风险规避对制造商开通直销渠道的影响

研究了风险规避对制造商开通直销渠道的影响。运用博弈论中个人理性和激励相容原则建立单渠道和双渠道供应链需求模型,得出均衡情况下供应链各成员的最优决策及社会福利。研究发现,仅当决策者风险规避度和直销渠道销售成本满足一定条件时,制造商开通直销渠道有利可图;且直销渠道并非总侵蚀零售商效用。当决策者风险规避度较大且直销渠道成本适中时,供应链价值减少。社会福利总随着制造商风险规避度的增大呈现先减少后增加的趋势。     

新产品分销下再制造产品直销与分销渠道研究

基于消费者对再制造产品和新产品具有不同接受度,首次研究了制造商通过电子直销渠道销售再制造产品,通过零售商分销渠道销售新产品的渠道模式,构建了再制造产品直销与分销渠道模型,分别求得了两种渠道下制造商与零售商的最优定价策略,并对两种定价策略进行了比较分析.通过数值仿真,分析了消费者对再制造产品接受度对两种销售渠道下的销售价...     

考虑消费者公平关切的制造商渠道选择策略

消费者不仅在意产品的功能,还在意交易中的公平性,因此研究了消费者公平关切对制造商渠道选择的影响。分别建立了单渠道和双渠道供应链决策模型,通过逆向归纳法,得出不同渠道选择策略下制造商和零售商最优利润。研究发现:消费者公平关切下,渠道间竞争适中或激烈时制造商均不开通直销渠道。制造商在渠道间竞争较弱时主动开通直销渠道,并且开通直销渠道并非总是使得零售商利润受损。渠道间竞争适中时,直销渠道的开通有利于增加零售商利润。渠道间竞争较弱或适中时,直销渠道总是增加整个供应链利润。渠道间竞争激烈时,直销渠道对所有供应链成员造成损失。     

放弃制造商品牌？——制造商入侵与自有品牌引入的博弈分析

研究直销渠道和零售渠道以及制造商品牌和自有品牌之间的竞争关系。考虑了零售商放弃销售制造商品牌产品的情形,分析了6种情境下的博弈模型,得出了供应链成员的博弈均衡策略和利润,进一步探讨了不同参数对供应链双方策略选择的影响。结果表明,零售商放弃销售制造商品牌产品的充分条件是自有品牌产品生产成本小于制造商品牌产品生产成本。此时,如果制造商品牌产品生产成本和直销运营成本较小,且自有品牌产品生产成本接近于制造商品牌产品生产成本,制造商入侵;否则,制造商拒绝开通直销渠道。     

基于消费者接受程度的双渠道产品价格和质量决策研究

在消费者对直销渠道和零售渠道接受程度有差异的情形下,研究了产品质量为内生的双渠道供应链中价格和质量联合决策问题。分别构建传统单一零售渠道模型、双渠道分散决策模型和双渠道集中决策模型。比较制造商和零售商在3种模型下的定价均衡决策、产品质量水平和利润,分析零售商和制造商的渠道策略和最优定价。结果表明：与传统单一零售渠道情形相比,在集中决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道不改变零售价格,但是能够提高产品质量水平和供应链整体利润;在分散决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道将降低产品批发价、零售价以及产品质量水平;另外当消费者对直销渠道接受程度适中时,制造商和零售商可实现帕累托改进。     

双渠道供应链中直销成本对销售渠道决策的影响

针对传统零售与网上直销并存的双渠道供应链系统,在制造商为Stackelberg博弈的领导者和零售商具有销售成本优势的假设下,建立了销售渠道决策模型,分析了制造商的直销成本对销售模式选址的影响。结果表明:当直销成本满足一定范围时,制造商采用直销模式可以使制造商、零售商和消费者三方共赢。     

不确定需求下制造商渠道入侵与信息收集披露激励

研究单个零售商和制造商组成的二级供应链,零售商通过调查获取市场不确定需求信息,而制造商可能建立直销渠道与零售商展开销售竞争。分别在集中决策和分散决策下刻画零售商最优收集、披露策略以及制造商的最优入侵策略;在此基础上设计了促进零售商收集并且披露需求信息的固定报酬激励机制。研究表明:当收集成本、渠道替代率以及固定入侵成本处于合适阈值区间时,需求信息收集和披露会改善双方收益;零售商信息披露可以影响制造商的入侵决策;制造商入侵在一定条件下有利于供应链整体收益,但总是不利于零售商;在制造商率先决定入侵时,零售商接受激励政策可以实现双方共赢。最后通过算例验证了理论的正确性和有效性。     

消费者退货的双渠道供应链产量决策研究

研究了考虑消费者退货的二级供应链产量决策的问题。分析提供退款保证以及决策顺序对均衡结果和开通直销渠道阈值的影响。研究发现:制造商提供退款保证与零售商提供退款保证相比,除批发价较高外,其他均衡结果都是一致的;在顺序决策的双渠道情形下,与单一渠道相比,制造商利润较高,当消费者对产品满意度满足一定范围时,零售商利润也较高;在同时决策的双渠道情形下,与单一渠道相比,只有当消费者对产品满意度满足一定范围时,制造商和零售商的利润才都较高;顺序决策和同时决策相比,不仅能降低开通直销渠道阈值,而且还能使制造商和零售商达到"双赢"。提供退款保证不仅能在不降低零售商利润的基础上降低开通直销渠道的阈值,当消费者对产品满意度满足一定范围时,还能提高制造商利润;提供退款保证虽然提高销售价,但是能够扩大市场需求提高消费者剩余。     

网络比价下风险规避对制造商渠道选择的影响

研究了网络比价行为下零售商风险规避对制造商渠道选择的影响。制造商生产成本为线性和非线性情形下,得到制造商和零售商的均衡结果。研究发现:无论制造商生产成本是线性情形或者非线性情形,制造商均倾向于开通直销渠道。但是,与传统观点不同,直销渠道并非总是侵蚀零售商效用。若制造商生产成本为线性情形,直销渠道增加了零售商效用;若制造商生产成本为非线性情形,当零售商风险规避较小时,直销渠道侵蚀了零售商效用;当零售商风险规避较大时,直销渠道增加了零售商效用。此外,直销渠道总是增加整个供应链价值。     

规模不经济下信息分享对制造商渠道选择的影响

研究了零售商信息分享是如何影响制造商渠道结构选择的。考虑了制造商生产成本为线性和非线性两种情形。研究发现:无论制造商成本如何,零售商都没有动机将其市场预测信息与制造商分享。在零售商不分享其市场预测信息情形下,尽管制造商倾向于开通网络直销渠道,但是直销渠道是否侵蚀零售利润由零售商市场信息预测精准度和制造商规模不经济程度决定。此外,设计了Nash信息补偿机制使得零售商自愿与制造商分享其市场预测信息以实现供应链帕累托最优。     

考虑渠道成本差异的双渠道供应链定价策略与渠道选择

根据网上渠道不同销售模式的特征,构建制造商网上直销、网上分销和网上代销3种供应链定价模型,引入渠道成本参数并分析制造商如何进行产品定价和渠道选择。研究表明,在3种渠道结构中,代销模式下产品价格最低,直销模式和分销模式下的价格受到渠道偏好的影响;随着线上或线下渠道成本增加,制造商会降低该渠道产品的批发价格,而零售价格与自身渠道成本正相关;此外,当制造商自建网上平台成本较低时,制造商选择直销模式最优;当制造商自建网上平台成本较高,且代销平台服务效率较低时,制造商应选择分销模式,否则制造商选择代销模式更优。     

基于网络服务水平的农产品供应链分销渠道模式选择

考虑网络服务水平对农产品供应链网络分销渠道模式选择的影响,提出了直销网店和代理网店两种供应链网络分销渠道,及分别构建了直销网店模式和代理网店销模式的博弈模型,得到了农业生产企业收益最大化角度下网络分销渠道模式选择策略,并对比分析了供应链收益最大化角度下网络分销渠道模式选择策略。研究发现, 当线上销售价格与线下销售价格的比值低于一定值时,无论网店的网络服务成本有多低,农业生产企业都不会开展线上销售业务; 当直销网店的网络服务成本系数适中时,农业生产企业收益最大化角度下分销渠道模式选择策略将不利于供应链整体效率的提升;网络分销渠道市场占潜在市场规模百分比能正向影响对直销网店模式的选择。     

Dual channel closed-loop supply chain coordination with a reward-driven remanufacturing policy

This paper investigates a reward-driven policy, employed in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), for acquiring used products earmarked for remanufacture. Under the examined model, a single manufacturer sells products through a retailer as well as directly to end users in a forward supply chain. In the reverse supply chain, three different modes of collection are employed to capture used products for remanufacture: they are through a third party, directly by the manufacturer and from the retailer. Mathematical models for both non-cooperative and centralised scenarios are developed to characterise the pricing decisions and remanufacturing strategies that indicate individual and overall supply chain performance. Optimality of all the proposed models is examined with theory. To coordinate and achieve a win–win outcome for channel members, we proposed a three-way discount mechanism for the manufacturer. Extended numerical investigation provides insights on ways to manage an efficient reward-driven CLSC in a dual-channel environment.     

Coordination of joint pricing-production decisions in a supply chain

We consider the coordination of dynamic, joint pricing-production/ordering decisions in a decentralized supply chain where a manufacturer outsources her product distribution/retailing function to an independent distributor/retailer. The manufacturer produces and wholesales her product to the distributor who, after some further processing, sells the product to an external market. In a leader-follower setting with convex production/ordering cost functions, both parties make pricing and production/ordering decisions over a discrete, finite-time horizon (a selling season) to maximize their respective profits. For a given manufacturer's (the leader's) wholesale price schedule, we develop a simple forward algorithm to solve the distributor's problem optimally, and prove a planning horizon property of the solution. Our key result is to show the existence of a manufacturer's price schedule that induces distributor to adopt decisions in the decentralized setting to achieve the performance of a centralized supply chain. Based on this channel-optimal pricing policy we then develop an incentive scheme for the manufacturer to achieve channel coordination. A numerical example is provided to compare the performance of different policies and lo reinforce key managerial insights generated through analysis.     

基于电商平台的互补产品捆绑策略及销售模式研究

为了研究供应商与平台商的最优捆绑策略及销售模式选择问题,基于单个供应商通过电商平台以转销或代销模式销售互补产品的供应链,构建4个Stackelberg博弈模型,分析互补程度和佣金费率对渠道成员均衡价格和利润的影响。结果表明,分开销售时,供应商与平台商的利润随着产品间互补程度的增大而降低;代销捆绑销售对供应商更有利,而转销捆绑销售对平台商更有利;此外,只有当佣金费率大到一定程度时,平台商才倾向于采用代销模式。     

The role of spot market in a decentralised supply chain under random yield

We consider a decentralised supply chain with demand uncertainty, wherein a manufacturer sells a single product that consists of two components to the end consumer through an independent distributor. Assume that one component has a random yield, the manufacturer may rely on the spot market to replenish any shortage components after the random yield is realised. We identify the optimal product order, component production and replenishment decisions under two different situations. One is the traditional arrangement that the distributor decides the product procurement quantity and the manufacturer chooses the production quantity. The other is vendor-managed inventory (VMI) arrangement in which the manufacturer is responsible for both the order and the production decisions. The results show that the role of spot market can effectively offset the negative effects from production yield’s, market demand’s and component spot price’s variances. Consequently, the spot market leads to the cooperation between the manufacturer and the distributor, and improves the channel’s overall performance, in particular under the VMI arrangement when the wholesale price is sufficiently high.     

Coordinating and pricing decisions in two competitive reverse supply chains with different channel structures

This paper addresses coordination and competition problem in two reverse supply chains each having its own exclusive retailer and manufacturer. The chains have various collecting channel structures so that one of them uses the advantages of dual channels, where the consumer can return their e-waste through direct or traditional channels, while its competitor collects obsolete products only through its traditional channel. The willingness to return in each channel is a function of self- and cross-discounts of the competitors. Four decision scenarios are investigated; the first and second chain respectively select, Decentralised-Decentralised, Centralised-Centralised, Centralised-Decentralised or Decentralised-Centralised scenario. The closed-form optimal solution of each channel is derived based on the Stackelberg game when the second chain acts as a leader. The most economical scenario is determined by using a Non-Zero-Sum game when each chain plays as a single player in the game. To coordinate the members’ decisions and to convince unsatisfied members, two coordination contracts are offered. Numerical investigations reveal that direct channel suggests more discount and obtains more share of market. The results show that Centralised-Centralised scenario is the best decision from the SCs’ perspective which proposing contracts are able to persuade members to change their strategy to a global decision.     

Product variety and distribution channel structure

We consider how a manufacturer’s product variety decision is affected by its distribution strategy. While offering product variety will generally lead to higher demand, it also has negative implications on production costs and demand uncertainty. We investigate how the manufacturer’s optimal product variety decision differs when selling directly to customers (centralised scenario) as compared to selling through a retailer (decentralised scenario). We find that the retailer’s power and the impact of product variety on demand significantly affect the attractiveness of product variety and determine under which distribution strategy the manufacturer should provide a higher level of variety.     

Coordination of a dual-channel supply chain after demand or production cost disruptions

Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain could not only achieve the integrated profit of the supply chain but also alleviate the channel conflict. Although some researches addressed this area, there is scant literature to discuss the coordination issue in the situations of disruption. To fill this void, we utilise a contract with a wholesale price, a direct channel’s price and a lump sum fee to coordinate a dual-channel supply chain under the cases of demand disruptions and production cost disruptions. After deriving the optimal contract for each case, we find that the manufacturer can achieve coordination of the disrupted supply chain by adjusting the parameters of the coordination contract used in a normal environment. We also show that after disruptions, there exists a contract adjustment benefit zone, in which both the manufacturer and the retailer can benefit from the adjustment of coordination contract when demand increases or production cost decreases. A further analysis of the production and distribution strategies in the coordinated dual-channel supply chain after disruptions suggests that the adjustment of the total production and sales of each channel depends heavily on the level of disruptions and the degree of consumers’ loyalty to both channels.