Study on severe accident mitigation measures for the development of PWR SAMG

In the development of the Severe Accident Management Guidelines （SAMG）, it is very important to choose the main severe accident sequences and verify their mitigation measures. In this article, Loss-of-Coolant Accident （LOCA）, Steam Generator Tube Rupture （SGTR）, Station Blackout （SBO）, and Anticipated Transients without Scram （ATWS） in PWR with 300 MWe are selected as the main severe accident sequences. The core damage progressions induced by the above-mentioned sequences are analyzed using SCDAP/RELAP5. To arrest the core damage progression and mitigate the consequences of severe accidents, the measures for the severe accident management （SAM） such as feed and bleed, and depressurizations are verified using the calculation. The results suggest that implementing feed and bleed and depressurization could be an effective way to arrest the severe accident sequences in PWR.     

Severe accident management strategy verification for VVER-1000 (V320) reactor

Severe accident analysis of a reactor is an important aspect in evaluation of source term. This in turn helps in emergency planning and Severe Accident Management (SAM). The use of the Severe Accident Management Guideline (SAMG) is required for accident situation which is not handled adequately through the use of Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP), thus leading to a partial or a total core melt. Actions recommended in the SAMG aim at limiting the risk of radiologically significant radioactive releases in the short- and mid-term (a few hours to a few days). Initiation of SAMG for VVER-1000 is considered at two core exit temperatures viz. 650 °C as a desirable entry temperature and 980 °C as a backup action. Analyses have been carried out for VVER-1000 (V320) for verification of some of the strategies namely water injection in primary and secondary circuit. These strategies are analysed for a high and low pressure primary circuit transients. Station Black Out (SBO) is one such high pressure transient for which core heat can be removed by natural circulation of the primary circuit inventory by maintaining the secondary side inventory. This strategy has been verified where the feed water injection to secondary side of SG is considered from external power sources (e.g. mobile DG sets) as suggested in SAM guidelines. The second transient, a low pressure event is analysed for verification of the SG flooding and core flooding strategies. The analysis shows that SG flooding is not adequate to arrest the degradation of the core. In case of core flooding strategy, the analyses show that core flooding is not adequate to arrest the degradation of the core for the large break LOCA where as for small break LOCA the injections through available safety systems are adequate. The assessments are carried out with integral severe accident computer code ASTEC V1.3.     

Effectiveness and adverse effects of in-vessel retention strategies under a postulated SGTR accident of an OPR1000

During a steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident, direct release of radioactive nuclides into the environment is postulated via bypassing the containment building. This conveys a significant threat in severe accident management (SAM) for minimization of radionuclide release. To mitigate this risk, a numerical assessment of SAM strategies was performed for an SGTR accident of an Optimized Power Reactor 1000 MWe (OPR1000) using MELCOR code. Three in-vessel mitigation strategies were evaluated and the effect of delayed operation action was analyzed. The MELCOR calculations showed that activation of a prompt secondary feed and bleed (F&B) operation using auxiliary feed water and use of an atmospheric dump valve could prevent core degradation. However, depressurization using the safety depressurization system could not prevent core degradation, and the injection of coolant via high-pressure safety injection without the use of reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurization increased fission product release. When mitigation action was delayed by 30 minutes after SAMG entrance, a secondary F&B operation failed in depressurizing the RCS sufficiently, and a significant amount of fission products were released into the environment. These results suggest that appropriate mitigation actions should be applied in a timely manner to achieve the optimal mitigation effects.     

反应堆主回路卸压对压力容器外裂变产物释放的影响分析

本工作耦合建立了600 MW压水堆核电厂热工水力、裂变产物行为和放射性后果评价的分析模型,选取SB-LOCA、SGTR、SBO和LOFW等4个高压熔堆事故序列,研究了主回路卸压对压力容器外裂变产物释放的影响,包括主回路卸压对压力容器外裂变产物释放的缓解效应和其他负面影响。分析表明：实施主回路卸压可缓解高压熔堆事故序列下压力容器外的释放,但卸压工况下事故早期安全壳内的气载放射性活度较基准工况下的大。相关分析结论可作为严重事故管理导则制定的技术基础。     

Development of safety injection flow map associated with target depressurization for effective severe accident management of OPR1000

If any severe accident occurs, application of the Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG) is initiated by the Technical Support Center (TSC). In order to provide advisory information to the TSC, required safety injection flow rate for maintaining the coolability of the reactor core has been suggested in terms of the depressurization pressure. In this study, mechanistic development of the safety injection flow map was performed by post-processing the core exit temperature (CET) data from MELCOR simulation. In addition, effect of oxidation during the core degradation was incorporated by including simulation data of core water level decrease rate. Using the CET increase rate and core water level decrease rate, safety injection flow maps required for removing the decay and oxidation heat and finally for maintaining the coolability of the reactor core were developed. Three initiating events of small break loss of coolant accidents without safety injection, station black out, and total loss of feed water were considered. Reactor coolant system depressurization pressure targeting the suggested injection flow achievable with one or two high pressure safety injections was included in the map. This study contributes on improving the current SAMG by providing more practical and mechanistic information to manage the severe accidents.     

Effectiveness and adverse effects of reactor coolant system depressurization strategy with various severe accident management guidance entry conditions for OPR1000

Severe accident analysis for Korean OPR1000 with MELCOR 1.8.6 was performed by adapting a mitigation strategy under different entry conditions of Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG). The analysis was focused on the effectiveness of the mitigation strategy and its adverse effects. Four core exit temperatures (CETs) were selected as SAMG entry conditions, and Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA), Station Blackout (SBO), and Total Loss of Feed Water (TLOFW) were selected as postulated scenarios that may propagate into severe accidents. In order to delay reactor pressure vessel (RPV) failure, entering the SAMG when the CET reached 923 K, 923 K, and 753 K resulted in the best results for SBLOCA, SBO, and TLOFW scenarios, respectively. This implies that using event-based diagnosis for severe accidents may be more beneficial than using symptom-based diagnosis. There is no significant difference among selected SAMG entry conditions in light of the operator's available action time before the RPV failure. Potential vulnerability of the RPV due to hydrogen generation was analyzed to investigate the foreseeable adverse effects that act against the accident mitigation strategies. For the SBLOCA cases, mitigation cases generated more hydrogen than the base case. However, the amount of hydrogen generated was similar between the base and mitigation cases for SBO and TLOFW. Hydrogen concentrations of containment were less than 5% before RPV failure for most cases.     

Detailed evaluation of coolant injection into the reactor vessel with RCS depressurization for high pressure sequences

A coolant injection into the reactor vessel with depressurization of the reactor coolant system (RCS) has been evaluated as part of the evaluation for a strategy of the severe accident management guidance (SAMG). Two high pressure sequences of a small break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) without safety injection (SI) and a total loss of feedwater (LOFW) accident in Optimized Power Reactor (OPR)1000 have been analyzed by using the SCDAP/RELAP5 computer code. The SCDAP/RELAP5 results have shown that only one train operation of a high pressure safety injection at 30,000 s with indirect RCS depressurization by using one condenser dump valve (CDV) at 6  min after implementation of the SAMG prevents reactor vessel failure for the small break LOCA without SI. In this case, only one train operation of the low pressure safety injection (LPSI) without the high pressure safety injection (HPSI) does not prevent reactor vessel failure. Only one train operation of the HPSI at 20,208 s with direct RCS depressurization by using two SDS valves at 40 min after an initial opening of the safety relief valve (SRV) prevents reactor vessel failure for the total LOFW.     

Simulation of the small modular reactor severe accident scenario response to SBO using MELCOR code

Advanced small modular reactors (SMRs) use different design in the systems, structures, components from large reactors for achieving a high level of safety and reliability. In present work, the SMRs severe accident caused by the station blackout (SBO) was modeled and analyzed using MELCOR code, and the simulation of the accident scenario response to SBO was conducted. Based on the steady state calculation, which agrees well with designed values, we introduced the SBO accident for transient calculation. First, the case of the SBO accident without the passive core cooling system (PXS) was calculated. The progression and scenario in the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) and the containment were simulated and analyzed, including the transient response, cooling capacity and thermal-hydraulic characteristics and so on. The station black-out transient in the SMR can be simulated accurately, and the main failure model in the accident process can be concluded. Then three other cases of the SBO accident with different passive safety systems (core makeup tank (CMT), accumulator (ACC), passive residual heat removal system heat exchanger (PRHR HX), automatic depressurization system (ADS)) of the PXS were calculated respectively, and the results for different passive safety systems were compared. The passive core cooling system can not only provide water to the primary coolant system, but also take away the reactor decay residual heat. So in a station black-out transient, we can get more time for restoring AC power, and effectively prevent the accidents such as Fukushima.     

Detailed Evaluation of RCS Boundary Rupture during High-Pressure Severe Accident Sequences

A depressurization possibility of the reactor coolant system (RCS) before a reactor vessel rupture during a high-pressure severe accident sequence has been evaluated for the consideration of direct containment heating (DCH) and containment bypass. A total loss of feed water (TLOFW) and a station blackout (SBO) of the advanced power reactor 1400 (APR1400) has been evaluated from an initiating event to a creep rupture of the RCS boundary by using the SCDAP/RELAP5 computer code. In addition, intentional depressurization of the RCS using power-operated safety relief valves (POSRVs) has been evaluated. The SCDAPRELAP5 results have shown that the pressurizer surge line broke before the reactor vessel rupture failure, but a containment bypass did not occur because steam generator U tubes did not break. The intentional depressurization of the RCS using POSRV was effective for the DCH prevention at a reactor vessel rupture.     

压水堆核电厂自然循环对一回路卸压策略的影响

以我国秦山二期核电厂为研究对象,使用SCDAP/RELAP5程序建立了核电厂的自然循环模型.选取高压溶堆严重事故(TMLB'事故)为基准事故序列,分析了高压熔堆严重事故中自然循环的机理现象.通过计算在有无自然循环情况下一回路卸压措施的实施情况,对比分析了自然循环对一回路卸压策略的影响.结果表明,自然循环能有效延缓一回路卸压的启动时间和整体事故进程,但对一回路卸压的效果影响较小.     

Effect analysis of the intentional depressurization on fission product behavior during TMLB' severe accident

It has been found that the pressure in the reactor coolant system (RCS) remains high in some severe accident sequences at the time of reactor vessel failure, with the risk of causing direct containment heating (DCH).Intentional depressurization is an effective accident management strategy to prevent DCH or to mitigate its consequences. Fission product behavior is affected by intentional depressurization, especially for inert gas and volatile fission product. Because the pressurizer power-operated relief valves (PORVs) are latched open, fission product will transport into the containment directly. This may cause larger radiological consequences in containment before reactor vessel failure. Four cases are selected, including the TMLB' base case and the opening one, two and three pressurizer PORVs. The results show that inert gas transports into containment more quickly when opening one and two PORVs,but more slowly when opening three PORVs; more volatile fission product deposit in containment and less in reactor coolant system (RCS) for intentional depressurization cases. When opening one PORV, the phenomenon of revaporization is strong in the RCS.     

Effect of SAMG entry condition on operator action time for severe accident mitigation

The effect of SAMG (Severe Accident Management Guidance) entry condition on operator action time for prevention of reactor vessel failure in the OPR1000 (Optimized Power Reactor 1000) was evaluated with a comparison to other conditions using the SCDAP/RELAP5/MOD3 computer code in detail. Dominant severe accident sequences, such as a station blackout, a total loss of feedwater, a small and medium break loss of coolant accidents without a safety injection were evaluated in this study. The results showed that a core exit temperature of 480 °C for the SAMG entry condition was too early, but a core exit temperature of 1000 °C was too late for operator action time to prevent reactor vessel failure. The SAMG entry condition of a core exit temperature of 650 °C for the OPR1000 was suitable for the operator action timing point in order to mitigate a severe accident.     

Analysis on containment depressurization under severe accidents for a Chinese 1000 MWe NPP

Containment depressurization has been implemented for many nuclear power plants (NPPs) to mitigate the risk of containment overpressurization induced by steam and gases released in LOCA accidents or generated in molten core concrete interaction (MCCI) during severe accidents. Two accident sequences of large break loss of coolant accident (LB-LOCA) and station blackout (SBO) are selected to evaluate the effectiveness of the containment venting strategy for a Chinese 1000 MWe NPP, including the containment pressure behaviors, which are analyzed with the integral safety analyses code for the selected sequences. Different open/close pressures for the venting system are also investigated to evaluate CsI mass fraction released to the environment for different cases with filtered venting or without filtered venting. The analytical results show that when the containment sprays can't be initiated, the depressurization strategy by using the Containment Filtered Venting System (CFVS) can prevent the containment failure and reduce the amount of CsI released to the environment, and if CFVS is closed at higher pressure, the operation interval is smaller and the radioactive released to the environment is less, and if CFVS open pressure is increased, the radioactive released to the environment can be delayed. Considering the risk of high pressure core melt sequence, RCS depressurization makes the CFVS to be initiated 7 h earlier than the base case to initiate the containment venting due to more coolant flowing into the containment.     

基于氢气风险分析的ADS手动卸压策略研究

先进非能动压水堆设计采用自动卸压系统(ADS)对一回路进行卸压,严重事故下主控室可手动开启ADS,缓解高压熔堆风险。然而ADS的设计特点可能导致氢气在局部隔间积聚,带来局部氢气风险。本文基于氢气负面效应考虑,对利用ADS进行一回路卸压的策略进行研究,为严重事故管理提供技术支持。选取全厂断电始发的典型高压熔堆严重事故序列,利用一体化事故分析程序,评估手动开启第1~4级ADS、手动开启第1~3级ADS、手动开启第4级ADS 3种方案的卸压效果,并分析一回路卸压对安全壳局部隔间的氢气负面影响。研究结果表明,3种卸压方案均能有效降低一回路压力。但在氢气点火器不可用时,开启第1~3级ADS以及开启第1~4级ADS卸压会引起内置换料水箱隔间氢气浓度迅速增加,可能导致局部氢气燃爆。因此,基于氢气风险考虑,建议在实施严重事故管理导则一回路卸压策略时优先考虑采用第4级ADS进行一回路卸压。     

Effects of accident management strategy on the severe accident environmental conditions

This paper presents a methodology utilizing an accident management strategy in order to determine accident environmental conditions to be used as inputs to equipment survivability assessments. In the case that there is a well-established accident management strategy for a specific nuclear power plant (NPP), an application of this tool can provide a technical rationale on equipment survivability assessment so that plant-specific and time-dependent accident environmental conditions could be practically and realistically defined in accordance with the equipment and instrumentation required for the accident management strategy or appropriate actions. For this work, three different tools are introduced; probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) outcomes, major accident management strategy actions, and accident environmental stages (AESs). In order to quantitatively investigate an applicability of accident management strategy on equipment survivability, the accident simulation for most likely scenario in Korean standard nuclear power plants (KSNPs) is performed with the MAAP4 code. The accident management guideline (AMG) actions such as the reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurization, water injection into the RCS, the containment pressure and temperature control, and hydrogen concentration control in containment are applied. The effects of these AMG actions on the accident environmental conditions are investigated by comparison to actions from previous normal accident simulation, especially focusing on equipment survivability assessment. As a result, the AMG-involved case shows the higher accident consequences along the accident environmental stages. This implies that plant-specific AMG actions need to be considered in order to determine accident environmental conditions in equipment survivability assessments.     

秦山一厂严重事故管理导则典型事故缓解对策有效性验证

在日本福岛核事故后,国家核安全局要求核电运营单位提升应对严重事故的能力。按照国家核安全局要求,秦山一厂开发了严重事故管理导则。应用MELCOR程序建立了秦山一厂严重事故分析模型,模拟典型严重事故序列,根据严重事故管理导则的缓解对策,分析实施事故缓解对策对核电厂主要参数的影响,从而验证事故缓解对策的有效性。分析结果表明:在严重事故情况下,按照严重事故管理导则实施缓解对策,可有效地延缓或终止堆芯损坏的过程。     

Analysis of the in-vessel phase of SAM strategy for a Korean 1000 MWe PWR

This study focuses on the in-vessel phase of severe accident management (SAM) strategy for a hypothetical 1000 MWe pressurized water reactor (PWR). To examine the effectiveness of SAM strategy, it is necessary to identify and assess epistemic and aleatory uncertainties. The selected scenario is a station blackout (SBO) and the corresponding SAM strategy is reactor coolant system (RCS) depressurization followed by water injection into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV). The analysis considers the depressurization timing and the flow rate and timing of in-vessel injection for scenario variations. For the phenomenological uncertainties, the core melting and relocation process is considered to be the most important phenomenon in the in-vessel phase of SAM strategy. Accordingly, sensitivity analyses are carried out to assess the impact of the cutoff porosity related to the flow area of core node (EPSCUT), the critical temperature (TCLMAX) and the minimum fraction of oxidized Zr (FZORUP) for cladding rupture, and the flag to divert gas flows in the core to the bypass channel (FGBYPA) on the core melting and relocation process. In this study, the effect of injection time on the integrity of RPV has been examined based on the quantification of the scenario and phenomenological uncertainties.     

全厂断电引发的严重事故下蒸汽发生器传热管蠕变失效风险研究

全厂断电引发的严重事故若处置不当,可能发展为长期、高压的严重事故进程,此时堆芯冷却系统中的自然循环在导出部分堆芯余热的同时,也增加了蒸汽发生器（SG）传热管、稳压器波动管以及热管段出现蠕变失效的风险。本文基于两环路设计的秦山二期核电厂设计特点,结合蠕变失效风险模型,对全厂断电引发的严重事故后未能执行“严重事故管理导则中向蒸汽发生器注水（SAG-1）”时SG传热管的蠕变失效风险进行了研究,从而为全厂断电引发的严重事故的负面影响提供量化结果,为技术支持中心（TSC）最终决策提供参考依据。分析结果表明,全厂断电引发的严重事故后16 361 s可能出现蠕变失效;自事故后16 610 s,SG传热管出现蠕变失效的可能性均远低于稳压器波动管与热管段,秦山二期核电厂全厂断电引发的严重事故下因SG传热管蠕变失效而导致安全壳旁通的风险很小。     

A simple novel analysis procedure for IVR calculation in core-molten severe accident

In-Vessel Retention (IVR) of core melt is a key severe accident management strategy adopted by operating nuclear power plants and advanced light water reactors (ALWRs), AP600, AP1000, etc. External Reactor Vessel Cooling (ERVC), which involves flooding the reactor cavity to submerge the reactor vessel in an attempt to cool core debris relocated to the vessel low head, is a novel severe accident management for IVR analysis. In present study, IVR analysis code in severe accident (IVRASA) has been proposed to evaluate the safety margin of IVR in AP600 with anticipative depressurization and reactor cavity flooding in severe accident. For, IVRASA, a simple novel analysis procedure has been developed for modeling the steady-state endpoint of core melt configurations. Furthermore, IVRASA was developed in a more general fashion so that it is applicable to compute various molten configurations such as UCSB Final Bounding State (FIBS). The results by IVRASA were consistent with those of the UCSB and INEEL. Benchmark calculations of UCSB-assumed FIBS indicate the applicability and accuracy of IVRASA and it could be applied to predict the thermal response of various molten configurations.     

Overview of plant specific severe accident management strategies for Kozloduy nuclear power plant,WWER-1000/320

This paper focuses on the fourth level of the defence in depth concept in nuclear safety, including the transitions from the third level and into the fifth level. The use of the severe accident management guideline (SAMG) is required when an accident situation is not handled adequately through the use of emergency operating procedures (EOP), thus leading to a partial or a total core melt. In the EOPs, the priority is to save the fuel, whereas, in the SAMG, the priority is to save the containment. Actions recommended in the SAMG aim at limiting the risk of radiologically significant radioactive releases in the short- and mid-term (a few hours to a few days). The paper describes basic severe accident management requirements related to nuclear power plant (NPP), specified by the IAEA and in Republic of Bulgaria Nuclear Legislation. It also surveys plant specific severe accident management (SAM) strategies for the Kozloduy NPP, equipped with WWER-1000 type reactors.