考虑企业社会责任的三级物流服务供应链协调

为研究物流服务集成商的企业社会责任对三级物流服务供应链决策的影响,构建受价格和企业社会责任共同影响的需求函数,运用Stacklberg博弈方法分析分散模型和集中模型下的最优决策问题,发现集中决策下物流需求与企业社会责任水平是分散决策下的一倍多,供应链总利润明显增加。为了达到集中决策的最优策略,设计带有补偿额的成本共担-收益共享契约,并引用议价模型设定补偿额,发现契约能够实现供应链的协调,社会责任意识和相对议价能力与成员利润、物流需求和企业社会责任水平之间呈正相关关系,且集成商能够更快地获益;补偿额取决于成员的议价能力,随着相对议价能力的提升,分包商获得的补偿增加。最后,通过算例分析验证了契约的有效性。     

考虑双边可靠性的物流服务供应链协调契约研究

研究由单个物流集成商和单个功能型物流提供商构成的二级物流服务供应链,考虑双方的可靠性均影响客户物流需求的情况下,针对物流服务供应链的协调问题进行研究。讨论物流服务供应链在分散式决策与集中式决策下的决策情况,指出传统批发价格契约的局限,提出利用考虑双边可靠性的收益共享契约对物流服务供应链进行协调,并讨论协调契约的效果与局限。研究表明:收益共享契约能激励企业双方提升自身的可靠性,使物流服务供应链协调;双方具有的基本可靠性在实施契约前后对各自的利润与协调均有正向积极影响,并且收益共享契约扩大了该积极影响;最后,通过仿真验证了该协调契约的有效性,并对相关参数进行灵敏度分析。     

考虑通关水平的跨境物流服务供应链契约协调机制研究

为实现跨境物流服务供应链完全协调,运用Stackelberg博弈理论,构建由一个跨境物流服务供应商与一个物流服务集成商组成的二级供应链。采用因子分析法测度通关水平,分析通关水平对跨境物流服务供应链最优决策及协调运作的影响,设计可供跨境物流服务供应链完美协调的契约机制。研究表明,考虑通关水平使跨境物流服务供应链成员及供应链整体利润均得到提升;集中决策下跨境物流服务供应链整体利润总是高于分散决策;收益共享契约可实现跨境物流服务供应商及供应链整体决策的帕累托优化,但不能达到供应链的完全协调,而Nash协商改进的二部定价契约模型可实现供应链的完全协调。     

政府干预下考虑双重行为偏好特征的闭环供应链决策与协调

将供应链成员双重行为偏好特征考虑到政府奖惩干预下的闭环供应链决策模型中,采用均值-标准差风险度量准则探讨了决策者行为偏好对闭环供应链最优决策和协调性的影响。结论表明：公平关切行为只是闭环供应链系统内部利润分配的一种手段,零售商和回收商公平关切行为会促使制造商出让部分利润,从而有利于自身利润的提高;回收商风险偏好行为影响回收转移价和回收价,当供应链成员以效用最大化为决策目标时,回收商越喜好风险,对制造商越不利,越厌恶风险,对零售商越不利;有效协调区域受到双重行为偏好特征的影响,供应链成员过度公平关切以及过度喜好风险或过度规避风险都将使收益共享-费用分担契约难以实现供应链协调,当供应链成员的行为偏好在各成员可接受的合理范围内,收益共享-费用分担契约能够实现闭环供应链Pareto改善。     

零售商竞争的供应链对突发事件的协调应对

研究了一个制造商和两个相互竞争的零售商组成的供应链,在面临单需求突变和双需求突变两种情况下,使用收入共享契约进行协调的问题。研究发现:当发生需求突变时,通过调整收入共享契约的参数可以使分权供应链达到集权供应链的效率;另外,当零售商的决策次序不同时,所得到的能够协调供应链的收入共享契约也会有所不同。     

面向延保服务的网购供应链协调策略研究

针对网购供应链延保服务决策效率和利润均衡问题,考虑产品故障率情形下,从延保价格、产品价格以及销售努力水平同时影响延保市场需求的角度,利用Stackelberg博弈构建了第三方服务商和电商平台的延保收益函数。分析比较了集中决策和分散决策下网购供应链的最优延保决策问题,探讨了2种收益共享契约对面向延保服务的网购供应链协调效果。研究表明,无论是集中决策还是分散决策,产品故障率的大小会同时影响延保服务的价格、销售努力水平、销售量及延保利润;传统收益共享契约无法实现面向延保服务的网购供应链协调,而改进收益共享契约并保证收益共享系数在合理区间取值,可优化电商平台、第三方服务商以及供应链系统的延保决策效率,实现供应链各主体延保收益的帕累托改善。     

线下体验服务和保鲜努力双重因素下生鲜电商供应链决策与协调研究

线下体验服务和保鲜努力投入是影响生鲜电商供应链绩效水平的关键因素。同时考虑线下体验服务和保鲜努力水平,构建生鲜电商供应链决策模型,对集中决策和分散决策下供应链绩效进行比较,在此基础上,设计“双向成本分摊”和“双向成本分摊+收益共享”契约,并验证契约协调的可行性。通过数值仿真,对供应链协调前后最优决策变化以及参数灵敏度影响进行分析。研究发现：1)集中决策、分散决策最优解均与体验服务敏感系数、新鲜度敏感系数呈正相关关系,且集中决策最优解优于分散决策;2)“双向成本分摊”契约可使得体验服务和保鲜努力均达到集中决策水平,但供应链总利润未得到改善;“双向成本分摊+收益共享”契约实现了供应链完美协调,各主体利润均得到帕累托改善。     

考虑集成水平的多期产品服务供应链网络均衡

产品与服务的集成水平影响着制造企业服务化的实现,结合多源多期服务质量参差不齐的特点,利用变分不等式构建了产品服务供应链网络均衡模型。运用投影算法对其进行仿真求解,旨在分析服务质量努力系数和集成水平努力系数变化对不同周期下网络交易量、利润以及决策均衡的影响。研究表明：服务质量是体现产品服务集成效果的关键,制造集成商可通过调整服务质量和种类迎合不同客户群体;集成水平决定产品与服务的匹配度和协同度,制造集成商可通过模块化、标准化进行系统集成,实现长期稳定收益;服务质量努力成本和集成努力成本随周期性变化影响决策者均衡利益,网络中决策者需要综合考虑多类集成方案和缩短销售周期来实现多方的价值共创。     

价格随机条件下看涨期权折扣契约的应急供应链协调研究

在突发事件造成市场需求与市场价格均随机波动的条件下,将期权与数量折扣契约融合,形成一种新的期权折扣契约,并用看涨期权折扣契约模型来协调供应链。通过海塞矩阵判断得知供应链存在最优决策,并进行算例分析。结果表明：当突发事件引起市场需求增加时,看涨期权折扣契约和数量折扣契约均能有效地提升供应链收益,且看涨期权折扣契约提升的幅度更大;当突发事件引起市场需求缩小时,2种契约均不能扭转整个供应链收益大幅下降的局面,且看涨期权折扣契约下降的幅度更大。为获取超额利润,决策者必须充分获取市场信息并对市场需求进行准确的预测才能使新的契约机制更有效。在新的前提条件下,看涨期权折扣契约模型能有效地协调供应链并提高整个供应链系统的绩效。该契约实现了风险共担和收益双赢,在一定程度上提升了供应链的柔性。     

随机需求下绿色农产品三级供应链协调

考虑市场随机需求、产品绿色度、绿色研发成本等因素，研究绿色农产品三级供应链协调问题。首先，构建了不同决策模式下供应链成员的利润模型，发现合作可提高供应链整体收益，随后构建"收益共享-成本共担"混合契约对绿色农产品供应链进行协调。研究结论表明：混合契约能够降低绿色农产品售价，提高绿色度，增加绿色农产品市场需求；合理比例的收益共享和成本共担可使各个绿色供应链成员达到共赢。最后通过算例分析验证了契约模型的正确性。     

Incentives for quality improvement efforts coordination in supply chains with partial cost allocation contract

In this paper, we consider quality improvement efforts coordination in a two-stage decentralised supply chain with a partial cost allocation contract. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, both of which produce defective products. Two kinds of failure cost occur within the supply chain: internal and external. The supplier and the manufacturer determine their individual quality levels to maximise their own profits. We propose a partial cost allocation contract, under which the external failure cost is allocated between the manufacturer and the supplier at different rates based on information derived from failure root cause analysis. If the quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are observable, we show that the partial cost allocation contract coordinates the supply chain, provided that the failure root cause analysis does not erroneously identify the manufacturer’s fault as the supplier’s, and the supplier does not take responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. In the single moral hazard model, where only the quality level of the supplier is unobservable, the optimal share rates require the supplier to take some responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. However, in the double moral hazard model, where quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are unobservable to each other, the optimal share rates require the supplier not to take responsibility for the manufacturer’s fault. It is noted that the root cause analysis conducted by the manufacturer may have its disadvantage in attributing the fault to the supplier when both sides are at fault. We also propose a contract based on the dual root cause analysis to reduce the supplier’s penalty cost. Numerical results illustrate that the partial cost allocation contract satisfies the fairness criterion compared with the traditional cost allocation contract.     

Game Theory Based Decision Coordination Strategy of Agricultural Logistics Service Information System

Under the background of “Internet plus” rapid development, the agricultural logistics industry should apply information technology to every link of the agricultural product logistics industry chain. By making full use of the decision making module of the agricultural logistics information system, we can realize the full sharing of information and data resources, which makes the decision-making scheme of the agricultural logistics information system more optimized. In real economic society, the uncertainty and mismatch between the customer’s logistics service demand and the logistics service capability that the logistics service function provider can provide, that is, when the two information are asymmetric, how to use the third-party contract to coordinate the income and profit distribution of the two, to make the information system decision making more reasonable? This paper mainly studies the coordination scheme of agricultural logistics information system decision making under uncertain output and demand information by introducing the spot market. A joint coordination strategy based on revenue sharing and penalty feedback contracts proposes decentralized decision making based on game theory. Experiments show that the flexible ordering strategy proposed in this paper can reduce the logistics service supply chain’s uncertainty and significantly improve the logistics service supply chain’s overall income level through coordination contracts.     

What is the role of value-added service in a remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain?

While the previous literature overlooks value-added service in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), we consider new research problems with embedding value-added service into remanufacturing models. In this paper, we mainly study the role of value-added service in a CLSC and investigate how the value-added service influences profits and other decision variables. Then, we evaluate the performance of the CLSC in different service structures, where a manufacturer or a retailer provide the value-added service. Systematic comparisons and numerical studies show that the supply chain is more effective when service is provided by a manufacturer rather than by a retailer. Also, value-added service improves the whole supply chain performance and plays a regulatory role in a CLSC and influences the decisions of supply chain members. We also show that while a service cost-sharing mechanism can only optimise rather than achieve the supply chain coordination, and the degree of optimisation depends on cost-sharing percentage, the two-part tariff contract can be an effective mechanism to coordinate decentralised service scenarios by generating the same supply chain performance in a centralised service architecture model.     

带有资金约束的零售商的替代性产品双渠道供应链运作策略

在对称信息框架下,基于博弈理论对带有资金约束的零售商的替代性产品双渠道供应链运作决策问题进行了研究。结果表明,双渠道间产品替代性的增加,会加剧渠道间冲突。零售商实体店服务水平提高到一定程度后,其不再有动机进一步提高服务水平。当零售商存在资金约束时,制造商通过提供延期支付合同可以有效协调双渠道供应链,但是,这种协调效应对制造商来说是有代价的,制造商利润会低于零售商资金充足情形下的利润。     

CVaR准则下双渠道供应链订货与信息搭便车行为

研究双渠道供应链中生产商负责的网上直销渠道对零售商负责的传统零售渠道的信息服务搭便车行为。假定产品需求随机且依赖于零售商信息服务水平,利用条件风险值准则和均衡分析方法建立了生产商与零售商均为风险厌恶者时双渠道供应链的集中式决策模型和分散式决策模型,利用合同理论给出了协调供应链的回购加信息服务补贴契约,利用数值仿真方法验证了模型的合理性和协调契约的有效性。研究表明,增加直销渠道对供应链而言是把“双刃剑”,既可吸引潜在需求,也应避免需求由零售渠道向直销渠道的大规模转移;直销渠道的信息服务搭便车行为有利于供应链各方;决策者越厌恶风险,其订货量越低,此时生产商、零售商和供应链的利润都将下降;当风险厌恶因子等于1时,决策者风险厌恶时双渠道供应链的决策与决策者风险中性时一致。     

Coordinating a three-layer supply chain with uncertain demand and random yield

The paper considers a three-layer supply chain involving one raw-material supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. The market demand is assumed to be stochastic and productions at the raw-material supplier and manufacturer are subject to random yield. The centralised model is studied as the benchmark case. The decentralised model is solved and Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained. It is shown that buyback contract fails to coordinate such a supply chain. However, a composite contract framed combining buyback, and sales rebate and penalty contracts is shown to coordinate the supply chain. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the developed models.     

Strategies for warranty service in a dual-channel supply chain with value-added service competition

This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer and the retailer sell homogeneous durable goods bundled with warranty service that is provided by the manufacturer, and they compete for customers by offering free value-added service. Both the warranty and value-added services can affect the purchasing behaviour of customers. We examine the warranty service decision of the manufacturer and the value-added service competition between the manufacturer and the retailer. Three types of warranty service strategies that can affect the value-added service competition are proposed. By analysing the equilibriums of the value-added service level decisions of the manufacturer and the retailer, we find that when the manufacturer increases its warranty service level, the value-added service competition will be weakened, and when the warranty service level is high enough, there is no value-added service competition. In addition, we examine the optimal warranty service strategy and warranty service level of the manufacturer under different conditions, and we find that the stronger the manufacturer’s bargaining power is, or the stronger the value-added service competition intensity is, the more motivation the manufacturer has to provide a high warranty service level. Numerical examples reveal that differentiation strategy in value-added service may hurt the profits of the manufacturer, the retailer and the entire supply chain.