基于委托代理模型的梯级水电站补偿效益分配

调节水库有显著的梯级补偿效益,可以大大提高下游各梯级电站的保证出力和年发电量。为有效解决梯级龙头水库的巨大建设投资和补偿效益分配,实现梯级水电站联合优化运行,在深入分析国内外各种补偿效益分配的方法后,基于委托代理理论,提出隶属于不同业主的梯级水电站群委托代理关系的效益分配模型。算例分析表明:该方法能激励上游电站配合下游电站整体运行的积极性,使水能资源得到合理利用。     

基于全微分法的多主体梯级水电站群联合调度增益归因及分配

公平、高效、合理的增益分配是开展多主体水库群联合优化调度的机制保障。以往基于水库库容、装机容量、发电量等单一指标或综合指标构建的按比例分摊方法,未能反映联合增益形成机制和径流变化对增益结果的影响。针对上述不足,本文将联合调度增益依照独立调度和联合调度情景下的效益差异进行逐项定量分解,提出基于全微分法的增益归因-分配模型:建立联合调度增益与时段弃水量、时段蓄量差、累积蓄量差的关系,采用全微分公式定量分解各水库增益贡献。实例结果表明:(1)全微分法可定量解构各水库各时段增益贡献及其物理成因机制,可得到满足增益分配基本原则的分配结果。(2)该方法综合考虑来水条件、水库参数、库群拓扑结构等因素对联合增益的综合影响,弥补了单一指标评价片面性的缺陷,避免了综合指标法中权重系数的确定问题及难以反映增益形成机理的问题。研究为多利益主体梯级水电站群增量效益分配问题提供了一种新的解决途径。     

水库补偿效益分配问题研究

水库补偿效益分配的步骤:一是确定水库补偿效益的施益方和受益方;二是计算水库补偿效益值;三是选择科学合理并能使各方较满意的分配方法.在分析水库补偿效益不确定性、可变性和博弈性的基础上,探讨了梯级水库串联式发电和并联式水库发电补偿效益影响因子的识别方法.水库补偿效益的分配方法主要有多目标综合分析法、模糊综合评判法、熵权法、离差平方法等,但都存在不足,需要进一步研究完善.     

红水河梯级水电站水库(三维)优化补偿调节数学模型及其求解方法

红水河梯级水电站水库补偿调节,应用传统的动态规划方法时,由于“维数灾”问题,不能研究二个以上水库的同期优化补偿问题。本文以二元动态规划新算法及Fibo Nacci法联合应用,首次对梯级水电站三个水库联合优化补偿调节数学     

梯级水电站汛期错峰调度效益的补偿方法

洪水经上游水电站拦蓄错峰后,下游水电站将减少泄洪,可以增发电量创造效益,这一效益离不开上游水电站的调节作用发挥。为解决上下游梯级水电站在洪水优化调度中创造效益的分摊问题,文章分析提出一种错峰调度效益补偿方法,并以北盘江梯级光照、马马崖及董箐三座水电站为实例进行验证,实例证明补偿方法可以提高上下游水电站错峰调度积极性,显著提升梯级水电站群的优化调度水平。     

基于Shapley-Value的梯级水库联合调度效益分配方法探讨

目前梯级水库在联合调度时由于补偿效益分配制度上的不合理,致使一些调节性能较好的电站在联合调度过程中得不到公正的对待,从而影响了这些电站对联合调度的积极性.针对上述问题,以三峡梯级和清江梯级五库联合调度为例,引入博弈论中的Shapley-Value法对联合调度所产生效益分配方法问题进行了探讨.结果表明:该方法不仅具有很强...     

洪家渡发电厂水库效益补偿研究

在定量分析了洪家渡水电站对下游其他电站水量、电量影响的基础上,确定以洪家渡多年平均补偿电量作为流域开展效益补偿的依据,并根据理论研究和现行政策,提出了5:5分配法,作为洪家渡水库调节效益补偿的计算方法,为乌江干流龙头电站效益补偿问题的解决提供了科学、合理的依据。     

控制性水库建设模式研究

依据《四川省流域梯级水电站间水库调节效益偿付管理办法》,在合理核算上游控制性水库梯级对其下游梯级受益电站补偿调节效益的基础上,对上游控制性水库梯级建设模式进行了研究,提出了控制性水库梯级几种可能的建设投资分摊模式。     

基于状态转移矩阵的梯级水库优化调度确定性离散动态规划方法

基于状态转移矩阵的确定性离散动态规划(DDDP)方法是在考虑水库运行的综合利用的前提下,利用状态转移矩阵寻找出梯级水库优化调度过程中所有的可行策略,基于目标函数逆向搜索可行策略,得出最优解的优化算法.该方法可进行单库优化计算,也可以进行梯级水电站优化计算.文中以锦屏梯级为例,说明该方法可在满足梯级水库上下游生态用水、发电用水等综合利用的前提下,以梯级水电站发电效益最大为目标,求得梯级水库优化调度的较好解.     

沅水上游水电站投运后对发电效益影响分析

为分析沅水上游水电站投运后,对五强溪水电站发电效益的影响,首先根据流域实际来水还原计算五强溪的天然来水过程,利用还原计算的天然来水,按五强溪实际运行控制水位计算发电量,五强溪实际年均发电量比还原计算年均发电量增加3.297亿k W·h。通过梯级水库的调节、补偿作用,可显著增加五强溪及梯级水电站的发电效益。     

电力市场中水电厂间补偿效益的分摊方法

针对电力市场中,水电厂间补偿效益的合理分摊将成为补偿调节能否顺利开展的关键问题,借助于合作博弈中的估值理论,提出了基于Shapely值的补偿效益分摊方法。该方法基于市场主体的“理性”行为,体现了市场机制,准确核定了参与主体的边际贡献,真正体现方案的公平性;针对多库问题,引入统计思想,改进了Shapely值计算方法,有效地解决了随电厂数以指数增长的分摊计算量过大问题,真正体现了方案的实用性,从而易于被各方接受。经实例研究验证了方案的可行性和有效性。     

利益相关者的水资源配置博弈

水资源的准公共产品属性及其在开发利用中存在的外部性使河流自然流态受到严重的扰动,本文基于非合作博弈博弈论,建立主从关系的用户博弈模型分析河流水资源分配,基于个体效益不能达到帕累托最优状态,采用合作博弈方法,建立水资源用户合作博弈模型。合作博弈增加了总效益,但使得上游用户的效益比非合作时减少,有必要对上游用户进行效益补偿:引入微观经济学的无差异曲线与合作联盟形成的条件构建合作效益分配的可行解集,并提出基于边际贡献的效益分配方法在可行解集中挑选唯一的效益分配解。研究结果表明,合作博弈总效益大于非合作博弈的总效益,达到帕累托最优状态;通过合作效益分配,处于先动优势的上游用户的分配效益大于非合作的效益,有利于行动占先者加入合作联盟。     

An Interval Parameter Model for Cooperative Inter-Basin Water Resources Allocation Considering the Water Quality Issues

In this paper, a new methodology based on interval optimization and game theory is developed for optimal operation of an inter-basin water transfer system considering efficiency, equity and sustainability criteria. A linear version of the agricultural water production function is proposed and used for incorporating deficit irrigation. The interval programming and cooperative game theory are utilized for equitable reallocation of benefits to water users in both water donor and receiving basins. To assess the sustainability of water allocation policies, water quality and environmental flow in the donor basin and groundwater table drawdown in the receiving basin are taken into consideration. The effectiveness of this methodology is examined by applying it to a large scale case study of water transfer from the Karoon river basin in south-west to the Rafsanjan plain in the central part of Iran.     

A Nonlinear Interval Model for Water and Waste Load Allocation in River Basins

In this paper, a new methodology is proposed for simultaneous allocation of water and waste load in river basins. A nonlinear interval number optimization model is used to incorporate the uncertainties of model inputs and parameters. In this methodology, the bounds of the uncertain inputs are only required, not necessarily knowing their probability density or fuzzy membership functions. In the proposed model, the existing uncertainties in water demands and monthly available water are considered in the optimization model. Also the economic and environmental impacts of water allocation to the agricultural water users are taken into account. To have an equitable water and waste load allocation, benefits are reallocated to water users using some solution concepts of the cooperative game theory. Results of applying the methodology to the Dez river system in south-western part of Iran show its effectiveness and applicability for water and waste load allocation in an uncertain environment.     

Incorporating Water Demand Management into a Cooperative Water Allocation Framework

The impact of a water demand management plan on a water system and its users is investigated within a comprehensive cooperative water allocation framework. In particular, a demand management plan is incorporated into a two-step multi-period fair water allocation model. A modified cooperative game is designed for the sharing of additional net benefits under the scenario having water demand management. The results indicate that cooperation among water users can yield more net benefits, and a water demand management plan is able to lead to a further increase of the aggregated net benefits by means of water transfers from less productive users to more productive ones. By utilizing the modified cooperative game, fair sharing of additional net benefits ensures that every water user can expect to receive more net benefits and thereby water users are motivated by incentives to implement a water demand management plan which in turn improves water use efficiency. The results demonstrate that the demand management plan can be of great assistance in some arid and semi-arid regions.     

水库补偿效益产生机理的研究

为使水库补偿效益计算和分摊更加科学合理,利用马克思经济学、环境经济学和物理学等理论,从调节型水库对过流水资源价值改变入手,揭示水库补偿效益产生机理,通过大坝做功,水库改变过流水资源价值,水资源的流动特性使得相关对象在投资不变的情况下,直接或间接利用价值变化的水资源,所得的利益发生变化,利益变化部分是水库改变水资源价值的效益外部化,即水库产生的补偿效益。     

南水北调东线水资源供应链定价模型

把南水北调东线供水工程作为一个水资源的供应链,交易主体由水供应商和分销商组成,从交易主体市场资金运营的角度,建立了合作博弈的联合定价模型,并设计了政府最高限价的两部制(基本水价与计量水价相结合的水价制)动态定价约束.通过数值算例验证了模型的有效性.其结果表明,联合定价模型所获得的供应链整体利润比Stackelberg博弈模型高,并且在联合定价下通过利润分配因子的设计可实现供应链整体、生产商、分销商的多赢.     

博弈论在水资源冲突中应用的研究进展

与传统的定量分析方法和最优化方法相比,博弈论能更好地识别和模拟水资源冲突主体的决策机制,并考察不同冲突间的相互作用机制。通过梳理和归纳有关文献,分别从水资源配置冲突、跨界水污染冲突和水资源冲突协调机制3个方面,对博弈论在解决水资源冲突中的运用进行了综述,并在此基础上提出了研究展望。鼓励运用市场经济宏观调控机制解决流域水资源水量和水质双重利用冲突;流域初始水权分配定量化有待深入研究。     

An Ultimatum Game Theory Based Approach for Basin Scale Water Allocation Conflict Resolution

Increasing water consumption via competitive demands has resulted in serious water conflicts and the subsequent environmental crisis in the Gavkhouni Watershed with the Gavkhouni swamp in the most downstream located in the central part of Iran. In this research, a two-player ultimatum game theory approach is adopted to not only address the water conflicts with the purpose of environmental reclamation of the drying swamp, but also to ensure economic satisfaction for the upstream landowners and farmers. The Ministry of Energy (MoE) and its subsidiary regional water authority represent the responsible organizations for providing water while the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) is the primary body in charge of water consumption in the watershed. MoE and MoA are considered as two players in the game, whereas MoE has more power than MoA in terms of allocating water. Five strategies are studied namely: 1 and 2) decreasing water allocation to irrigated agriculture as much as the annual shortage of the Gavkhouni swamp with and without compensation to MoA (D-L), 3 and 4) decreasing water allocation to irrigated agriculture twice as much the annual shortage of the swamp with and without compensation for MoA (D-2 L) and 5) giving up Gavkhouni swamp’s reclamation plan (D). Moreover, three scenarios regarding the relations between environmental and agricultural utilities are designated. According to the results, D-2 L with paying compensation to MoA is chosen as the best alternative in scenario 1 when the environmental utility was assumed to be greater than the agricultural utility. Ultimatum Game Theory has no final solution for scenarios 2 and 3 where the environmental utility is considered to be equal and smaller than agricultural utility. The swamp’s annual environmental water shortage as 324 million cubic meters is supplied by application of both strategies D-L and D-2 L. Ultimatum Games are efficient in assessment of water conflicts to resolve them through careful and planned negotiations.