基于消费者接受程度的双渠道产品价格和质量决策研究

在消费者对直销渠道和零售渠道接受程度有差异的情形下,研究了产品质量为内生的双渠道供应链中价格和质量联合决策问题。分别构建传统单一零售渠道模型、双渠道分散决策模型和双渠道集中决策模型。比较制造商和零售商在3种模型下的定价均衡决策、产品质量水平和利润,分析零售商和制造商的渠道策略和最优定价。结果表明：与传统单一零售渠道情形相比,在集中决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道不改变零售价格,但是能够提高产品质量水平和供应链整体利润;在分散决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道将降低产品批发价、零售价以及产品质量水平;另外当消费者对直销渠道接受程度适中时,制造商和零售商可实现帕累托改进。     

考虑渠道间比价行为的双渠道决策

在考虑渠道间比价行为下,构造了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的两阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,求得了制造商与零售商竞争时的最优策略和利润。研究结论表明:随着比价消费者比例的增加,网络渠道的销售价格与服务水平增加,传统零售渠道的销售价格下降,制造商的最优利润增加,零售商的最优利润减少,供应链整体利润呈递增的规律;当市场全覆盖时,零售商的最优决策是不提供服务。     

考虑渠道权力结构和产品双重差异的再制造闭环供应链最优定价决策

针对具有不同渠道权力结构和回收拆解产品质量差异、新产品与再制造产品价格差异的再制造闭环供应链,主要研究其成员企业最优定价决策问题。构建了包含制造/再制造商、零售商、消费者和回收拆解商的三级再制造闭环供应链决策模型;采用Stackelberg主从博弈确定不同渠道权力结构下各成员企业的最优定价策略及其利润,并重点探讨废旧产品回收率τ、产品替代系数δ两个关键参数对它们的影响;将该决策模型应用到汽车发电机再制造闭环供应链案例。研究结果表明：1） 对于3种渠道权力结构,当制造/再制造商和零售商为主导者时,其自身利润和再制造闭环供应链总利润均最大;而当回收拆解商为主导者时,其自身利润和总利润却最小;2） 随着τ和δ的提高,单位新产品与再制造产品的最优批发价、最优零售价均增加,单位废旧产品的最优回收价则降低;制造/再制造商和零售商的利润下降,回收拆解商的利润上升,导致再制造闭环供应链的总利润呈U形。研究能够为各成员企业的最优定价决策提供有效支持与参考。     

消费者退货的双渠道供应链产量决策研究

研究了考虑消费者退货的二级供应链产量决策的问题。分析提供退款保证以及决策顺序对均衡结果和开通直销渠道阈值的影响。研究发现:制造商提供退款保证与零售商提供退款保证相比,除批发价较高外,其他均衡结果都是一致的;在顺序决策的双渠道情形下,与单一渠道相比,制造商利润较高,当消费者对产品满意度满足一定范围时,零售商利润也较高;在同时决策的双渠道情形下,与单一渠道相比,只有当消费者对产品满意度满足一定范围时,制造商和零售商的利润才都较高;顺序决策和同时决策相比,不仅能降低开通直销渠道阈值,而且还能使制造商和零售商达到"双赢"。提供退款保证不仅能在不降低零售商利润的基础上降低开通直销渠道的阈值,当消费者对产品满意度满足一定范围时,还能提高制造商利润;提供退款保证虽然提高销售价,但是能够扩大市场需求提高消费者剩余。     

考虑搭便车和风险规避的零售商定价、渠道选择策略

针对一个风险规避型零售商和一个风险中性制造商组成的供应链,考虑消费者服务“搭便车”行为,构建单渠道和零售商双渠道下零售商主导的均值-方差模型。通过逆向求解,得到并对比供应链成员的最优决策。最后通过算例分析验证表明,零售商双渠道价格与零售商的风险态度和市场需求波动呈反比,制造商批发价格变化则相反;零售商风险规避程度在一定范围内时,集中决策下的期望效用比分散决策下的高;零售商在“搭便车”下开通网络渠道不一定总是有利的,且存在搭便车比例、促销努力系数和风险规避度的取值区间使得零售商开通网络渠道有利可图;相反,在最优区间之外时,则会对利润造成负增长,因此企业应合理地控制自身风险规避程度和成本系数才能更好地在双渠道模式下获得超额利润。     

考虑零售商公平关切的双渠道供应链合作广告决策分析

针对零售商公平中性和公平关切两种情形,分析了制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈下零售商公平关切对双渠道供应链合作广告决策的影响。研究结果表明:当制造商考虑零售商公平关切时,零售商广告投入水平与其公平关切程度正相关,且总是高于零售商公平中性下的广告投入水平;而制造商广告成本分担率随着零售商公平关切程度的增大先增大后减小。此外,对零售商公平关切程度以及广告投入水平对制造商网上直销渠道需求的影响比例对零售商、制造商和供应链系统利润的影响进行了数值仿真。     

三级竞争供应链的渠道选择研究

在供应链链间竞争的背景下,研究三级竞争供应链的纳什均衡结构。利用非线性规划、纳什博弈和Stackelberg博弈理论,分析了2条三级竞争供应链的渠道选择问题,求解了3种情景：全分布式结构;全一体化结构和混合结构（一条供应链为一体化,另一条为分布式）下的决策变量的最优解,并分别依据3种决策标准,即制造商利润最大化、渠道利润最大化和供应链系统利润最大化,分析了不同决策标准下供应链纳什均衡结构。研究表明,三级竞争供应链的纳什均衡结构,依赖于产品之间的替代系数及决策标准,并且当供应链链间的竞争强度较大时,无论何种决策准则下,全分布式结构均为供应链的纳什均衡结构。     

价格相依的闭环供应链渠道选择和协调策略

从社会环保意识、回收价格以及产品销量的角度构建了EOL(End-of-life)产品的供给函数,对分散决策时零售商销售渠道下的不同回收模式之闭环供应链进行了博弈分析,得到了闭环供应链成员的最优定价策略和最终利润,以及制造商渠道选择与回收成本的临界关系.设计了一个收入费用分享合同用以协调分散决策下的闭环供应链.     

考虑环保标签和利他偏好的绿色供应链决策研究

目的 考虑消费者对环保标签的信任度和绿色意识,探究利他偏好对制造商和零售商决策的影响。方法 构建由生产自贴环保标签型绿色产品制造商和零售商组成的Stackelberg博弈模型,分析制造商利他偏好的作用机制,然后采用数值分析方法对决策结果进行对比。结论 消费者对环保标签信任度的提升和制造商利他偏好的增强有助于提升绿色努力水平和绿色供应链总利润;当制造商利他偏好强度过大时,制造商的利润会随着消费者信任度的增加而减少,可能出现负值,引起供应链失衡;制造商利他偏好强度和消费者信任度越大,对制造商效用的提升效果越明显。     

考虑公平关切的双渠道绿色供应链决策分析

在双渠道绿色供应链中,考虑了零售商的公平关切行为,得到供应链各决策者博弈模型及最优决策。分析了零售商公平关切的程度、产品绿色化的效率及传统渠道市场的份额对各成员决策和利润的影响。结果表明:随着产品绿色化效率增大,双渠道产品需求量及各决策者利润都会增大;随着零售商公平关切程度的增大,各决策者的最优决策和利润在不同的产品绿色化效率系数下,有不同的变化趋势,但零售商利润占供应链整体利润的份额是不断增大的,实现了利润分配公平的目的;传统渠道的市场份额也会影响各成员决策和利润;最后给出直销渠道开设的条件。     

Pricing decisions for three-echelon supply chain with advertising and quality effort-dependent fuzzy demand

Simultaneous influence of market power structure, advertising and quality efforts on the optimal pricing decisions and performance of a multi-echelon supply chain under uncertainty have received scant attention in the literature. We focus on this gap by examining a serial decentralised three-echelon supply chain consisting of a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. The uncertainty associated with customer demand, marginal production costs and effort costs is expressed as linguistic or fuzzy variables. We analyse centralised supply chain to obtain all benchmark parameters. We investigate four decentralised supply chain cases through fuzzy game theoretic approach. We compare among three Stackelberg games with various supply chain leaderships and a vertical Nash. Our key findings are as follows. First, the manufacturer puts least quality effort while retailer puts least advertising effort when they act as Stackelberg leader in a three-echelon supply chain. Second, supplier's per unit price is governed by the channel leadership in three-echelon supply chain while retail prices are less affected by the leadership. We investigate the impact of fuzzy degree of quality and advertising sensitivity on optimal profit distribution among agents. We present numerical analysis to illustrate the importance of the derived theoretical results and discuss additional managerial insights.     

Impact of demand price elasticity on advantages of cooperative advertising in a two-tier supply chain

This paper focuses on pricing and vertical cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain. Using a Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as the game leader and the retailer acts as the game follower, we obtain closed-form equilibrium solution and explicitly show how pricing and advertising decisions are made. When market demand decreases exponentially with respect to the retail price and increases with respect to national and local advertising expenditures in an additive way, the manufacturer benefits from providing percentage reimbursement for the retailer’s local advertising expenditure when demand price elasticity is large enough. Whether the manufacturer benefits from cooperative advertising is also closely related to supply chain member’s relative advertising efficiency. In the decision for adopting coop advertising strategy, it is critical for the manufacturer to identify how market demand depends on national and local advertisements. The findings from this research can enhance our understanding of cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain with price-dependent demand.     

公平关切下制造商主导的闭环供应链定价策略

将公平关切行为引入到闭环供应链决策中,研究了制造商公平关切与零售商公平关切两种情形下的决策行为,比较分析了不同关切主体下公平偏好系数对供应链回收率、系统利润的影响。研究发现,制造商的公平偏好会提高系统的批发价与零售价,造成回收率及双方利润的降低;而零售商的公平偏好会导致批发价、零售价及供应链回收率的降低,但可以提高自身的利润;同时发现决策者不能一味地追求公平而导致供应链运作失常及社会福利的损失。     

多供应链间的Nash和Stackelberg博弈决策模型

以N条包含一个制造商和一个零售商的单链式供应链为研究对象,分别讨论了多供应链间Nash博弈和Stackelberg博弈问题,对N条供应链间博弈均衡解进行了分析和求解,证明了N条供应链博弈下均衡解的存在性和唯一性。在实例分析中,以两条供应链为例,比较了不同博弈框架下定价策略和系统利润的差异。结果表明,对于供应链1来说,链间Nash博弈时的零售商利润、制造商利润和供应链利润均大于链间Stackelberg博弈情形,也即无论从零售商、制造商还是整条供应链的角度,他们均乐于放弃作为领导者的先动优势;对于供应链2来说,情况则相反,也即无论从零售商、制造商还是整条供应链的角度,他们均乐于作为追随者发挥后动优势。     

Dual-channel supply chain pricing decisions with a risk-averse retailer

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain with one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer where there is only one perishable product with price-dependent stochastic demand. We choose Conditional Value-at-Risk criterion to measure the retailer’s risk-averse level, and assume that the manufacturer’s direct sales channel and the retailer’s traditional channel adopt a consistent pricing strategy. The model explores a Nash bargaining problem where the manufacturer and the retailer negotiate with each other on the wholesale price, the retail price and the order quantity when they have equal bargaining power. It is found that when demand uncertainty follows a uniform distribution, a Nash bargaining equilibrium exists and the retail price will decrease as the retailer becomes more risk averse. However, when the risk-averse indicator increases, the manufacturer’s profit on his direct channel will decrease, increase or first increase and then decrease, depending on the values of the related parameters. The profit shares of the manufacturer and the retailer under the Nash equilibrium model are related to the risk-averse indicator of the retailer. Furthermore, we perform three sets of numerical experiments to verify the effects of the retailer’s risk-averse indicator on decision-making and profit allocations under the different environmental parameters and gain several meaningful managerial insights.     

Pricing and remanufacturing decisions in two competing supply chains

This paper considers the pricing and remanufacturing decisions in a duopoly market with two competing supply chains, which compete at both manufacturer and retailer levels. There are one manufacturer and one retailer in each supply chain, one manufacturer produces the new product directly from raw material, while the other manufacturer has incorporated a remanufacturing process for used product into the original production system. Based on different industry organisation structures and the chain members’ competing forms, five game decision models are established to explore the chain members’ optimal strategies on price and/or remanufacturing, and the corresponding equilibrium solutions are obtained. Finally, we carry out the sensitivity analysis through numerical studies of some key parameters for examining their influences on the pricing decisions and chain members’ maximum profits. On the basis of comparison and analysis, some managerial insights are derived.     

Myopic vs. far-sighted behaviours in a revenue-sharing supply chain with reference quality effects

In this paper, we consider a dynamic supply chain where a manufacturer produces and distributes a featured product through an exclusive retailer to end consumers. The manufacturer decides the product quality and wholesale price, while the retailer sets the retail price in the presence of a revenue-sharing contract and consumers’ reference quality effects. The objective of this study is to investigate the impacts of myopic behaviour regarding the reference quality on the product quality and pricing strategies and profits of both members. Our results suggest that the manufacturer’s myopia leads to a higher quality, higher price strategy and a higher quality–price ratio which benefits consumers. Meanwhile, relative to the far-sighted behaviour, myopia results in a more quality-sensitive but less price-sensitive market demand. What’s more, we find that the manufacturer is apt to act in a far-sighted way, but the retailer isn’t always willing to cooperate with a far-sighted manufacturer. Taking myopic strategies for both members is likely to gain a high profit of the whole supply chain for a relatively high marginal contribution of product quality on demand and a relatively low revenue-sharing proportion.     

Impact of an emergency order opportunity on supply chain coordination

We consider a manufacturer-retailer supply chain in the pre-selling and selling seasons, whereby the manufacturer can offer the retailer an emergency order opportunity with a limited commitment quantity in addition to the regular order from the retailer before the selling season. Due to the short lead time for the emergency order, the manufacturer needs to prepare for it in the pre-selling season by producing more than the regular order or reserving its capacity for the responsive production. Through mathematically modelling and analyzing the supply chain, we found that, when the emergency order opportunity is provided, the manufacturer might be worse off, although the retailer is always better off. We derive the conditions whereby both the manufacturer and retailer can benefit from the emergency order, and the supply chain profit can be maximised. Further, we show that the supply chain can be coordinated by setting only the unit price and maximum commitment quantity for the emergency order. We also prove that Pareto improvement can be always achieved by setting the unit price for the regular order in addition to the unit price and maximum commitment quantity for the emergency order.     

基于风险规避的绿色供应链定价研究

为了解决风险规避型厂商在不同市场结构下的绿色供应链定价问题,首先以由一个风险规避的制造商和一个风险规避的零售商组成的二级绿色供应链为背景,考虑了消费者偏好、产品绿色度、厂商风险规避度等因素,构建厂商的期望效用函数,然后运用博弈论的方法建立了集中决策模型和三种分散决策模型。比较分析了这四种模型下的批发价格、产品绿色度和零售价格,并进一步分析了四种模型在制造商与零售商风险态度不同时的情况。最后通过MATLAB软件数值仿真研究了集中决策模型下的风险规避度对批发价格、产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响以及产品绿色度对供应链效用的影响。仿真结果表明：在一定市场条件下,制造商风险规避对批发价格的影响程度要大于零售商,而对于产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响程度是相同的且负向相关;同时,在固定制造商和零售商的风险规避度为0.5时,最优产品绿色度在3.3~3.4之间,最大产品绿色度为7.8。     

供应商纵向持股对竞争性制造商定价策略的影响

研究供应商对制造商进行持股时,不同的市场结构与持股比例对竞争性制造商定价策略的影响。根据制造商市场地位的差异,构建双寡头领导者、被持股制造商为领导者与未被持股制造商为领导者3种持股模型,运用博弈论中的逆向归纳法求解各模型均衡产量,零售价格及最优利润。研究发现：1)被持股制造商的最优零售价格在自身强势时最高,在竞争对手强势时次之,未被持股制造商的产品价格同时受到持股比例与市场结构的影响;2)持股比例较大时,被持股制造商具有“先动优势”,持股比例较小时,具有“后动优势”,而未被持股制造商的“后动优势”与持股比例无关;3)供应链整体利润随持股比例的增加先升高后降低,社会福利与持股比例呈正相关。