资金约束供应链预付款融资模式的比较优势分析

供应链下游企业以预付款方式为资金约束的上游企业提供生产性融资与传统的从外部金融机构（如银行）获得融资的方式相比具有其自身的优势,具有提升供应链的运作效率作用。在上游企业存在资金约束的供应链中,建立了供应链成员企业作为参与人的动态博弈模型。分别得到了银行融资模式和预付款模式下供应链成员企业的均衡策略,分析了预付款较银行融资模式的优势。结果表明,存在价格区间使得批发价格在在该区间内时,下游企业能够激励上游企业选择预付款模式并实现双方的帕累托改进,同时提高供应链整体的运作效率。     

考虑资金约束零售商公平关切的融资模式研究

以资金充足供应商和资金约束零售商组成的二级供应链为背景,考虑零售商公平关切心理,基于Nash讨价还价公平关切框架,分析了银行融资和交易信用融资2种方式,进而分析公平关切对供应链融资及运营决策的影响。研究表明：当批发价达到某个阈值时,零售商拒绝融资及交易,当批发价低于这个阈值时,零售商在一定条件下会选择交易信用融资,否则会选择银行融资。还比较了零售商公平中性与公平关切的选择行为：给定批发价,受公平关切影响,零售商决策趋于保守,2种融资方式下订货量都会减小。因此,供应商在2种融资模式下均会降低最优批发价以激励零售商增加订货量。可见零售商公平关切会影响供应链融资及运营决策,促使供应链利润分配更加公平。     

资金约束下基于零售商竞争的融资模式对比研究

以单供应商与多个零售商的供应链为研究背景,供应商是供应链上的核心企业,而零售商面临着资金约束,与供应商签订收益共享契约。供应商为中小企业提供两种融资方式：保兑仓融资和延迟支付融资。本文研究两种融资对供应链绩效以及供应链各方的影响,构建单供应商和多零售商的Stackelberg博弈模型,发现保兑仓融资模式能增加零售商的订货量,这两种融资模式在分散型供应链下,供应商都可以设置合适的收益分配系数和批发价格实现在集中型供应链下的协调,并能够保证供应商利润最大化。     

资金约束型汽车租赁供应链融资决策北大核心CSSCI

针对由单个处于领导地位的汽车制造商和单个作为跟随者的汽车租赁商组成的租赁供应链,分析了租赁商资金不足对租赁供应链的影响。在完全信息下,运用Stackelberg博弈理论分别对租赁供应链在两种融资模式下的博弈模型进行分析,给出了制造商与租赁商的最优决策。证明了租赁商选择内部融资可以增加汽车订购量,提高租赁收益。研究显示集中控制决策下制造商选择内部融资模式比外部融资模式更优。最后运用数值算例验证了研究结论。     

资金约束下的低碳供应链决策研究

以制造商占优的两级供应链为研究对象,分析资金约束下低碳供应链的决策问题。首先应用回购契约建立基本模型,得到资金约束下低碳供应链实现协调的条件,然后引入减排成本分担机制建立减排模型,讨论低碳供应链各方决策。研究表明,资金约束下,制造商可以通过调整回购契约,使零售商利润函数为供应链利润函数的仿射函数,实现供应链协调;制造商融资减排后可以修改回购契约以达到供应链协调,且供应链最优订货量大于减排之前;分析了零售商与制造商的各项决策参数。算例表明,当碳排放配额交易价格较高,制造商融资减排后的碳排放总量小于减排之前。     

供需随机和资金约束下新创企业的运营决策

考察由OEM供应商、新创企业和需求市场组成的供应链,其中新创企业通过自建产能或向OEM供应商采购来满足市场需求,研究受资金约束的新创企业以股东权益价值最大为目标时产能设置和订货数量的最优决策。研究表明,当债权融资金额无限制时,随着新创企业初始自有资金逐渐增加,新创企业的最优产能先是保持不变,然后逐渐增加,最后下降;当初始资金非常匮乏时完全采用外包策略以及在资金较充分时彻底抛弃外包都不是最佳选择。     

资金与碳排放双重约束下低碳供应链决策研究

在低碳供应链背景下,建立制造商存在资金和碳排放双重约束下的Stackelberg博弈定价模型。探究了无资金约束、提前支付和银行贷款3种情形下企业定价和制造商融资决策问题,并分析了相关因素对最优决策和利润的影响。研究表明,当银行利率小于提前支付折扣因子时,制造商始终选择提前支付融资模式;反之,制造商的融资模式选择会受到碳排放影响因子和碳价的影响。而消费者偏好绿色产品时,可以减少制造商的融资规模,但会造成制造商和零售商利润的减少。     

资金约束下的中小企业联合融资研究

针对零售商与制造商均为中小企业且都存在资金约束的两级供应链,引入批发价格契约建立联合融资基本模型,发现没有实现供应链协调,因此引入回购契约加以改进,并分析了参与各方的最优决策,确定了零售商与制造商的供应链参数,研究了银行的放贷风险与贷款利率,最后应用算例展示了供应链参数的确定过程及其对各方利润的影响.研究结果可以为资金约束下的中小企业联合融资决策各方提供支持.     

带有资金约束的零售商的替代性产品双渠道供应链运作策略

在对称信息框架下,基于博弈理论对带有资金约束的零售商的替代性产品双渠道供应链运作决策问题进行了研究。结果表明,双渠道间产品替代性的增加,会加剧渠道间冲突。零售商实体店服务水平提高到一定程度后,其不再有动机进一步提高服务水平。当零售商存在资金约束时,制造商通过提供延期支付合同可以有效协调双渠道供应链,但是,这种协调效应对制造商来说是有代价的,制造商利润会低于零售商资金充足情形下的利润。     

考虑3PL企业融资服务的双渠道制造商定价与融资决策

在由一个制造商、一个传统零售商和一个3PL企业组成的双渠道供应链中,制造商占主导地位且存在资金约束,传统零售商和3PL企业分别为传统渠道和直销渠道提供运输服务。构建Stackelberg博弈模型对比分析制造商无资金约束、向零售商融资和向3PL企业融资3种情形下双渠道供应链定价和内部融资决策问题。研究表明,当运输服务费用较高时,制造商始终选择向3PL企业融资;当运输服务费用较低时,若直销渠道市场份额也较低,则制造商倾向于向零售商融资;若直销渠道市场份额较高,则制造商倾向于向3PL企业融资。     

二部制契约下供应链内外部融资模式比较分析

主要对二级响应型供应链的内外部融资模式的对比分析。主要研究的是二级供应链由单一供应商和零售商组成和销售单一产品所面临的资金约束问题。运用数量柔性契约使供应链链条下游企业来考虑内外部融资方式并能够做出最优选择。研究得出,在二级供应链上,影响供应链企业融资的主要因素为供应商和零售商的综合信用。若供应商的信用较好,则采用的融资方式为内部融资,既有利于降低资金使用的成本又可以吸引零售商加大订购产品数量,从而达到供应链绩效整体最优。     

供应链相关契约仿真的预付账款融资模型

以博弈论为模型的预付账款融资研究,在时间延迟和动态变化等复杂情况下无法求出解析解,为探究复杂环境下的供应链中的融资参数和决策参数的变化。本文以预付账款融资模式为研究对象,利用系统动力学原理分别构建了该模式下供应链采取批发价格契约和收益共享契约时的动力学模型,通过仿真模拟分析了在采取该两种不同契约下的相关数据。研究发现采取批发价格契约下零售商有更充足的继续采购资金,可以更快地完成资金周转;但是在采取收益共享契约时,在系统周期末供应链总收益更高。     

基于供应链金融的银行决策分析

根据需求模型,建立了包含银行在内的供应链决策模型,研究分散决策模型下的收益问题,分别得到供应链各个参与者的期望收益,并通过数值仿真,得到银行在供应链中产生的影响。从供应链金融的角度出发,研究零售商订购量、制造商批发价格、银行利率的关系。并利用Stackelberg博弈的理论,以银行为主导者,制造商和零售商为跟随者,求出均衡最优解。研究发现当市场需求较小时,三者收益函数趋势一致;当市场需求较大时,银行利率对零售商订购量没有影响并且银行的收益最后逐渐平稳达到一个固定值。     

供应链中供应商-零售商之间的渠道协调机制的研究

研究了由一个供应商、N个零售商组成的供应链的渠道协调机制,建立了协调机制的基本模型,得到协调价格和联合最优订货数量,以此来提高供应链的整体效益;分析了影响供应链协调的主要因素和因供应商或整个供应链采取协调机制而新增收益的来源,对进一步分析供应链协调机制提供了依据。     

Financing Strategy of Low-Carbon Supply Chain with Capital Constraint under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Cap-and-trade regulation provides incentives for manufacturers to reduce carbon emissions, but manufacturers’ insufficient capital can disrupt the implementation of low-carbon emission reduction technologies. To alleviate capital constraints, manufacturers can adopt external financing for low-carbon emission reduction investments. This paper studies the independent financing and financing cooperation behavior in a supply chain in which the manufacturer and retailer first implement low-carbon emission reduction technologies and then organize production and sales in accordance with wholesale price contracts. Through comparing the optimal profits and low-carbon emission reduction levels under the independent financing and financing cooperation mode, we come to the following conclusions: (1) Although financing interest increases the cost of the supply chain, manufacturers prefer to invest in reducing carbon emissions rather than buying carbon quotas. (2) When financing independently, a decentralized decision-making mode (MD) is the best choice for manufacturers. (3) In cooperative financing, when the supply chain adopts a decentralized decision-making mode (SD) in which the retailer determines the financing cost-sharing ratio according to their optimal profit, the profits of the supply chain and its members are significantly improved. (4) When manufacturers and retailers adopt a centralized decision-making model (SC) in cooperative financing, they jointly determine the financing cost-sharing ratio and the level of low-carbon emission reduction. If the financing cost-sharing ratio meets a certain threshold range, the profits of manufacturers and retailers achieve Pareto improvement, indicating that this cooperative financing model is effective.     

Impact of an emergency order opportunity on supply chain coordination

We consider a manufacturer-retailer supply chain in the pre-selling and selling seasons, whereby the manufacturer can offer the retailer an emergency order opportunity with a limited commitment quantity in addition to the regular order from the retailer before the selling season. Due to the short lead time for the emergency order, the manufacturer needs to prepare for it in the pre-selling season by producing more than the regular order or reserving its capacity for the responsive production. Through mathematically modelling and analyzing the supply chain, we found that, when the emergency order opportunity is provided, the manufacturer might be worse off, although the retailer is always better off. We derive the conditions whereby both the manufacturer and retailer can benefit from the emergency order, and the supply chain profit can be maximised. Further, we show that the supply chain can be coordinated by setting only the unit price and maximum commitment quantity for the emergency order. We also prove that Pareto improvement can be always achieved by setting the unit price for the regular order in addition to the unit price and maximum commitment quantity for the emergency order.     

Quantity discount coordination for allocation of purchase orders in supply chains with multiple suppliers

Studies about supply chain coordination have emphasised maximising the profit of the overall supply chain, but the profit changes of individual members in the supply chain have often been overlooked. It has been shown that profit increment of the whole supply chain may not be beneficial for every individual member. Therefore, the use of quantity discounts to achieve the coordination of a supply chain is discussed in this article. A two-echelon selling system with a single buyer and multiple suppliers is considered to enhance profitability for both sides at the same time. An acceptable quantity discount condition for both the buyer and the suppliers to determine an appropriate order quantity allocation to produce more profits in the supply chain is proposed. Furthermore, the profit distribution between the buyer and each supplier is studied. Finally, the results of the numerical application show that the buyer should focus on managing the procurement costs to decrease the acquiring costs, and the suppliers should focus on the fixed costs of management to reduce the production costs in machine operations.