Hindsight bias among physicians weighing the likelihood of diagnoses.

Examines findings showing that (1) those who know an event has occurred tend to claim that, if they had been asked to predict the event in advance, they would have been likely to do so; and (2) such Ss demonstrate hindsight bias to the extent that their "prediction" accuracy exceeds the accuracy of others who actually make the prediction without knowledge of the outcome. 75 practicing physicians were divided into 5 equal groups and given the same medical case history. The foresight group was asked to assign a probability estimate to each of 4 possible diagnoses. The 4 hindsight groups were asked to do the same, but each was told that a different 1 of the 4 possible diagnoses was correct. The hindsight groups, who were told that the least likely diagnoses were correct, assigned far greater probability estimates to these "correct" diagnoses than did the foresight group. Implications for physicians are discussed with respect to overconfident 2nd opinions, overconfidence in diagnostic accuracy, and inadequate appreciation of the original difficulty of diagnoses. (6 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"I knew we would win": Hindsight bias for favorable and unfavorable team decision outcomes.

This study examined hindsight bias for team decisions in a competitive setting in which groups attempted to outperform each other. It was anticipated that, because of self-serving mechanisms, individuals would show hindsight bias only when decision outcomes allowed them to take credit for their own team's success or to downgrade another team for being unsuccessful. MBA students playing a market simulation game made hindsight estimates regarding the likelihood that either their own or another team would perform well. Consistent with a self-serving interpretation, when decision outcomes were favorable individuals evaluating their own team, but not those evaluating another, showed hindsight bias. When outcomes were unfavorable individuals evaluating their own team did not show hindsight bias, but those evaluating another team did. Discussion focuses on implications of hindsight bias in team decision-making settings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A multiprocess account of hindsight bias in children.

In hindsight, that is, after receiving the correct answers to difficult questions, people's recall of their own prior answers tends to be biased toward the correct answers. We tested 139 participants from 3 age groups (9- and 12-year-olds and adults) in a hindsight-bias paradigm and found that all groups showed hindsight bias. Multinomial model-based analyses indicated that all age groups used the correct answers to reconstruct their original answers. In addition, the youngest group showed memory impairment caused by the presentation of the correct answers as well as an increased belief that they knew the correct answers all along. These results support a multiprocess explanation of hindsight bias in children. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 37(3) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2011-08992-005). On page 381, the notation in Figure 1 is incorrect. The corrected notations are discussed in the correction.] Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Bernstein et al. (2011).

Reports an error in "Hindsight bias from 3 to 95 years of age" by Daniel M. Bernstein, Edgar Erdfelder, Andrew N. Meltzoff, William Peria and Geoffrey R. Loftus (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2011[Mar], Vol 37[2], 378-391). On page 381, the notation in Figure 1 is incorrect. The corrected notations are discussed in the correction. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2011-02006-001.) Upon learning the outcome to a problem, people tend to believe that they knew it all along (hindsight bias). Here, we report the first study to trace the development of hindsight bias across the life span. One hundred ninety-four participants aged 3 to 95 years completed 3 tasks designed to measure visual and verbal hindsight bias. All age groups demonstrated hindsight bias on all 3 tasks; however, preschoolers and older adults exhibited more bias than older children and younger adults. Multinomial processing tree analyses of these data revealed that preschoolers' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them substituting the correct answer for their original answer in their recall (a qualitative error). Conversely, older adults' enhanced hindsight bias resulted from them forgetting their original answer and recalling an answer closer to, but not equal to, the correct answer (a quantitative error). We discuss these findings in relation to mechanisms of memory, perspective taking, theory of mind, and executive function. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight bias and the misinformation effect: separating blended recollections from other recollection types

Questioning the presence of "truly" blended recollections, we investigated two cognitive phenomena: hindsight bias and the misinformation effect. At first glance, both phenomena seem to result from the same interference process, whereby the subsequent encoding of conflicting information impairs the recall of earlier encoded (original) material. Experiment 1 compared both paradigms using numerical items as material: hindsight as well as misinformation subjects revealed the same mean shift in their recollection of the original values. The additional analysis of a multinomial model, however, suggested that blended recollections occurred in the hindsight condition only. The misinformation effect, on the other hand, appeared to be based on averaging across two different recollection types. Experiment 2 further investigated how the memory-trace strength influences the likelihood for blended recollections to occur. In a misinformation procedure, one group of subjects read the original information twice, another group thrice. Again, recollections were similarly shifted towards the misinformation in both groups. But the multinomial model revealed that only the second group (with a stronger memory representation of the original information) showed blended recollections. Taken together, these results suggested that: (1) a minimum memory-trace strength of the original information must be met for blended recollections to occur; and (2) hindsight bias and the misinformation effect--though superficially similar--are induced by different cognitive processes.     

Hindsight bias: A by-product of knowledge updating?

With the benefit of feedback about the outcome of an event, people's recalled judgments are typically closer to the outcome of the event than their original judgments were. It has been suggested that this hindsight bias may be due to a reconstruction process of the prior judgment. A model of such a process is proposed that assumes that knowledge is updated after feedback and that reconstruction is based on the updated knowledge. Consistent with the model's predictions, the results of 2 studies show that knowledge after feedback is systematically shifted toward feedback, and that assisting retrieval of the knowledge prior to feedback reduces hindsight bias. In addition, the model accounts for about 75% of cases in which either hindsight bias or reversed hindsight bias occurred. The authors conclude that hindsight bias can be understood as a by-product of an adaptive process, namely the updating of knowledge after feedback. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Limited conscious monitoring of motor performance in normal subjects

Normal subjects traced sagittal lines on a graphic tablet using a stylus held in their right hand. The hand was hidden by a mirror in which they saw the lines projected from a computer screen. In normal trials, the line seen in the mirror exactly corresponded to the traced line. In perturbed trials, a bias was introduced by the computer, so that the line appeared to deviate in one direction (right or left) by a variable angle (2, 5, 7 or 10 degrees). Subjects consistently displaced their hand in the opposite direction for producing a visually sagittal line. After each trial, they were asked in which direction they thought their hand had moved. In perturbed trials, they grossly underestimated the hand deviation. In addition, a post-hoc analysis revealed that one group of subjects misperceived the direction of their hand movement in the direction opposite to the perturbation (Group 1, including 9 Ss), whereas the other group gave responses in the correct direction (Group 2, including 4 Ss). In a second session using the same experimental paradigm, a motor response was asked for: subjects had to indicate the perceived direction of their hand during each trial by drawing a line with their eyes closed. Again, responses indicated a poor conscious monitoring of motor performance. These results suggest that normal subjects are not aware of signals generated by their own movements.     

False beliefs maintenance for fear-related information in obsessive-compulsive disorder: An investigation with the hindsight paradigm.

The present study tested whether participants with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) overestimate the incidence frequency of OCD-relevant phenomena and display a decreased hindsight bias for concern-related information, which may represent a maintenance factor for OCD. Thirty participants with OCD and 39 control participants were requested to estimate the incidence frequency of 8 events in each of 4 domains: washing-relevant, checking-relevant, negative, or neutral. Subsequently, participants received the correct statistics for all items and were requested to affectively appraise these. Two hours later participants had to reproduce their initial estimates. No differences emerged between participants with OCD and control participants regarding initial estimates. In case the frequency of an OCD-relevant item was initially largely overestimated, control participants expressed more relief when confronted with the correct solution than participants with OCD, especially for washing-relevant items. The recalled estimates showed a typical hindsight bias (i.e., the reproduced estimates were biased toward the correct response), but with no difference between groups. In sum, participants were normal in their subjective estimates of OCD-relevant events, and there was no evidence for a heightened maintenance of false beliefs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight bias doesn't always come easy: Causal models, cognitive effort, and creeping determinism.

Creeping determinism, a form of hindsight bias, refers to people's hindsight perceptions of events as being determined or inevitable. This article proposes, on the basis of a causal-model theory of creeping determinism, that the underlying processes are effortful, and hence creeping determinism should disappear when individuals lack the cognitive resources to make sense of an outcome. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were asked to read a scenario while they were under either low or high processing load. Participants who had the cognitive resources to make sense of the outcome perceived it as more probable and necessary than did participants under high processing load or participants who did not receive outcome information. Experiment 3 was designed to separate 2 postulated subprocesses and showed that the attenuating effect of processing load on hindsight bias is not due to a disruption of the retrieval of potential causal antecedents but to a disruption of their evaluation. Together the 3 experiments show that the processes underlying creeping determinism are effortful, and they highlight the crucial role of causal reasoning in the perception of past events. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The interplay of memory and judgment processes in effects of aging on hindsight bias.

Hindsight bias is the phenomenon that after people are presented with the correct answer to a question, their judgment regarding their own past answer to this question is biased toward the correct answer. In three experiments, younger and older adults gave numerical responses to general-knowledge questions and later attempted to recall their responses. For some questions, the correct answer was provided during recall (Experiment 1) or before recall (Experiments 2 and 3). Multinomial model-based analyses show age differences in both recollection bias and reconstruction bias when the correct judgment was in working memory during the recall phase. The authors discuss implications for theories of cognitive aging and theories of hindsight bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Decision makers' hindsight bias after receiving favorable and unfavorable feedback.

Two studies examined if decision makers show hindsight bias when feedback reflects upon their judgment. Study 1 investigated whether decision making heightens cognitive activity, and thereby reduces hindsight effects, or triggers self-serving mechanisms that prompt hindsight bias only when outcomes match favorably with decisions. Business students decided if they would purchase a company's stock, then received no feedback or feedback that the stock value increased or decreased. Consistent with a self-serving interpretation, relative to no-feedback participants, those whose outcomes matched favorably with their decisions showed hindsight bias and had a higher proportion of internal thoughts. In Study 2, favorable-feedback participants again showed hindsight bias, and had higher recall for decision-supportive items, but not when their tendency to take credit for success was suppressed. Discussion focuses on implications of decision makers' hindsight bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

When debiasing backfires: Accessible content and accessibility experiences in debiasing hindsight.

Two studies demonstrated that attempts to debias hindsight by thinking about alternative outcomes may backfire and traced this to the influence of subjective accessibility experiences. Participants listed either few (2) or many (10) thoughts about how an event might have turned out otherwise. Listing many counterfactual thoughts was experienced as difficult and consistently increased the hindsight bias, presumably because the experienced difficulty suggested that there were not many ways in which the event might have turned out otherwise. No significant hindsight effects were obtained when participants listed only a few counterfactual thoughts, a task subjectively experienced as easy. The interplay of accessible content and subjective accessibility experiences in the hindsight bias is discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal Attribution and Hindsight Bias for Economic Developments.

Hindsight bias for economic developments was studied, with particular focus on the moderating effects of attitudes and causal attributions. Participants (N = 263) rated the likelihood of several economic developments 6 months before and 6 months after the euro introduction in 2002. Hindsight bias occurred selectively for attitude-consistent economic developments: Euro supporters showed stronger hindsight bias for positive developments than for negative ones; euro opponents showed the opposite pattern. Causal attribution further moderated the hindsight bias: Participants who perceived a strong connection between the euro introduction and specific economic developments showed higher attitude-consistent hindsight bias than participants who perceived those developments as unrelated to the euro. It is argued that hindsight bias serves to stabilize subjective representations of the economy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The confidence–hindsight mirror effect in judgment: An accuracy-assessment model for the knew-it-all-along phenomenon.

This article presents a model for the "knew-it-all-along effect": the accuracy-assessment model. The model is based on the assumption that participants in hindsight studies use the strategy of trying to reproduce the distribution of correct and wrong responses that seem appropriate in view of their assessment of the expected accuracy. The model provides precise, quantitative, parameter-free predictions about the extent and direction of hindsight bias. In particular, the model predicts good calibration in hindsight and a systematic relation between over/underconfidence in foresight and hindsight bias, referred to as the confidence-hindsight mirror effect. A novel and unique prediction by the model is a reversal of the knew-it-all-along effect in judgment domains characterized by underconfidence in foresight. This reversed hindsight phenomenon and other predictions by the model were tested and confirmed in 4 experiments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Preparatory action and belief in the probable occurrence of future events.

This study was conducted to determine the influence of behaving as if an event will occur on the belief that it will occur. It was hypothesized that such behavior should increase the belief in the likelihood of the event occurring. Ss (volunteer female high school students) were told that ? the Ss who volunteered would have to take an exam, but not whether they were in that group (50% probability). All Ss were required to do some preparatory study; ? were told to memorize the data in preparatory for the exam, ? to only acquaint themselves casually with it. Ss were then asked their assessment of the probability that they were included in the group to be tested. A larger percentage of the group that had to make the greatest effort (memorize vs. acquaint) believed they would have to take the test. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Probability matching: Encouraging optimal responding in humans.

Two hundred undergraduate students (mean age 20.4 yrs) participated in a repeated-trials binary choice procedure in which choice of one outcome was correct on 75% of trials. Subjects received 192 trials and were divided into 5 conditions: 1) control; 2) subjects were given the actual probabilities; 3) subjects were told if they did well they could leave early; 4) competition condition; 5) midway through the task subjects were asked to recommend a strategy for another subject. Half of the subjects in each group were told that the best they could do was to be correct on 75% of the trials. This manipulation permitted assessment of the hypothesis that subjects in probability-matching tasks are seeking a strategy that will be correct on 100% of the trials. The results partially confirmed this hypothesis. In addition, two of the variables improved performance significantly (giving probabilities and asking subjects to recommend a strategy). However, while subjects in all groups improved significantly over trials, optimal choice did not occur in this task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Hindsight: Biased judgments of past events after the outcomes are known.

The hindsight bias is the tendency for people with outcome knowledge to believe falsely that they would have predicted the reported outcome of an event. This article reviews empirical research relevant to hindsight phenomena. The influence of outcome knowledge, termed creeping determinism, was initially hypothesized to result from the immediate and automatic integration of the outcome into a person's knowledge of an event. Later research has identified at least 4 plausible, general strategies for responding to hindsight questions. These explanations postulate that outcome information affects the selection of evidence to make a judgment, the evidence evaluation, the manner in which evidence is integrated, or the response generation process. It is also likely, in some situations, that a combination of 2 or more of these mechanisms produces the observed hindsight effects. We provide an interpretation of the creeping determinism hypothesis in terms of inferences made to reevaluate case-specific evidence once the relevant outcome is known and conclude that it is the most common mechanism underlying observed hindsight effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Self-discrepancies and emotional vulnerability: How magnitude, accessibility, and type of discrepancy influence affect.

Two studies with 129 undergraduates examined whether the type of emotional change experienced by individuals is influenced by the magnitude and accessibility of the different types of self-discrepancies they possess. In both studies, Ss filled out a measure of self-discrepancy a few weeks prior to the experimental session. Ss were asked to list up to 10 attributes each for their actual self, their ideal self (their own or others' hopes and goals for them), and their ought self (their own or others' beliefs about their duty and obligations). In Study 1, Ss asked to imagine a positive or negative event who had a predominant actual–ideal discrepancy felt more dejected on a mood measure and wrote more slowly on a writing-speed task in the negative event condition than in the positive event condition. Ss with a predominant actual–ought discrepancy felt more agitated and wrote more quickly in the negative event condition. In Study 2, Ss high or low in both kinds of discrepancies were either asked to discuss their own and their parents' hopes and goals for them (ideal priming) or asked to discuss their own and their parents' beliefs concerning their duty and obligations (ought priming). For high-discrepancy Ss, ideal priming increased their dejection, whereas ought priming increased their agitation. (59 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attributions as inferences and explanations: Conjunction effects.

When asked to estimate the probability of an interpretation for an event, observers may either assess whether the event can give rise to the interpretation (an inference set) or assess whether the interpretation can give rise to the event (an explanation set). These two strategies may moderate the conjunction effects (Leddo, Abelson, & Gross, 1984)—attributors' tendency to assign lower probabilities to single-reason interpretations than to their conjunctions. Our two studies showed that explanation-set instructions (e.g., "assess the probability that the interpretation could be the reason for the event") produced stronger conjunction effects than inference-set instructions (e.g., "assess the probability that the interpretation could be inferred from the event"). This Set (inference or explanation)?×?Reason (multiple or single) interaction was not affected by whether the events involved voluntary or involuntary behavior or by whether they described events that happened or failed to happen. In a third study, we found that subjects in an inference set were more likely to report that they estimated probability of the interpretation (as opposed to probability of the behavior) than were subjects in an explanation set. The extent to which the explanation set may account for conjunction effects obtained in other studies was discussed. Possible implications and determinants of the inference-explanation distinction were also considered. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)