Memory deficits and memory surfeits: Differential cognitive consequences of tokenism for tokens and observers.

Investigated whether tokens (persons who are the only member of their social category) might suffer more cognitive deficits than nontokens and whether they do so even when they are treated no differently. 48 undergraduate students (acting either as participants or as observers) were led to believe that they were sharing their views on everyday topics with 3 other Ss (actually videotaped confederates) who were either all of the Ss' own sex or all of the opposite sex. In a later memory test, token Ss remembered fewer of the opinions that they and the 3 other Ss had expressed than did nontokens. Observers, in contrast, remembered more of what token Ss said than what the 3 other Ss said. Results suggest that being distinctive had different effects on the distinctive individuals than on those around them. Theoretical and public policy implications are discussed. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Memory organization during children's repeated recall.

Presented a list of categorically related words to 20 2nd graders and 20 6th graders in a memory test. Multiple recall tests followed the initial presentation of words so that changes in memory organization could be assessed over recall attempts. Ss in both grades remembered many new words on later recall trials that they had not remembered on Trial 1. The proportions of new words recalled and the retrieval characteristics of these words were similar in both grades. Younger Ss, however, forgot many words during repeated recall, and older Ss did not. Different patterns of forgetting were correlated with different types of organizational strategies. Second graders recalled words in a sequential, rote manner with few transformations or rearrangements of words. Sixth graders, on the other hand, actively constructed larger categories or chunks of words over recall attempts. The spontaneous reconstruction of remembered information by 6th graders is interpreted as a manifestation of constructive memory-monitoring skills. Some potential advantages of a repeated recall paradigm for developmental research are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reading, memory, and metacognition.

Investigated relations among reading skills, metareading (knowledge about reading), memory, and metamemory (knowledge about memory) as they relate to reading ability (good vs poor readers), operativity, and grade level. 40 2nd graders (aged 7.25–9.83 yrs) and 40 4th graders (aged 9.42–22.00 yrs) were interviewed to assess the reading–memory variables. Significant but low correlations were obtained between metareading and reading, metamemory and memory, metareading and metamemory, and reading and memory. Significant effects of operativity were revealed on all dependent measures. Operative Ss had higher scores on the metareading and metamemory tasks, read at higher levels, and remembered more items on the memory tasks than did nonoperative Ss. Effects of grade level were revealed on most dependent measures. Fourth-grade Ss received higher scores on the metareading and metamemory tasks and read at higher levels than did 2nd-grade Ss. An interaction between operativity and grade level revealed that operative 2nd-grade and both groups of 4th-grade Ss made fewer total reading errors than did nonoperative 2nd-grade Ss. The effects of operativity, experience, and metacognition on reading and memory skills are discussed. (43 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Do nonclinical checkers exhibit deficits in cognitive control? Tests of an inhibitory control hypothesis

We tested the hypothesis that persons who engage in compulsive checking may do so to compensate for cognitive errors produced by deficient inhibitory control. In two experiments, undergraduates were classified by scores on the MOCI checking subscale as checkers or noncheckers. On self-report measures, checkers were significantly more depressed, more anxious, more prone to cognitive slips, and more likely to engage in obsessive-compulsive behaviors. However, checkers performed similarly to noncheckers on laboratory tests of inhibitory control of cognition. Checkers and noncheckers were equally able to (1) ignore distractors in a selective attention task, (2) suppress inappropriate word meanings in a sentence comprehension task, and (3) inhibit retrieval of to-be-forgotten items in a memory task. These results suggest that compulsive checking does not arise from failures of inhibitory control of cognition.     

Effects of signaling topic structure on text recall.

Two experiments studied effects of signaling devices (headings, overviews, and summaries) on text memory. In Exp 1, Ss read a text with or without signals, then recalled the topics of the text. Signaling produced better memory for the topics and their organization. In Exp 2, Ss recalled the content of the text they read, and recalls were scored for the number of accurately recalled ideas. Signals produced recalls that were better organized by text topics. Signals also influenced the distribution of recall of ideas: Ss remembered more topics but recalled less about each accessed topic if the text they read contained signals than if it did not. The results are interpreted as supporting a model in which signals influence readers' representations of a text's topic structure, which, in turn, is used to guide the recall of text content. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A prediction of patterns of schizophrenic error resulting from semantic generalization.

Conducted a study with 2 groups of 26 male schizophrenics and normal psychiatric aides (mean age = 45 yr) to test predictions derived from a theory of disordered thought by L. J. Chapman, J. P. Chapman, and G. A. Miller (see PA, Vol. 39:10059) concerning the conditions under which schizophrenic Ss exhibit excessive generalization errors. The theory assumes that both the schizophrenic and normal are biased toward responding to words in terms of the words' strongest aspects of meaning, but that schizophrenics are more strongly biased toward this than are normals. Ss were instructed to indicate by pressing buttons marked "yes" and "no" whether or not test words presented in serial fashion on a memory drum had appeared on a previous training list. "Yes" responses to test words not appearing on a previous training list were the measures of generalization errors. The predictions were supported by the finding that schizophrenics made significantly more errors to words on the test list that shared strong meaning responses (p     

Effects of attention, as indexed by subsequent memory, on electrodermal detection of information.

Three closely related experiments tested the effects of attention, as indexed by subsequent memory, on electrodermal detection of information. A total of 62 male college students attempted to conceal 6 critical items of information from a polygraph examiner recording their electrodermal response (EDR). In the polygraph test the S was asked if any of a list of 24 words, 1 every 10–25 sec, were critical items he was concealing. The list was comprised of 3 semantically similar control words along with each critical word. Afterward, without forewarning, a 2nd experimenter asked the S to remember all the words he had been asked about on the test. Deceptive Ss who gave a larger EDR to critical than to control words more often than could be expected by chance (i.e., were correctly detected as deceptive) remembered more control words than did other deceptive Ss who escaped detection. Results are interpreted to mean that the less thoroughly an S processes the test words, as indexed by later memory, the less likely he is to be detected. (17 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bizarre imagery: The misremembered mnemonic.

Conducted 2 experiments with 56 undergraduates to measure the effects of bizarre imagery and image interaction on the brief and long-term memory of word pairs. Ss in Exp I performed an incidental learning task and were administered free- and cued-recall tests either 5 min or 1 wk after the task. Ss in Exp II received more intensive training in the learning task and completed 2 cued-recall tests in the same session and another cued-recall test 1 wk later. In both experiments, bizarre imagery did not improve memory more than plausible, interactive imagery. The degree of interaction in the image was a strong determinant of cued-recall performance at both retention intervals. Most Ss in Exp II believed that they had remembered more bizarre than plausible pairs, even though this was clearly not the case. Possible reasons for the acceptance of the notion that bizarre imagery improves memory are discussed. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the psycholinguistics of sarcasm.

Examined comprehension and memory for sarcastic statements in conversation in 6 experiments with 256 undergraduates. Data from 3 reading-time studies indicate that Ss did not need to first process the literal meanings of sarcastic expressions, such as "You're a fine friend" (meaning "You're a bad friend"), before deriving their nonliteral, sarcastic-interpretations. Ss also comprehended instances of sarcasm based on an explicit echoic mention of some belief, societal norm, or previously stated opinion faster than they did instances in which the echo was only implicit. Three additional experiments examining memory for sarcasm showed that sarcasm was remembered much better than literal uses of the same expressions of nonsarcastic equivalents. Ss recalled sarcasm that explicitly echoed a previously mentioned belief or societal norm more often than they remembered sarcasm that did not involve some explicit echo. Overall results demonstrate that ease of processing and memory for sarcastic utterances depends crucially on how explicitly a speaker's statement echoes either the addressee or some other source's putative beliefs, opinions, or previous statement. (41 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The next-in-line effect: Encoding or retrieval deficit?

The phenomenon that people cannot remember what happens when they are next-in-line to perform was investigated in 2 experiments with 144 undergraduates to determine whether this memory deficit reflects a failure to encode or an inability to retrieve preperformance events. In Exp I, 96 Ss participated in 4 memory trials; in each trial, half the Ss were called on to read words, and the other half merely listened. Before each trial, Ss were told whether they would be readers or listeners and the order in which numbers would be called. Thus, readers could anticipate precisely when they would be called on to perform. After hearing the 28 words in random order, all Ss wrote down the recalled words on cued or noncued sheets. Although the semantic cues strongly facilitated access to memories, they did not moderate the next-in-line effect. In Exp II, Ss were told—either before or after performing—to make a special effort to remember preperformance events. If instructed afterward, Ss displayed the usual memory deficit. If instructed beforehand, they reversed the deficit and showed a superior preperformance recall. It is concluded that the next-in-line effect is a failure at encoding, not at retrieval. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The effect of imagery on explicit and implicit tests of memory in young and old people: A double dissociation.

Examined the effect of imagery on implicit and explicit tests of memory in young and old adults. 48 undergraduates (mean age 21 yrs) and 64 adults (mean age 72.48 yrs) in Canada were presented with 2 separate word lists in a random order and were assigned to imagery or no-imagery instruction conditions. Ss in the imagery instruction condition read the words to themselves, formed a mental image of it, and rated their ability to do so. Ss in the no-imagery instruction condition simply read the words. All Ss were tested on explicit or implicit memory tests and asked to describe the mnemonic strategies used. Results show that imaging the referent of a visually-presented word improved the performance of the young Ss on the explicit memory test, but reduced their performance on the implicit test. Results of the elderly Ss showed a similar trend but did not reach the level of significance observed for young adults. (French abstract) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Are emotionally charged lures immune to false memory?

Using the Deese–Roediger–McDennott task and E. Tulving's (1985) remember–know judgments for recognition memory, the authors explored whether emotional words can show the false memory effect. Participants studied lists containing nonemotional, orthographic associates (e.g., cape, tape, ripe; part, perk, dark) of either emotional (e.g., rape) or nonemotional (e.g., park) critical lures. This setup produced significant false "remembering" of emotional lures, even though initially no emotional words appeared at study. When 3 emotional nonlure words appeared at study, emotional-lure false recognition more than doubled. However, when these 3 study words also appeared on the recognition test, false memory for the emotional lures was reduced. Across experiments, participants misremembered nonemotional lures more often than they did emotional lures, but they were more likely to rate emotional lures as "remembered," once they had been recognized as "old." The authors discuss findings in light of J. J. Freyd and D. H. Gleaves, (1996) criticisms of this task. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Depth of processing and interference effects in the learning and remembering of sentences.

In 2 experiments with a total of 140 undergraduates, Ss who completed the last words of sentences they read learned more than Ss who simply read whole sentences. This facilitation was observed even with sentences that were almost always completed with the wrong words. However, proactive interference attributable to acquisition errors appeared on recall and recognition tests administered after a 1-wk interval. (17 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Personal and peers' word associations in relation to children's false recognition errors.

Attempted to show that false recognition errors would be more frequently elicited by children's personal associates to a set of target words than by associates based on peer norms; Ss were 80 White middle-class 2nd and 5th graders (mean ages, 7.6 and 10.6 yrs, respectively). In Session 1 Ss gave oral associations to 34 words. In the 1st phase of Session 2, target words were each read aloud once and Ss were required to memorize them; in the 2nd phase Ss worked for 5 min on a maze task to prevent rehearsal; and in the final phase, a 40-item recognition list was read. Ss determined whether a word was one they had been asked to remember. As predicted, responses occurred with decreasing frequency to target, personal, peer, and control words. Consistent with the expectation that personal associates would more frequently elicit false recognition errors than would peer associates, the difference between personal and control responses was larger than the difference between peer and control. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Semantic priming during sentence processing by young and older adults.

Examined semantic processing of sentences by 30 younger (mean age 25.1 yrs) and 30 older (mean age 68.5 yrs) adults, using a priming technique. Ss read a sentence and then made a lexical decision about a target presented immediately after the sentence. For both age groups, word targets that were instruments implied by the action of the sentence had faster latencies than unrelated word targets. There was no evidence of inhibition of unrelated targets, suggesting that the facilitation of instrument targets involved automatic processes. Results provide no evidence for age-related changes in semantic processing of sentences, including access to implied information. Older Ss did, however, have poorer memory for the sentences on a recognition test. It is suggested that previous findings by G. Cohen (see PA, Vols 63:747 and 67:958) of age deficits in comprehension may depend on techniques that measure what is remembered rather than what is understood. (35 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mental imagery helps eight-year-olds remember what they read.

To determine whether 8-yr-olds can use mental imagery to improve their memory of prose they read, 43 experimental Ss were given practice constructing mental images of progressively longer prose passages (sentences, paragraphs, and a short story) and were shown examples of good images. 43 controls were exposed to the prose material, but did not practice constructing mental images. Experimental Ss read 17 segments of a short story and constructed a mental image for each segment after reading the segment. Control Ss read the same story segments and were instructed to "do whatever you can or have to" in order to remember the story. Experimental Ss answered significantly more short-answer questions about the story than controls did. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The generation effect: Evidence for generalized inhibition.

Words that are generated as responses to incomplete stimuli are remembered better than complete words that are read. The present research shows that the generation effect occurs only if both reading and generating are done in the same list. Comparisons with unmixed reading controls reveal that the effect occurs because the read words are remembered poorly; the generated ones are no better than the controls. Therefore, the question for theories is not why generating helps memory, but why the demand to generate makes people lazy readers. Furthermore, cued recall of pairs of unrelated words is worse if they were generated than if they were read. We propose that generation is a demand to identify words as independent events. There is nothing special about generating, but the demand to generate is special; it hurts reading. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Covariation information and cognitive processing: Effects of causal implications on memory.

Investigated the impact of attributional implications of covariation information on memory for the implied causal agent. 118 undergraduates read summary paragraphs of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency (CDC) information and were then timed as they verified from memory whether certain probe words, including the name of the implied causal agent, had appeared in the paragraph. In Exps I and II, Ss were not instructed to attend to attributional implications but merely to study the information for the subsequent memory test. In Exp III, Ss made attributions to each paragraph just prior to the probe task. Results indicate that (a) the names of implied causal agents were verified more slowly than names of noncausal entities if the order of CDC components facilitated attributional processing and (b) this effect was obtained regardless of Ss' immediate need to make an attributional judgment. Data are consistent with the interpretation that the implied causal agent was automatically integrated more thoroughly into the memory representation of the information, which had to be "decomposed" to allow verification of the agent's identity. (29 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Aging and memory for frequency of occurrence of novel, visual stimuli: Direct and indirect measures.

Memory for frequency of occurrence typically is investigated using familiar stimuli (e.g., words) and with "direct" tests of memory; that is, the S is required to state explicitly how often an item occurred or which item occurred more often. Exps 1 and 2 examined the effects of age on the ability to make judgments (i.e., direct tests) regarding the frequency of occurrence of words and of novel, visual stimuli (Japanese ideograms). In Exp 3, young and old Ss were compared on "indirect" measures of memory for frequency of occurrence of these ideograms, as indexed by the mere exposure effect. On the direct test of memory, elderly and young Ss did not differ when shown words, but elderly were impaired compared with young Ss when ideograms were presented. When tested indirectly, both groups were sensitive to the frequency of occurrence of ideograms. The pattern of results replicates and extends previous findings regarding performance dissociations between direct and indirect measures of memory in aging. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Manipulation of attention at study affects an explicit but not an implicit test of memory

We investigated the impact of attention during encoding on later retrieval. During study, participants read some words aloud (ignoring the print color) and named the print color of other words aloud (ignoring the word). Then one of two memory tests was administered. The explicit test--recognition--required conscious recollection of whether a word was studied. Previously read words were recognized more accurately than were previously color named words. This contrasted sharply with performance on the implicit test--repetition priming in lexical decision. Here, words that were color named during study showed priming equivalent to words that were read during study; both were responded to faster than unstudied words. Thus, an attentional manipulation during study had a strong effect on an explicit test of memory, but almost no effect on an implicit test. Focal attention during study is crucial for remembering consciously but not necessarily for remembering without awareness.