Manufacturer-retail platform interactions in the presence of a weak retailer

Motivated by the emergence of dominant retail platforms operating using a store-within-a-store strategy, we study the interaction of such a retailer's decision on the selling format and a manufacturer's decision on the channel selection. The dominant retailer may elect to operate as a traditional reseller or a retail platform where the manufacturer manages his own store and pays a slotting fee and a portion of the revenue to the platform. The manufacturer makes the channel selection decision between the dominant retailer and a weak reseller. A Stackelberg game with the dominant retailer being the leader is formulated, and five relevant channel options are presented. We solve sub-games and characterise the equilibrium solution of the full game. Numerical studies shed light on the roles of the slotting fee and the outcomes of some prevailing selling formats in business practice. In particular, it is shown that the demand substitution between the dominant retailer and the weak retailer is crucial in determining channel selection.     

Dual-channel supply chain pricing decisions with a risk-averse retailer

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain with one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer where there is only one perishable product with price-dependent stochastic demand. We choose Conditional Value-at-Risk criterion to measure the retailer’s risk-averse level, and assume that the manufacturer’s direct sales channel and the retailer’s traditional channel adopt a consistent pricing strategy. The model explores a Nash bargaining problem where the manufacturer and the retailer negotiate with each other on the wholesale price, the retail price and the order quantity when they have equal bargaining power. It is found that when demand uncertainty follows a uniform distribution, a Nash bargaining equilibrium exists and the retail price will decrease as the retailer becomes more risk averse. However, when the risk-averse indicator increases, the manufacturer’s profit on his direct channel will decrease, increase or first increase and then decrease, depending on the values of the related parameters. The profit shares of the manufacturer and the retailer under the Nash equilibrium model are related to the risk-averse indicator of the retailer. Furthermore, we perform three sets of numerical experiments to verify the effects of the retailer’s risk-averse indicator on decision-making and profit allocations under the different environmental parameters and gain several meaningful managerial insights.     

Myopic vs. far-sighted behaviours in a revenue-sharing supply chain with reference quality effects

In this paper, we consider a dynamic supply chain where a manufacturer produces and distributes a featured product through an exclusive retailer to end consumers. The manufacturer decides the product quality and wholesale price, while the retailer sets the retail price in the presence of a revenue-sharing contract and consumers’ reference quality effects. The objective of this study is to investigate the impacts of myopic behaviour regarding the reference quality on the product quality and pricing strategies and profits of both members. Our results suggest that the manufacturer’s myopia leads to a higher quality, higher price strategy and a higher quality–price ratio which benefits consumers. Meanwhile, relative to the far-sighted behaviour, myopia results in a more quality-sensitive but less price-sensitive market demand. What’s more, we find that the manufacturer is apt to act in a far-sighted way, but the retailer isn’t always willing to cooperate with a far-sighted manufacturer. Taking myopic strategies for both members is likely to gain a high profit of the whole supply chain for a relatively high marginal contribution of product quality on demand and a relatively low revenue-sharing proportion.     

Consumer search,transshipment, and bargaining power in a supply chain

We study a decentralised supply chain with one manufacturer and two symmetric retailers who could transship their excess inventory between each other. Without transshipment, the retailer’s unsatisfied customers search and buy the product at the other retailer with some probability. With transshipment, the retailer can transship the other retailer’s excess inventory to fulfil its own unmet demand. However, a transshipment price is often charged by one retailer for transshipping goods to another. We show the retailer’s profit is unimodal in the transshipment price, and the manufacturer’s profit increases in the customer search probability. Although the retailer’s preference over transshipment depends on the magnitude of search probability and transshipment price, the retailer may always prefer the transshipment no matter their magnitude. We then study the effect of bargaining power over the transshipment decision (whether to transship between retailers and at what transshipment price). Our analysis suggests that the manufacturer always prefers to control the transshipment price rather than to control whether to transship, while the retailer can prefer both. We also find that increasing bargaining power always benefits the manufacturer but could hurt the retailer. We finally check the robustness of our results by investigating the case with asymmetric retailers     

Impact of demand price elasticity on advantages of cooperative advertising in a two-tier supply chain

This paper focuses on pricing and vertical cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain. Using a Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as the game leader and the retailer acts as the game follower, we obtain closed-form equilibrium solution and explicitly show how pricing and advertising decisions are made. When market demand decreases exponentially with respect to the retail price and increases with respect to national and local advertising expenditures in an additive way, the manufacturer benefits from providing percentage reimbursement for the retailer’s local advertising expenditure when demand price elasticity is large enough. Whether the manufacturer benefits from cooperative advertising is also closely related to supply chain member’s relative advertising efficiency. In the decision for adopting coop advertising strategy, it is critical for the manufacturer to identify how market demand depends on national and local advertisements. The findings from this research can enhance our understanding of cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain with price-dependent demand.     

Pricing and effort decisions for a supply chain with uncertain information

This paper analyses the pricing and effort decisions of a supply chain with single manufacturer and single retailer. The manufacturer produces a kind of product and then wholesales the product to the retailer, who in turn retails it to customers over a single selling season. The retailer can influence demand through her sales effort. This research depicts the consumer demand, the manufacturing cost and the sales effort cost as uncertain variables. Considering the demand expansion effectiveness of sales effort, one centralised and three decentralised game models are built on the basis of the expected value criterion, and the equilibrium solutions are obtained. We investigate the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the pricing and effort decisions. The results indicate that the manufacturer benefits from improvement in demand and cost uncertainties when he has at least bargaining power in the supply chain. The results also imply that the uncertainty degree of sales effort elasticity has an outstanding influence on the pricing and effort decisions, whereas the uncertainty degree of price elasticity has a modest impact on these decisions. We also study the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the supply chain from the consumers’ perspective. The results suggest that with a power retailer, the retail price should always be on the high end. Consequently, consumers do not necessarily benefit from a power retailer. When the manufacturer and the retailer have equal bargaining power, consumers do not necessarily benefit from the supply chain, either.     

Optimal order quantity and product modularity for a two-echelon returnable supply chain

This study considers a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, customers and a returnable and modular product with uncertain demand, in which customers return the unsatisfactory products to the retailer, and the retailer returns the unsold products to the manufacturer. We investigate the effects of the manufacturer’s refund for the retailer’s unsold products and the product modularity under the decentralised and the centralised strategies. We confirm that the order quantity and customer’s return probability both affect the optimal modularity level of the product, and that the optimal modularity level is related to the refund policy. Also, a strategic alliance between the supply chain members is more advantageous to product innovation based on modularity for a returnable chain. Finally, managerial insights and remarks are offered.     

Should short warranty always be interpreted as low quality: the effect of brand advantages on warranty’s signalization

Brand and warranty information have been always been accepted as signals of unknown product quality. Given this, offering an attractive warranty is suggested as an effective competitive strategy. However, manufacturers with strong brand tend to provide the minimal industry standard warranty period in reality. This paper considers two competing manufacturers with different brand reputations selling their products through common retailer. The demand of products depends on price, brand and warranty period. A model for this problem is proposed when the manufacturers decide the warranty periods and the wholesale prices meanwhile the retailer decides the retail prices. We find that brand reputations influence all the optimal decisions of each party. We show that under certain condition, the strong brand manufacturer realises his profit maximisation by providing a shorter warranty compared to the weaker brand manufacturer. To a certain extent, this brand advantage modifies signalisation of manufacturers’ warranty. Several numerical examples and managerial insights are presented and used to illustrate the model presented in this paper.     

低碳需求约束下制造商技术创新决策的比较分析

为了分析消费者低碳需求约束的影响,在单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链系统中,通过在需求函数中引入减排技术创新水平参数,采用stackelberg博弈方法,构建了占主导地位的制造商实施减排技术创新是否有利可图的决策模型。分析了制造商不实施、单独实施以及与零售商联合实施技术创新3种情形对供应链成员定价与利润的影响。研究表明,制造商的减排技术创新决策不仅会受到消费者低碳需求的约束,而且也会受到零售商销售成本的制约,当满足一定条件时,制造商单独实施创新可以使制造商与零售商的价格与利润都高于不实施创新情形,而制造商与零售商联合创新却不一定是最优选择,零售商销售成本在一定程度上会制约制造商与零售商联合创新的效果。     

Ordering and sales effort investment for temperature-sensitive products considering retailer’s disappointment aversion and elation seeking

We investigate a retailer’s optimal policy of ordering and sales effort investment for temperature-sensitive products in a stylised newsvendor setting considering the effects of the retailer’s disappointment aversion and elation seeking. We provide a function to describe the demand for temperature-sensitive products and a psychological utility function to capture the retailer’s perceived utility of disappointment aversion and elation seeking. Next, we construct four joint ordering and sales effort decision models by integrating the profit and psychological utility for high temperature-sensitive products, medium temperature-sensitive products, low temperature-sensitive products and high–low temperature-sensitive products, respectively. By solving the constructed models, we determine the optimal policy of order quantity and sales effort level. We find that the average temperature in the selling season, the temperature sensitivity parameter, disappointment aversion degree and elation seeking degree can affect the retailer’s optimal policy, and the trends and extents of the effects for each temperature-sensitive product may be different from those for the other temperature-sensitive products. Our models also suggest that the optimal policy for temperature-sensitive products is more conservative than the one for general non-temperature-sensitive products. The policy of a retailer who is primarily concerned with disappointment aversion is more conservative than the one of a disappointment-neutral retailer. The policy of a retailer who mainly focuses on elation seeking is more radical than the one of an elation-neutral retailer. Our results show that a retailer must consider the effects of temperature and psychological behaviour on policy and should make decisions regarding order quantity and sales effort level according to the temperature sensitivity type of selling products and degrees of disappointment aversion and elation seeking.     

考虑渠道成本差异的双渠道供应链定价策略与渠道选择

根据网上渠道不同销售模式的特征,构建制造商网上直销、网上分销和网上代销3种供应链定价模型,引入渠道成本参数并分析制造商如何进行产品定价和渠道选择。研究表明,在3种渠道结构中,代销模式下产品价格最低,直销模式和分销模式下的价格受到渠道偏好的影响;随着线上或线下渠道成本增加,制造商会降低该渠道产品的批发价格,而零售价格与自身渠道成本正相关;此外,当制造商自建网上平台成本较低时,制造商选择直销模式最优;当制造商自建网上平台成本较高,且代销平台服务效率较低时,制造商应选择分销模式,否则制造商选择代销模式更优。     

Influence of logistic service level on multichannel decision of a two-echelon supply chain

This paper investigates the channel structure and pricing problem of a two-echelon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer. There are four common channel structures: (1) traditional retail channel, (2) the retailer’s traditional and online channel, (3) traditional retail channel and the manufacturer’s online channel, (4) traditional retail channel and online channel of a manufacturer and a retailer. Four Models (Model R, Model RD, Model MR, and Model MRD) are established and analysed based on four channel structures. Considering the influence of logistic services on consumers’ channel choice, this paper uses Stackelberg game and consumer utility function to analyse the profit of the manufacturer, the retailer and the whole supply chain, and obtains the optimal channel strategy of the manufacturer and the retailer in the four models. In addition, our study also finds that First, the manufacturer’s online channel opening can indirectly stimulate consumers to buy products in the traditional retail channel, which increases the demand for traditional retail channel. Second, the manufacturer’s online channel is more conducive to improving the profit of the whole supply chain than the retailer’s online channel under the dual channel structure. Third, multiple channels consisting of traditional retail channel and online channel of the manufacturer and the retailer can provide consumers with the lowest retail price, which is most beneficial to the retailer.     

Pricing and ordering decisions in a supply chain with imperfect quality items and inspection under buyback of defective items

In this article, the economic production and inventory model in a three-layer supply chain including one distributor, one manufacturer and one retailer for a single-product and general demand functions under three scenarios is developed. We assume that during the production process, both healthy and defective items are generated. As the first scenario, we develop the first model, in which the defective items are not reworked and all considered as scrape, while in the second model, we assume that the defective items are reworked and are sold as perfect item. In the second scenario, we assume that defective item can be sold with lower price than the selling price. Moreover, raw materials with imperfect quality are sent back from a distributor to outside supplier under a lower price. Determining the order quantity of the distributor and the selling prices of the distributor and the manufacturer as well as the retailer was the goal of this article such that the total profit of each member is maximised. In order to solve the models, the Stackelberg approach is employed between the members, and the concavity of the profit functions is proved using several theorems. Then, closed form solutions are derived for the decision variables and a solution algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal solutions. Finally, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the applicability of the model.     

A manufacturer’s production and pricing strategies with a salvage channel

We study a manufacturer’s production quantity and pricing decisions when the manufacturer has an opportunity to sell surplus inventory through a salvage channel. Before sales begin, the manufacturer determines the production quantity without knowing customer demand. After demand is realised, the manufacturer first satisfies the demand through primary channel while charging a fixed price or adjusting price to maximise profit. At the end of the selling season, the manufacturer resells surplus inventory through the salvage channel, which can be either integrated with or independent of the manufacturer. The manufacturer’s optimal production quantity and expected profit are investigated under different salvage channel structures. We show that the salvage channel improves the manufacturer’s profitability as well as the availability of the product to potential customers through both primary and salvage channels.     

基于风险规避的绿色供应链定价研究

为了解决风险规避型厂商在不同市场结构下的绿色供应链定价问题,首先以由一个风险规避的制造商和一个风险规避的零售商组成的二级绿色供应链为背景,考虑了消费者偏好、产品绿色度、厂商风险规避度等因素,构建厂商的期望效用函数,然后运用博弈论的方法建立了集中决策模型和三种分散决策模型。比较分析了这四种模型下的批发价格、产品绿色度和零售价格,并进一步分析了四种模型在制造商与零售商风险态度不同时的情况。最后通过MATLAB软件数值仿真研究了集中决策模型下的风险规避度对批发价格、产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响以及产品绿色度对供应链效用的影响。仿真结果表明：在一定市场条件下,制造商风险规避对批发价格的影响程度要大于零售商,而对于产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响程度是相同的且负向相关;同时,在固定制造商和零售商的风险规避度为0.5时,最优产品绿色度在3.3~3.4之间,最大产品绿色度为7.8。     

基于消费者接受程度的双渠道产品价格和质量决策研究

在消费者对直销渠道和零售渠道接受程度有差异的情形下,研究了产品质量为内生的双渠道供应链中价格和质量联合决策问题。分别构建传统单一零售渠道模型、双渠道分散决策模型和双渠道集中决策模型。比较制造商和零售商在3种模型下的定价均衡决策、产品质量水平和利润,分析零售商和制造商的渠道策略和最优定价。结果表明：与传统单一零售渠道情形相比,在集中决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道不改变零售价格,但是能够提高产品质量水平和供应链整体利润;在分散决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道将降低产品批发价、零售价以及产品质量水平;另外当消费者对直销渠道接受程度适中时,制造商和零售商可实现帕累托改进。     

具有延保服务的闭环供应链回收渠道选择

针对具有延保服务的闭环供应链（CLSC）回收渠道选择问题，构建了3种回收渠道（制造商回收、零售商回收、第三方回收）和2种延保服务提供者（制造商、零售商）组合而成的6种分散决策CLSC模型，基于博弈论方法研究了每种情形下的最优回收渠道选择及其对CLSC决策的影响。结果表明，无论是制造商还是零售商提供延保，零售商都是产品回收最有效的承担者，此时制造商、零售商和整个CLSC都可以获得最大的利润，且产品回收率也最高。     

新鲜度差异下两种可替代生鲜品的多阶段定价策略研究

研究单个零售商销售2种可替代生鲜产品时的价格决策,建立3种定价策略下的决策模型,得到2种产品的最优固定价格、最优折扣价格和最优捆绑价格售价;通过数值仿真分析影响零售商价格决策的因素及其影响大小。研究结果表明,3种策略下产品价格都与产品新鲜度临界值同方向变化;最优固定价格随销售期临近度的增大而变高;对比3种策略下零售商的利润发现,有时捆绑价格是占优策略,有时折扣价格是占优策略,参数的大小是关键因素。     

考虑信息披露的双渠道供应链两周期定价策略

在一个含有线上直销渠道的双渠道供应链中,考察当消费者注重产品体验时,信息不披露和信息披露两种模式下制造商、零售商两周期的定价策略。研究发现:消费者对产品体验为高的概率和信息披露对提升制造商和零售商的议价能力都存在正向的作用;信息披露使实体店第二期的需求对前期需求更加敏感,而对第二期价格及成本的敏感性下降;不论信息是否披露,第一期实体店定价总高于网店定价,但当消费者体验产品为高的概率足够大时,网店在第二期可以采用高于实体店的定价策略,且信息披露可以使网店在第二期有更多的可能制定高于实体店的定价;信息披露使得制造商在两期内都可以获得更高的收益,而零售商的收益变化与披露成本有关,且零售商在第一期受益的可能性更高。     

制造商主导下供应链企业产品定制权限博弈模型及分析

为更好地探究制造商与零售商之间关于产品定制权限的分配问题,提出一种制造商主导下的供应链企业产品定制权限分配的博弈模型。该模型基于Kano需求分析理论将产品定制模块按照消费者需求类型分为3类,并通过组合这3类定制模块得到4种产品定制方案。通过采用制造商主导下的Stackelberg博弈模型构建制造商和零售商之间的产品定制权限分配模型,对定制权限同质化和差异化两种情况下制造商和零售商的决策进行分析,并运用算例对该模型进行应用和求解,得出制造商主导下的制造商和零售商关于定制权限分配问题的最优解。结果表明,只有当制造商和零售商的产品定制范围呈现完全差异化特征时,制造商和零售商才取得关于产品定制权限的均衡解,实现供应链利润的最大化。