “club” arrangement. Ex ante, we first reconsider skills and strengths of industrial consumers and German Business associations in defining and assessing rules of transmission access. We underline that incomplete vertical and horizontal integration of German electricity companies impeded extensive cartel collusion. Ex post, we first look at a strong Competition Authority backing. Then we discover that ex ante and ex post dimensions are much more mixed and reinforced in an open “cumulative pro-competition process” framed by the Competition Authority.     

Optimal energy efficiency policies and regulatory demand-side management tests: How well do they match?

Under conventional models, subsidizing energy efficiency requires electricity to be priced below marginal cost. Its benefits increase when electricity prices increase to finance the subsidy. With high prices, subsidies are counterproductive unless consumers fail to make efficiency investments when private benefits exceed costs. If the gain from adopting efficiency is only reduced electricity spending, capping revenues from energy sales may induce a utility to substitute efficiency for generation when the former is less costly. This goes beyond standard “decoupling” of distribution revenues from sales, requiring complex energy price regulation. The models’ results are used to evaluate tests in the 2002 California Standard Practice Manual for assessing demand-side management programs. Its “Ratepayer Impact Measure” test best conforms to the condition that electricity price is too low. Its “Total Resource Cost” and “Societal Cost” tests resemble the condition for expanded decoupling. No test incorporates optimality conditions apart from consumer choice failure.     

Strategies for regional integration of electricity supply in West Africa

To improve peoples’ living conditions in West African countries national governments have to considerably reinforce the electricity supply infrastructures. Rehabilitation of the existing installations and construction of new power generation facilities and transmission lines require substantial resources which are tremendously difficult to raise due to the region's specific economical and political conditions. This paper examines the long-term prospects for integrated development of the regional electricity industry and evaluates its advantages by using PLANELEC-Pro, a “bottom-up” electricity system expansion planning optimisation model. The evolution of regional electricity market is analysed on the basis of two strategies. The “autarkical” strategy consists in adequate expansion of national power generation systems and the exchanges of electricity between the countries in sub-zones. Another approach referred to as “integration” strategy is recommended in this article. It leads to fast retirement of the obsolete power plants and the integration of new investment projects at the level of whole West African sub-region. The main finding is that the regional integration strategy is capable to bring about additional benefits in terms of reduced capital expenditures, lower electricity supply cost and the enhanced system's reliability compared to the autarkical strategy.     

Assessing the effects of CO2 price caps on electricity investments—A real options analysis

This paper uses real options modeling to assess the impact of different climate change policy instruments on investment, profits and cumulative emissions in the electricity sector. Even though CO₂ price caps or “safety valves” have been suggested as methods to limit uncertainty emanating from fluctuating prices of CO₂ permits that would hurt the industry's profit and thereby also energy security, our analysis shows that price caps set at a too low level are detrimental to the adoption of e.g. modern biomass-fired capacity as a replacement for existing coal-fired power plants. We therefore conduct a series of experiments with different policy scenarios to analyze under which regime emissions are most effectively reduced. With respect to CO₂ price uncertainty, it turns out that even for moderately rising CO₂ prices, fluctuations frequently lead to investment into carbon capture and storage (CCS), while investment is often not triggered in the face of deterministic CO₂ prices.     

Do generation firms in restructured electricity markets have incentives to support social-welfare-improving transmission investments?

This paper examines the incentives that generation firms have in restructured electricity markets for supporting long-term transmission investments. In particular, we study whether generation firms, which arguably play a dominant role in the restructured electricity markets, have the incentives to fund or support incremental social-welfare-improving transmission investments. We examine this question in a two-node network and explore how such incentives are affected by the ownership of financial transmission rights (FTRs) by generation firms. In the analyzed two-node network, we show both (i) that the net exporter generation firm has the correct incentives to increase the transmission capacity incrementally up to a certain level and (ii) that, although a policy that allocates FTRs to the net exporter generation firm can be desirable from a social point of view, such a policy would dilute the net-importer-generation-firm's incentives to support transmission expansion. Moreover, if all FTRs were allocated or auctioned off to the net exporter generation firm, then it is possible to increase both consumer surplus and social welfare while keeping the net exporter generation firm revenue neutral.     

Planning India's long-term energy shipment infrastructures for electricity and coal

The Purdue Long-Term Electricity Trading and Capacity Expansion Planning Model simultaneously optimizes both transmission and generation capacity expansions. Most commercial electricity system planning software is limited to only transmission planning. An application of the model to India's national power grid, for 2008–2028, indicates substantial transmission expansion is the cost-effective means of meeting the needs of the nation's growing economy. An electricity demand growth rate of 4% over the 20-year planning horizon requires more than a 50% increase in the Government's forecasted transmission capacity expansion, and 8% demand growth requires more than a six-fold increase in the planned transmission capacity expansion. The model minimizes the long-term expansion costs (operational and capital) for the nation's five existing regional power grids and suggests the need for large increases in load-carrying capability between them. Changes in coal policy affect both the location of new thermal power plants and the optimal pattern inter-regional transmission expansions.     

The crucial relationship among energy commodity prices: Evidence from the Spanish electricity market

The main purpose of this article is twofold to analyze: (a) the long-term relation among the commodities prices and between spot electricity market price and commodity prices, and (b) the short-term dynamics among commodity prices and between electricity prices and commodity prices. Data between 2002 and 2005 from the Spanish electricity market was used. Econometric methods were used in the analysis of the commodity spot price, namely the vector autoregression model, the vector error correction model and the granger causality test. The co-integration approach was used to analyze the long-term relationship between the common stochastic trends of four fossil fuel prices. One of the findings in the long-term relation is that the prices of fuel and the prices of Brent are intertwined, though the prices of Brent ten to “move” to reestablish the price equilibrium. Another finding is that the price of electricity is explained by the evolution of the natural gas series.     

Cooperation mechanisms to achieve EU renewable targets

There are considerable benefits from cooperating among member states on meeting the 2020 renewable energy sources (RES) targets. Today countries are supporting investments in renewable energy by many different types of support schemes and with different levels of support. The EU has opened for cooperation mechanisms such as joint support schemes for promoting renewable energy to meet the 2020 targets. The potential coordination benefits, with more efficient localisation and composition of renewable investment, can be achieved by creating new areas/sub-segments of renewable technologies where support costs are shared and credits are transferred between countries.Countries that are not coordinating support for renewable energy might induce inefficient investment in new capacity that would have been more beneficial elsewhere and still have provided the same contribution to meeting the 2020 RES targets. Furthermore, countries might find themselves competing for investment in a market with limited capital available. In both cases, the cost-efficiency of the renewable support policies is reduced compared to a coordinated solution.Barriers for joint support such as network regulation regarding connection of new capacity to the electricity grid and cost sharing rules for electricity transmission expansion are examined and examples given. The influence of additional renewable capacity on domestic/regional power market prices can be a barrier. The market will be influenced by for example an expansion of the wind capacity resulting in lower prices, which will affect existing conventional producers. This development will be opposed by conventional producers, whereas consumers will support such a strategy.A major barrier is the timing of RES targets and the uncertainty regarding future targets. We illustrate the importance of different assumptions on future targets and the implied value of RES credits. The effect on the credit price for 2020 is presented in an exemplary case study of 200 MW wind capacity.     

Cause of the memory effect in “nickel” electrodes

Several types of commercial batteries employ the H₂NiO₂–HNiO₂ (or Ni(OH)₂–NiOOH) reaction in their positive electrodes. Such batteries often exhibit a so-called “memory effect” in which the available capacity at useful voltages noticeably decreases if they are used under conditions in which they are repeatedly only partially discharged before being recharged. However, if such cells are deeply discharged, the apparently lost capacity can be recovered. It is shown that these phenomena can be rationally explained by considering the reactions in the “nickel electrode” in terms of the thermodynamics of the ternary H–Ni–O system.     

Electricity market design for generator revenue sufficiency with increased variable generation

We present a computationally efficient mixed-integer program (MIP) that determines optimal generator expansion decisions, and hourly unit commitment and dispatch in a power system. The impact of increasing wind power capacity on the optimal generation mix and generator profitability is analyzed for a test case that approximates the electricity market in Texas (ERCOT). We analyze three market policies that may support resource adequacy: Operating Reserve Demand Curves (ORDC), Fixed Reserve Scarcity Prices (FRSP) and fixed capacity payments (CP). Optimal expansion plans are comparable between the ORDC and FRSP implementations, while capacity payments may result in additional new capacity. The FRSP policy leads to frequent reserves scarcity events and corresponding price spikes, while the ORDC implementation results in more continuous energy prices. Average energy prices decrease with increasing wind penetration under all policies, as do revenues for baseload and wind generators. Intermediate and peak load plants benefit from higher reserve prices and are less exposed to reduced energy prices. All else equal, an ORDC approach may be preferred to FRSP as it results in similar expansion and revenues with less extreme energy prices. A fixed CP leads to additional new flexible NGCT units, but lower profits for other technologies.     

The diversity of design of TSOs

It is puzzling today to explain diversity and imperfection of actual transmission monopoly designs in competitive electricity markets. We argue that transmission monopoly in competitive electricity markets has to be analyzed within a [Wilson, R, 2002. Architecture of the power markets. Econometrica 70(4), 1299–1344] modular framework. Applied to the management of electricity flows, at least three modules make the core of transmission design: (1) the short run management of network externalities; (2) the long run management of network investment; and (3) the coordination of neighboring transmission system operators (TSOs) for cross-border trade. In order to tackle this diversity of designs of TSOs, we show that for each of these modules, three different basic ways of managing them are possible. Among the identified 27 options of organization, we define an ideal TSO. Second, we demonstrate that (1) monopoly design differs from this ideal TSO and cannot handle these three modules irrespective of the “institutional” definition and allocation of property rights on transmission, while (2) definition and allocation of property rights on transmission cannot ignore the existing electrical industry and transmission network structure: they have to complement each other to be efficient. Some conclusions for regulatory issues of TSOs are derived from this analysis of network monopoly organization.     

Strategic investment in merchant transmission: The impact of capacity utilization rules

In this paper we look at the relative merits of two capacity utilization regimes in the merchant electricity transmission network: Must offer (Mo) where the entire capacity installed has to be made available for transmission and Non Must Offer (NMo) where some capacity could be withheld. We look at two specific cases: (i) demand for transmission varies across time, and (ii) vertical integration is allowed between investors in transmission network and electricity generators. In the case of time-varying demand under Mo, we find that a monopolist may underinvest in transmission when compared to NMo, although NMo may lead to more capacity withholding. In the case of vertical integration, we find that when the market power is with the generators of the exporting node, without vertical integration no welfare-enhancing merchant investment would occur, neither under Mo nor NMo. Further, if the generators in the importing node have market power, in case vertical integration is allowed, Mo is better than NMo. Finally, we also argue that the incentive to collude among various transmission network investors is mitigated with Mo in place.     

Cycles in deregulated electricity markets: Empirical evidence from two decades

In this article, we discuss the “cycle hypothesis” in electricity generation, which states that the introduction of deregulation in an electricity system might lead to sustained fluctuations of over- and under-capacity. The occurrence of cycles is one of the major threats for electricity markets as it affects the security of supply, and creates uncertainty in both the profitability of electricity companies and in consumer prices. We discuss the background for these cycles using analogies with other capital-intensive industries, along with evidence from the analysis of behavioral simulation models as well as from experimental electricity markets. Using data from the oldest deregulated markets we find support for the hypothesis in the case of the English and Chilean markets, based on an autocorrelation analysis. Evidence from the Nordpool market is more ambiguous, although we might be observing the first half of a cycle in generation capacity. Comparing a simulation of the English market performed in 1992 with the actual performance we can observe that the qualitative behavior of the model is consistent with the actual evolution. Finally, we discuss possible mechanisms for damping cycles in electricity generation, such as mothballing, capacity payments, and reliability markets.     

Investment prospects for geothermal power in El Salvador''s electricity market

A mixed-integer optimizing programming model was created to simulate capacity expansion for the electricity market in El Salvador. Various demand scenarios were constructed, under which capacity expansion alternatives were tested. Results showed that possible geothermal projects were able to meet the growing energy needs of El Salvador, while yielding relatively low prices for the end-user. A best case projection for 2020 showed an increased proportion of geothermal generation in the energy mix by 6% compared to the present mix.

Much of the current generating plants and planned capacity are distanced from the load center, San Salvador. In order to meet the country's increasing demand, it was found that generating capacity investment should be accompanied by transmission upgrades. Even when current conditions were simulated, transmission congestion appeared to be present. Results from some expansion scenarios showed that transmission congestion increased nodal prices despite the addition of further generating capacity.     

Investment,firm value,and risk for a system operator balancing energy grids

With the liberalization of energy markets integrated energy companies have separated into entities that specialize in production and/or transmission of energy. Transmission of energy requires balancing the grid to guarantee system security, which is performed by the (independent) system operator (SO). When the SO faces stochastic demand, grid balancing has sizeable consequences on current and future profits, and hence, on firm value and firm risk. We explore these value and risk consequences with and without an investment option to expand transmission capacity. We show that firm value consists of the value of the transmission capacity in place plus the value of a short put and a short call option that are the result of the SO's balancing actions. Firm risk without investment option is non-linear and determined by the short option positions. It is decreasing with increasing energy demand. The existence of an option to expand transmission capacity increases firm value and firm risk.     

Concentration in the European electricity industry: The internal market as solution?

This article offers an analysis of the present competitive and regulatory framework of the European electricity sector and the results achieved with the liberalisation process. Considering the reactions of incumbents to the liberalisation, the focus in this work is mainly on the problem of market concentration in the sector. The new trends toward the creation of “national champions” as well as recent mergers between gas suppliers and electricity producers raise serious concerns about abuses of market power and risk of future collusion. In particular, the strategic linkage of existing markets and the expansion into new ones are analyzed in the light of the multimarket contact theory. Considering investment in interconnection among Member States, the internal market issue is investigated as a solution to the “risks” coming from liberalisation.     

Simulation-based sensitivity analysis of an on-site hydrogen production unit in Hungary

This article examines the additional profit that can be achieved with the integrated operation of an on-site electrolyser, a hydrogen tank, a photovoltaic system, and a wind power plant based on Hungarian data from 2019. The results of the optimisation show that the system economically reduces the volatility of weather-dependent renewable production, so there is a promising demand-side management potential in coordination. We found that the operating profit is highest in April at EUR 19,416, 18,932 in July, and lowest at EUR 17,075 in January. The production curve of photovoltaic capacities is better matched to fuel demand, so increasing the share of solar energy results in lower balancing activity but higher profits. Increasing the size of the hydrogen storage and electrolyser, with constant hydrogen demand and prices, will cause a convergent increase in profits, however above a 10 kg storage capacity or 350 kW electrolyser capacity there is no substantial profit increase. In the case of the economically optimal asset size, there is a slight competition between the electricity market and the hydrogen distribution activity. The choice between the two activities depends on current electricity and hydrogen prices and the cost of unmet hydrogen demand.