The Good, the Bad and the Blameworthy: Understanding the Role of Evaluative Reasoning in Folk Psychology.

The authors begin this article by distinguishing judgments that an agent is praiseworthy or blameworthy from judgments that a behavior is good or bad. Their inquiry was concerned to determine which of these two kinds of judgment influences people's application of the concept of intentional action. The available evidence seems to indicate that people's application of the concept is influenced by judgments of goodness and badness without the mediation of judgments of praise and blame. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral anger, but not moral disgust, responds to intentionality.

We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely explained by the coactivation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, whereas disgust responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by different cues in a moral situation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Fringe benefits, side effects, and indifference: A reply to Feltz.

In a previous paper, I suggested that if an agent is a morally praiseworthy person and one of the consequences of the action she knowingly brings about is morally positive, then this consequence isn't really a side effect for the agent. Adam Feltz (see record 2008-01492-011) has recently developed a case that purportedly puts pressure on my account of side effects. In the present paper, I am going to argue that Feltz's purported counter-example fails to undermine my view even if it happens to shed new light on the difference between negative side effects and positive fringe benefits. After responding to Feltz's criticisms, I will conclude by presenting the results of a pilot study that provide prima facie support for my view. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reanalysis of experimental halo effects.

Data on ratings of individuals, obtained under 2 conditions of judgment and published in 1956, were reanalyzed by a more complete analysis of variance. The usual interaction between raters and individuals, called a halo effect, was found but it was not influenced by judgment conditions intended to maximize it. Hence, the evidence for halo effect due to judging operations remains questionable. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the role of causal intervention in multiple-cue judgment: Positive and negative effects on learning.

Previous studies have suggested better learning when people actively intervene rather than when they passively observe the stimuli in a judgment task. In 4 experiments, the authors investigated the hypothesis that this improvement is associated with a shift from exemplar memory to cue abstraction. In a multiple-cue judgment task with continuous cues, the data replicated the improvement with intervention and participants who experimented more actively produced more accurate judgments. In a multiple-cue judgment task with binary cues, intervention produced poorer accuracy and participants who experimented more actively produced poorer judgments. These results provide no support for a representational shift but suggest that the improvement with active intervention may be limited to certain tasks and environments. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of different patterns on outcomes of problem-solving discussion.

Using an analysis of variance design, some effects of 3 patterns for problem-solving discussion were investigated experimentally. All 3 patterns began with an analysis of the problem, but differed thereafter: ideation-criteria (A), criteria-ideation (B), and solution (C). 135 students Ss were randomly assigned to 27 groups of 5 Ss and a trained leader. All groups discussed 3 problems, using each pattern once. Patterns A and B, incorporating deferred judgment, yielded significantly more ideas (p X2, p     

"Letter to the Editor": Reply.

Responds to the comments by D. E. Berlyne (see record 2007-02140-027) on the original article by P. O. Davidson (see record 2007-02137-003) on "Graduate training and research funding for clinical psychology in Canada." Dr. Berlyne's general point is well taken. The intention of Dr. Davidson was to provoke not to offend and he apparently missed the 'fine line distinction' in the paragraph to which Dr. Berlyne refers. The word 'hobby' need not be considered as pejorative term in the 'hobby-horse' sense. In using this term Davidson was indicating that while studies ABOUT the rat may be a favorite (and valuable) research subject for some researchers he was not prepared to assume that it is the main business of psychology. Davidson agrees completely with Dr. Berlyne that much of this research can be justified as both necessary and valuable but given our limited research resources these days and increasing governmental involvement in directions of research spending, such justification must be given and too often is not. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Knowledge, moral praise, and moral side effects.

Thomas Nadelhoffer (2004) claims that a morally praiseworthy agent cannot knowingly produce a morally positive side effect. I claim that the argument Nadelhoffer uses to establish this claim has two false premises. The two false premises are: (1) If something is a side effect, then it is not desired or intended; and (2) If agent S is morally praiseworthy and knows that her performing p will produce a morally positive q, then q forms part of S's reason for p-ing. I offer a counterexample that shows the falsity of (1) and (2). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Developmental studies of perception.

Review of an enormous special literature on age changes of perception. 3 trends: (a) assimilation effects decrease with age while contrast effects increase, (b) errors of judgment in verticality sharply diminish, (c) incomplete and very complex patterns are difficult for the child. Most unresolved questions lie in the 1st trend. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Testing the density hypothesis: Reply to Krumhansl.

In a commentary on Corter (1987), Krumhansl (1988) re-analyzed the data from Experiment 1 and found an effect of stimulus context on similarity ratings involving two of the stimuli (although not those stimuli that were the targets of the density manipulation). It is suggested that the effect reflects an anchoring phenomenon that takes place due to the special nature of the stimuli involved. A general question is raised concerning the interpretation of the density parameters in Krumhansl's (1978) distance–density model, because this interpretation seems crucial to designing tests of the density hypothesis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mediators of a brief hypnosis intervention to control side effects in breast surgery patients: Response expectancies and emotional distress.

Objective: The present study was designed to test the hypotheses that response expectancies and emotional distress mediate the effects of an empirically validated presurgical hypnosis intervention on postsurgical side effects (i.e., pain, nausea, and fatigue). Method: Women (n = 200) undergoing breast-conserving surgery (mean age = 48.50 years; 63% White, 15% Hispanic, 13% African American, and 9% other) were randomized to a hypnosis or to an attention control group. Prior to surgery, patients completed assessments of hypothesized mediators (response expectancies and emotional distress), and following surgery, patients completed assessments of outcome variables (pain, nausea, and fatigue). Results: Structural equation modeling revealed the following: (a) Hypnotic effects on postsurgical pain were partially mediated by pain expectancy (p p = .12); (b) hypnotic effects on postsurgical nausea were partially mediated by presurgical distress (p = .02) but not by nausea expectancy (p = .10); and (c) hypnotic effects on postsurgical fatigue were partially mediated by both fatigue expectancy (p = .0001) and presurgical distress (p = .02). Conclusions: The results demonstrate the mediational roles of response expectancies and emotional distress in clinical benefits associated with a hypnotic intervention for breast cancer surgical patients. More broadly, the results improve understanding of the underlying mechanisms responsible for hypnotic phenomena and suggest that future hypnotic interventions target patient expectancies and distress to improve postsurgical recovery. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A medication screening tool for cognitive aging researchers.

A Web-based medication screening toll that provides researchers with information about side effects associated with medications commonly used by older participants is described. this tool can be used for research purposes to better separate the effects of normal, healthy aging processes from the deleterious effects often associated with medication usage. Researchers can use this tool, called SMART (Screening Medications: Aging Research Taxonomy), to (a) obtain information pertaining to the cognitive, sensory, and motor side effects associated with specific medications, and (b) screen medications in their research for side effect severity. The Web address for the tool is www.psychology.gatech.edu/SMART. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Leong.

Reply to the comment by Che Kan Leong (see record 2007-07332-017). Downing and Leong take issue with my statement, "The authors recommend some variation of the IQ/achievement discrepancy formula as a definition of reading disability." It appears to me that they are, in fact, recommending an IQ/achievement discrepancy formula. The source for my statement is the discussion on pages 305-306 of Downing and Leong, in particular, the statement on p. 306: "Overall, the regression approach is generally sound and statistically defensible." The regression approach that Downing and Leong discuss is one in which a child's reading level (as measured by a particular test) is related to the child's score on an IQ test. As I noted in my review, this type of equation assumes that IQ and reading can be measured independently are likely to be deficient in the reading-disabled individual, a child with a real reading disability may have spuriously low IQ scores but may not be diagnosed as reading disabled because of a low IQ score. Until investigators agree on some operational definitions or at least attempt to study questions as a function of different operational definitions, advancement in this field will be difficult to achieve. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Beckman-Bishop.

Responds to the paper by L. Beckman and B.R. Bishop (see record 1990-56846-001 and asserts that the final section of that paper on "Safeguards" is central to the research ethics issue and define the relationship between the experimenter and research subjects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Stagner.

This is written in response to Ross Stagner's comments (see record 2005-11890-003) concerning the publication of books of readings. First, it is my experience that it is far easier to author a book than edit readings. I don't assume that people who write the original articles that finally find themselves in a book of readings are any more creative than the editors. I don't know how much of a reputation any one gets from authorship or editing a readings book. As for "good solid cash" (to use Stagner's words) I have yet to see some and my experience is not unique. I have paid out a considerable amount of money in secretarial fees alone. If I recoup the money I have expended I will be fortunate. As for so-called profits, if I send one copy of the book to each author and his co-author(s) who contributed an article for a book of readings--well, there goes the "good solid cash." Second, there are many articles that are rescued from the scrap pile by a book of readings. My suggestion is that after the editor of a readings book recoups his expenses in preparing the book, copies of the book be sent to clinics or libraries which are on a limited budget. Copies may even be sent to some of the "underprivileged nations." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Fiedorowicz.

We appreciate the fact that Fiedorowicz has chosen to comment on our review of Reading disabilities (see record 2007-03865-001) because this provides us with an opportunity to expand on some of our previous remarks. However, since these positive features already had received coverage in the review by Goodacre (1982), and since over two-thirds of the book dealt with the authors' own research (which was not discussed in any depth by Goodacre), we chose to restrict ourselves mainly to concerns raised by this research. Our response will have the same focus. To begin with, there are a number of misleading statements in Fiedorowicz's letter that distort both the tone and the content of our review. Fiedorowicz contends, contrary to the conclusion that we reached in our review, that "distinct neuropsychological profiles were determined corresponding to each subtype." The second issue raised by Fiedorowicz deals with our concern about the construct validity of the various test items employed in this investigation. The third issue in Fiedorowicz's letter centres on the interpretation of the results reported by Doehring et al. for the Type S subjects. The last issue of any substance in this letter has to do with the label "oral reading deficit" given by the authors to the Type O subjects. In addition to these four issues there is one final point that we believe also merits a reply. In referring rather pessimistically to the matter of treatment in our review, we were merely repeating comments made by the authors themselves in Chapter 11. Because this review was written in August 1983, we were of course unaware of the information in the paper cited by Fiedorowicz, which was not presented until February 1984. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Greenwald.

Discusses Greenwald's (see 40:6) analysis of the implications of Nuttin's work for the status of the law of effect. The argument that Nuttin's findings constitute a decisive refutation of the hypothesis of automatic action of rewards and punishments is examined. It is concluded, largely on methodological grounds, that Nuttin's experiments failed to test the validity of the law of effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)