Folk Intuitions, Asymmetry, and Intentional Side Effects.

An agent S wants to A and knows that if she A-s she will also bring about B. S does not care at all about B. S then A-s, also bringing about B. Did she intentionally bring B about? Joshua Knobe (2003b) has recently argued that, according to the folk concept of intentional action, the answer depends on B's moral significance. In particular, if B is reprehensible, people are more likely to say that S intentionally brought it about. Knobe defends this position with empirical facts about how ordinary people use the adjective 'intentionally.' Knobe's results are consistent with the thesis that the concept of intentional action is fundamentally evaluative. There is an alternative hypothesis, however, which can account for Knobe's data and which keeps the concept of intentional action within the purview of action theory. The current author suggests that the following conditions are jointly sufficient for a side effect E, produced by S's action A, being intentional: (i) S knows that E will (or is likely to) occur as a result of A-ing, (ii) bringing about E counts against A-ing (from the S's perspective), and (iii) S does not try to keep E from occurring. Known immoral side effects will always, from the folk's perspective, satisfy condition (ii) of this hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Intentionality and Moral Judgments in Commonsense Thought About Action.

The concept of intentional action occupies a central place in commonsense or folk psychological thought. This paper describes two psychological experiments designed by the author and Joshua Knobe. The experiments investigate further some questions that arose from Knobe's work on responsibility and intentionality beliefs in folk psychology. They show that there is reason to doubt that subjects' beliefs about the intentionality of side effects are simply a product of their beliefs about the agent's responsibility for these effects. The author also considers how the experimental results bear on Knobe's most recent views about the relation of subjects' value judgments about side effects and their intentionality judgments. What the experimental results suggest is that subjects do not simply use either their belief that a side effect is bad, or that the agent is responsible for it, to determine their view about the intentionality of its production. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Folk Psychology and Moral Evaluation.

Assessments of an action done intentionally, as we might expect, influence judgments of moral responsibility. What we don't expect is the converse--judgments of moral responsibility influencing assessments of whether an action was done intentionally. Yet this is precisely how people decide, according to Knobe (2003, 2004) and Mendlow (2004) and Nadelhoffer (2004a). I evaluate whether the studies actually support this biasing effect. I argue that the studies are at best inconclusive and that even if they demonstrated that people fall under the biasing effect, such tendencies ought to have no bearing upon philosophical analyses of the concept of intentional action. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy: Understanding the Role of Evaluative Reasoning in Folk Psychology.

The authors begin this article by distinguishing judgments that an agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy from judgments that a behavior is good or bad. Their inquiry was concerned to determine which of these two kinds of judgment influences people's application of the concept of intentional action. The available evidence seems to indicate that people's application of the concept is influenced by judgments of goodness and badness without the mediation of judgments of praise and blame. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Knowledge, moral praise, and moral side effects.

Thomas Nadelhoffer (2004) claims that a morally praiseworthy agent cannot knowingly produce a morally positive side effect. I claim that the argument Nadelhoffer uses to establish this claim has two false premises. The two false premises are: (1) If something is a side effect, then it is not desired or intended; and (2) If agent S is morally praiseworthy and knows that her performing p will produce a morally positive q, then q forms part of S's reason for p-ing. I offer a counterexample that shows the falsity of (1) and (2). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fringe benefits, side effects, and indifference: A reply to Feltz.

In a previous paper, I suggested that if an agent is a morally praiseworthy person and one of the consequences of the action she knowingly brings about is morally positive, then this consequence isn't really a side effect for the agent. Adam Feltz (see record 2008-01492-011) has recently developed a case that purportedly puts pressure on my account of side effects. In the present paper, I am going to argue that Feltz's purported counter-example fails to undermine my view even if it happens to shed new light on the difference between negative side effects and positive fringe benefits. After responding to Feltz's criticisms, I will conclude by presenting the results of a pilot study that provide prima facie support for my view. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Summary of Praise and Blame.

A summary of the major arguments of PRAISE AND BLAME, both critical and constructive, is offered. The overarching objectives of the book are set forth, making clear the radical form of moral realism defended. Additional material is presented to justify the attention paid to historical vs. contemporary alternatives to moral realism, the latter found to be at once indebted to the former but often less developed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Intentional forgetting can increase, not decrease, residual influences of to-be-forgotten information.

Intentionally forgotten information remains in memory at essentially full strength, as measured by recognition and priming, but access to that information is impaired, as measured by recall. Given that pattern, it seemed plausible that intentionally forgotten information might have a greater impact on certain subsequent judgments than would intentionally remembered information. In 2 experiments, participants cued to forget nonfamous names were subsequently more likely to make false attributions of fame to those names than were participants instructed to remember them. These findings implicate retrieval inhibition as a potent factor in the interplay of recollection and priming in memory and judgment. They also point to possible unintended consequences of instructions to forget, suppress, or disregard in legal or social settings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Foreknowledge, caring, and the side-effect effect in young children.

Children and adults often judge that the side effects of the actions of an uncaring story agent have been intentional if the effects are harmful but not if these are beneficial, creating an asymmetrical "side-effect" effect. The authors report 3 experiments involving 4- and 5-year-olds (N = 188) designed to clarify the role of foreknowledge and caring in judgments of intentionality. Many children showed the side-effect effect even if agents were explicitly described as lacking foreknowledge of the outcome. Similarly, when agents were described as possessing foreknowledge but their caring state was unspecified, children more often judged that the negative, compared with the positive, effects of agents' actions were brought about intentionally. Regardless of foreknowledge, children infrequently judged positive outcomes as intentional when agent caring was unspecified, and they gave few attributions of intentionality when agents were described as having a false belief about the outcome. These results testify to the robustness of the side-effect effect and highlight the extent to which children's intentionality judgments are asymmetrical. The findings suggest developmental continuity in the link between reasoning about morality and intentionality. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The one that does, leads: Action relations influence the perceived temporal order of graspable objects.

Perception and action are influenced by the “possibilities for action” in the environment. Neuropsychological studies (e.g., Riddoch, Humphreys, Edwards, Baker, & Willson, 2003) have demonstrated that objects that are perceived to be interacting (e.g., a corkscrew going toward the top of a wine bottle) are perceptually integrated into a functional unit, facilitating report of both objects. In addition, patients with parietal damage tend to report the “active” item of the pair (the corkscrew in the above example) when the objects are positioned for action, overriding their spatial bias toward the ipsilesional side. Using a temporal order judgment task we show for the first time that normal viewers judge that active objects appear earlier when they are positioned correctly for action. This effect is not dependent on a learned relationship between objects, or on the active object being integrated at a perceptual level with the object it is paired with. The data suggest that actions afforded by a correctly positioned active object permeate normal perceptual judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Biases in Social Comparative Judgments: The Role of Nonmotivated Factors in Above-Average and Comparative-Optimism Effects.

Biases in social comparative judgments, such as those illustrated by above-average and comparative-optimism effects, are often regarded as products of motivated reasoning (e.g., self-enhancement). These effects, however, can also be produced by information-processing limitations or aspects of judgment processes that are not necessarily biased by motivational factors. In this article, the authors briefly review motivational accounts of biased comparative judgments, introduce a 3-stage model for understanding how people make comparative judgments, and then describe how various nonmotivational factors can influence the 3 stages of the comparative judgment process. Finally, the authors discuss several unresolved issues highlighted by their analysis, such as the interrelation between motivated and nonmotivated sources of bias and the influence of nonmotivated sources of bias on behavior. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Abstraction, Inference, and Acceptance in Children's Processing of an Adult Model's Moral Judgments.

The effects of a common dimension within a model's performance on different aspects of observational learning were examined in two experiments. Children observed an adult female make a series of choices between alternative solutions to hypothetical moral dilemma situations. In the common-dimension conditions, the model either selected behavioral options that consistently reflected some form of social responsibility or picked solutions that consistently reflected the motive of avoiding harm to self. In the no-common-dimension condition, the model chose half social responsibility and half harm-avoidance answers. In Experiment 1 we tested children's ability to recall the model's moral judgments given the presence or absence of a common dimension. In Experiment 2 we examined children's attributions concerning the unobserved behavior of the model and their acceptance of the rule governing her responses as a guide for their own choices. As predicted, the presence of a common dimension facilitated recall of the model's choices, led children to infer that similar consistency would be found in her judgments about other moral issues, and resulted in modifications of the children's own responses to a test of moral reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Children's Moral Judgments as a Function of Intention, Damage, and an Actor's Physical Harm.

A study was conducted to examine the moral judgments of kindergartners, third graders, and fifth graders with respect to physical harm to the actor. The subjects were exposed to stories varying in terms of intention, damage, and harm to the actor. Younger children rated the hurt actors more negatively than unhurt actors; however, this distinction disappeared by fifth grade. It is suggested that young children's belief in the notion of immanent justice accounted for the obtained results. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of variation of profile format on intelligence and sociability judgments.

In a variety of laboratory and practical settings, persons are confronted with a profile of scores from which a more global judgment is required. Profile scores are commonly displayed in either a percentile or T score format. This study investigates the effects of variation of these 2 formats upon judgments of intelligence and sociability. 2 similarly designed experiments were conducted in which 36 undergraduate Ss each made 600 judgments from profiles in the 2 formats. A regression model was fitted to the data for each judge. Relative to T scores, the percentile format was found to be associated with greater variance of judgments, higher reliability, and higher multiple correlations. These findings support a view that judgments from profiles are influenced not only by the underlying meaning of the plotted scores but by their graphical location as well. From Psyc Abstracts 36:05:5HE14K. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Subjectivity, intentionality, and the emergence of reality testing in early infancy.

The peck-a-boo behavior of a young infant is used to illustrate early processes of intentionality and reality testing. Based on the observations made in this study, as well as findings from similar studies of face-to-face behavior in infants, a general paradigm of cyclical engagement-disengagement of objects on the part of infants is described and discussed. Observations of the transfer of engagement-disengagement behavior on the part of the infant from oral to visual modalities are presented. The observations are discussed from a psychoanalytic object-relational standpoint with integrations of cognitive theory. Implications for an emerging subjectivity in the infant are briefly addressed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of transdermal nicotine on symptoms, moods, and cardiovascular activity in the everyday lives of smokers and nonsmokers with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

The aim of the study was to test the self-medication hypothesis by examining the effects of nicotine in the everyday lives of smokers and nonsmokers with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Fifty-two adults with ADHD (25 abstinent smokers and 27 nonsmokers) participated in a double-blind placebo controlled study with one nicotine patch condition and one placebo patch condition in counterbalanced order. Each condition continued for two consecutive days in which patches were administered each morning. The effects of nicotine on ADHD symptoms, moods, and side effects were assessed with electronic diaries. Cardiovascular activity was recorded with ambulatory blood pressure monitors and physical activity was monitored with actigraphs. Nicotine reduced reports of ADHD symptoms by 8% and negative moods by 9%, independent of smoking status. In addition, nicotine increased cardiovascular activity during the first 3 to 6 hours after nicotine patch administration. The results support the self-medication hypothesis for nicotine in adults with ADHD and suggest that smoking cessation and prevention efforts for individuals with ADHD will need to address both the symptom reducing and mood enhancing effects of nicotine. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Procedural fairness, outcome favorability, and judgments of an authority's responsibility.

Fairness theory (R. Folger & R. Cropanzano, 1998, 2001) postulates that, particularly in the face of unfavorable outcomes, employees judge an organizational authority to be more responsible for their outcomes when the authority exhibits lower procedural fairness. Three studies lent empirical support to this notion. Furthermore, 2 of the studies showed that attributions of responsibility to the authority mediated the relationship between the authority's procedural fairness and employees' reactions to unfavorable outcomes. The findings (a) provide support for a key assumption of fairness theory, (b) help to account for the pervasive interactive effect of procedural fairness and outcome favorability on employees' attitudes and behaviors, and (c) contribute to an emerging trend in justice research concerned with how people use procedural fairness information to make attributions of responsibility for their outcomes. Practical implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research also are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

To do or not to do: Desirability and consistency mediate judgments of regret.

In 4 studies, the authors demonstrated that when errors associated with action were inconsistent with decision makers' orientation, they were undesirable and produced more regret than did errors associated with inaction. Conversely, when errors associated with action were consistent with decision makers' orientation, they were desirable and produced less regret than did errors associated with inaction. Desirability and consistency mediated this relationship, independent of mutability. These results were obtained when judgments and decisions to act or not act were made in close temporal proximity to one another as well as when participants reflected on their past decisions. The authors provide an analysis of when counterfactuals would and would not be expected to mediate judgments of normality and regret. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)