Associative and rule-based accounts of cue interaction in contingency judgment.

This study examined how people detect and assess the strength of contingent relationships between pairs of events. Some researchers have suggested that contingency learning is analogous to classical conditioning and that contingency judgment is based on psychological associations formed during learning. Others have rejected the associative account in favor of a rule-based account involving higher level statistical and causal reasoning. The results of 4 experiments in which college-student participants performed a simulated medical-judgment task, showed that the rule-based account does not provide a sufficient explanation of cue-interaction effects in contingency learning and judgment. Elements of the associative account are needed to explain the entire range of contingency judgment phenomena. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to comments on Lipsey and Wilson (1993).

Replies to comments by H. J. Eysenck, D. Sohn, and H. Cooper et al (see PA, Vol 82:22192, 22208, and 22189, respectively) regarding Lipsey and Wilson's (see record 1994-18340-001) meta-analysis of meta-analyses. Both Sohn and Eysenck seem to be concerned with how theory is developed, but they may be confused about the role of meta-analysis in that process. It is argued that the purpose of meta-analysis is to develop generalizations about research findings across different studies. The extension of the analysis by Cooper et al reminds researchers that meta-analysis can be subject to error and bias. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Geometric Determinants of Spatial Reorientation: Reply to Cheng and Gallistel (2005).

The principle proposed by K. Cheng and C. R. Gallistel (see record 2005-03796-012) has the merit of explaining empirical data on reorientation of chicks and rats, invoking the simple computation of a global shape parameter: the extraction of the principal axis. However, despite its elegance and economy, it is inconsistent with previous observations on the geometric determinants encoded and used by both chicks and rats in place-learning tasks based on the shape of the environment. Further investigations are necessary to clarify whether different geometric features are used in different spatial tasks (i.e., reorientation vs. place learning). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

List-strength and list-length effects: Reply to Shiffrin, Ratcliff, Murnane, and Nobel (1993).

R. M. Shiffrin et al (see record 1994-24299-001) claimed that the theory of distributed associative memory (TODAM) is unable simultaneously to predict an absent (or negative) list-strength effect (LSE) and a positive list-length effect (LLE). However, Shiffrin et al failed to distinguish between situations in which lag (i.e., number of items intervening between study and test) is controlled and situations in which it is not. The authors stand by their previous conclusion: TODAM can explain why there is little or no LSE when at the same time there is an LLE when the LLE is studied under the standard conditions. It is argued that there are no published studies where lag has been controlled. However, this simplified version of TODAM cannot explain an LLE when a scoring window is used. Whether such a result would be inconsistent with a more complete version of TODAM remains to be seen. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Conducting and comprehending cross-cultural comparisons: Reply to Stigler and Miller (1993).

J. W. Stigler and K. F. Miller (see record 1994-07531-001) critiqued the matching methodology and theoretical interpretation reported in the R. E. Mayer et al (see record 1991-19796-001) study of mathematical problem solving in Japan and the US. In this reply, the authors explain why they disagree with Stigler and Miller's comments concerning (1) the reliability of the matching methodology used, (2) the correctness of hypotheses concerning the relative effectiveness of US and Japanese schools, (3) reporting of the relative problem-solving performances of US and Japanese students, (4) whether Mayer et al are guilty of drawing causal conclusions from correlational data, and (5) whether the results are best explained by differences in intelligence. Finally, the authors call for recognizing the legitimacy of multiple research perspectives. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Potential power of coding particular experiences: Reply to Mathews and Roussel (1993).

R. C. Mathews and L. G. Roussel (see record 1993-44092-001) argued that it is more fruitful to understand memory as a "conceptualizer," which enables the organism to interact efficiently with its environment, than as a simple "warehouse" for storing the details of past experience. The authors completely agree. However, Mathews and Roussel believe that the human capacity to acquire sensitivity to general properties of the environment requires a memory system that chronically abstracts regular aspects of the general structure of experience. It is argued that such abstraction is unnecessary. Instead, encoding particular experiences of encountering the members of a domain accidentally makes memory sensitive to the general structure of that domain. In effect, simply coding particular experiences grants memory the potential to interact efficiently with complex and unanticipated aspects of its environment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An autoassociative model of causal reasoning and causal learning: Reply to Van Overwalle's (1998) critique of Read and Marcus-Newhall (1993).

The authors respond to F. Van Overwalle's (see record 1997-38975-003) critique of the explanatory coherence (ECHO) model of causal reasoning (P. Thagard, 1992) and its application to social reasoning (S. J. Read & A. Marcus-Newhall; see record 1994-01615-001). Contrary to Van Overwalle's doubts about its possibility, a feedback model similar to ECHO that learns covariation information appropriately is presented. This model simulates Read and Marcus-Newhall's results and can also simulate findings from the causal learning literature. In contrast, because of limitations in feedforward networks, Van Overwalle can simulate many of Read and Marcus-Newhall's results only by making incorrect assumptions about their procedures. Further, the model presented handles several issues that Van Overwalle's cannot, such as asymmetries in reasoning between cause and effect, evaluation of explanatory coherence, and causal chains. Finally, limitations of feedforward models of causal reasoning are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Association between conscious knowledge and performance in normal subjects: Reply to Cohen and Curran (1993) and Willingham, Greeley, and Bardone (1993).

Several studies (e.g., M. J. Nissen & P. Bullemer, 1987) have claimed that reaction times (RTs) to a repeating sequence may improve although Ss are not aware of the repeating sequence. P. Perruchet and M. A. Amorim (see record 1992-37919-001) pointed out that the measure of awareness involved in these studies was inadequate (e.g., Ss were not even explicitly asked to retrieve the repeating sequence), and they showed that the dissociation in normal Ss no longer held when awareness was assessed by recall or recognition tests. In this reply, it is shown that A. Cohen and T. Curran's (1993) criticisms of the validity of Perruchet and Amorim's tests and of the theoretical implications of their results are either without foundation or unfalsifiable. Further, it is shown that the new experiment by D. B. Willingham et al (1993) does not demonstrate dissociation. Both comments further illustrate the widespread uncritical acceptance of dissociation, which probably originates from, but is not theoretically justified by, evidence available for dissociation in amnesic patients. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Egotism versus generalization-of-uncontrollability explanations of helplessness: Reply to Snyder and Frankel (1989).

M. L. Snyder and A. Frankel (see record 1990-09504-001) argue that our experiments (M. Kofta and G. S?dek; see record 1989-24900-001) were inadequate for testing the egotism theory of helplessness because they did not directly address the role of threat to self-esteem, the process held responsible for helplessness deficits by this theory. We reply that failure experience—the chief manipulation in these experiments—is critical for arousing threat to self-esteem. Therefore, our findings—that (a) noncontingency, not ego-threatening failure, is specifically responsible for helplessness deficits, and (b) availability of excuse for failure in the test phase augments performance deficits instead of mitigating them—call into question the validity of the egotism explanation of helplessness. We conclude that by and large, our study lends support to the original learned helplessness theory of Seligman and his associates. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Grouped arrays versus object-based representations: Reply to Kramer et al. (1997).

An important issue in attention research concerns the representational format from which attention selects. S. P. Vecera and M. J. Farah (see record 1994-32352-001) presented results that they argued demonstrated attentional selection from a spatially invariant object representation. In their comment, A. F. Kramer, T. A. Weber, and S. E. Watson (see record 84-18014) questioned the interpretation of these results, and they presented evidence consistent with selection from a grouped location-based representation. In this reply, the author argues that although an absence of spatial, or distance, effects may be ambiguous as to whether attention is selecting from an object-based representation or from a location-based representation, there are computational considerations that favor object-based selection in certain tasks. The author concludes with a discussion of how object-based and location-based representations might interact with one another, thereby providing a possible explanation of Kramer et al.'s results. Such an account may lead to an understanding of how multiple forms of attentional selection may coexist in the visual system. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Process, not representation: Reply to Radavansky (1999).

The size of fan effects is determined by processes at retrieval, not by whether or not information is represented as situations. Evidence contradicts G. A. Radvansky's (see record 1999-05245-005) claim that time to retrieve information from a situation does not depend on the number of elements in the situation. Moreover, Radvansky's principles for ascribing situational models to experiments appear to be post hoc ways of redescribing the data. On the other hand, the evidence does support the Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational (ACT-R) assumption that participants can adjust their attentional weightings and so produce differential fan effects. Moreover, the ACT-R theory of the fan effect is consistent with many other findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Affordances, codes, and decision processes: A response to Michaels (1993).

In her commentary on R. W. Proctor et al (see record 1993-20228-001), C. F. Michaels (see record 1994-08287-001) claimed to have demonstrated a destination compatibility effect that cannot be attributed to relative direction coding. She also argued that the concept of "affordance" compatibility is needed to supplement the concept of "coding" compatibility to explain differences in the ease with which people can respond to compatible assignments for different stimulus and response sets. Neither of these assertions is supported by existing evidence. The destination compatibility effect, as well as most other stimulus–response compatibility phenomena, can be attributed to decision processes that operate on stimulus and response codes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Reply to Strain, Patterson, and Seidenberg (2002).

E. Strain, K. E. Patterson, and M. S. Seidenberg (2002) reported an effect of imageability and a Regularity X Imageability interaction in a regression analysis of naming latencies to 120 words. One of their items (couth) was named correctly by just 5 of their 24 participants, and its reaction time was an outlier on their distribution. When that single item is removed, the significant predictors are age of acquisition (AoA), word frequency, regularity, and length. Analyses of the combined data from J. Monaghan and A. W. Ellis's (2002) Experiments 1-3 indicate that AoA predicts naming latencies for exception words but not consistent words. E. Strain et al.'s other points are considered in the light of these observations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mentalism, mechanisms, and medical analogues: Reply to Wakefield (1998).

J. C. Wakefield's (1998) critique of W. C. Follette and A. C. Houts's (1996) article is addressed by raising questions about (a) mentalism as a framework for studying psychopathology, (b) the nature of inferred mechanisms and the process of making such inferences, and (c) the accuracy of claiming that the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM; American Psychiatric Association) expansion is analogous to the success of physical medicine. The authors argue that Wakefield's analysis of mental disorders leads to the conclusion that the modern DSMs are not reflective of the progress of physical medicine. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Occlusion, symmetry, and object-based attention: Reply to Saiki (2000).

J. Saiki (see record 2000-13210-027) argued that, because the stimuli used by M. Behrmann, R. S. Zemel, and M. C. Mozer (see record 1998-04674-001) were confounded by symmetry, conclusions about whether amodally completed objects can benefit from object-based attention are unwarranted. Here, the authors, examine J. Saiki's claim further and expand on their view of the mechanisms underlying object-based attention, suggesting that perceptual organization is the process whereby features from a single object are selectively attended. In light of this, they claim that heuristics such as symmetry and collinearity play an important role in the facilitation of features from a single object. In support of this claim, they present data from a further experiment using displays that exploit common fate, another grouping heuristic, and show that, under these conditions, the hallmark of object-based attention, a single-object advantage, is obtained for the occluded (amodally completed) shapes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Prototypes in category learning: The effects of category size, category structure, and stimulus complexity.

Although research in categorization has sometimes been motivated by prototype theory, recent studies have favored exemplar theory. However, some of these studies focused on small, poorly differentiated categories composed of simple, 4-dimensional stimuli. Some analyzed the aggregate data of entire groups. Some compared powerful multiplicative exemplar models to less powerful additive prototype models. Here, comparable prototype and exemplar models were fit to individual-participant data in 4 experiments that sampled category sets varying in size, level of category structure, and stimulus complexity (dimensionality). The prototype model always fit the observed data better than the exemplar model did. Prototype-based processes seemed especially relevant when participants learned categories that were larger or contained more complex stimuli. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Autonomic and eyeblink conditioning are closely related to contingency awareness: Reply to Wiens and ?hman (2002) and Manns et al (2002).

S. Wiens and A. Ohman (see record 2002-00340-002) disputed the conclusion that Pavlovian conditioning is strongly related to contingency awareness (P. F. Lovibond & D. R. Shanks, see record 2002-00340-001) on the basis that an inappropriate definition of awareness was used. J. R. Manns, R. E. Clark, and L. R. Squire (see record 2002-00340-003) contended that delay eyeblink conditioning is independent of awareness. The authors of the present article consider these arguments, highlight several problems in the new studies described by the commentators, and conclude that there is still little evidence for unconscious conditioning in either subliminal autonomic conditioning or eyeblink conditioning. The most parsimonious account of existing data is that a single learning process gives rise to both awareness and conditioned responding. Further progress in evaluating the possibility of unconscious conditioning would be facilitated by the development of more completely specified and testable dual-process models. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stress and specificity: Reply to Miller (2009).

T. F. Denson, M. Spanovic, and N. Miller (see record 2009-19763-001) meta-analytically tested the hypotheses that specific appraisals and emotions would predict cortisol and immune responses to laboratory stressors and emotion inductions. Although the cortisol data supported the integrated specificity hypothesis, G. E. Miller (see record 2009-19763-002) raised questions concerning the extent to which the immunity data supported specificity. The authors respond to these concerns. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Small, robust, and important: Reply to Sloan and Bagiella (2001).

Responds to R. P. Sloan and E. Bagiella's (see record 2001-06506-009)comments on the M. E. McCullough, et al (see record 2000-03769-001) article regarding religious involvement and morality. McCullough et al note that Sloan and Bagiella compared their findings with results from individual studies of hopelessness and physical activity that used criteria other than morality. The present authors argue that such comparisons are meaningless. Sloan and Bagiella's questioning of the statistical nonsignificance of the fully adjusted association is addressed. Methodological issues are also discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)