汽车租赁供应链中汽车制造商的回购定价策略

研究了在汽车租赁供应链中,当汽车制造商为Stackelberg博弈的领导者而租赁商为追随者时.汽车制造商向租赁商提供回购合同时的回购定价策略,分析了租赁商产品维护水平和二手市场对供应链决策的影响.结果表明,与汽车制造商不提供回购合同的情形相比,汽车制造商在一定条件下通过实施回购合同可以有效实现汽车租赁供应链的协调.     

基于消费者接受程度的双渠道产品价格和质量决策研究

在消费者对直销渠道和零售渠道接受程度有差异的情形下,研究了产品质量为内生的双渠道供应链中价格和质量联合决策问题。分别构建传统单一零售渠道模型、双渠道分散决策模型和双渠道集中决策模型。比较制造商和零售商在3种模型下的定价均衡决策、产品质量水平和利润,分析零售商和制造商的渠道策略和最优定价。结果表明：与传统单一零售渠道情形相比,在集中决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道不改变零售价格,但是能够提高产品质量水平和供应链整体利润;在分散决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道将降低产品批发价、零售价以及产品质量水平;另外当消费者对直销渠道接受程度适中时,制造商和零售商可实现帕累托改进。     

面向再制造的废旧产品回收渠道模式研究

研究了一个由制造商、销售商和第三方回收机构组成的再制造闭环供应链,提出并探讨回收废旧产品的3种混合回收渠道模式,构建了相关收益函数模型,利用Stackelberg主从博弈模型,以制造商向其他方收取的回购价为自变量,选取整个闭环供应链体系下的废旧产品回收率、制造商利润以及整个闭环供应链的利润和零售商销售的零售产品价格等指标作为可比对象,推导出其相关指标关于回购价的目标函数,在其他条件不变的情况下进行对比分析。结论显示制造商与零售商混合回收渠道模式最佳。然后通过具体算例分析对结论进行了进一步证明和现实意义解释。文章研究意义在于帮助处在循环产业链的企业如何选择回收渠道模式,作出最有利于企业利益的决策模式。     

考虑渠道权力结构的O2O供应链合作广告策略研究

通过建立和比较四种Stackelberg博弈模型,即制造商未参与网络零售平台合作广告计划的博弈模型(N模型)、网络零售平台主导的合作广告模型(P模型)、制造商主导的合作广告模型(M模型)、集中决策的合作广告模型(C模型),研究了渠道权力结构对O2O供应链渠道成员合作广告决策的影响。研究发现:当网络零售平台为供应链领导者时,只有当线上渠道交叉销售效应需到达一定水平,制造商才拥有参与网络零售平台合作广告计划的资格,且当交叉销售效应较大时,网络零售平台的利润将超过制造商;而当制造商为供应链领导者时,制造商不愿意让网络零售平台"搭便车",因此具有较高线上渠道交叉销售效应水平的制造商会选择具有较小引导作用的合作广告方案;集中决策模型中的制造商全国性广告投入及供应链整体利润最大。     

考虑更新时间的汽车租赁闭环供应链回购激励模型

针对单个汽车制造商和单个租赁商构成的二级闭环供应链系统,在租赁需求随时间呈指数下降以及回购价格与产品维护水平具有相关性的前提下,研究了占主导的制造商对租赁商的回购激励策略,考虑了租赁商的车辆更新时间、产品维护水平、资金成本以及二手市场对供应链决策的影响,并与制造商不采用回购激励策略进行了比较.结果表明:当回购率满足一定条件时,制造商可通过调整奖惩因子来实现供应链利润在其与租赁商之间的分配,从而保证供应链能达到协调状态.     

汽车租赁闭环供应链的回购策略及激励问题

研究由单个制造商和单个租赁商构成的汽车租赁闭环供应链的回购合同设置问题。发现在汽车租赁商的维护成本与旧车返回率具有相关性的前提下,单纯的回购合同无法实现供应链协调。提出了奖惩策略,结果表明,在回购合同中引入该策略后,占主导地位的制造商可以对租赁商的订购数量和旧车返回率实施控制和引导,从而实现汽车租赁闭环供应链的协调。     

汽车制造商与租赁服务提供商的回购合同

研究了在线性租赁需求环境下,汽车制造商不提供回购合同和提供回购合同时的供应链决策,以及二手市场对决策的影响.结果表明,在一定条件下合理利用回购策略可以有效实现汽车租赁供应链的协调.     

基于过度自信的双渠道绿色供应链决策研究

在决策者过高估计消费者对产品绿色度的敏感性以及过度精确估计产品需求的不确定性的情形下,研究决策者的过度自信对双渠道绿色供应链的产品绿色度决策、产品定价和供应链成员利润的影响。基于博弈理论,构建集中式决策下制造商和零售商同时过度自信、分散式决策下仅零售商过度自信和分散式决策下仅制造商过度自信3种情形下的双渠道供应链决策模型,通过优化求解和仿真分析得出结论。研究发现,零售商的过度自信导致产品绿色度、批发价、直销渠道零售价和制造商利润下降,而零售商利润与零售渠道价格的变化与零售渠道市场份额有关;制造商的过度自信导致产品绿色度、批发价、两种渠道零售价及制造商利润增大,而零售商利润随制造商过度自信水平先增后减。     

基于服务水平的制造商延保服务销售渠道选择

基于顾客风险规避度,构建了延保服务需求函数,并运用Stackelberg主从博弈,分别构建了制造商通过零售渠道和直销渠道销售延保服务的利润模型,结合数值算例,比较分析了在双边际效应及互补效应共同作用下,延保服务的服务水平对2种销售模式下制造商利润的影响。研究发现:延保服务的服务水平对制造商2种销售模式下利润的影响符合边际效益递减规律。服务水平对2种渠道下制造商延保服务销售渠道选择的影响是分段的,服务水平较低时制造商选择零售渠道销售延保服务较为有利,而服务水平较高时制造商选择直销渠道销售延保服务更为有利。     

基于零售商代发货模式的双渠道供应链协调

提出了零售商代发货模式,构建了一个由制造商和网络零售商组成的代发货双渠道供应链模型,其中制造商拥有网络直销渠道,并将订单全部交给网络零售商,由网络零售商代发到顾客手中。分析、比较了集中式和分散式决策下制造商和网络零售商的最优均衡解,论证了逆向收益共享契约对这种代发货双渠道供应链协调的有效性。最后通过算例分析,发现存在一个共享因子变化范围能够实现这种代发货双渠道供应链的完美协调。     

The value of buyback contract under price competition

We investigate the value of buyback contract by analysing a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. Three scenarios, depending on whether buyback contracts are offered to neither, one, or both of the retailers, are considered. We first study the case when the manufacturer can only determine his buyback price. We show how the demand uncertainty, the competition level and the handling cost of buyback contract influence the profits of the manufacturer, the two retailers and the whole supply chain. Interestingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the buyback contract may intensify competition between the retailers, we show that offering the buyback contract to two competing retailers can benefit every channel member even if the competition level is high. Next, we study the return contract, a special type of buyback contract, and show the effect of competition level and industry outlook on supply chain parties' choices on return contract. We extend Padmanabhan and Png [1997. “Manufacturer's Returns Policies And Retail Competition.” Marketing Science 16 (1): 81–94] to the case with an asymmetric contract structure, i.e. one return contract and one whole-sale contract. We show that an asymmetric contract structure may better off both the retailers and the whole supply chain.     

Supply chain management using put option contracts with information asymmetry

We study the problem of hedging demand uncertainty in a supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer under a buyback contract. We use semi-variance of the possible profit values as a measure of the retailer’s risk attitude. We first study the setting where the supplier can observe the risk type of the retailer and find that in this case the supplier can design a buyback contract that extracts the maximum profit for the supplier. When the retailer’s type is unobservable, a new contract needs to be designed (the ‘option buyback contract’) and we show that in this case the retailers will self-select and chose an order quantity that maximises the total supply chain profit. Through numerical computations, we analyse the dynamics between the benefits of hedging risk, information rent and the retailer’s type, and outline cases when, depending on the shape of the reservation utilities of the retailers, it is too costly for the supplier to manage risk. In conclusion, our results show that whereas semi-variance has appealing properties as a measure of risk, its use introduces analytical challenges that can only be overcome through numerical computation.     

Coordinating a three-layer supply chain with uncertain demand and random yield

The paper considers a three-layer supply chain involving one raw-material supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. The market demand is assumed to be stochastic and productions at the raw-material supplier and manufacturer are subject to random yield. The centralised model is studied as the benchmark case. The decentralised model is solved and Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained. It is shown that buyback contract fails to coordinate such a supply chain. However, a composite contract framed combining buyback, and sales rebate and penalty contracts is shown to coordinate the supply chain. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the developed models.     

多品牌商线上线下竞争定价与渠道决策研究

为解决多个品牌商线上线下渠道决策问题,运用Spokes模型分析了直营和混合销售模式的最优定价及收益情况,基于博弈论方法,研究了市场和渠道竞争程度对品牌商决策均衡的影响。结果表明：两种销售模式下,品牌商的最优定价随市场和渠道竞争程度的增加而增加;当市场或渠道竞争程度较低时,品牌商选择直营模式;市场或渠道竞争程度处于一定阈值区间时,两种模式都具有适用性;而市场或渠道竞争程度较高则选择混合模式。     

Coordination of quantity and shelf-retention timing in the video movie rental industry

How should a video rental chain replenish its stock of new movies over time? Any such policy should consist of two key dimensions: (i) the number of copies purchased; and (ii) when to remove a movie from the front shelves and replace it by a newly released one. We first analyze this bi-variate problem for an integrated chain. As for decentralized chains, we show that a (wholesale) price-only contract cannot coordinate such a chain. We then consider a price-and-revenue-sharing contract. Such a contract can achieve coordination, but the unique price and share which are needed may not provide one of the parties with its desired profit (i.e., it will violate individual rationality). This situation has been reported in the case of Blockbuster Video and has led to litigation between Blockbuster and Disney Studios. We thus propose adding a third lever: a license fee (or subsidy) associated with each new movie. Such a contract can coordinate the channel and satisfy the individual rationality requirements. In fact, all our results hold true irrespective of whether or not the rental store is allowed to sell surplus copies of movies. We are able to compare the optimal decision variable and coordinating lever values, as well as the optimal profits, for the “rental only” and “sales + rental” models. Our numerical examples, which utilize empirical demand data have significant managerial implications in terms of increasing the effectiveness of the video rental industry.     

渠道结构有序度的熵模型

基于渠道内信息传输的速度和质量,引入速度熵和质量熵概念,在此基础上,构建渠道结构有序度的熵模型,从渠道长度和渠道宽度有序度两方面说明渠道结构有序度,以此从信息传递效率的角度,对渠道结构的有效性进行分析和评价.最后,通过算例对该方法加以说明.     

A manufacturer’s production and pricing strategies with a salvage channel

We study a manufacturer’s production quantity and pricing decisions when the manufacturer has an opportunity to sell surplus inventory through a salvage channel. Before sales begin, the manufacturer determines the production quantity without knowing customer demand. After demand is realised, the manufacturer first satisfies the demand through primary channel while charging a fixed price or adjusting price to maximise profit. At the end of the selling season, the manufacturer resells surplus inventory through the salvage channel, which can be either integrated with or independent of the manufacturer. The manufacturer’s optimal production quantity and expected profit are investigated under different salvage channel structures. We show that the salvage channel improves the manufacturer’s profitability as well as the availability of the product to potential customers through both primary and salvage channels.     

基于顾客渠道偏好改进的Hotelling模型的双渠道供应链零售商博弈

为了对双渠道供应链中互相独立的不同渠道零售商的决策进行分析,从考虑顾客对不同购买渠道的心理偏好角度出发,构建出在Hotelling线性城市模型基础上加以改进的博弈模型。在前往不同渠道购买的产品存在成本差异,产品对网络渠道适用性不同这两个条件的约束下,分析了互相独立的不同渠道零售商之间博弈均衡价格、市场份额和利润的变化趋势。研究说明,随着产品网络渠道适用性的增大,不同渠道零售商的博弈均衡价格差异、均衡市场份额差异均会随之减小,同时,传统零售商利润也会随之减小,而电子渠道零售商利润会随之增大。网络渠道的适用性确定时,对网络适用性好的产品会受到不同渠道购买成本的影响,导致不同渠道零售商的定价和市场份额占比不同。