信息分享对供应链企业社会责任配置的影响

研究了市场需求不确定情况下,零售商信息分享对供应链企业社会责任(CSR)配置,以及对供应链成员的CSR业绩和经济业绩的影响。以制造商和零售商是否主动实施CSR行为来描述CSR配置,建立和求解了有无信息分享以及不同CSR配置组合共8种情形下的动态博弈模型。研究发现:均衡情况下制造商和零售商均会主动实施CSR行为,且这种CSR配置对企业的CSR业绩和经济业绩均是最优的。当双方均实施CSR行为时CSR实施效率较高,零售商自愿分享预测信息,此时信息分享成为"双赢策略"(即信息分享会同时提高制造商和零售商的经济业绩);当CSR实施效率较低时,零售商没有自愿分享预测信息的动力。     

制造商竞争环境下供应链CSR投入模式选择研究

基于当前大多数企业均将社会责任(cooperate social responsibility, CSR)投入纳入到战略规划的背景,研究制造商CSR投入模式对供应链成员及系统利润的影响。考虑3种投入模式：无制造商投入CSR(模型NN)、单个制造商投入CSR(模型NY)和制造商同时投入CSR(模型YY)。通过建立两制造商−单零售商的二级供应链模型,求解出均衡价格与利润。研究表明,制造商利润始终与价格敏感系数成反比,但仅在模型YY中零售商的利润与价格敏感系数成正比;在制造商双方均投入CSR时三方成员可实现利润最大化,且供应链决策效率达到最优。通过数值算例分析模型中部分参数对供应链成员利润的影响。     

考虑绿色偏好和政府补贴的供应链营销策略研究

为研究消费者绿色偏好和政府补贴的不同水平对供应链成员营销策略的影响问题,本文建立了仅包含一个制造商和一个零售商的营销策略选择模型,分别运用演化博弈理论和Matlab软件进行了理论分析和数值仿真。结果表明：只有当消费者绿色偏好以及政府补贴达到一定水平时才能有效促进制造商和零售商双方均采取绿色营销策略;当消费者绿色偏好或政府补贴处于较低水平时,零售商往往会通过搭便车的方式分享制造商绿色营销所带来的收益;随着制造商和零售商采取绿色营销策略所需投入成本的上升,双方采取绿色营销策略所需消费者绿色偏好水平也会上升,随着市场上消费者绿色偏好水平的上升,双方采取绿色营销策略所需政府补贴将会下降。     

消费者寻求多样化行为对供应链渠道选择影响研究

考虑存在消费者寻求多样化行为的情形下,对双寡头制造商渠道选择策略(自销或代销)的影响。寻求多样化行为是由于重复购买会产生餍足感,即消费者对再次购买的意愿降低。本文在三阶段Hotelling模型框架下,分析两种情况并发现：1)当某个制造商选择代销并需要向相应的零售商支付一定的入店费时,如果制造商自销的运营成本和代销产生的入店费较高时,市场上的均衡策略为(自销,代销),否则为(代销,代销)或(自销,自销),而消费者寻求多样化行为将会降低前一策略均衡策略的阈值;2)当某个制造商选择代销而零售商相对会产生每单位运营成本时,两个制造商将共同选择代销或共同选择自销。如果此制造商和零售商的运营成本都很高时,消费者寻求多样化行为可能会使均衡策略变为(自销,代销)。该文的研究可以从消费者层面解释为何部分企业纷纷选择自建销售渠道的竞争策略。     

非线性生产成本对供应链社会责任分担策略的影响

在制造商生产成本非线性下,运用博弈论分别建立了零售商不参与责任分担、零售商进行成本分担与努力分担三种模型,求解得到了三种模型的最优决策和最优利润。研究发现:在制造商生产规模不经济下,制造商和零售商均愿意合作进行社会责任分担,而且二者总是倾向于选择努力分担模式;在制造商生产规模经济下,当规模经济较明显且社会责任实施效率较高时,制造商和零售商均偏好于零售商进行成本分担,当规模经济不明显且社会责任实施效率较低时,零售商进行努力分担策略仍然优于成本分担策略;此外,无论制造商生产规模经济还是规模不经济,制造商和零售商总是倾向于承担社会责任。     

双渠道供应链降低成本研发对零售商信息分享的影响北大核心CSSCI

研究了双渠道供应链中制造商降低生产成本研发对零售商信息分享策略的影响。分别考虑了制造商无降低生产成本研发和降低生产成本研发两种情形。研究发现：无论制造商是否投资降低生产成本研发,零售商与制造商共享其市场需求信息总是有利于增加制造商利润。但是,若制造商未投资降低生产成本研发,零售商不与制造商共享其市场需求信息。这与已有观点相同。若制造商投资降低生产成本研发,当制造商研发效率较高时,零售商与制造商共享其市场需求信息;反之,零售商仍然不与制造商共享其市场需求信息。此外,设计Nash信息补偿机制以促使零售商与制造商共享其市场需求信息。     

双渠道供应链降低成本研发对零售商信息分享的影响

研究了双渠道供应链中制造商降低生产成本研发对零售商信息分享策略的影响。分别考虑了制造商无降低生产成本研发和降低生产成本研发两种情形。研究发现:无论制造商是否投资降低生产成本研发,零售商与制造商共享其市场需求信息总是有利于增加制造商利润。但是,若制造商未投资降低生产成本研发,零售商不与制造商共享其市场需求信息。这与已有观点相同。若制造商投资降低生产成本研发,当制造商研发效率较高时,零售商与制造商共享其市场需求信息;反之,零售商仍然不与制造商共享其市场需求信息。此外,设计Nash信息补偿机制以促使零售商与制造商共享其市场需求信息。     

双渠道绿色供应链定价和信息共享策略研究

从信号博弈的角度探讨制造商对定价顺序的决策以及不同情景下零售商的信息共享策略。研究发现：制造商让零售商先定价并不总会导致利润受损，因为信息不对称时制造商能以零售价为信号决策直销价；零售商在消费者绿色偏好较强或渠道间竞争强度较弱时愿意主动共享市场需求信息；制造商零售价滞后决策提升了绿色创新水平，但使其无法通过零售价推测市场需求信息，信息不对称对绿色创新的影响增大。零售商共享信息时零售价滞后策略会降低最优直销价格，而零售商不共享信息时制造商的零售价滞后策略使其只能根据期望决策直销价。     

考虑制造商消费者特点的零售商定价订购策略

面对策略型消费者且消费者对产品估值服从两点分布的情形,借助报童模型分析了零售商的决策行为。发现当对产品估值高的消费者所占比例较高时,零售商应该采用预售,否则不预售。接下来进一步研究制造商生产能力不确定情形下零售商的订购策略,发现直接订货无法满足零售商的订购需求,而共享需求信息可以满足零售商的订购需求。研究结果可以为新情境下零售商的决策提供理论支持。     

BOPS零售模式下考虑信息共享的电子优惠券投放策略

针对制造商通过线下零售商开通BOPS分销渠道并在BOPS渠道投放电子优惠券的全渠道零售系统,构建制造商不共享优惠券信息、共享优惠券信息以及基于信息共享的合作定价三种博弈模型,剖析优惠券投放和信息共享行为对制造商和零售商定价策略的影响。研究发现:制造商定价和优惠券面值呈正相关关系,但投放大面值优惠券并不总能使制造商受益;优惠券信息共享策略不影响制造商定价及优惠券面值,零售商则可由此定高价;当制造商市场预测能力较强时,制造商应不披露优惠券信息,当其市场预测能力较弱时,应采取合作定价策略;零售商应努力争取获得制造商的优惠券信息,并判断信息的有用性以决定是否展开合作。     

Mitigating global supply chain risks through corporate social responsibility

This paper presents a decision model that captures supply-side disruption risks, social risks, and demand-side uncertainty within an integrated global supply chain and corporate social responsibility (CSR) modelling and analysis framework. The global supply chain decision-makers must decide on the level of investment in CSR activities and the choice of trading partners (manufacturer or retailer) given their CSR consciousness and perceived riskiness in order to maximise profit and minimise their overall risk. The model incorporates individual attitudes towards disruption risks among the manufacturers and the retailers, with the demands for the product associated with the retailers being random. The model allows one to investigate the effects of heterogeneous CSR activities in a global supply chain and to compute the resultant equilibrium pattern of product outputs, transactions, product prices, and levels of social responsibility activities. The results show that CSR activities can potentially be used to mitigate global supply chain risk.     

Forecasting errors and the value of information sharing in a supply chain

The paper investigates the impact of forecasting errors and information sharing on the performance of a supply chain. It also examines the impact of forecasting errors on the value of information sharing between retailers and a supplier. Analyses of the simulation outputs show that while information sharing can bring tremendous benefits to the supplier and the entire supply chain, it hurts the retailers under most conditions. Demand pattern and forecasting error distributions faced by the retailers significantly influence the magnitudes of the cost savings as a result of information sharing. The expected bias in forecast errors has a much more significant impact on supply chain performance and the value of information sharing than the standard deviation of forecasting errors and its pattern of deterioration over time. A slight positive bias in the retailer's forecast can actually increase the benefit of sharing information for the supplier and the entire supply chain. However, it can also increase the cost for retailers. The demand pattern faced by retailers also significantly influences the impact of forecasting accuracy on the value of the information sharing. These findings will motivate companies to share information, and will help to design incentive schemes to encourage information-sharing and justify investment in information-sharing projects. The findings can also be used to minimize the negative impact of forecasting errors on supply chain performance.     

A new game of information sharing and security investment between two allied firms

In consideration of business information sharing, this paper investigates a new game of information sharing and security investment between two allied firms. Firms’ strategies in three decision models (Nash Equilibrium decision, partially centralised decision and totally centralised decision) are analysed. We provide some quantitative analyses on how some parameters affect firms’ decisions in the three decision models. Our Nash Equilibrium analysis shows that when firms make decisions individually, they will share no information with each other. When information sharing is determined by a social planner, firms will share some information with each other, which increases the risk of information leakage. Thus, firms should increase their security investments to mitigate the higher information leakage risk. However, our analysis shows that instead of investing more in information security, firms will reduce their security investment, which will further aggravate the risk. Hence, a social planner is required to designate the security investments and information sharing levels for both firms. Our theoretical analysis shows that firms’ strategies can achieve global optimality in the totally centralised decision model. Furthermore, a numerical experiment is conducted and the result demonstrates that totally centralised decision model is more efficient than the other two decision models. At last, we propose two compensation mechanisms to help firms coordinate their strategies when making decisions individually.     

不确定需求下制造商渠道入侵与信息收集披露激励

研究单个零售商和制造商组成的二级供应链,零售商通过调查获取市场不确定需求信息,而制造商可能建立直销渠道与零售商展开销售竞争。分别在集中决策和分散决策下刻画零售商最优收集、披露策略以及制造商的最优入侵策略;在此基础上设计了促进零售商收集并且披露需求信息的固定报酬激励机制。研究表明:当收集成本、渠道替代率以及固定入侵成本处于合适阈值区间时,需求信息收集和披露会改善双方收益;零售商信息披露可以影响制造商的入侵决策;制造商入侵在一定条件下有利于供应链整体收益,但总是不利于零售商;在制造商率先决定入侵时,零售商接受激励政策可以实现双方共赢。最后通过算例验证了理论的正确性和有效性。     

Information sharing in supply chains: Incentives for information distortion

The existing literature on supply chain information sharing assumes that information is shared truthfully. Unless each party can verify the authenticity of the other party's information, manufacturers and retailers may divulge false information for their own benefit. These information distortions may reduce the benefit levels or even stop information sharing in supply chains. We analyze the incentives for manufacturers and retailers within a supply chain to distort information when they share it and propose a mechanism that results in truthful information sharing. We consider a make-to-order supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The manufacturer and the retailer set prices based on their private forecasts of uncertain demand. If both parties share their forecasts truthfully, the manufacturer always benefits; however, the retailer benefits only if the manufacturer sets a lower wholesale price when information is shared compared to when information is not shared. However, we show that the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively, have an incentive to overstate and understate their forecasts while sharing information. The information distortion phenomenon is the direct result of each party exploiting its private information to appropriate the gains from information sharing. We show that the incentives to distort information are eliminated and both parties benefit from information sharing if the manufacturer and the retailer can agree on their relative profit margins prior to information sharing.     

含风险规避者的供应链收益共享契约机制研究

提出了具有风险规避者加盟的供应链协作收益共享机制,分别给出了零售商为风险中性及风险规避者时收益共享系数协商区间.采用数值实验方法,对所提出的收益共享机制进行了分析.结果表明,供应商采用收益共享机制可使整个供应链得到协调;在收益共享契约机制中供应商制定的批发价格要低于它的生产成本,而且当零售商为风险规避者时,它将期望供应商给予较低的批发价格,而宁愿让供应商获取较大的供应链销售收入份额.     

考虑信息泄露的供应链成员行为

为了研究供应链中纵向成员信息共享及横向成员之间的需求信息泄露行为发生机理,针对服从伯川德竞争的替代产品,建立了由一个批发商与两个竞争型零售商（在位零售商和跟随零售商）组成的基本模型,探讨了批发商泄露与不泄露在位零售商产品定价信息时两个零售商的产品差别定价策略,分析了批发商的泄露行为选择机理。研究表明：当批发商泄露在位零售商定价信息时,零售商一定进行分离均衡定价;当在位零售商定价高于分离均衡高价格时,跟随零售商判断市场为高需求状态,反之为低;当在位零售商的产品定价位于最小泄露区间时,批发商一定泄露在位零售商的定价信息。     

Bridging corporate social responsibility and social impact assessment

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and social impact assessment (SIA) share foundational values. Yet even where a single corporation espouses CSR and carries out SIA, the two often pass like ships in the night. Drawing upon recent literature and experiences from a decade of applied social research in CSR and SIA in the resources industry, this professional practice paper identifies three key bridging points through which CSR and SIA could be better linked and strengthened in future: policy–practice gaps, voluntary versus involuntary regulation and internal versus independent implementation.     

Demand information sharing and channel choice in a dual-channel supply chain with multiple retailers

In this paper, under a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple retailers, we investigate vertical and horizontal information sharing in different channel structures and the manufacturer’s choice on whether or not to keep a direct channel. To this end, we first study the dual-channel structure where uncertain demand is a linear function of price with a generalised-distribution base demand and show that the retailers have incentives to share information horizontally but not vertically, while the manufacturer is better off with vertical information sharing but its expected profit is not affected by horizontal information sharing. We next examine the retail-channel structure and find the basic results remain unchanged. Finally, we provide closed-form internal and external conditions under which the manufacturer can benefit from owning a dual-channel structure. Our study extends the existing literature by combining information sharing and dual-channel choice, introducing channel difference, discussing the impact of channel structure on horizontal and vertical sharing as well as providing interesting managerial insights for channel choice.     

Supply chain models with corporate social responsibility

Currently, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a critical issue because more than 88% of consumers think companies should try to achieve their business goals while improving society and the environment. This paper focuses on a CSR supply chain where an Original Equipment Manufacturer’s (OEM’s) sales can be significantly reduced because of its oversea supplier’s social misconduct. Specifically, as in a conventional wholesale price contract the supplier determines its wholesale price and the OEM decides its order quantity, but in a CSR supply chain, the supplier can autonomously change its CSR cost once a minimum requirement is satisfied. A higher CSR cost means that the supplier invests more in its corporate social responsibility and the OEM’s sales will be less likely to be influenced by negative CSR events. The equilibrium solutions show an important dilemma – although the supplier’s profit increases in the basic CSR requirement, the supplier will always use the minimum CSR cost under the conventional wholesale price contract, which eventually leads to a low supply chain profit. Thus, we introduce two different contracts to handle this problem: the flexible quantity contract and the wholesale price incentive contract, which are, respectively, a ‘tough’ way and a ‘beneficent’ way for the OEM to solve the problem. Although the two ways cannot (always) coordinate the supply chain, we show that they both will significantly improve the supply chain performance. Our results also show that in some conditions, one strategy will dominate, whereas in different conditions the other strategy dominates.