Newsvendor model for a dyadic supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns

The paper investigates newsvendor problem for a dyadic supply chain in which both the supplier and the retailer have the preference of status-seeking with fairness concerns. Nash bargaining solution is introduced as the fairness reference point and equilibrium results are derived. The effects of fairness-concerned status-seeking behaviors on optimal decisions as well as channel efficiency are further analyzed. It is shown that the channel efficiency will decrease because of such behavioral preference. The retailer’s share will be larger when the supplier concerns fairness less, and the supplier’s sensitivity to fairness plays a relatively more important role for the channel efficiency. Additionally, another interesting managerial insight is concluded that fairness concerns will not change the status of channel coordination in certain conditions. More specifically, those contracts able (unable) to coordinate fairness-neutral supply chain, based on affine transformations with scale factors within certain ranges, still succeed (fail) to coordinate the fairness-concerned. Furthermore, several insights on bargaining powers are given as well.     

Study on the decision-making and coordination of an e-commerce supply chain with manufacturer fairness concerns

The decision-making and coordination of an e-commerce supply chain (ECSC) with manufacturer fairness concerns by incorporating the e-commerce platform into the decision-making process is studied in this paper. An ECSC composed of a single manufacturer and a single e-commerce platform is developed, and the optimal decisions for three scenarios are investigated, namely, a decentralised decision-making model without consideration of fairness concerns, a decentralised decision-making model considering manufacturer fairness concerns, and a centralised decision-making model. Then, a comparative analysis of the optimal decisions of the different models is conducted. On this basis, a coordination mechanism for the decentralised decision-making models is further proposed, and finally, a numerical analysis is employed to verify the conclusions. The research shows that the e-commerce platform, although it is the dominant party, obtains less profit than the manufacturer due to the unique operation characteristics of the ECSC. The sales price, service level, and profit of the ECSC are maximised in the centralised decision-making model, and they are not affected by the commission rate. The sales price, service level and profit of the decentralised decision-making model that considers manufacturer fairness concerns are inferior to those for the model that considers fairness concerns, indicating that manufacturer fairness concerns reduce system efficiency. In addition, a ‘cost sharing joint commission’ contract can be used to coordinate an ECSC.     

Pricing decisions in closed-loop supply chains with marketing effort and fairness concerns

We investigate closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) under four reverse channel structures where a central planner, a manufacturer (M), a retailer (R) or a third party (T), respectively, serves as the collector of used product and demand depends on R’s marketing effort. We derive supply chain profitability under both the centralised and decentralised CLSCs and furnish the optimal marketing effort, collection rate and pricing decisions for the supply chain members. We then extend the base models along two directions: the first extension incorporates R’s distributional fairness concerns into the M collection model and the second extension considers potential recycle cost advantages by R and T compared to the M collection model.     

Optimal pricing strategy for the perishable food supply chain

This research investigates the optimal pricing strategy for the perishable food supply chain. Using the setting of a two-echelon supply chain including a supplier and a retailer, we apply the game theory approach to derive the equilibriums for both a single pricing strategy and a two-stage pricing strategy. Through a comparison of the equilibriums, we explore how the two pricing strategies affect the supply chain’s decisions and supplier’s and retailer’s performance individually and collectively. The results of the analysis show that the optimal choice of pricing strategy depends on the price markdown cost and its relationship with the two critical thresholds that are determined by a combination of factors including the potential market size, the price and quality sensitivity factors, the initial quality, the unit product cost, and the quality deterioration rate.     

Responding to supplier temporary price discounts in a supply chain through ordering and pricing decisions

This paper considers a one-retailer and one-supplier supply chain and addresses the question of how a retailer should use its ordering and pricing decisions to respond to its supplier’s temporary price discounts. The paper considers a hybrid environment – somewhere between deterministic and stochastic modelling approaches – that is, the retailer does not know when the next promotion from its supplier will occur but, once the promotion is announced, all its details are deterministic and often there is some time remaining before the promotion actually starts. We include in the objective function penalties on deviations from the original plan and explore the properties of the retailer’s ordering and pricing decisions under fixed and flexible set-up scenarios. We show that, when the set-up epochs are fixed, the retailer’s order quantities are monotonic and non-decreasing in situations where retail prices can be either fixed or flexible. When the set-up epochs are flexible, the ordering cycle is identical. Finally, we use some numerical examples to illustrate the proposed approach.     

Supplier credit guarantee loan in supply chain with financial constraint and bargaining

This paper adopts a multiunit bilateral bargaining framework on financial decision. In a two-echelon supply chain, the supplier sells products through a financial constraint retailer. If needed, the retailer gets a short-term financing from a bank by supplier credit guarantee loan (CGL). Through applying the Nash bargaining framework, we formulate two-level game models, i.e. Retailer-Supply System negotiation and Supplier-Bank negotiation. In this paper, we study and discuss the equilibrium order quantity which is affected by initial working capital and interest rate, the retailer-supply system negotiation and upstream wholesale price effects for supply chain performance, the supplier-bank negotiation and interest rate decisions with different capital markets. The results show: (i) there exists loan size limit for financial constraint retailer under CGL. (ii) The upstream wholesale price increase will weaken retailer’s bargaining position, and the supply system may gain or lose depending on the bargaining power. (iii) There exists unique equilibrium sharing ratio in supply system, which means CGL can achieve risk sharing. (iv) Within a supply system, the upstream wholesale price advantage will weaken bank’s profit, whereas supplier may gain or lose depending on his bargaining power.     

Pricing and ordering decisions in a supply chain with imperfect quality items and inspection under buyback of defective items

In this article, the economic production and inventory model in a three-layer supply chain including one distributor, one manufacturer and one retailer for a single-product and general demand functions under three scenarios is developed. We assume that during the production process, both healthy and defective items are generated. As the first scenario, we develop the first model, in which the defective items are not reworked and all considered as scrape, while in the second model, we assume that the defective items are reworked and are sold as perfect item. In the second scenario, we assume that defective item can be sold with lower price than the selling price. Moreover, raw materials with imperfect quality are sent back from a distributor to outside supplier under a lower price. Determining the order quantity of the distributor and the selling prices of the distributor and the manufacturer as well as the retailer was the goal of this article such that the total profit of each member is maximised. In order to solve the models, the Stackelberg approach is employed between the members, and the concavity of the profit functions is proved using several theorems. Then, closed form solutions are derived for the decision variables and a solution algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal solutions. Finally, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the applicability of the model.     

Service capability procurement decision in logistics service supply chain: a research under demand updating and quality guarantee

Though existing researches have already studied on service quality guarantee and demand updating in a supply chain respectively, there is little attention paid to integrated research on service quality guarantee problem with demand updating. This paper aims to investigate the impacts of demand uncertainty revelation and quality guarantee change cost (GCC) on the optimal decisions of logistics service integrator (LSI) and functional logistics service provider (FLSP) in a logistics service supply chain. At the beginning of the first period, the FLSP first guarantees an initial quality level and the LSI procures service capacity from the FLSP based on the demand prediction. Then the demand information is updated after the first-period demand being satisfied, and the LSI and the FLSP make their optimal decisions based on the renewed demand in the next period. Before the second period, uncertainty complete revelation/uncertainty incomplete revelation (UCR/UIR) and GCC/no guarantee change cost (NGCC) may take place, which will affect the decisions the LSI and the FLSP make. Consequently, four situations are considered: (1) UCR and GCC; (2) UIR and GCC; (3) UCR and NGCC; and (4) UIR and NGCC. In each situation, we derive the optimal decisions of the FLSP and the LSI, and a comparison between the first- and second-period decisions in each situation is conducted. Several managerial insights are concluded, and the most important one is that the LSI is supposed to reduce the procurement quantity and the FLSP is supposed to promise a higher quality defect rate in the case of UIR and NGCC. Furthermore, in case of UIR and GCC, we specify a critical condition in which the LSI and the FLSP insist on the initial decisions of the first period. At last, we conducted numerical analysis and gave a practical example of China Yuantong Express Company to support our conclusions.     

Coordinating a three-layer supply chain with uncertain demand and random yield

The paper considers a three-layer supply chain involving one raw-material supplier, one manufacturer and one retailer. The market demand is assumed to be stochastic and productions at the raw-material supplier and manufacturer are subject to random yield. The centralised model is studied as the benchmark case. The decentralised model is solved and Nash equilibrium solutions are obtained. It is shown that buyback contract fails to coordinate such a supply chain. However, a composite contract framed combining buyback, and sales rebate and penalty contracts is shown to coordinate the supply chain. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the developed models.     

Enhanced joint pricing and lotsizing problem in a two-echelon supply chain with logit demand function

In retail supply chains, ordering and pricing policies for the retailer and shipment plan for the supplier are the most important decisions. These policies are often conducted either individually or sequentially with poor overall performance for the whole supply chain resulting to extra inventory and other deficiencies. In this paper, an integrated marketing-inventory model in a two-echelon supply chain model is developed involving discount promotion, customer behaviour more realistically and operations aspects to determine optimal ordering, shipping and pricing quantities simultaneously. An efficient analytical solution procedure and a Particle Swarm Optimisation solution algorithm are also developed. Finally, a number of numerical tests are conducted to approve the interesting theoretical results of the analytical approach.     

Pricing decisions for a supply chain with refurbished products

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer where a fixed portion of new products sold will be returned to the retailer and then be repaired and resold as refurbished products at a lower price. Using the utility model, we formulate how consumers will make their choices when facing both new and refurbished products. Then, using the divide-and-conquer method, we derive the supplier and retailer's equilibrium decisions, including the supplier's wholesale price and the retailer's prices for both the new and refurbished products. The main findings include the following. First, refurbished products will be sold in the market only when the refurbishing cost is small. In this situation, as the refurbishing cost increases, most of the negative impact on the retailer will be transferred to the supplier. Second, in the same condition, as the refurbishing cost increases, the wholesale price and retail price of the new product will change in opposite directions. This result contrasts with the traditional pass-through effect. Third, when the repair cost is moderate, the retailer will eventually not sell refurbished products, but its profit can be significantly improved and the double marginalisation effect can be mitigated.     

Optimal reservation pricing strategy for a fashion supply chain with forecast update and asymmetric cost information

We address the reservation pricing problem for a two-echelon fashion supply chain in which the downstream manufacturer with private information on its operations cost (low or high type) reserves the capacity for a critical component from the upstream supplier before placing the final order. We consider the case when the demand forecast is partially updated. We find that a novel menu of reservation contracts containing the unit reservation fee with reservation quantity and final order could induce the manufacturer to reveal its operations cost information truthfully. We also show that the supplier should require less capacity reservation and charge a lower unit reservation fee if it has asymmetric information about the manufacturer’s operations cost. Finally, we analyse the effects of forecast update, and our results indicate that: (i) the supplier benefits from forecast update because the optimal reservation pricing strategy is designed to reveal the true information and meanwhile induce a higher capacity reservation; and (ii) a greater amount of forecast update decreases the supply chain deficit and increases the supplier’s agency cost.     

Pricing and effort decisions for a supply chain with uncertain information

This paper analyses the pricing and effort decisions of a supply chain with single manufacturer and single retailer. The manufacturer produces a kind of product and then wholesales the product to the retailer, who in turn retails it to customers over a single selling season. The retailer can influence demand through her sales effort. This research depicts the consumer demand, the manufacturing cost and the sales effort cost as uncertain variables. Considering the demand expansion effectiveness of sales effort, one centralised and three decentralised game models are built on the basis of the expected value criterion, and the equilibrium solutions are obtained. We investigate the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the pricing and effort decisions. The results indicate that the manufacturer benefits from improvement in demand and cost uncertainties when he has at least bargaining power in the supply chain. The results also imply that the uncertainty degree of sales effort elasticity has an outstanding influence on the pricing and effort decisions, whereas the uncertainty degree of price elasticity has a modest impact on these decisions. We also study the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the supply chain from the consumers’ perspective. The results suggest that with a power retailer, the retail price should always be on the high end. Consequently, consumers do not necessarily benefit from a power retailer. When the manufacturer and the retailer have equal bargaining power, consumers do not necessarily benefit from the supply chain, either.     

Optimisation of online retailer pricing and carrier capacity expansion during low-price promotions with coordination of a decentralised supply chain

In recent years, many online retailers in China set low prices on 11 November, which stimulates huge delivery demand and results in many problems although carriers make an effort to increase their delivery capacities temporarily. To circumvent this difficulty, we consider a supply chain consisting of an online retailer, who can set price to influence the demand, and a capacitated carrier, whose capacity can be expanded at a high cost. We derive the optimal decisions in the centralised and decentralised decision systems, and compare the performances of the two systems. We find that the optimal decisions, and which system has lower price, larger capacity increment, and more late delivered goods depends on the model parameters (the market scale, the late delivery costs, the capacity expansion cost, the delivery fee, and the demand uncertainty). Specially, we show that, contrary to the traditional channel, the online retailer in the decentralised system may set lower price and the carrier has less incentive to expand capacity in the decentralised system in some situations, which underlines the need for coordination. In addition, we propose coordination contracts to improve the overall performance of the supply chain under deterministic and random demands.     

Using game theory for analysing pricing models in closed-loop supply chain from short- and long-term perspectives

Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management is an environmental approach to supply chain management that aims to prevent hazardous material from entering the nature by means of creating a reverse flow. This paper studies the short- and long-term behaviour of agents in implementing the appropriate collecting strategy in a two-echelon CLSC. In short-term, based on the Stackelberg game, several novel pricing models for different collecting strategies are proposed and compared. Then, the optimal policies of the pricing decisions are determined for each model. The long-term behaviour of companies in implementing collecting process is examined by evolutionary game theory and the most stable strategy is selected. Furthermore, a numerical example is presented to compare the different collecting structures. Finally, a managerial insight is provided to indicate the effect of key parameters such as remanufacturing rate, marketing elasticity and government subsidies on selecting the appropriate strategy.     

A strategic decision framework for a value added supply chain

Supply chains are becoming increasingly complex. The structure of the supply chain and the suppliers who participate in it are critical decisions for managers. The supply chain is no longer simply a source of inputs or services but an integral source of value added. It is clear that in some cases strategic supply chain objectives may require trade-offs, for example, between cost and innovation capability or between managing risk and maximising flexibility. These decisions balancing trade-offs between desirable partner characteristics are critical and can make a significant contribution to business performance. A framework is outlined, based on the foundation of extant literature, within which firms can make strategic decisions on supply chain structure by categorising the characteristics they prioritise in their supply chain strategy. There is also a strong foundation in the literature on developing mathematical models that provide insight into the decision-making process. A mixed integer programming model is specified that incorporates the opportunity for diversification and provides a demand allocation decision. The model is robust enough to allow for single or diversified supplier strategies based not only on capacity constraints but also on risk pooling and minimum performance requirements for key characteristics that form the basis of the strategy. A Lagrangian relaxation is proposed and satisfactory performance results are provided.     

A strategic model for exact supply chain network design and its application to a global manufacturer

This paper presents a comprehensive model that captures significant strategic decisions involved in designing or redesigning high-performance supply chains from the perspective of the manufacturer. The problem considers deterministic demand by multiple clients, for multiple products, over the periods of a long-term horizon. The design decisions involve selection of suppliers, establishment or resizing of production facilities and distribution centres, possible subcontracting of related activities, and selection of transportation modes and routes. The problem is formulated by a Mixed Integer Linear Programming model. Its objective is to minimise the overall costs associated with procurement, production, inventory, warehousing, and transportation over the design horizon. Appropriate constraints model the complex relationships among the links of the supply chain. The proposed model has been applied to a large case study of a global manufacturing firm, providing valuable insights into the transformation of the firm’s current supply chain network, as well as into the potential of the proposed approach.     

A simulation-optimisation approach for supply chain network design under supply and demand uncertainties

We investigate a three-echelon stochastic supply chain network design problem. The problem requires selecting suppliers, determining warehouses locations and sizing, as well as the material flows. The objective is to minimise the total expected cost. An important feature of the investigated problem is that both the supply and the demand are uncertain. We solve this problem using a simulation-optimisation approach that is based on a novel hedging strategy that aims at capturing the randomness of the uncertain parameters. To determine the optimal hedging parameters, the search process is guided by particle swarm optimisation procedure. We present the results of extensive computational experiments that were conducted on a large set of instances and that provide evidence that the proposed hedging strategy constitutes an effective viable solution approach.     

A dynamic model for serial supply chain with periodic delivery policy

A three-echelon, dynamic lot-sizing model is presented for computing the parameters of a serial supply chain, which consists of integrated material replenishment, production at a capacity constraint, and outbound dispatching with a periodic delivery policy. The model is applicable in the general context of a three-echelon model with capacity constraint at the middle echelon of the serial supply chain which was not considered in most of the literature. This paper addresses a number of structural properties of the model and proposes a polynomial-time algorithm for deriving the optimal solution of minimising the total system costs over the planning horizon. Examples are provided to describe the algorithm.     

A basic model for co-ordinating a four-level supply chain of a product with a vendor,multiple buyers and tier-1 and tier-2 suppliers

This paper investigates the co-ordination of order quantities amongst the players in a four-level supply chain with a centralised decision process. The first level of the supply chain consists of multiple buyers, the second level of a vendor (manufacturer), the third level consists of multiple tier-1 suppliers, and the fourth level consists of multiple tier-2 suppliers. Each supplier supplies one or more items that are components of the product produced by the manufacturer. The model developed in this paper guarantees that the local costs for the players either remain the same as before co-ordination, or decrease as a result of co-ordination. A mathematical model is developed, with numerical examples presented and results discussed.