The association between emotional upset and cardiac arrhythmia during daily life.

Ventricular arrhythmia exhibits considerable within-subject variability that cannot be attributed to clinical status alone. This investigation examined the extent to which cardiac arrhythmia was associated with psychological and physical factors assessed during the hour preceding arrhythmic or nonarrhythmic activity. Approximately twice hourly, 46 patients randomly completed a diary assessing mood and physical symptoms during 24-hr electrocardiographic monitoring. Greater negative emotion was associated with increased arrhythmia. Additionally, greater negative emotion was significantly associated with increased arrhythmia among participants in a low left ventricular ejection fraction group (LVEF). However, this relationship between negative emotion and arrhythmia was not observed among higher LVEF participants. These findings contribute to a larger body of evidence suggesting that negative moods may exacerbate cardiac conditions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to DeSteno et al (2000).

Reports an error in "Beyond valence in the perception of likelihood: The role of emotion specificity" by David DeSteno, Richard E. Petty, Duane T. Wegener and Derek D. Rucker (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 2000[Mar], Vol 78[3], 397-416). In Figure 5 (p. 410), the graph in the upper panel, "Low NC Participants," was incorrect. The corrected figure in its entirety appears in this erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2000-07236-001.) Positive and negative moods have been shown to increase likelihood estimates of future events matching these states in valence (e.g., E. J. Johnson and A. Tversky, 1983). In the present article, 4 studies provide evidence that this congruency bias (1) is not limited to valence but functions in an emotion-specific manner, (2) derives from the informational value of emotions, and (3) is not the inevitable outcome of likelihood assessment under heightened emotion. Specifically, Study 1 demonstrates that sadness and anger, 2 distinct, negative emotions, differentially bias likelihood estimates of sad and angering events. Studies 2 and 3 replicate this finding in addition to supporting an emotion-as-information (cf. N. Schwarz and G. L. Clore, 1983), as opposed to a memory-based, mediating process for the bias. Finally, Study 4 shows that when the source of the emotion is salient, a reversal of the bias can occur given greater cognitive effort aimed at accuracy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Making Psychology a Household Word": Erratum.

Reports an error in "Making Psychology a Household Word" by Ronald F. Levant (American Psychologist, 2006[Jul-Aug], Vol 61[5], 383-395). This erratum clarifies the APA Council of Representatives response to the PENS Task Force Report at its August 2005 meeting. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2006-08928-002.) This article addresses Ronald F. Levant's four APA presidential initiatives for 2005. "Making Psychology a Household Word" was both the general theme for his presidency as well as an initiative in its own right. The other three initiatives were "Promoting Health Care for the Whole Person," "Enhancing Diversity Within APA," and "Developing an APA Position on Evidence-Based Practice in Psychology." (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Experienced emotion and affect recognition in adult attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder": Correction to Rapport et al. (2002).

Reports an error in "Experienced emotion and affect recognition in adult attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder" by Lisa J. Rapport, Sara L. Friedman, Angela Tzelepis and Amy Van Voorhis (Neuropsychology, 2002[Jan], Vol 16[1], 102-110). On Page 102, in the byline and in the author note, and on page 109 in the Rapport et al. (2001) reference, Sara Friedman's middle initial incorrectly reads "L." Her correct middle initial is "R." (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2002-00339-011.) Emotional competence and deficits that may disrupt interpersonal interactions were evaluated in 28 adults with attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and 28 demographically equivalent controls. Participants completed tasks assessing affect recognition and experienced emotional intensity. Adults with ADHD performed worse in affect recognition than did adults without the disorder; however, the impairment was unrelated to gross perceptual processes, fundamental abilities in facial recognition, or attentional aspects of affect perception. Moreover, intensity of experienced emotion moderated affect recognition: Among controls, experienced emotion facilitated affect recognition. Among adults with ADHD, who reported significantly greater intensity, experienced emotion was inversely related to affect recognition. Results are consistent with theories of ADHD as a deficit in behavioral inhibition; yet, results may merely reflect a constellation of deficits associated with the disorder. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Harlé et al. (2010).

Reports an error in "The impact of depression on social economic decision making" by Katia M. Harlé, John J. B. Allen and Alan G. Sanfey (Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 2010[May], Vol 119[2], 440-446). In the article, the last revision received date printed on the final page of the article was incorrect due to an error in the production process. The correct publication dates are as follows: Received April 14, 2009; Revision received November 6, 2009; Accepted November 9, 2009. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-08841-020.) Although the role of emotion in social economic decision making has been increasingly recognized, the impact of mood disorders, such as depression, on such decisions has been surprisingly neglected. To address this gap, 15 depressed and 23 nondepressed individuals completed a well-known economic task, in which they had to accept or reject monetary offers from other players. Although depressed individuals reported a more negative emotional reaction to unfair offers, they accepted significantly more of these offers than did controls. A positive relationship was observed in the depressed group, but not in controls, between acceptance rates of unfair offers and resting cardiac vagal control, a physiological index of emotion regulation capacity. The discrepancy between depressed individuals' increased emotional reactions to unfair offers and their decisions to accept more of these offers contrasts with recent findings that negative mood in nondepressed individuals can lead to lower acceptance rates. This suggests distinct biasing processes in depression, which may be related to higher reliance on regulating negative emotion. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"What is in a word? No versus Yes differentially engage the lateral orbitofrontal cortex": Correction.

Reports an error in "What is in a word? No versus Yes differentially engage the lateral orbitofrontal cortex" by Nelly Alia-Klein, Rita Z. Goldstein, Dardo Tomasi, Lei Zhang, Stephanie Fagin-Jones, Frank Telang, Gene-Jack Wang, Joanna S. Fowler and Nora D. Volkow (Emotion, 2007[Aug], Vol 7[3], 649-659). The supplemental materials link should appear as follows: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.7.3.649.supp. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2007-11660-018.) The words "No" and "Yes" are involved in conditioning to prohibit or encourage behavior, respectively. The authors, therefore, hypothesized that these words would be attributed to endogenous valence, activating neuronal circuits involved with valence and emotional control. Functional MRI (fMRI) at 4 Tesla was used to record regional brain activity while participants were exposed to emphatic vocalizations of the words. Results showed that No and Yes were associated with opposite brain-behavior responses; while No was negatively valenced, produced slower response times, and evoked a negative signal in the right lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), Yes was positively valenced, produced faster response times, and evoked a positive signal in a contiguous region of the OFC. Attribution of negative valence to No and trait anger control were associated with increased responsivity of the OFC to No. Inasmuch as sensitivity to the prohibitive command No develops during childhood through interaction with primary caregivers as the first social objects, our findings may implicate the lateral OFC in the neurobiology of emotion regulation and subsequent social development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Correction to Hobfoll et al. (2003).

Reports errors in the original article by S. E. Hobfoll et al (Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 2003[Mar], Vol 84[3], 632-643). On page 643, in the tables for Appendixes B and C, the variables labeled with "T3" should all read "T2." In Appendix C, the column headings "Nonlinear model" should read "Nonlinear model T1"; the column headings "Linear model" should read "Nonlinear model T2." These changes do not affect the findings, interpretations, or conclusions. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 2003-01588-018): The authors examined a dynamic conceptualization of stress by investigating how economic stress, measured in terms of material loss, alters women's personal and social resources and how these changed resources impact anger and depressive mood. Resource change in women's mastery and social support over 9 months was significantly associated with changes in depressive mood and anger among 714 inner city women. Greater loss of mastery and social support was associated with increased depressive mood and anger. Loss of mastery and social support also mediated the impact of material loss on depressive mood and anger. Resource loss and worsening economic circumstances had more negative impact than resource gain... (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Affect dynamics, affective forecasting, and aging": Correction to Nielsen, Knutson, and Carstensen (2008).

Reports an error in "Affect dynamics, affective forecasting, and aging" by Lisbeth Nielsen, Brian Knutson and Laura L. Carstensen (Emotion, 2008[Jun], Vol 8[3], 318-330). The first author of the article was listed as being affiliated with both the National Institute on Aging and the Department of Psychology, Stanford University. Dr. Nielsen would like to clarify that the research for this article was conducted while she was a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford University. The copyright notice should also have been listed as "In the Public Domain." (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2008-06717-002.) Affective forecasting, experienced affect, and recalled affect were compared in younger and older adults during a task in which participants worked to win and avoid losing small monetary sums. Dynamic changes in affect were measured along valence and arousal dimensions, with probes during both anticipatory and consummatory task phases. Older and younger adults displayed distinct patterns of affect dynamics. Younger adults reported increased negative arousal during loss anticipation and positive arousal during gain anticipation. In contrast, older adults reported increased positive arousal during gain anticipation but showed no increase in negative arousal on trials involving loss anticipation. Additionally, younger adults reported large increases in valence after avoiding an anticipated loss, but older adults did not. Younger, but not older, adults exhibited forecasting errors on the arousal dimension, underestimating increases in arousal during anticipation of gains and losses and overestimating increases in arousal in response to gain outcomes. Overall, the findings are consistent with a growing literature suggesting that older people experience less negative emotion than their younger counterparts and further suggest that they may better predict dynamic changes in affect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Marital interaction and depression": Correction to Schmaling and Jacobson.

Reports an error in "Marital interaction and depression" by Karen B. Schmaling and Neil S. Jacobson (Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1990[Aug], Vol 99[3], 229-236). In this article, the measures in Table 1 were incorrectly listed. The third and fourth measures ought to read "Wife DAS" and "Husband DAS," respectively. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 1991-01471-001.) In this article, patterns of marital interaction as a function of depression and marital satisfaction are examined. The purpose of the study was to separate dysfunctional marital interaction patterns that were unique to depression from those that were associated with marital distress. The presence or absence of a depressed wife was crossed with level of marital satisfaction (distressed or nondistressed) to produce four groups of subject couples. Couples in which the wife was depressed exhibited more depressive behavior than did nondepressed couples, but only during discussion of a high conflict (as opposed to neutral) topic. Sex?×?Depression Level?×?Marital Satisfaction interactions were found for aggressive behavior: Depressed women in nondistressed relationships exhibited behavior that was characteristic of maritally distressed couples (high rates of aggression). In contrast, the husbands of these women exhibited behavior that one would expect in happily married couples (low rates of aggression). We failed to replicate previous findings that depressive behavior served a coercive function, although distressed couples, regardless of depression status, exhibited all the usual signs of negative dysfunctional interaction. [An erratum for this article will appear in Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1990 (Nov), Vol 99(4). The measures in Table 1 were incorrectly listed in the original article.] (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"STOP Regain: Are There Negative Effects of Daily Weighing?": Correction to Wing et al (2007).

Reports an error in "STOP regain: Are there negative effects of daily weighing" by Rena R. Wing, Deborah F. Tate, Amy A. Gorin, Hollie A. Raynor, Joseph L. Fava and Jason Machan (Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 2007[Aug], Vol 75[4], 652-656). Coauthor Joseph L. Fava's affiliation was incorrect and should list Brown University Medical School/The Miriam Hospital. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2007-11558-014.) Several recent studies suggest that daily weighing is important for long-term weight control, but concerns have been raised about possible adverse psychological effects. The "STOP Regain" clinical trial provides a unique opportunity to examine this issue both cross-sectionally and prospectively. Successful weight losers (N = 314) were randomly assigned to a control or to a face-to-face or Internet intervention designed to help them maintain their weight loss and were then followed for 18 months. The intervention groups reported increases in daily self-weighing, which were associated with successful weight loss maintenance. We found no evidence that increases in frequency of weighing or daily weighing per se had any adverse effects in this study population. Rather, increases in self-weighing were associated with increases in dietary restraint (p     

"Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic": Clarification on Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002).

Reports a clarification to "Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic," by Daniel G. Goldstein and Gerd Gigerenzer (Psychological Review, 2002[Jan], Vol 109[1], 75-90). Due to circumstances that were beyond the control of the authors, the studies reported in the aforementioned article overlap with studies reported in "The Recognition Heuristic: How Ignorance Makes Us Smart," by the same authors (in Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart, 1999, G. Gigerenzer & P. M. Todd, Eds., pp. 37-59, Oxford University Press) and with studies reported in "Inference From Ignorance: The Recognition Heuristic" (D. G. Goldstein, 1998, in Proceedings of the 20th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, 407-411, Erlbaum). In addition, Figure 3 in the Psychological Review article (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) was originally published in the book chapter (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999) and should have carried a note saying that it was used by permission of Oxford University Press. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2002-00351-006.) One view of heuristics is that they are imperfect versions of optimal statistical procedures considered too complicated for ordinary minds to carry out. In contrast, the authors consider heuristics to be adaptive strategies that evolved in tandem with fundamental psychological mechanisms. The recognition heuristic, arguably the most frugal of all heuristics, makes inferences from patterns of missing knowledge. This heuristic exploits a fundamental adaptation of many organisms: the vast, sensitive, and reliable capacity for recognition. The authors specify the conditions under which the recognition heuristic is successful and when it leads to the counter-intuitive less-is-more effect in which less knowledge is better than more for making accurate inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Minding one's emotions: Mindfulness training alters the neural expression of sadness": Correction to Farb et al (2010).

Reports an error in "Minding one’s emotions: Mindfulness training alters the neural expression of sadness" by Norman A. S. Farb, Adam K. Anderson, Helen Mayberg, Jim Bean, Deborah McKeon and Zindel V. Segal (Emotion, 2010[Feb], Vol 10[1], 25-33). The DOI printed in the article was incorrect. The correct DOI is presented in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2010-01983-008.) Recovery from emotional challenge and increased tolerance of negative affect are both hallmarks of mental health. Mindfulness training (MT) has been shown to facilitate these outcomes, yet little is known about its mechanisms of action. The present study employed functional MRI (fMRI) to compare neural reactivity to sadness provocation in participants completing 8 weeks of MT and wait-listed controls. Sadness resulted in widespread recruitment of regions associated with self-referential processes along the cortical midline. Despite equivalent self-reported sadness, MT participants demonstrated a distinct neural response, with greater right-lateralized recruitment, including visceral and somatosensory areas associated with body sensation. The greater somatic recruitment observed in the MT group during evoked sadness was associated with decreased depression scores. Restoring balance between affective and sensory neural networks—supporting conceptual and body based representations of emotion—could be one path through which mindfulness reduces vulnerability to dysphoric reactivity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Race and genetics: Controversies in biomedical, behavioral, and forensic sciences": Correction to Ossorio and Duster (2005).

Reports an error in "Race and Genetics: Controversies in Biomedical, Behavioral, and Forensic Sciences" by Pilar Ossorio and Troy Duster (American Psychologist, 2005[Jan], Vol 60[1], 115-128). In this article, Table 1 contains several errors due to an editorial mistake. In the Population and Incarceration columns, the data for Blacks and Whites were transposed. In addition, decimal points were omitted from the data in the Rate (%) of Incarceration per Population columns. The correct version of Table 1 appears in the erratum. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2005-00117-011.) Among biomedical scientists, there is a great deal of controversy over the nature of race, the relevance of racial categories for research, and the proper methods of using racial variables. This article argues that researchers and scholars should avoid a binary-type argument, in which the question is whether to use race always or never. Researchers should instead focus on developing standards for when and how to use racial variables. The article then discusses 1 context, criminology, in which the use of racial variables in behavioral genetics research could be particularly problematic. If genetic studies of criminalized behavior use forensic DNA databanks or forensic genetic profiles, they will be confounded by the many racial biases of the law enforcement and penal system. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Learning myopia: An adaptive recency effect in category learning": Correction to Jones and Sieck (2003).

Reports an error in "Learning myopia: An adaptive recency effect in category learning" by Matt Jones and Winston R. Sieck (Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 2003[Jul], Vol 29[4], 626-640). On page 633, Table 2, the values in columns (T, P) and (P, T) in the dual condition row incorrectly read .10 and .90, respectively. The correct values are .90 and .10, respectively. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2003-06626-013.) Recency effects (REs) have been well established in memory and probability learning paradigms but have received little attention in category learning research. Extant categorization models predict REs to be unaffected by learning, whereas a functional interpretation of REs, suggested by results in other domains, predicts that people are able to learn sequential dependencies and incorporate this information into their responses. These contrasting predictions were tested in 2 experiments involving a classification task in which outcome sequences were autocorrelated. Experiment 1 showed that reliance on recent outcomes adapts to the structure of the task, in contrast to models' predictions. Experiment 2 provided constraints on how sequential information is learned and suggested possible extensions to current models to account for this learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Approach and avoidance coping responses among older problem and nonproblem drinkers": Clarification.

Reports a clarification in the article by R. H. Moos et al (Psychology and Aging, 1990[Mar], Vol 5[1], 31–40). The authors wish to note that research reported in the article by P. L. Brennan and R. H. Moos (see record 1991-10154-001) was based on the sample used in the research reported by Moos et al and that this information was inadvertently deleted in the Brennan and Moos article. (The following abstract of the article by Moos et al originally appeared in PA, Vol 77:14961.) The Coping Responses Inventory (CRI) was used to study coping among older problem and nonproblem drinkers. The CRI organizes coping efforts according to their focus (approach or avoidance) and method (cognitive or behavioral). Compared with nonproblem drinkers, older problem drinkers were more likely to use cognitive and behavioral avoidance responses to manage life stressors. Problem drinkers who experienced more negative life events and more severe stressors used both more approach and more avoidance coping. Those who had more financial and social resources relied more on approach and less on avoidance coping. Problem drinkers who relied more on avoidance coping tended to have more drinking problems and to report more depression and physical symptoms and less self-confidence. Positive reappraisal was associated with less depression and more self-confidence. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Erratum.

Reports and error in the original article by Constance T. Fischer's (American Psychologist, Jan [1973], Vol no. 28 [1], 90-91) "Psychology as a Human Science contra Humane Behaviorism", should read: "While its [humanistic psychology's] argument with behaviorism thus is not an opposition to being scientific, it is a stance against being scientific with humans (cf. Giorgi, 1970)." The printed version renders "scientistic" as "scientific," thus obfuscating a critical point. Scientism is the position that to be scientific a discipline must model itself after the physical sciences. The point was that, in contrast, psychology as a human science seeks to develop methods that are appropriate to man recognized as more than physical object. (The following abstract of this article originally appeard in record 1990-57039-001.) Challenges D. L. Avila's (1972) assertion that humanism refers only to the development and use of knowledge toward humane ends in his proposal to "kill" humanism and unite humaneness and behaviorism. Humanistic psychologists are described as being not merely humanitarians but as being committed toward dealing with humanness in its own right. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Mediators of the relation between maternal depressive symptoms and child internalizing and disruptive behavior disorders": Correction to McCarty, McMahon, et al. (2003).

Reports an error in "Mediators of the relation between maternal depressive symptoms and child internalizing and disruptive behavior disorders" by Carolyn A. McCarty and Robert J. McMahon (Journal of Family Psychology, 2003[Dec], Vol 17[4], 545-556). On page 551, in Table 2, two values are listed incorrectly. In row 17, Early Child Externalizing (K, Grade 2), the correlation coefficients in columns 4 and 5 should be transposed to read -.087 in column 4 (People in My Life Communication) and -.208 in column 5 (Inventory of Parent Experiences Community Support). (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2003-10052-012.) Drawing on a normative sample of 224 youth and their biological mothers, this study tested 4 family variables as potential mediators of the relationship between maternal depressive symptoms in early childhood and child psychological outcomes in preadolescence. The mediators examined included mother-child communication, the quality of the mother-child relationship, maternal social support, and stressful life events in the family. The most parsimonious structural equation model suggested that having a more problematic mother-child relationship mediated disruptive behavior-disordered outcomes for youths, whereas less maternal social support mediated the development of internalizing disorders. Gender and race were tested as moderators, but significant model differences did not emerge between boys and girls or between African American and Caucasian youths. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Evidence for universality and cultural variation of differential emotion response patterning": Correction.

Reports an error in the original article by K. R. Scherer and H. G. Wallbott (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1994[Feb], Vol 66[2], 310–328). On page 325, the 2nd and 3rd terms in the leftmost column of figure 2 should be interchanged. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 1994-29654-001.) Reviews the major controversy concerning psychobiological universality of differential emotion patterning vs cultural relativity of emotional experience. Data from a series of cross-cultural questionnaire studies in 37 countries on 5 continents are reported and used to evaluate the respective claims of the proponents in the debate. Results show highly significant main effects and strong effect sizes for the response differences across 7 major emotions (joy, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, shame, and guilt). Profiles of cross-culturally stable differences among the emotions with respect to subjective feeling, physiological symptoms, and expressive behavior are also reported. The empirical evidence is interpreted as supporting theories that postulate both a high degree of universality of differential emotion patterning and important cultural differences in emotion elicitation, regulation, symbolic representation, and social sharing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)