Subjective confidence in perceptual judgments: A test of the self-consistency model.

Two questions about subjective confidence in perceptual judgments are examined: the bases for these judgments and the reasons for their accuracy. Confidence in perceptual judgments has been claimed to rest on qualitatively different processes than confidence in memory tasks. However, predictions from a self-consistency model (SCM), which had been confirmed for general-information questions (Koriat, 2010) and social attitudes (Koriat & Adiv, 2010), are shown to hold true also for perceptual judgments. In SCM, confidence is modeled by the procedure for assessment of statistical level of confidence: For a 2-alternative, forced-choice item, confidence is based on the consistency with which the choice is favored across a sample of representations of the item, and acts as a monitor of the likelihood that a new sample will yield the same choice. Assuming that these representations are drawn from commonly shared populations of representations associated with each item, predictions regarding the basis of confidence were confirmed by results concerning the functions relating confidence and choice latency to interparticipant consensus and to intraparticipant consistency for majority and minority choices. With regard to the confidence-accuracy (C/A) relationship, the consensuality principle, documented for general-knowledge tasks (Koriat, 2008a), was replicated for perceptual judgments: Confidence correlated with the consensuality of the choice rather than with its correctness, suggesting that the C/A correlation is due to the relationship between confidence and self-consistency and is positive only as long as the correct choices are the consistently made choices. SCM provides a general model for the basis and accuracy of confidence judgments across different domains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effect of age, skill, and performance feedback on children's judgments of confidence.

We examined children's judgments of confidence following performance on a cognitive task as a function of the children's age and skill and the presence or absence of feedback regarding performance. Second and third graders (n?=?75) and fifth and sixth graders (n?=?79) estimated the numerosity of large numbers of dots, made ratings of confidence concerning their answers, and were assessed on a timed task of counting in multiples. For older children, regardless of skill level, feedback was associated with "calibration," that is, a positive relation between estimation accuracy and confidence. For younger children, on the other hand, feedback was associated with such a relation only if the children were relatively skillful on the counting task. Results suggest that domain-specific knowledge, in conjunction with objective feedback following task performance, may help young children compensate for developmental factors that typically are associated with an unrealistically high degree of confidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Age differences in the accuracy of confidence judgments

Age differences in accuracy were investigated by having older (M = 68.6 years) and younger (M = 21.5 years) adults make confidence judgments about the correctness of their responses to two sets of general knowledge items. For one set, prior to making their confidence judgments, subjects made mental strategy judgements indicating how they had selected their answers (i.e., they guessed, used intuition, made an inference, or immediately recognized the response as correct). Results indicate that older subjects were more accurate than younger subjects in predicting the correctness of their responses; however, making mental strategy judgments did not result in increased accuracy for either age group. Additional analyses explored the relationship between accuracy and other individual difference variables. The results of this investigation are consistent with recent theories of postformal cognitive development that suggest older adults have greater insight into the limitations of their knowledge.     

ROC curves and confidence judgments in recognition memory.

Most models of recognition memory rely on a strength/familiarity-based signal detection account that assumes that the processes giving rise to a confidence judgment are the same as those giving rise to an old-new decision. Confidence is assumed to be scaled directly from the perceived familiarity of a probe. This assumption was tested in 2 experiments that examine the shape of confidence-based z receiver operating characteristic (zROC) curves under different levels of response bias induced by changing stimulus probabilities (Experiment 1) and payoffs (Experiment 2). Changes in the shape of the zROC curves with bias indicate that confidence is not scaled directly from perceived familiarity or likelihood. A model of information accumulation in recognition memory is proposed that can account for the observed effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Retrieval processes underlying confidence in comprehension judgments.

People's ratings of confidence in ability to answer questions about previously studied expository passages are virtually uncorrelated with test performance. This correlation would be attenuated if confidence ratings were influenced by momentary accessibility (e.g., latency to initial access of probed information) and if test performance were influenced by other aspects of retrieval (e.g., total recall over an interval). To see if momentary accessibility influences confidence ratings, Experiment 1 manipulated accessibility by using self- versus other-generated title probes. Both confidence and accessibility measures varied with generation condition. Experiment 2 provided three findings. First it assessed whether accessibility is the only common factor underlying confidence and domain familiarity ratings by observing whether confidence and familiarity covary wth accessibility partialed out. Marginal covariation implied either some common factor other than accessibility, imperfect measurement of accessibility, or both. Second, negative correlations of rating latencies with rating magnitudes implied that access latency, momentary access rate, or both, affect the ratings. Third, calibration of comprehension was poor, but nonzero. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Probing the locus of confidence judgments: Experiments on the time to determine confidence.

Three experiments investigated the properties of the time to determine confidence to determine the processing locus for the judgment of confidence. Results suggest that when the primary decision is made under speed stress, confidence is determined postdecisionally and involves a memory-based, computational algorithm. This strategy frees the primary decision of processing time and permits the accurate diagnosis of decision errors. When the primary decision is made under accuracy stress, however, the determination of confidence is initiated, or can even be completed, during the primary decision process. This strategy permits confidence to be used in the adaptive regulation of the decisional parameters during the decision process but yields poorer diagnosticity of errors when they occur. The latter finding also implies that primary decision latencies include time to determine confidence, rendering such data difficult, if not impossible, to model empirically. Implications for contemporary decision models that provide a basis for confidence in human judgment are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Immediate feedback, delayed feedback, and perceptual cues and inquiry during verbal interactions.

Evaluated the effectiveness of diverse ways of teaching an interpersonal inquiry technique. Using 5 experimental groups of male undergraduates and a videotape technique, the impact of delayed feedback, immediate feedback, and perceptual cues was separated. When Ss were exposed to delayed feedback plus perceptual cues, they learned at a significantly higher level than when receiving immediate feedback. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Context effects in judgments of causation.

It is hypothesized that causal explanations for an occurrence vary as a function of the causal background against which the occurrence is considered. Three experiments are presented that test propositions regarding the operation of the causal background in the selection of causal explanations. Findings indicate that factors previously shown to affect subjects' attributions—specifically, role (actor vs. observer), covariation information (consensus and distinctiveness), and quality of performance (positive vs. negative)—may do so by guiding subjects' selection of a causal background. Evidence indicates that these factors may not have the predicted effect on subjects' attributions when competing cues, such as context or wording of the causal question, suggest the relevance of conflicting causal backgrounds. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

On the evaluation of probability judgments: Calibration, resolution, and monotonicity.

Judgments of probability are commonly evaluated by 2 criteria: (1) calibration, namely, the correspondence between stated confidence and rate of occurrence, and (2) resolution, namely, the ability to distinguish between events that do and do not occur. Two representations of probability judgments are contrasted: the designated form that presupposes a particular coding of outcomes (e.g., rain vs no rain) and the inclusive form that incorporates all events and their complements. It is shown that the indices of calibration and resolution derived from these representations measure different characteristics of judgment. Calibration is distinguished from 2 types of overconfidence: specific and generic. An ordinal measure of performance is proposed and compared to the standard measures in forecasts of recession and in both numerical and verbal assessments of general knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Contextual effects on the calibration of probabilistic judgments.

24 practicing auditors employed by public accounting firms participated in a study to determine the extent to which contextual factors affect the calibration of their subjective prior probability distributions (PPDs). Probabilistic responses to general-knowledge (almanac) questions were analyzed and compared to responses obtained in a previous study by the present 3rd author et al (see record 1983-07156-001), which used the same type of Ss and methods in a substantive audit judgment context. Results indicate that Ss' judgments in the general-knowledge task context were miscalibrated and significantly overconfident, whereas their judgments in the substantive audit task context were less miscalibrated and predominantly underconfident. Findings suggest that calibration research results may not be generalizable across applied judgment–decision contexts. Implications for practical applications of Bayesian decision models, improvement of preexperimental training methods, and the effects of incentives on miscalibration are discussed. (23 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From figurative to operative expectancy in the perceptual judgments of children.

Conducted 2 studies on "figurative expectancy," the tendency to make perceptual judgments on the basis of temporal patterns. In Exp I, 60 4-9 yr old children were shown 4 series of animal pictures in which the relative strengths of the temporal patterns were varied. Results show (a) a significant decrease with age in figurative expectancy and (b) significantly more figurative expectancy in the case of a strong temporal sequence linked with a weak critical figure than in the case of a weak temporal sequence linked with a strong critical figure. In Exp II, 66 4-yr-old children were shown a single series of pictures presented at different rates and with critical figures that were ambiguous or nonambiguous. Results show that there was more figurative expectancy the more rapid the rate of presentation. There was also an ambiguity effect showing more figurative expectancy judgments the greater the ambiguity of the critical figure. Results support Piaget's theory of perceptual development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Adult age differences in the realism of confidence judgments: Overconfidence, format dependence, and cognitive predictors.

Realistic confidence judgments are essential to everyday functioning, but few studies have addressed the issue of age differences in overconfidence. Therefore, the authors examined this issue with probability judgment and intuitive confidence intervals in a sample of 122 healthy adults (ages: 35-40, 55-60, 70-75 years). In line with predictions based on the na?ve sampling model (P. Juslin, A. Winman, & P. Hansson, 2007), substantial format dependence was observed, with extreme overconfidence when confidence was expressed as an intuitive confidence interval but not when confidence was expressed as a probability judgment. Moreover, an age-related increase in overconfidence was selectively observed when confidence was expressed as intuitive confidence intervals. Structural equation modeling indicated that the age-related increases in overconfidence were mediated by a general cognitive ability factor that may reflect executive processes. Finally, the results indicated that part of the negative influence of increased age on general ability may be compensated for by an age-related increase in domain-relevant knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Accuracy of feeling-of-knowing judgments for predicting perceptual identification and relearning.

The feeling of knowing (FOK) refers to predictions about subsequent memory performance on previously nonrecalled items. The present research explored predictive accuracy with 2 new FOK criterion tests (in addition to recognition): relearning and perceptual identification. In 2 experiments, Ss attempted to recall the answers to general information questions, then made FOK predictions for all nonrecalled answers, and finally had a criterion test to assess the accuracy of the FOK predictions. Exp I, conducted with 32 undergraduates, demonstrated that perceptual identification can be employed successfully as a criterion test for the feeling of knowing FOK. This opens a new way for metamemory research via perception. Moreover, the FOK accuracy for predicting perceptual identification was not significantly correlated with the FOK accuracy for predicting recognition, in accord with the idea that these 2 tests assess memory differently. Exp II, conducted with 77 undergraduates, demonstrated that relearning performance can also be predicted by FOK judgments. Overall results show that there is a positive relationship between the FOK and the amount of time elapsing before a memory search is terminated during recall. (76 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Written personalized feedback and confidence in smoking cessation.

Examines the relationship among written personalized feedback, smokers' confidence, and smoking cessation with 1,217 smokers participating in a randomized trial. There were higher quit rates among smokers with lower levels of baseline confidence, and greater increases in confidence from baseline to 3 mo among smokers who quit. Personalized feedback had its largest impact on confidence early in the cessation process, and the impact was reflected in sustained increases in confidence among quitters through a 1-yr follow-up. The feedback had no effect on the confidence of smokers who did not achieve initial cessation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The perceptual basis of judgments of pitch differences and pitch ratios.

In Exps I and II, 13 Ss were required in each trial to directly compare 2 pairs of tones and indicate which pair of tones had the greater pitch difference (Exp I) or pitch ratio (Exp II). In Exps III and IV, 6 Ss estimated both pitch differences and pitch ratios. A nonmetric analysis indicated that most Ss did not distinguish between pitch ratios and pitch differences, but treated them as the same perceptual quantity. The mel scale described how pitch changed with frequency for Ss without musical training, while a logarithmic relationship between pitch and frequency (the musical scale) provided a better fit for musically trained Ss. (French abstract) (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Accuracy, confidence, and calibration: How young children and adults assess credibility.

Do children and adults use the same cues to judge whether someone is a reliable source of information? In 4 experiments, we investigated whether children (ages 5 and 6) and adults used information regarding accuracy, confidence, and calibration (i.e., how well an informant's confidence predicts the likelihood of being correct) to judge informants' credibility. We found that both children and adults used information about confidence and accuracy to judge credibility; however, only adults used information about informants' calibration. Adults discredited informants who exhibited poor calibration, but children did not. Requiring adult participants to complete a secondary task while evaluating informants' credibility impaired their ability to make use of calibration information. Thus, children and adults may differ in how they infer credibility because of the cognitive demands of using calibration. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

The influence of virtual sample size on confidence and causal-strength judgments.

The authors investigated whether confidence in causal judgments varies with virtual sample size--the frequency of cases in which the outcome is (a) absent before the introduction of a generative cause or (b) present before the introduction of a preventive cause. Participants were asked to evaluate the influence of various candidate causes on an outcome as well as to rate their confidence in those judgments. They were presented with information on the relative frequencies of the outcome given the presence and absence of various candidate causes. These relative frequencies, sample size, and the direction of the causal influence (generative vs. preventive) were manipulated. It was found that both virtual and actual sample size affected confidence. Further, confidence affected estimates of strength, but confidence and strength are dissociable. The results enable a consistent explanation of the puzzling previous finding that observed causal-strength ratings often deviated from the predictions of both of the 2 dominant models of causal strength. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Highly confident but wrong: Gender differences and similarities in confidence judgments.

Although gender differences are fairly consistent when people report their general confidence, much less is known about such differences when individuals assess the degree of confidence they have in their ability to answer any particular test question. The objective of this research was to investigate gender differences in item-specific confidence judgments. Data were collected from 3 psychology courses containing 70 men and 181 women. After answering each item on course exams, students indicated their confidence that their answer to that item was correct. Results showed that gender differences in confidence are dependent on the context (whether items were correct or wrong) and on the domain being tested. Moreover, although both men and women were overconfident, undergraduate men were especially overconfident when incorrect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Age differences in feeling-of-knowing and confidence judgments as a function of knowledge domain.

For two semantic knowledge domains, general and computer-related, feeling-of-knowing (FOK) and confidence level (CL) ratings and their relative accuracy were assessed in young, middle-aged, and older adults, after test difficulty was equated across age groups. Global memory self-efficacy beliefs were also assessed for each domain. As expected, greater age was associated with poorer memory self-efficacy beliefs only in the computer domain. The oldest two groups were found to be more underconfident than young adults when rating their FOK but not their CL, for computer items but not for general items. Statistical control of age differences in memory self-efficacy beliefs in the relevant domain greatly reduced this age effect on computer-related FOK ratings. This finding suggests that absolute FOK judgments are more closely related to memory self-efficacy beliefs than are CL judgments. Gamma correlations between judgments and recognition performance revealed that all age groups were equally accurate in FOK and in CL judgments, in both domains. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Frequency judgments: The problem of defining a perceptual event.

In four experiments the conditions under which frequency judgments reflect the relative frequency of complex perceptual events were explored. Ss viewed a series of 4?×?4 grids each containing seven items, which were letters and numbers in one of four typefaces. Later judgments of the relative frequency with which particular letters appeared in particular typefaces were unaffected by a warning about an upcoming frequency judgment task, but were affected by both the time available for processing the stimuli and the nature of the cover task subjects engaged in while viewing the grids. Frequency judgments were poor when exposure durations were less than 2 and when the cover task directed subjects' attention merely to the locations of the items within the grids. Frequency judgments improved when the cover task directed subjects' attention to the identity of the stimuli, especially to the conjunction of letter and typeface. The results suggest that frequency estimation of complex stimuli may be possible only for stimuli that have been processed as phenomenal objects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)