"Use of analogy in learning scientific concepts": Correction to Donnelly and McDaniel.

Reports an error in "Use of analogy in learning scientific concepts" by Carol M. Donnelly and Mark A. McDaniel (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993[Jul], Vol 19[4], 975-987). The captions for Figures 1 and 2 on pp. 979 and 980, respectively, were transposed. The figures and the correct captions are included in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1993-44140-001.) Four experiments compared learning of scientific concepts as expressed in either traditional literal form or through an analogy. Comprehension of basic-level details and inferential implications was measured through multiple-choice testing. In Exp 1, literal or analogical renditions were presented in textual form only. In Exp 2, text was accompanied by a dynamic video. In Exp 3, the video and text literal rendition was compared with a text-only analogical rendition. In Exp 4, Ss read only about a familiar domain. Ss consistently answered basic-level questions most accurately when concepts were expressed literally, but answered inferential questions most accurately when concepts were expressed analogically. Analysis of individual differences (Exp 2) indicated that this interaction strongly characterized the conceptual learning of science novices. The results are discussed within the framework of schema induction. [A correction to this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993, Vol 19(5), 1093. The captions for Figures 1 and 2 are corrected.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What is learned during automatization? The role of attention in constructing an instance.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 20(6) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-10475-001). In the aforementioned article, the Appendix on page 1050 was incomplete. The complete Appendix is presented in the erratum.] Seven experiments with 372 Ss were conducted to examine the role of attention in automatization. Ss searched 2-word displays for members of a target category in divided-attention, focused-attention, and dual-task conditions. The main issue was whether attention conditions would affect what Ss learned about co-occurrences of the words in the displays. The attention hypothesis, derived from the instance theory of automaticity, predicts learning of co-occurrences in divided-attention and dual-task conditions in which Ss attend to both words but not in focused-attention conditions in which Ss only attend to 1 word. The data supported the attention hypothesis and therefore the instance theory. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 1994(Nov), Vol 20(6), 1390. The Appendix was incomplete and the complete Appendix is presented.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Incidental concept learning, feature frequency, and correlated properties.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 19(2) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-10487-001). This article included three typographical errors in the statistics. The corrected statistics are provided in the erratum.] Four experiments examined sensitivity to feature frequencies and feature correlations as a function of intentional and incidental concept learning. Feature frequencies were encoded equally well across variations in learning strategies, and although classification decisions in both intentional and incidental conditions preserved correlated features, this sensitivity was achieved through different processes. With intentional learning, sensitivity to correlations resulted from explicit rules, whereas incidental encoding preserved correlations through a similarity-based analogical process. In incidental tasks that promoted exemplar storage, classification decisions were mediated by similarity to retrieval examples, and correlated features were indirectly preserved in this process. Results are discussed in terms of the diversity of encoding processes and representations that can occur with incidental category learning. [An erratum concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993(Mar), Vol 19(2). The statistics on page 211 are corrected.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"What is learned during automatization? The role of attention in constructing an instance": Correction to Logan and Etherton.

Reports an error in "What is learned during automatization? The role of attention in constructing an instance" by Gordon D. Logan and Joseph L. Etherton (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1994[Sep], Vol 20[5], 1022-1050). In the aforementioned article, the Appendix on page 1050 was incomplete. The complete Appendix is presented in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1995-04305-001.) Seven experiments with 372 Ss were conducted to examine the role of attention in automatization. Ss searched 2-word displays for members of a target category in divided-attention, focused-attention, and dual-task conditions. The main issue was whether attention conditions would affect what Ss learned about co-occurrences of the words in the displays. The attention hypothesis, derived from the instance theory of automaticity, predicts learning of co-occurrences in divided-attention and dual-task conditions in which Ss attend to both words but not in focused-attention conditions in which Ss only attend to 1 word. The data supported the attention hypothesis and therefore the instance theory. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 1994(Nov), Vol 20(6), 1390. The Appendix was incomplete and the complete Appendix is presented.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Incidental concept learning, feature frequency, and correlated properties": Correction to Wattenmaker.

Reports an error in "Incidental concept learning, feature frequency, and correlated properties" by William D. Wattenmaker (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993[Jan], Vol 19[1], 203-222). This article included three typographical errors in the statistics. The corrected statistics are provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1993-16363-001.) Four experiments examined sensitivity to feature frequencies and feature correlations as a function of intentional and incidental concept learning. Feature frequencies were encoded equally well across variations in learning strategies, and although classification decisions in both intentional and incidental conditions preserved correlated features, this sensitivity was achieved through different processes. With intentional learning, sensitivity to correlations resulted from explicit rules, whereas incidental encoding preserved correlations through a similarity-based analogical process. In incidental tasks that promoted exemplar storage, classification decisions were mediated by similarity to retrieval examples, and correlated features were indirectly preserved in this process. Results are discussed in terms of the diversity of encoding processes and representations that can occur with incidental category learning. [An erratum concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993(Mar), Vol 19(2). The statistics on page 211 are corrected.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What can we learn from the morphology of Hebrew? A masked-priming investigation of morphological representation.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 23(5) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-09898-001). On page 854, two Hebrew words are missing from Appendix F. The corrected Appendix appears with the erratum.] All Hebrew words are composed of 2 interwoven morphemes: a triconsonantal root and a phonological word pattern. The lexical representations of these morphemic units were examined using masked priming. When primes and targets shared an identical word pattern, neither lexical decision nor naming of targets was facilitated. In contrast, root primes facilitated both lexical decisions and naming of target words that were derived from these roots. This priming effect proved to be independent of meaning similarity because no priming effects were found when primes and targets were semantically but not morphologically related. These results suggest that Hebrew roots are lexical units whereas word patterns are not. A working model of lexical organization in Hebrew is offered on the basis of these results. (A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1997, Vol 23(5), 1189–1191. On page 854 of the current issue, two Hebrew words are missing from Appendix F. The corrected Appendix appears in this correction.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How good is the evidence for a production deficiency among learning disabled students?

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 77(6) of Journal of Educational Psychology (see record 2008-10974-001). Figures 1 and 2 (p. 557 and 559, respectively) are reversed. The captions are correct, but Figure 1 should be above the caption for Figure 2 and Figure 2 should be above the caption for Figure 1.] Investigated the spontaneous use of mnemonic strategies by learning disabled (LD) and non-LD children and adolescents to examine whether LD Ss can be distinguished from their non-LD peers on the basis of strategy use and recall. In Exp I, 105 LD and 105 non-LD 9–15 yr olds were administered a picture study/recall task, in which the strategies of interest were categorical organization during study and clustering during recall. In Exp II, 140 LD and 140 non-LD 11–17 yr olds were administered a paired-associate recall task, in which the strategy of interest was elaboration. In both studies, LD Ss earned lower mean recall scores than did the non-LD Ss. As a group, LD Ss did not differ from non-LD Ss in the use of categorical organization during study but showed less categorical clustering at recall. Fewer LD Ss used elaboration. Despite these differences, recall and strategy use were not useful predictors of classification as LD or non-LD and were only weak to moderate correlates of academic achievement. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Thematic relations affect similarity via commonalities.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 36(1) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2009-24668-017). In the article “Thematic Relations Affect Similarity via Commonalities,” by Sabrina Golonka and Zachary Estes (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, Vol. 35, No. 6, pp. 1454–1464), the error terms reported in Table 2 (p. 1458) were mislabeled as standard deviations; they are actually standard errors.] Thematic relations are an important source of perceived similarity. For instance, the rowing theme of boats and oars increases their perceived similarity. The mechanism of this effect, however, has not been specified previously. The authors investigated whether thematic relations affect similarity by increasing commonalities or by decreasing differences. In Experiment 1, thematic relations affected similarity more than difference, thereby producing a noninversion of similarity and difference. Experiment 2 revealed substantial individual variability in the preference for thematic relations and, consequently, in the noninversion of ratings. In sum, the experiments demonstrated a noninversion of similarity and difference that was caused by thematic relations and exhibited primarily by a subgroup of participants. These results indicate that thematic relations affect perceived similarity by increasing the contribution of commonalities rather than by decreasing the contribution of differences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social categorization and the truly false consensus effect.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 65(6) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10490-001). In this article, the second and third column headings of Table 2 were inadvertently transposed. The corrected table is provided in the erratum.] The false consensus effect involves adequate inductive reasoning and egocentric biases. To detect truly false consensus effects (TFCEs), item endorsements were correlated with the differences between estimated and actual consensus within Ss. In Exp 1, Ss overgeneralized from themselves to gender in-groups and to the overall population, but not to gender out-groups. Exps 2 and 3 demonstrated intuitive understanding of consensus bias. Another person's choices were inferred from that person's population estimates or estimates about the gender in-group. In Exp 4, Ss inferred that consensus estimates for a behavior were higher among people who were willing to engage in that behavior than among those who were not. Implications of these findings for general induction, social categorization, and the psychological processes underlying TFCEs are discussed. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1993, Vol 65(6), 1090. The second and third column headings of Table 2 were inadvertently transposed and the corrected table is included.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Does reward increase or decrease creativity?

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 67(1) of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (see record 2008-10477-001). In the aforementioned article, Figures 1 and 2 were interchanged. The figures appear with their correct captions in the erratum.] Two studies involving 504 school children investigated why behaviorists and cognitively oriented investigators have come to opposite conclusions about reward's effects on creativity. A monetary reward for a high degree of divergent thought in 1 task (word construction) increased children's subsequent originality in a different task (picture drawing). The same reward, made contingent on a low degree of divergent thought, reduced this generalized originality. These effects were eliminated by using a large reward and were restored by keeping the large reward out of the children's sight. The results suggest that reward training increases generalized creativity when (1) a high degree of divergent thought is required and (2) the reward is presented in not too salient a fashion. The findings are consistent with a 2-factor interpretation of rewarded creativity effects that incorporates learned industriousness and selective attention. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 1994(Jul), Vol 67(1), 125. Figures 1 and 2 were interchanged.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Interdomain transfer between isomorphic topics in algebra and physics.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 15(5) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-10689-001). On page 157, parts of two sentences in the Results and Discussion section were omitted. The corrected sentences are provided in the erratum.] Three experiments examined transfer between 2 isomorphic subdomains of algebra and physics. The two areas were arithmetic-progression problems in algebra and constant-acceleration problems in physics. High school and college students who had learned one of these subtopics were presented with word problems that used either content from the domain they had originally studied or content based on the unfamiliar but analogous domain. Ss who had learned arithmetic progressions were very likely to spontaneously recognize that physics problems involving velocity and distance can be addressed using the same equations. Analysis of problem-solving protocols revealed that the recognition was immediate and that the solutions were a straightforward application of the algebraic method. Such recognition occurred even when the algebraic procedures were taught using example word problems all of which were drawn from a single content area (e.g., "money" problems). In contrast, Ss who had learned the physics topic almost never exhibited any detectable transfer to the isomorphic algebra problems. The results were interpreted in terms of content-free vs content-specific applicability conditions for mathematical procedures. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Testing during study insulates against the buildup of proactive interference.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 35(1) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-18581-005). Incorrect figures were printed due to an error in the production process. A corrected version of Figure 5 is provided.] Recent interest in the benefits of retrieval practice on long-term retention--the testing effect--has spawned a considerable amount of research toward understanding the underlying nature of this ubiquitous memory phenomenon. Taking a test may benefit retention through both direct means (engaging appropriate retrieval processes) and indirect means (fostering directed study). Here the authors report 4 experiments demonstrating a novel benefit of testing. Extended study sessions cause a buildup of proactive interference, but interpolating tests during the study sequence insulates against this negative influence. These findings highlight a unique benefit of testing and have important implications for study strategies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Nature of priming effects in semantic matching.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 12(4) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-10970-001). The Appendix table was constructed incorrectly. The correct table appears in the erratum.] Studied priming effects in a semantic matching task that distinguished visually based matching processes from nominally and semantically based matching processes, using 24 undergraduates. Ss judged semantic matches for 3 types of word pairs: identical (e.g., robin–robin), same category (e.g., robin–sparrow), and different category (e.g., robin–truck). Visual matching was isolated by comparing performance between physical identity (e.g., robin–robin) and nominal identity (e.g., robin–ROBIN) pairs. Physical identity pairs, which allowed visually based matching, exhibited an interaction between priming and the typicality of category exemplars that was absent in nominal identity and same-category pairs. Priming had no effect on nominal identity pairs. For same-category pairs, which required semantically based matching, priming produced facilitation at all levels of typicality. The results bring the semantic matching paradigm into agreement with other procedures that show that priming facilitates processing for all related targets. Categories and exemplars used as stimulus materials are appended. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Prototypes in the mist: The early epochs of category learning.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 25(1) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-09597-001). As a result of errors made in production, two equations in the article were printed incorrectly. The corrected equations are included in the erratum.] Recent ideas about category learning have favored exemplar processes over prototype processes. However, research has focused on small, poorly differentiated categories and on task-final performances—both may highlight exemplar strategies. Thus, we evaluated participants' categorization strategies and standard categorization models at successive stages in the learning of smaller, less differentiated categories and larger, more differentiated categories. In the former case, the exemplar model dominated even early in learning. In the latter case, the prototype model had a strong early advantage that gave way slowly. Alternative models, and even the behavior of individual parameters within models, suggest a psychological transition from prototype-based to exemplar-based processing during category learning and show that different category structures produce different trajectories of learning through the larger space of strategies. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"What can we learn from the morphology of Hebrew? A masked-priming investigation of morphological representation": Correction to Frost et al. 1997.

Reports an error in "What can we learn from the morphology of Hebrew? A masked-priming investigation of morphological representation" by Ram Frost, Kenneth I. Forster and Avital Deutsch (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1997[Jul], Vol 23[4], 829-856). On page 854, two Hebrew words are missing from Appendix F. The corrected Appendix appears with the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1997-05320-003.) All Hebrew words are composed of 2 interwoven morphemes: a triconsonantal root and a phonological word pattern. The lexical representations of these morphemic units were examined using masked priming. When primes and targets shared an identical word pattern, neither lexical decision nor naming of targets was facilitated. In contrast, root primes facilitated both lexical decisions and naming of target words that were derived from these roots. This priming effect proved to be independent of meaning similarity because no priming effects were found when primes and targets were semantically but not morphologically related. These results suggest that Hebrew roots are lexical units whereas word patterns are not. A working model of lexical organization in Hebrew is offered on the basis of these results. (A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1997, Vol 23(5), 1189-1191. On page 854 of the current issue, two Hebrew words are missing from Appendix F. The corrected Appendix appears in this correction.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Eye closure reduces the cross-modal memory impairment caused by auditory distraction.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 37(5) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2011-19375-001). There is an error reported in the Results section on p. 1010. This error is addressed in the correction.] Eyewitnesses instructed to close their eyes during retrieval recall more correct and fewer incorrect visual and auditory details. This study tested whether eye closure causes these effects through a reduction in environmental distraction. Sixty participants watched a staged event before verbally answering questions about it in the presence of auditory distraction or in a quiet control condition. Participants were instructed to close or not close their eyes during recall. Auditory distraction did not affect correct recall, but it increased erroneous recall of visual and auditory details. Instructed eye closure reduced this effect equally for both modalities. The findings support the view that eye closure removes the general resource load of monitoring the environment rather than reducing competition for modality-specific resources. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Does reward increase or decrease creativity?": Correction to Eisenberger and Selbst.

Reports an error in "Does reward increase or decrease creativity" by Robert Eisenberger and Michael Selbst (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1994[Jun], Vol 66[6], 1116-1127). In the aforementioned article, Figures 1 and 2 were interchanged. The figures appear with their correct captions in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1994-40652-001.) Two studies involving 504 school children investigated why behaviorists and cognitively oriented investigators have come to opposite conclusions about reward's effects on creativity. A monetary reward for a high degree of divergent thought in 1 task (word construction) increased children's subsequent originality in a different task (picture drawing). The same reward, made contingent on a low degree of divergent thought, reduced this generalized originality. These effects were eliminated by using a large reward and were restored by keeping the large reward out of the children's sight. The results suggest that reward training increases generalized creativity when (1) a high degree of divergent thought is required and (2) the reward is presented in not too salient a fashion. The findings are consistent with a 2-factor interpretation of rewarded creativity effects that incorporates learned industriousness and selective attention. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 1994(Jul), Vol 67(1), 125. Figures 1 and 2 were interchanged.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)