乏燃料后处理厂退役用远距离操作技术探索

随着我国大型遗留核燃料后处理设施退役治理工作的按序推进,现已进入退役关键阶段,为使其中强放射性区域安全、顺利实施退役,研究、摸索和掌握远距离操作应用技术,良好的退役设计与策划,是推进退役事业、使之具备工作条件和能力的先决条件。由于我国尚未建立乏燃料后处理厂退役用远距离操作的相关标准体系,本文首次依据对我国遗留后处理厂现状特点,深入剖析典型退役难点,并参照国外同类型工程远距离操作经验提出了退役用远距离操作的总体设计要求,可以作为设计远距离操作技术决策的重要依据。     

某研究所放射性实验设施退役工程源项调查

辐射安全研究部监测与评价室2006年承担并完成了某研究所放射性实验设施退役工程的源项调查。源项调查在整个退役过程中是非常重要的一个环节，作为退役工程不可缺少的一部分，源项调查本身就是一个独立的工作，其结果为退役方案的制定、环境影响评价以及最终的退役实施提供最基础、最重要的依据。     

某放射性废水蒸发池退役源项调查

近年来，我国即将有一批研究实验堆、核燃料循环设施和放射性实验设施进入退役阶段，而退役过程中一个重要的工作是源项调查，其主要目标是确定各类场所表面、物体等是否受到污染、污染类型及分布情况。源项调查结果将直接影响退役方案的制订和实施。本工作针对某放射性废水蒸发池退役进行的源项调查。     

北京城市放射性废物库的源项调查

北京城市放射性废物库是我国建成的第一个收储城市放射性废物的暂存库。经过 3 0多年运行 ,目前已经停止收贮工作 ,准备退役。本工作是该库退役之前的源项调查工作。经调查 ,北京城市放射性废物库共收贮了 5 70m3的放射性废物和 2 5 82个放射源 ,总活度 8.3 9× 1 0 12 Bq。     

101重水研究堆安全关闭过渡期放射性源项调查

针对我国第1座研究性反应堆（101重水研究堆）安全关闭过渡期的放射性源项调查,采用对可达部位取样分析与理论计算相结合的方法,给出了堆本体主要部件的中子活化源项。采用现场测量和对管道、设备内壁取样的方法获取了回路系统污染源项。另外,对反应堆厂房构筑物地面和墙面的污染水平、乏燃料保存水池和废树脂等进行了较为全面的现场测量和取样分析。通过源项调查,初步掌握了101重水研究堆退役的主要放射性源项的特点和存留量。     

核反应堆退役的总体设计

本文论述核反应堆退役的阶段划分、总体设计的任务、目标、依据、工程规划、放射性特性调查、工程技术方案、专用技术研究开发、放射性废物处理等方面的问题。     

核设施退役过程中辐射测量的一般问题

本文叙述了设施退役的阶段划分和退役过程吕辐射测量的一些问题，主要包括退役前源项调查中辐射测量的目的、内容和方法，退役施工过程中的施工辐射监测，以及退役施工结束后终态辐射检测和终态验收检测的有关问题。     

退役反应堆放射性活化源项计算

本文建立了退役反应堆活化源项的计算模型,通过临界计算验证了模型的正确性。介绍了对于距堆芯较远的区域采用分层计算和分步计算的重要意义,通过MCNP和ORIGEN程序相结合,计算了距堆芯较远处的支撑裙、铅支撑筒内侧和外侧钢板样品和一次水箱外筒的预留样品⁶⁰Co比活度,计算值与测量值的偏差满足退役工程设计需求,表明本文所建立的退役反应堆放射性活化源项计算方法和模型是适用的。     

退役源项刍议

本文论述了退役源项在核设施退役中的重要性,定义了什么是退役源项.本文主要从退役源项计算的内容和时间两方面对退役源项的计算进行分析,没有涉及具体的计算方法.由于退役方式的不同将导致退役源项的特征有很大的差异,因此本文就退役方式对退役源项的影响做了详细的分析.     

源项调查技术在某核电站源项异常分析中的应用实践

源项调查技术已经在国内外核电站广泛应用,源项调查所获得的核素种类、表面活度、核素剂量率贡献占比等信息是重要的源项基础数据。这些数据为源项控制策略制定、源项异常分析、辐射屏蔽设计、机组源项信息建档等工作提供了重要支撑。文章介绍了某CPR1000机组使用碲锌镉γ谱测量系统开展源项调查的情况,以及通过源项调查结果辅助确定机组源项异常原因的实践经验。     

乏燃料后处理厂核材料衡算与控制国际经验及关键技术启示

本文系统地调研和分析了国内乏燃料后处理厂核材料管制现状,国外商业乏燃料后处理厂核材料衡算与控制措施的实施经验和采用的关键技术,包括典型商业乏燃料后处理厂物料平衡区和实物盘存关键测量点的设置、核材料衡算与控制措施的总体设计要求、近实时衡算的概念等。根据调研结果和分析,针对我国核材料管制的现状,提出了我国在商业乏燃料后处理厂核材料管制技术准备工作的几点初步建议。     

Spent fuel reprocessing: A vital link in Indian nuclear power program

The success of the three stage Indian nuclear energy program is inter-linked with the establishment of an efficient closed fuel cycle approach with recycling of both fissile and fertile components of the spent fuel to appropriate reactor systems. The Indian reprocessing journey was started way back in 1964 with the commissioning of a plant based on PUREX technology to reprocess aluminum clad natural uranium spent fuel from the research reactor CIRUS. After achieving the basic skills, a power reactor reprocessing facility was built to reprocess spent fuel from power reactors. Adequate design and operating experience was gained from these two plants for mastering the reprocessing technology. The first plant, being the maiden venture, based on indigenous technology had to undergo many modifications during its operation and finally needed refurbishment for continued operation. Decommissioning and decontamination of this plant was carried out meticulously to allow unrestricted access to the cells for fresh installation. A third plant was built for power reactor spent fuel reprocessing to serve as a design standard for future plants with the involvement of industry. Over the years, spent fuel reprocessing based on PUREX technology has reached a matured status and can be safely deployed to meet the additional reprocessing requirements to cater to the expanding nuclear energy program. Side by side with the developments in the spent natural uranium fuel reprocessing, irradiated thoria reprocessing is also perused to develop THOREX into a robust process. The additional challenges in this domain are being addressed to evolve appropriate technological solutions. Advancements in the field of science and technology are being absorbed to meet the challenges of higher recovery combined with reduced exposure and environmental discharges.     

Risks associated with nuclear material recovery and waste preparation

This paper presents an analysis of the risk associated with nuclear material recovery and waste preparation. The steps involve: (1) reprocessing of spent fuel to recycle fissionable material, (2) refabrication of the recovered material for use as reactor fuel, and (3) the transportation links connecting these plants with the power plants and waste repositories. The risks considered are radiological and non-radiological, accident and routine effects on the public and workers during plant construction, operation and decommissioning.The lightwater reactor fuel is considered to be in its fifth recycle. The reprocessing plant is sized to receive 2000 MTHM/year, which corresponds to the fuel from 75 one-G We nuclear power plants. The refabrication plant which is considerably larger than current designs is colocated (within 1 km), and receives all the recovered fissionable material from the reprocessing plant and produces the fuel for recycle to the power plants.Sabotage and material diversion is protected against by colocating the plants and by coprocessing, i.e., not separating plutonium from uranium. For this reason, this risk is not treated, nor is the risk from earthquakes and other natural occurrences, on the basis that the plant is appropriately designed.The results of the analysis are that the non-radiological risk is 0.34 fatalities/GWe-year and that the radiological risk is 2 x 10^?3 fatalities/GWe-year, of which 60% comes from occupational exposure, 40% from routine public exposure, and 0.025% from accidental public exposure. This distribution of risk is not generally perceived. The non-radiological aspects of the plants and transportation are often ignored, although statistically they contribute 170 times more risk than radiation; similarly, radiation exposure to workers and routine radiological releases contribute 4000 times more than radiological public accident risk, which receives a large fraction of the professional and public attention. To further give perspective, the total radiological risk (2 × 10^?3) is about $\text{1}\text{3500}$ of the risk that the same population group would experience from the natural background.     

乏燃料后处理设施核材料近实时衡算系统概念与设计

为指导后处理设施设计阶段统一部署核材料衡算、在设施运行阶段实施近实时衡算、及时反馈工艺的运行状态和趋势并探知异常情况,保障核设施核材料安全,本文在开展乏燃料后处理设施核材料衡算评价及关键技术研究的基础上,深入调研分析了核材料近实时衡算技术现状,梳理了Purex流程中核材料平衡区内过程监控的重要设备和先进仪器,以及一体化数据信息系统结构及其运行维护需求,提出我国开展乏燃料后处理近实时衡算技术研究的必要性和技术配置建议：结合传统的平衡区划分及关键测量点设置方式,以核材料重要量为目标,增补适宜的在线监控点和战略观察点,采用模型开发验证、分析方法优化评估、信息系统整合技术,在后处理设施全寿命周期内统筹管理控制Purex工艺中设备、管道、阀门、储槽中的核材料,达到近实时衡算目标。     

Adaptation of Approved Transport and Storage Cask Lines to Individual Customer Requirements

Abstract

Within the decommissioning programmes of the Italian nuclear power plants, the Italian multi-utility company ENEL decided to rely on on-site dry storage while waiting for the availability of the national interim storage site. SOGIN (Società Gestione Impianti Nucleari SpA, Rome, Italy), now in charge of all nuclear power plant (NPP) decommissioning activities was created in the ENEL group but is now owned by the Italian government. In 2000 it ordered 30 CASTOR® casks for the storage of its spent fuel not covered by existing or future reprocessing contracts. Ten CASTOR X/A17 casks will contain the Trino pressurised water reactor (PWR) fuel and the Garigliano boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel currently stored in pools at the nuclear power plant Trino and the Avogadro nuclear facility at Saluggia. Additionally 20 CASTOR X/B52 casks will contain the BWR fuel assemblies, which are stored in the pool at the Caorso nuclear power plant. GNB (Gesellschaft fuer Nuklear-Behaelter mbH, Essen, Germany) has completed detailed studies for the design of both types of cask. The tailored cask design is based on the well-established and proven design features of CASTOR reference casks and is responsive to the needs and requirements of the Italian fuel and handling conditions. The design of the CASTOR X/A17 for up to 17 Trino PWR fuel assemblies or 17 Garigliano BWR fuel assemblies and the CASTOR X/B52 cask holding up to 52 Caorso BWR fuel assemblies is suitable for the following conditions of use: loading of the casks in the fuel pools of the nuclear installations at Trino, Caorso and Avogadro; no upgrading of the Current on-site crane capacities; transport of the fuel assemblies, which are currently stored at the Saluggia facility to the nuclear power plant Trino; on-site storage in a vertical or horizontal position with the possibility of transfer to another temporary storage or a final repository, even after a number of years; the partial loading of mixed oxide (MOX) and failed fuel; loading and drying of bottled Garigliano fuel assemblies. On the basis of the CASTOR V/19 and CASTOR V/52 cask lines, the design of the CASTOR X/A17 and X/B52 casks aims at optimising safety and economics under the given boundary conditions. The long time for which fuel is kept in intermediate wet storage results in a reduced shielding and thermal-conduction requirement. This is used to meet the tight mass and geometry restrictions while allowing for the largest cask capacity possible.     

Spent fuel transport using cask loaded outside pool

Abstract

During the last year, Sogin (the Italian company in charge for decommissioning of Italian nuclear power plants) had to implement an accelerated decommissioning plan of a EUREX spent fuel pool due to finding a water leakage into the environment from the pool. EUREX is no longer operating a pilot reprocessing plant, which some years ago became the responsibility of Sogin. There were 52 spent fuel assemblies from the Trino Vercellese PWR nuclear power plant, 48 irradiated pins from a Garigliano BWR fuel assembly, and 10 plates from an irradiated MTR fuel assembly stored in the EUREX pool, so the first step of the accelerated decommissioning plan consisted in the evacuation of this spent fuel. Considering the necessity to start the evacuation as soon as possible, Sogin decided to use an already existing cask (AGN-1) used in the past for the transport of Trino and Garigliano fuel assemblies. This cask was requalified in order to obtain a transport licence for the fuel assemblies stored in the EUREX pool according to ADR 2005 regulation. The transport license for the AGN-1 cask loaded with EUREX fuel assemblies was released by APAT (the Italian Safety Authority) in the spring of 2007. Owing to the limited capacity of the EUREX pool crane (27 t for nuclear loads) and limited dimensions of pool operational area, it was not possible to transfer the AGN-1 cask (50 t) into the pool for fuel assemblies charging. The solution implemented to overcome this problem was the loading of the cask outside the pool. A special shielding shuttle was developed and used to allow safe spent fuel transfer between the pool and the cask. This procedure avoided also the problem of excessive contamination of cask surfaces that could have occurred due to very high level of contamination of EUREX pool water if the cask had been immersed in the pool. Additional shielding devices were developed and used to reduce dose rate during cask loading operations. Although the evacuation of spent fuel assemblies from the EUREX pool was a very challenging activity due to the short time available, unfavourable space conditions inside the pool building and handling tool limitations; all loading and transport operations were performed successfully and without particular problems. Ten transports were carried out to evacuate all of the spent fuel stored in the EUREX pool. Spent fuel was transferred to the Avogadro Deposit pool. The first loading sequence started on 2 May 2007 and the first transport was performed on 6 May 2007. The tenth and last transport was performed on 21 July 2007. A dose less than 50 μSv (neutron + gamma) was measured for the most exposed operator during a complete cask loading sequence.     

Dismantling design for the loop rooms on the MR reactor

The recently completed international co-operation project was aimed at planning for decommissioning the MR reactor identified as a pilot plant for the decommissioning of the other shutdown reactors on the site. The MR reactor was a pool-type, materials testing reactor with the total thermal power of 50 MW which incorporated pressure tubes containing fuel under test. The MR facility includes the reactor with its nine loop rig rooms containing pumps, heat exchangers and experimental equipment as well as systems and equipment located in other buildings in the complex. The objective of the MR reactor decommissioning project was to identify dismantling equipment and the decommissioning methodology for the reactor, loop rooms and redundant services to permit the refit and re-use of the building for a different nuclear related purpose. The dismantling design comprises two separate, but combined, tasks, namely, the dismantling of reactor installation itself and dismantling of experimental loops. The techniques proposed to undertake the dismantling operations within the loop rooms are described. Two options have been developed for removing contaminated equipment from the high radiation field loop rooms and packaging the waste into approved waste containers. The benefits and detriments of both methods have been identified, which allows implementing the safe, timely and cost-effective decommissioning.     

核燃料循环设施安全关键岗位识别方法初探

研究建立了基于岗位的工作责任、安全风险和专业技能等特性指标的核燃料循环设施安全关键岗位识别方法,给出了核燃料循环设施安全关键岗位的定义、识别指标体系、识别原则、识别评价流程和后处理设施应用案例。     

加速器驱动先进核能系统的乏燃料循环再生研究北大核心CSCD

乏燃料后处理是核燃料循环的关键环节,制约核电的可持续发展。借助于加速器驱动先进核能系统(ADANES)提供的高通量、硬能谱的外源中子,其乏燃料后处理只需除去乏燃料中的挥发性裂变产物和影响次锕系元素嬗变的中子毒物,长寿命的次锕系元素Np、Am、Cm可与二氧化铀一起转化为新的燃料元件在加速器驱动燃烧器中燃烧、嬗变、增殖和产能。基于此,本课题组提出了加速器驱动的乏燃料后处理及再生制备的技术路线,包括高温氧化粉化与挥发、选择性溶解分离和燃料再生制备。本文主要介绍了近几年本课题组在这三方面所取得的一些成就,希望能为加速器驱动先进核能系统的乏燃料后处理提供基础数据。     

我国乏燃料运输现状探讨

随着我国经济的持续发展,核能作为安全、清洁能源在我国能源战略中地位日益突出。在保证安全的前提下,我国核电机组按照国家规划合理增加,乏燃料的产量也将逐步增加。根据我国核电站乏燃料贮存及外运规则,以及我国核电站主要位于东部沿海,而乏燃料后处理厂处在西北腹地这一国情,必将面临乏燃料的大量、长距离及安全运输的问题。乏燃料运输作为联接核电站与后处理厂或最终处置场的纽带,在维持核燃料循环体系的正常运行上发挥至关重要的作用。对国内外乏燃料运输涉及的运输方式、运输容器、运输安全监管及事故应急体系等问题进行了分析和讨论,对我国乏燃料运输中存在问题的解决提出了建议。