Provably secure authenticated key agreement scheme for distributed mobile cloud computing services

With the rapid development of mobile cloud computing, the security becomes a crucial part of communication systems in a distributed mobile cloud computing environment. Recently, in 2015, Tsai and Lo proposed a privacy-aware authentication scheme for distributed mobile cloud computing services. In this paper, we first analyze the Tsai–Lo’s scheme and show that their scheme is vulnerable to server impersonation attack, and thus, their scheme fails to achieve the secure mutual authentication. In addition, we also show that Tsai–Lo’s scheme does not provide the session-key security (SK-security) and strong user credentials’ privacy when ephemeral secret is unexpectedly revealed to the adversary. In order to withstand these security pitfalls found in Tsai–Lo’s scheme, we propose a provably secure authentication scheme for distributed mobile cloud computing services. Through the rigorous security analysis, we show that our scheme achieves SK-security and strong credentials’ privacy and prevents all well-known attacks including the impersonation attack and ephemeral secrets leakage attack. Furthermore, we simulate our scheme for the formal security analysis using the widely-accepted AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool, and show that our scheme is secure against passive and active attacks including the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. More security functionalities along with reduced computational costs for the mobile users make our scheme more appropriate for the practical applications as compared to Tsai–Lo’s scheme and other related schemes. Finally, to demonstrate the practicality of the scheme, we evaluate the proposed scheme using the broadly-accepted NS-2 network simulator.     

A secure and efficient ECC-based user anonymity-preserving session initiation authentication protocol using smart card

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a signaling communications protocol, which has been chosen for controlling multimedia communication in 3G mobile networks. The proposed authentication in SIP is HTTP digest based authentication. Recently, Tu et al. presented an improvement of Zhang et al.’s smart card-based authenticated key agreement protocol for SIP. Their scheme efficiently resists password guessing attack. However, in this paper, we analyze the security of Tu et al.’s scheme and demonstrate their scheme is still vulnerable to user’s impersonation attack, server spoofing attack and man-in-the middle attack. We aim to propose an efficient improvement on Tu et al.’s scheme to overcome the weaknesses of their scheme, while retaining the original merits of their scheme. Through the rigorous informal and formal security analysis, we show that our scheme is secure against various known attacks including the attacks found in Tu et al.’s scheme. Furthermore, we simulate our scheme for the formal security analysis using the widely-accepted AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool and show that our scheme is secure against passive and active attacks including the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. Additionally, the proposed scheme is comparable in terms of the communication and computational overheads with Tu et al.’s scheme and other related existing schemes.     

A secure and efficient mutual authentication scheme for session initiation protocol

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) as the core signaling protocol for multimedia services is receiving much attention. Authentication is becoming increasingly crucial issue when a user asks to use SIP services. Many authentication schemes for the SIP have been proposed. Very recently, Zhang et al. has presented an authentication scheme for SIP and claimed their scheme could overcome various attacks while maintaining efficiency. In this research, we illustrate that their scheme is susceptible to the insider attack and does not provide proper mutual authentication. We then propose a modified secure mutual authentication scheme to conquer the security flaws in Zhang et al.’s scheme. Through the informal and formal security analyses, we demonstrate that our scheme is resilient possible known attacks including the attacks found in Zhang et al.’s scheme. In addition, the performance analysis shows that our scheme has better efficiency in comparison with other related ECC-based authentication schemes for SIP.     

Efficient and secure two-factor dynamic ID-based password authentication scheme with provable security

Password-based remote user authentication schemes using smart cards are designed to ensure that only a user who possesses both the smart card and the corresponding password can gain access to the remote servers. Despite many research efforts, it remains a challenging task to design a secure password-based authentication scheme with user anonymity. The author uses Kumari et al.’s scheme as the case study. Their scheme uses non-public key primitives. The author first presents the cryptanalysis of Kumari et al.’s scheme in which he shows that their scheme is vulnerable to user impersonation attack, and does not provide forward secrecy and user anonymity. Using the case study, he has identified that public-key techniques are indispensable to construct a two-factor authentication scheme with security attributes, such as user anonymity, unlinkability and forward secrecy under the nontamper resistance assumption of the smart card. The author proposes a password-based authentication scheme using elliptic curve cryptography. Through the informal and formal security analysis, he shows that proposed scheme is secure against various known attacks, including the attacks found in Kumari’s scheme. Furthermore, he verifies the correctness of mutual authentication using the BAN logic.     

New robust biometrics-based mutual authentication scheme with key agreement using elliptic curve cryptography

In this work, we demonstrate that Chaudhry et al.’s recent biometrics-based three factor authentication scheme is vulnerable to the denial of service attack, and it also fails to provide perfect forward secrecy because it only uses the lightweight symmetric key primitives to ensure security. To enhance the information security, this article presents a new robust biometrics-based mutual authentication scheme using elliptic curve cryptography for client-server architecture based applications in mobile environment. The proposed scheme supports session key agreement and flawless mutual authentication of participants, which is proved under the BAN logic. Moreover, the proposed scheme provides prefect security attributes and resists all known attacks, and it has perfect performance in communication cost. Thereby, the proposed scheme is more suitable for client-server architecture based applications.     

对TAKASIP协议的分析和改进

会话初始化协议(SIP)提供了认证和协商会话密钥,能保证后续会话的安全。2010年,Yoon等(YOON E-J,YOO K-Y.A three-factor authenticated key agreement scheme for SIP on elliptic curves.NSS'10:4th International Conference on Network and System Security.Piscataway:IEEE,2010:334-339)提出一种新的三要素SIP认证密钥协商协议TAKASIP。但TAKASIP协议不能抵抗内部攻击、服务器伪装攻击、离线口令猜测攻击、身份冒充攻击和丢失标记攻击,并且没有提供双向认证。在TAKASIP协议基础上提出一种基于椭圆曲线密码三要素SIP认证协议ETAKASIP以解决上述问题。ETAKASIP基于椭圆曲线离散对数难题和椭圆曲线密码系统,提供了高安全性。该协议只需7次椭圆曲线点乘运算、1次椭圆曲线加法运算和最高6次哈希运算,有较高的运算效率。     

对三个多服务器环境下匿名认证协议的分析

设计安全高效的多服务器环境下匿名身份认证协议是当前安全协议领域的研究热点。基于广泛接受的攻击者模型,对多服务器环境下的三个代表性匿名认证协议进行了安全性分析.指出Wan等协议无法实现所声称的离线口令猜测攻击,且未实现用户匿名性和前向安全性;指出Amin等协议同样不能抵抗离线口令猜测攻击,且不能提供匿名性,对两种破坏前向安全性的攻击是脆弱的;指出Reedy等协议不能抵抗所声称的用户仿冒攻击和离线口令猜测攻击,且无法实现用户不可追踪性.突出强调这些协议失败的根本原因在于,违反协议设计的三个基本原则：公钥原则、用户匿名性原则和前向安全性原则.明确协议的具体失误之处,并提出相应修正方法.     

An efficient improvement remote user mutual authentication and session key agreement scheme for E-health care systems

The E-health care systems allow patients to gain the health monitoring facility and access medical services remotely. A secure mechanism for mutual authentication and session key agreement is the most important requirements for E-Health Care Systems. Recently, Amin et al.’s proposed a mutual authentication and session key agreement protocol and claimed that their scheme is secure against all possible attacks. In this paper, we show that not only their scheme is vulnerable to privileged-insider attack, replay attack, session key disclosure attack, but also does not provide patient untraceability and backward secrecy. In order to withstand the mentioned security weaknesses, we propose an efficient remote mutual authentication scheme for the systems which are using ECC and Fuzzy Extractor. The proposed scheme not only resists against different security attacks, but it also provides an efficient registration, login, mutual authentication, session key agreement, and password and biometric update phases. During the experimentation, it has been observed that the proposed scheme is secure against various known attacks. Beside, our scheme is robust against privileged-insider attack that it rarely checked in security analysis. The informal analysis will ensure that our scheme provides well security protection against the different security attacks. Furthermore, we analyzed the security of the scheme using AVISPA software and Random Oracle Model. The formal analysis results and performance evaluation vouch that our scheme is also secure and efficient in computation and communication cost.     

Cryptanalysis and improvement of a robust smart card secured authentication scheme on SIP using elliptic curve cryptography

The session initiation protocol (SIP) has been receiving a lot of attention to provide security in the Voice over IP (VoIP) in Internet and mobility management. Recently, Yeh et al. proposed a smart card-based authentication scheme for SIP using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). They claimed that their scheme is secure against known security attacks. However, in this paper, we indicate that Yeh et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to off-line password guessing attack, user impersonation attack and server impersonation attack, in the case that the smart card is stolen and the information stored in the smart card is disclosed. As a remedy, we also propose an improved smart card-based authentication scheme which not only conquers the security weaknesses of the related schemes but also provides a reduction in computational cost. The proposed scheme also provides the user anonymity and untraceability, and allows a user to change his/her password without informing the remote server. To show the security of our protocol, we prove its security the random oracle model.     

面向多网关的无线传感器网络多因素认证协议

无线传感器网络作为物联网的重要组成部分,广泛应用于环境监测、医疗健康、智能家居等领域.身份认证为用户安全地访问传感器节点中的实时数据提供了基本安全保障,是保障无线传感器网络安全的第一道防线;前向安全性属于系统安全的最后一道防线,能够极大程度地降低系统被攻破后的损失,因此一直被学术及工业界视为重要的安全属性.设计面向多网关的可实现前向安全性的无线传感器网络多因素身份认证协议是近年来安全协议领域的研究热点.由于多网关无线传感器网络身份认证协议往往应用于高安全需求场景,一方面需要面临强大的攻击者,另一方面传感器节点的计算和存储资源却十分有限,这给如何设计一个安全的多网关无线传感器网络身份认证协议带来了挑战.近年来,大量的多网关身份认证协议被提出,但大部分都随后被指出存在各种安全问题.2018年,Ali等人提出了一个适用于农业监测的多因素认证协议,该协议通过一个可信的中心(基站)来实现用户与外部的传感器节点的认证;Srinivas等人提出了一个通用的面向多网关的多因素身份认证协议,该协议不需要一个可信的中心,而是通过在网关之间存储共享秘密参数来完成用户与外部传感器节点的认证.这两个协议是多网关无线传感器网络身份认证协议的典型代表,分别代表了两类实现不同网关间认证的方式:1)基于可信基站,2)基于共享秘密参数.分析指出这两个协议对离线字典猜测攻击、内部攻击是脆弱的,且无法实现匿名性和前向安全性.鉴于此,本文提出一个安全增强的可实现前向安全性的面向多网关的无线传感器网络多因素认证协议.该协议采用Srinivas等协议的认证方式,即通过网关之间的共享秘密参数完成用户与外部传感器节点的认证,包含两种典型的认证场景.对新协议进行了BAN逻辑分析及启发式分析,分析结果表明该协议实现了双向认证,且能够安全地协商会话密钥以及抵抗各类已知的攻击.与相关协议的对比结果显示,新协议在提高安全性的同时,保持了较高的效率,适于资源受限的无线传感器网络环境.     

An anonymous two-factor authenticated key agreement scheme for session initiation protocol using elliptic curve cryptography

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a signaling protocol widely applied in the world of multimedia communication. Numerous SIP authenticated key agreement schemes have been proposed with the purpose of ensuring security communication. Farash recently put forward an enhancement employing smart cards counted on Zhang et al.’s scheme. In this study, we observe that the enhanced scheme presented by Farash has also some security pitfalls, such as disclosure of user identity, lack of a pre-authentication in the smart card and vulnerability to key-compromise masquerading attack which results in an off-line guessing attack. We then propose an anonymous modified scheme with elliptic curve cryptography to eliminate the security leakages of the scheme proposed by Farash. We demonstrate that our scheme is immune to different kinds of attacks including attacks involved in Farash’s scheme. We mention Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic for completeness of the proposed scheme. Also, we compare the performance of our scheme with its predecessor schemes and the comparative results shows that it perfectly satisfies the needs of SIP.     

P2P-SIP网络通信安全方案

P2P和SIP融合技术已经普遍应用于多媒体通信中,它解决了传统的SIP网络单点失效的问题。但是由于现有的P2P-SIP缺少有效的认证方案,给其带来很多安全隐患。现有的P2P-SIP网络的认证方案大多采用节点的真实ID,不能满足其匿名性的特殊要求。针对这个问题,提出了一种基于Diffie-Hellman算法的节点匿名认证方案DHB,该方案初始化阶段使用代理ID分发中心PIAC产生节点的假名。认证阶段采用改进的Diffie-Hellman算法和节点共享信息进行身份认证,实现了P2P-SIP中节点间的匿名认证。理论和实验分析表明,DHB可以有效抵御中间人攻击和猜测攻击,是一种安全有效的节点匿名认证方案。     

定制加权公平队列调度下的SIP DoS攻击防御机制

SIP由于协议的开放性而容易受到DoS洪泛攻击,队列调度方案可以大大减轻洪泛攻击对SIP服务器的影响。通过对SIP消息特征和现有队列调度方案的分析,提出了一种基于定制加权公平队列调度的SIP DoS洪泛攻击防御机制,并对该机制进行了性能仿真。仿真结果显示该方案在防御INVITE洪泛攻击方面比单队列和优先级队列更为有效。     

Weaknesses and improvement of Wang et al.'s remote user password authentication scheme for resource-limited environments

Recently, Wang et al. showed that two new verifier-free remote user password authentication schemes, Ku-Chen's scheme and Yoon et al.'s scheme, are vulnerable to an off-line password guessing attack, a forgery attack, and a denial-of-service attack, and then proposed an improved scheme for the real application in resource-limited environments. Unfortunately, we find that Wang et al.'s scheme is still vulnerable to an impersonation attack and an off-line password guessing attack. In addition, Wang et al.'s scheme is not easily reparable and is unable to provide perfect forward secrecy. Finally, we propose an improved scheme with better security strength.     

Improvement of the secure dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environment

Recently, Liao and Wang proposed a secure dynamic ID based remote user authentication scheme for multi-server environment, and claimed that their scheme was intended to provide mutual authentication, two-factor security, replay attack, server spoofing attack, insider and stolen verifier attack, forward secrecy and user anonymity. In this paper, we show that Liao and Wang's scheme is still vulnerable to insider's attack, masquerade attack, server spoofing attack, registration center spoofing attack and is not reparable. Furthermore, it fails to provide mutual authentication. To remedy these flaws, this paper proposes an efficient improvement over Liao–Wang's scheme with more security. The computation cost, security, and efficiency of the improved scheme are well suited to the practical applications environment.     

A user friendly mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for wireless sensor networks using chaotic maps

Spread of wireless network technology has opened new doors to utilize sensor technology in various areas via Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Many authentication protocols for among the service seeker users, sensing component sensor nodes (SNs) and the service provider base-station or gateway node (GWN) are available to realize services from WSNs efficiently and without any fear of deceit. Recently, Li et al. and He et al. independently proposed mutual authentication and key agreement schemes for WSNs. We find that both the schemes achieve mutual authentication, establish session key and resist many known attacks but still have security weaknesses. We show the applicability of stolen verifier, user impersonation, password guessing and smart card loss attacks on Li et al.’s scheme. Although their scheme employs the feature of dynamic identity, an attacker can reveal and guess the identity of a registered user. We demonstrate the susceptibility of He et al.’s scheme to password guessing attack. In both the schemes, the security of the session key established between user and SNs is imperfect due to lack of forward secrecy and session-specific temporary information leakage attack. In addition both the schemes impose extra computational load on resource scanty sensor-nodes and are not user friendly due to absence of user anonymity and lack of password change facility. To handle these drawbacks, we design a mutual authentication and key agreement scheme for WSN using chaotic maps. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose an authentication scheme for WSN based on chaotic maps. We show the superiority of the proposed scheme over its predecessor schemes by means of detailed security analysis and comparative evaluation. We also formally analyze our scheme using BAN logic.     

A secure user anonymity-preserving biometric-based multi-server authenticated key agreement scheme using smart cards

Advancement in communication technology provides a scalable platform for various services, where a remote user can access the server from anywhere without moving from its place. It provides a unique opportunity for online services such that a user does not need to be physically present at the service center. These services adopt authentication and key agreement protocols in order to ensure authorized and secure access to the resources. Most of the authentication schemes proposed in the literature support a single-server environment, where the user has to register with each server. If a user wishes to access multiple application servers, he/she requires to register with each server. The multi-server authentication introduces a scalable platform such that a user can interact with any server using single registration. Recently, Chuang and Chen proposed an efficient multi-server authenticated key agreement scheme based on a user’s password and biometrics (Chuang and Chen, 2014). Their scheme is a lightweight, which requires the computation of only hash functions. In this paper, we first analyze Chuang and Chen’s scheme and then identify that their scheme does not resist stolen smart card attack which causes the user’s impersonation attack and server spoofing attack. We also show that their scheme fails to protect denial-of-service attack. We aim to propose an efficient improvement on Chuang and Chen’s scheme to overcome the weaknesses of their scheme, while also retaining the original merits of their scheme. Through the rigorous informal and formal security analysis, we show that our scheme is secure against various known attacks including the attacks found in Chuang and Chen’s scheme. Furthermore, we simulate our scheme for the formal security verification using the widely-accepted AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) tool and show that our scheme is secure against the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. In addition, our scheme is comparable in terms of the communication and computational overheads with Chuang and Chen’s scheme and other related existing schemes.     

Cryptanalysis and improvement of authentication scheme for roaming service in ubiquitous network

Abstract

The paper analyzes a recently proposed secure authentication and key agreement scheme for roaming service in a ubiquitous network. In 2018, Lee et al. proposed a biometric-based anonymous authentication scheme for roaming in ubiquitous networks. But, we found that Lee et al. scheme is prone to the off-line dictionary attack when a user’s smart device is stolen, replay attack due to static variables and de-synchronization attack when an adversary blocks a message causing failure of authentication mechanism. Further, the scheme lacks no key control property and has incorrect XOR calculation. In the sequel, we presented an improved biometric based scheme to remove the weaknesses in Lee et al.’s scheme, which also does not require an update of identity in every session, hence preventing de-synchronization attack. Also, the security of the proposed schemes were analyzed in a widely accepted random oracle model. Further, computational and communication cost comparisons indicate that our improved scheme is more suitable for ubiquitous networks.     

On the security and improvement of a two-factor user authentication scheme in wireless sensor networks

User authentication is a basic security requirement during the deployment of the wireless sensor network (WSN), because it may operate in a rather hostile environment, such as a military battlefield. In 2010, Khan and Alghathbar (KA) found out that Das’s two-factor user authentication scheme for WSNs is vulnerable to the gateway node (GW-node) bypassing attack and the privileged-insider attack. They further presented an improved scheme to overcome the security flaws of Das’s scheme. However, in this paper, we show that KA’s scheme still suffers from the GW-node impersonation attack, the GW-node bypassing attack, and the privileged-insider attack. Hence, to fix the security flaws in KA’s scheme, we propose a new user authentication scheme for WSNs. The security of the user authentication session in the proposed scheme is reduced by the model of Bellare and Rogaway. The security of partial compromise of secrets in the proposed scheme is reduced and analyzed by our adversarial model. Based on the performance evaluation, the overall cost of the proposed scheme is less than that of KA’s scheme. Hence, we believe that the proposed scheme is more suitable for real security applications than KA’s scheme.     

Practical authentication scheme for SIP

The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is commonly used to establish Voice over IP (VoIP) calls. However, the original authentication scheme for SIP-based service typically uses HTTP Digest authentication protocol, which is s not providing security at an acceptable level. In this paper, we propose a secure and practical password-only authenticated key agreement scheme for SIP using elliptic curve cryptography(ECC). Our scheme is remarkable efficient and quite simple to use. And yet we can provide the rigorous proof of the security for it. Therefore, the end result is more suited to be a candidate for SIP authentication scheme. In addition, we also suggest an extended scheme capable of providing anonymity, privacy, and location privacy to protect the user’s personal information and his real identity.