Use of analogy in learning scientific concepts.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 19(5) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-10486-001). The captions for Figures 1 and 2 on pp. 979 and 980, respectively, were transposed. The figures and the correct captions are included in the erratum.] Four experiments compared learning of scientific concepts as expressed in either traditional literal form or through an analogy. Comprehension of basic-level details and inferential implications was measured through muliple-choice testing. In Exp 1, literal or analogical renditions were presented in textual form only. In Exp 2, text was accompanied by a dynamic video. In Exp 3, the video and text literal rendition was compared with a text-only analogical rendition. In Exp 4, Ss read only about a familiar domain. Ss consistently answered basic-level questions most accurately when concepts were expressed literally, but answered inferential questions most accurately when concepts were expressed analogically. Analysis of individual differences (Exp 2) indicated that this interaction strongly characterized the conceptual learning of science novices. The results are discussed within the framework of schema induction. [A correction to this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993, Vol 19(5), 1093. The captions for Figures 1 and 2 are corrected.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Incidental concept learning, feature frequency, and correlated properties": Correction to Wattenmaker.

Reports an error in "Incidental concept learning, feature frequency, and correlated properties" by William D. Wattenmaker (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993[Jan], Vol 19[1], 203-222). This article included three typographical errors in the statistics. The corrected statistics are provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1993-16363-001.) Four experiments examined sensitivity to feature frequencies and feature correlations as a function of intentional and incidental concept learning. Feature frequencies were encoded equally well across variations in learning strategies, and although classification decisions in both intentional and incidental conditions preserved correlated features, this sensitivity was achieved through different processes. With intentional learning, sensitivity to correlations resulted from explicit rules, whereas incidental encoding preserved correlations through a similarity-based analogical process. In incidental tasks that promoted exemplar storage, classification decisions were mediated by similarity to retrieval examples, and correlated features were indirectly preserved in this process. Results are discussed in terms of the diversity of encoding processes and representations that can occur with incidental category learning. [An erratum concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993(Mar), Vol 19(2). The statistics on page 211 are corrected.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"What is learned during automatization? The role of attention in constructing an instance": Correction to Logan and Etherton.

Reports an error in "What is learned during automatization? The role of attention in constructing an instance" by Gordon D. Logan and Joseph L. Etherton (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1994[Sep], Vol 20[5], 1022-1050). In the aforementioned article, the Appendix on page 1050 was incomplete. The complete Appendix is presented in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1995-04305-001.) Seven experiments with 372 Ss were conducted to examine the role of attention in automatization. Ss searched 2-word displays for members of a target category in divided-attention, focused-attention, and dual-task conditions. The main issue was whether attention conditions would affect what Ss learned about co-occurrences of the words in the displays. The attention hypothesis, derived from the instance theory of automaticity, predicts learning of co-occurrences in divided-attention and dual-task conditions in which Ss attend to both words but not in focused-attention conditions in which Ss only attend to 1 word. The data supported the attention hypothesis and therefore the instance theory. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 1994(Nov), Vol 20(6), 1390. The Appendix was incomplete and the complete Appendix is presented.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"How good is the evidence for a production deficiency among learning disabled students?": Correction to Shepherd et al.

Reports an error in "How good is the evidence for a production deficiency among learning disabled students" by Margaret J. Shepherd, Lynn M. Gelzheiser and Roberta A. Solar (Journal of Educational Psychology, 1985[Oct], Vol 77[5], 553-561). Figures 1 and 2 (p. 557 and 559, respectively) are reversed. The captions are correct, but Figure 1 should be above the caption for Figure 2 and Figure 2 should be above the caption for Figure 1. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1986-14779-001.) Investigated the spontaneous use of mnemonic strategies by learning disabled (LD) and non-LD children and adolescents to examine whether LD Ss can be distinguished from their non-LD peers on the basis of strategy use and recall. In Exp I, 105 LD and 105 non-LD 9-15 yr olds were administered a picture study/recall task, in which the strategies of interest were categorical organization during study and clustering during recall. In Exp II, 140 LD and 140 non-LD 11-17 yr olds were administered a paired-associate recall task, in which the strategy of interest was elaboration. In both studies, LD Ss earned lower mean recall scores than did the non-LD Ss. As a group, LD Ss did not differ from non-LD Ss in the use of categorical organization during study but showed less categorical clustering at recall. Fewer LD Ss used elaboration. Despite these differences, recall and strategy use were not useful predictors of classification as LD or non-LD and were only weak to moderate correlates of academic achievement. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Incidental concept learning, feature frequency, and correlated properties.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 19(2) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-10487-001). This article included three typographical errors in the statistics. The corrected statistics are provided in the erratum.] Four experiments examined sensitivity to feature frequencies and feature correlations as a function of intentional and incidental concept learning. Feature frequencies were encoded equally well across variations in learning strategies, and although classification decisions in both intentional and incidental conditions preserved correlated features, this sensitivity was achieved through different processes. With intentional learning, sensitivity to correlations resulted from explicit rules, whereas incidental encoding preserved correlations through a similarity-based analogical process. In incidental tasks that promoted exemplar storage, classification decisions were mediated by similarity to retrieval examples, and correlated features were indirectly preserved in this process. Results are discussed in terms of the diversity of encoding processes and representations that can occur with incidental category learning. [An erratum concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1993(Mar), Vol 19(2). The statistics on page 211 are corrected.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What is learned during automatization? The role of attention in constructing an instance.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 20(6) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-10475-001). In the aforementioned article, the Appendix on page 1050 was incomplete. The complete Appendix is presented in the erratum.] Seven experiments with 372 Ss were conducted to examine the role of attention in automatization. Ss searched 2-word displays for members of a target category in divided-attention, focused-attention, and dual-task conditions. The main issue was whether attention conditions would affect what Ss learned about co-occurrences of the words in the displays. The attention hypothesis, derived from the instance theory of automaticity, predicts learning of co-occurrences in divided-attention and dual-task conditions in which Ss attend to both words but not in focused-attention conditions in which Ss only attend to 1 word. The data supported the attention hypothesis and therefore the instance theory. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition, 1994(Nov), Vol 20(6), 1390. The Appendix was incomplete and the complete Appendix is presented.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Social categorization and the truly false consensus effect": Correction to Krueger and Zeiger.

Reports an error in "Social categorization and the truly false consensus effect" by Joachim Krueger and Joanna S. Zeiger (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1993[Oct], Vol 65[4], 670-680). In this article, the second and third column headings of Table 2 were inadvertently transposed. The corrected table is provided in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1994-33435-001.) The false consensus effect involves adequate inductive reasoning and egocentric biases. To detect truly false consensus effects (TFCEs), item endorsements were correlated with the differences between estimated and actual consensus within Ss. In Exp 1, Ss overgeneralized from themselves to gender in-groups and to the overall population, but not to gender out-groups. Exps 2 and 3 demonstrated intuitive understanding of consensus bias. Another person's choices were inferred from that person's population estimates or estimates about the gender in-group. In Exp 4, Ss inferred that consensus estimates for a behavior were higher among people who were willing to engage in that behavior than among those who were not. Implications of these findings for general induction, social categorization, and the psychological processes underlying TFCEs are discussed. [A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1993, Vol 65(6), 1090. The second and third column headings of Table 2 were inadvertently transposed and the corrected table is included.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Role of analogical reasoning in the induction of problem categories": Correction.

Reports an error in the original article by D. D. Cummins (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1992[Sep], Vol 18[5], 1103–2124). On page 1111, there are labeling errors in 2 figures. In Figure 1c, problem 11 should have a "V' in the topic column; that line should read "11 V Fl.' In Figure 1d, problems 2 and 4 should have "CU' in the structure column; those lines should read "2 T CU' and "4 T CU,' respectively. Also in that figure, problems number 8 and 13 should have "Fl' in the structure column; those lines should read "8 V Fl' and "13 W Fl.' (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1993-04297-001.) In 3 experiments, novices were required to answer questions while reading a series of problems. The questions required them either to analyze individual problem structures (intraproblem processing) or compare problem structures (analogical comparison processing) to derive answers … (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How good is the evidence for a production deficiency among learning disabled students?

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 77(6) of Journal of Educational Psychology (see record 2008-10974-001). Figures 1 and 2 (p. 557 and 559, respectively) are reversed. The captions are correct, but Figure 1 should be above the caption for Figure 2 and Figure 2 should be above the caption for Figure 1.] Investigated the spontaneous use of mnemonic strategies by learning disabled (LD) and non-LD children and adolescents to examine whether LD Ss can be distinguished from their non-LD peers on the basis of strategy use and recall. In Exp I, 105 LD and 105 non-LD 9–15 yr olds were administered a picture study/recall task, in which the strategies of interest were categorical organization during study and clustering during recall. In Exp II, 140 LD and 140 non-LD 11–17 yr olds were administered a paired-associate recall task, in which the strategy of interest was elaboration. In both studies, LD Ss earned lower mean recall scores than did the non-LD Ss. As a group, LD Ss did not differ from non-LD Ss in the use of categorical organization during study but showed less categorical clustering at recall. Fewer LD Ss used elaboration. Despite these differences, recall and strategy use were not useful predictors of classification as LD or non-LD and were only weak to moderate correlates of academic achievement. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Nature of priming effects in semantic matching": Correction to Whitlow.

Reports an error in "Nature of priming effects in semantic matching" by J. W. Whitlow (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1986[Jul], Vol 12[3], 353-360). The Appendix table was constructed incorrectly. The correct table appears in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1986-29114-001.) Studied priming effects in a semantic matching task that distinguished visually based matching processes from nominally and semantically based matching processes, using 24 undergraduates. Ss judged semantic matches for 3 types of word pairs: identical (e.g., robin-robin), same category (e.g., robin-sparrow), and different category (e.g., robin-truck). Visual matching was isolated by comparing performance between physical identity (e.g., robin-robin) and nominal identity (e.g., robin-ROBIN) pairs. Physical identity pairs, which allowed visually based matching, exhibited an interaction between priming and the typicality of category exemplars that was absent in nominal identity and same-category pairs. Priming had no effect on nominal identity pairs. For same-category pairs, which required semantically based matching, priming produced facilitation at all levels of typicality. The results bring the semantic matching paradigm into agreement with other procedures that show that priming facilitates processing for all related targets. Categories and exemplars used as stimulus materials are appended. (18 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Identification of disoriented objects: Effects of context of prior presentation": Errata.

Reports an error in the original article by P. Jolicoeur and B. Milliken ( Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1989 [Mar], Vol 15[2], 200–210). Parts of 2 sentences were omitted in the left column on page 202; these sentences should read as follows: "Half of the Ss in the rotated group received the following type of block order: R1A, R2A, R3A, R4A, R5A, T6A–6B. The other half of the Ss had Set B objects in the training phase (first 5 blocks), but received the same transfer trials. Half of the Ss in the upright group received the same transfer trials. Half of the Ss in the upright group received block orders of the following type: U1A, U2A, U1A, U2A, U1A, T6A–6B." (For original abstract, see record 1989-24712-001). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"What can we learn from the morphology of Hebrew? A masked-priming investigation of morphological representation": Correction to Frost et al. 1997.

Reports an error in "What can we learn from the morphology of Hebrew? A masked-priming investigation of morphological representation" by Ram Frost, Kenneth I. Forster and Avital Deutsch (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1997[Jul], Vol 23[4], 829-856). On page 854, two Hebrew words are missing from Appendix F. The corrected Appendix appears with the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1997-05320-003.) All Hebrew words are composed of 2 interwoven morphemes: a triconsonantal root and a phonological word pattern. The lexical representations of these morphemic units were examined using masked priming. When primes and targets shared an identical word pattern, neither lexical decision nor naming of targets was facilitated. In contrast, root primes facilitated both lexical decisions and naming of target words that were derived from these roots. This priming effect proved to be independent of meaning similarity because no priming effects were found when primes and targets were semantically but not morphologically related. These results suggest that Hebrew roots are lexical units whereas word patterns are not. A working model of lexical organization in Hebrew is offered on the basis of these results. (A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1997, Vol 23(5), 1189-1191. On page 854 of the current issue, two Hebrew words are missing from Appendix F. The corrected Appendix appears in this correction.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Development of the concept of truth-functional negation": Correction to Kim.

Reports an error in "Development of the concept of truth-functional negation" by Kyung Kim (Developmental Psychology, 1985[May], Vol 21[3], 462-472). In the article, several key words were omitted from the last sentence of the Method section on page 464, column 2, third paragraph. The corrected sentence is included in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1985-25108-001.) Studied the development of the concept of truth-functional negation in 2 experiments, using 36 English-speaking children (aged 3-6 yrs) and 10 Korean-speaking children (aged 4-5 yrs) as Ss. In Exp I, English-speaking Ss were given a sentence-variation task in which the following 4 sentence types were used to describe 36 pictures of common items: true affirmative, false affirmative, true negative (TN), and false negative. The results show that a majority of Ss under 5 yrs had difficulty with negative sentences, particularly TN sentences, indicating a lack of explicit understanding of truth-functional negation as defined in logic. In Exp II, a cross-linguistic replication of Exp I was attempted with Korean-speaking Ss. Despite some cross-linguistic differences in the negation system, the Korean-speaking Ss showed essentially the same pattern of results, suggesting that the development in question proceeds within the general limit set by the general cognitive development. (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Learning myopia: An adaptive recency effect in category learning": Correction to Jones and Sieck (2003).

Reports an error in "Learning myopia: An adaptive recency effect in category learning" by Matt Jones and Winston R. Sieck (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2003[Jul], Vol 29[4], 626-640). On page 633, Table 2, the values in columns (T, P) and (P, T) in the dual condition row incorrectly read .10 and .90, respectively. The correct values are .90 and .10, respectively. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2003-06626-013.) Recency effects (REs) have been well established in memory and probability learning paradigms but have received little attention in category learning research. Extant categorization models predict REs to be unaffected by learning, whereas a functional interpretation of REs, suggested by results in other domains, predicts that people are able to learn sequential dependencies and incorporate this information into their responses. These contrasting predictions were tested in 2 experiments involving a classification task in which outcome sequences were autocorrelated. Experiment 1 showed that reliance on recent outcomes adapts to the structure of the task, in contrast to models' predictions. Experiment 2 provided constraints on how sequential information is learned and suggested possible extensions to current models to account for this learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What can we learn from the morphology of Hebrew? A masked-priming investigation of morphological representation.

[Correction Notice: An erratum for this article was reported in Vol 23(5) of Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition (see record 2008-09898-001). On page 854, two Hebrew words are missing from Appendix F. The corrected Appendix appears with the erratum.] All Hebrew words are composed of 2 interwoven morphemes: a triconsonantal root and a phonological word pattern. The lexical representations of these morphemic units were examined using masked priming. When primes and targets shared an identical word pattern, neither lexical decision nor naming of targets was facilitated. In contrast, root primes facilitated both lexical decisions and naming of target words that were derived from these roots. This priming effect proved to be independent of meaning similarity because no priming effects were found when primes and targets were semantically but not morphologically related. These results suggest that Hebrew roots are lexical units whereas word patterns are not. A working model of lexical organization in Hebrew is offered on the basis of these results. (A correction concerning this article appears in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 1997, Vol 23(5), 1189–1191. On page 854 of the current issue, two Hebrew words are missing from Appendix F. The corrected Appendix appears in this correction.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)