Trust-embedded coordination in supply chain information sharing

This paper studies supply chain coordination with trust-embedded cost-sharing contract. In a two-tier supply chain, a retailer (she) and a supplier (he) make their private demand forecasting individually. The retailer places soft-orders, which are costless, non-verifiable and cancellable before shipping, to the supplier. After that, the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information to update his demand evaluation and prepare his capacity. How much the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information is specified by trust, which is a kind of psychological feeling and affected by multiple factors. When the supplier does not fully trust the retailer, he tends to prepare a conservative capacity to avoid over-production. To coordinate the supply chain, a two-stage coordination process is proposed. At the first stage, the supplier and retailer negotiate a cost-sharing rule to bind soft-orders. At the second stage, the retailer places a soft-order and decides whether or not to bind it referring to the cost-sharing rule. After that, the supplier determines his optimal production capacity. We show that the retailer and supplier value trust differently in the experimental studies. We also find that there is a threshold of negotiation power for the supply chain partners which means the supplier’s/retailer’s expected profit drops down if his/her negotiation power exceeds certain thresholds. The experimental studies also show that the proposed the two-stage coordination is effective.     

Multi-period hedging and coordination in a prefabricated construction supply chain

In this paper, a multi-period buffer space hedging coordination between a building contractor (BC) and a logistics provider (LP) is investigated. In order to facilitate the application of the construction lead-time hedging (CLTH) strategy, adopted by the BC, extra buffer space needs to be reserved at LP’s intermediate warehouse for contingency usage. This strategy is defined as ‘buffer space hedging (BSH)’ and it increases the pressure of LP on involving extra storage and maintenance cost. Two coordination mechanisms are adopted for solving this BSH problem. One scheme is by introducing a cost-sharing term. A Nash game model is studied to find the individual optimal decisions. Another scheme is a cooperative game model with proper side-payments. We show that adjusting the BSH amount for each review period benefits the supply chain. Both coordination mechanisms enable a win–win outcome. Especially, if system resources are sufficient, the cooperative game outperforms the Nash game. Numerical experiments further demonstrate that the benefit of the proposed model is more significant under the case with lower unit enlarging/rearrangement cost, higher tardiness penalty and unpredictable and uncontrollable construction process-determined assembled and installed prefabs.     

Impact of an emergency order opportunity on supply chain coordination

We consider a manufacturer-retailer supply chain in the pre-selling and selling seasons, whereby the manufacturer can offer the retailer an emergency order opportunity with a limited commitment quantity in addition to the regular order from the retailer before the selling season. Due to the short lead time for the emergency order, the manufacturer needs to prepare for it in the pre-selling season by producing more than the regular order or reserving its capacity for the responsive production. Through mathematically modelling and analyzing the supply chain, we found that, when the emergency order opportunity is provided, the manufacturer might be worse off, although the retailer is always better off. We derive the conditions whereby both the manufacturer and retailer can benefit from the emergency order, and the supply chain profit can be maximised. Further, we show that the supply chain can be coordinated by setting only the unit price and maximum commitment quantity for the emergency order. We also prove that Pareto improvement can be always achieved by setting the unit price for the regular order in addition to the unit price and maximum commitment quantity for the emergency order.     

面向供应链合作的信任维系协调体系的研究

为了保证节点企业合作中信任协调的合作关系,以有效地实现企业经营目标,从信任的视角提出了一个包括目标层、合作层、信任协调层、支撑层在内的供应链合作(SCC)信任维系协调的解决思路.把节点企业内、外部的供应链运作、合作行为、业务目标集成起来,给出了整体框架模型,并对基于企业目标的信任协调机制、信任金字塔和实现协调层的具体方式等关键问题进行了探讨.信任协调体系框架模型对供应链合作运作提供了一定的参照.     

Decentralised planning coordination with quantity discount contract in a divergent supply chain

This paper proposes to solve a supply chain planning problem with realistic features. The problem consists of planning productions, transportations and storage activities in a supply chain at a tactical level on a finite horizon. The main features considered are decentralised decision making and iteration of the planning process on a rolling horizon basis. In each planning process, the actors optimise their local planning and coordinate to achieve a good overall planning. A multi-agent system is used to model such supply chain behaviour. The study is conducted in a divergent two-echelon supply chain with one manufacturer and multiple independent retailers. Coordination is achieved using a standard contract in practice, known as the ‘quantity discount’ contract. The planning framework on the supply chain structure is detailed. Lot-sizing models integrating the quantity discount are presented for the local planning problems. Experimental tests are conducted with three major parameters: quantity discount price, quantity discount breakpoint and rolling horizon length. They are used to determine the quantity discount parameters in achieving the best supply chain profit, and to analyse the increasing profit of the actors. A decision-making tool which is able to consider realistic features of supply chain planning is therefore resulted.     

Supply chain coordination under information asymmetry: a review

Aligning supply chain decisions of separate entities with independent objectives can be considered to be one of the difficulties of supply chain management. This difficulty becomes worse if the supply chains are characterised by an asymmetrical distribution of information. Although considerable research has recently been devoted to supply chain coordination, less attention has been paid to different information asymmetry settings to the mechanisms underlying it. This research attempts to help fill this gap by reviewing and classifying the literature based on supply chain features, applied methodology, coordination mechanisms, and types of information asymmetry. The proposed classification is used to highlight the ongoing issues in the area and identify the direction for future research.     

Production lead-time hedging and coordination in prefabricated construction supply chain management

This paper studies a coordination scheme to solve a production lead-time hedging (PLTH) issue in the prefabricated construction supply chain management. To mitigate tardiness delivery owing to prefab production uncertainty, the project contractor (PC) prefers to inform the prefab factory (PF) an earlier due date which is termed as PLTH strategy. However, this strategy forces the PF to compress its production process. A balance must be optimised through the proposed PLTH coordination scheme. It includes a PLTH-related cost term, i.e. crashing money (charged by the PF to the PC) and a constant transfer term. Three models with different power structures are considered. Firstly, two Stackelberg games with alternative decision-making sequences and an equal power model are discussed to obtain the optimal PLTH amount and crashing money. Later on, a cost-sharing term is used to fairly allocate the system surplus. It is observed that this coordination scheme reduces the PLTH amount and ensures win–win coordination for both parties. Some interesting managerial implications are also obtained from comparison analysis and numerical studies.     

A vendor-managed inventory scheme as a supply chain coordination mechanism

In this paper, we have considered a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) arrangement in a supply chain (SC), where the buyer imposes a penalty for shipments exceeding an upper limit. We have shown as how the industry practice of VMI under penalty can be used as a SC coordination mechanism. The vendor can influence the buyer to increase the batch size without making the buyer worse off. We also discuss how such a penalty scheme may be derived. Further, we have established the equivalence of VMI under deterministic demand with that of quantity discount models, thus highlighting the need to incorporate both cooperation and coordination perspectives while analysing SC collaboration mechanisms.     

A supply chain model with vendor-managed inventory,consignment, and quality inspection errors

This paper considers the integration between quality control and production inventory control in supply chain management. Specifically, we study the effect of inspection errors on the costs incurred in a supply chain system with a single vendor and multiple buyers. In this system, the vendor enters into a vendor-managed inventory (VMI) and a consignment stock (CS) partnership with several buyers. We assume that the items made by the vendor are not in perfect quality, but they contain a given proportion of defective units. We also assume that quality inspection of these items by the buyers is subject to sampling errors. Three cases indicating to different levels of supply integration are considered: VMI–CS system, traditional system and integrated system. For each case, a mathematical model is formulated, an optimum solution is developed, and a numerical example is solved.     

Dual channel closed-loop supply chain coordination with a reward-driven remanufacturing policy

This paper investigates a reward-driven policy, employed in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), for acquiring used products earmarked for remanufacture. Under the examined model, a single manufacturer sells products through a retailer as well as directly to end users in a forward supply chain. In the reverse supply chain, three different modes of collection are employed to capture used products for remanufacture: they are through a third party, directly by the manufacturer and from the retailer. Mathematical models for both non-cooperative and centralised scenarios are developed to characterise the pricing decisions and remanufacturing strategies that indicate individual and overall supply chain performance. Optimality of all the proposed models is examined with theory. To coordinate and achieve a win–win outcome for channel members, we proposed a three-way discount mechanism for the manufacturer. Extended numerical investigation provides insights on ways to manage an efficient reward-driven CLSC in a dual-channel environment.     

Consignment stock policy with unequal shipments and process unreliability for a two-level supply chain

This paper considers a vendor managed inventory model with consignment stock policy in which a single vendor delivers a single product to a single buyer in unequal-sized shipments. The vendor’s production process may produce some defective items during a production run. The buyer performs a screening process immediately after receiving each delivery from the vendor and the vendor bears the warranty cost of defective item, if any. The buyer either scraps or repairs the defective items by sending them to a repair factory. The average expected profit of the integrated system is derived using renewal reward theorem and a solution procedure is suggested to determine the optimal shipment policy of the vendor. Numerical examples are taken to determine both the equal and unequal shipment policies and compare their relative performances.     

Cash flow risk in dual-channel supply chain

This paper focuses on multi-period cash flow risk which is measured by the SD in dual-channel supply chain. The manufacturer offers a consignment contract to the retailer, exposing cash flow risk due to the payment delay. We analyze cash inflows, outflows, and netflows of each member in dual-channel supply chain. We also examine different influencing factors on the preference of cash flows in dual-channel supply chain and then provide some managerial implications to deal with cash flow risk.     

A review of coordination studies in the context of supply chain dynamics

Supply chain management is and has been a popular research topic in recent years. Among the reported studies, coordination is an important ingredient to improve the performance of supply chains subject to the presence of system dynamics. This paper sets out to review some recent supply chain studies in the last decades that are related to coordination among supply chain members regarding supply chain dynamics. Focus is put on inventory management problems. More than a hundred research papers are reviewed and they are broadly categorised into analytical approaches and simulations approaches. They are further divided into sub-categorises. Observations of each category are summarised in this paper so that characteristics of each of which could be comprehended. In addition, the concluding section reveals some insights that could be considered for future research regarding coordination in supply chains and supply chain systems dynamics.     

Return policy and supply chain coordination with network-externality effect

The benefits of a consumer return policy have been extensively studied in extent literature. This paper explores the potentially damaging impact of a return policy on the retailer. We develop an analytical framework and examine the economic impact of consumer return among consumers, retailer and supply chain. We distinguish three network-externality (NE) cases: no network externality, fixed network-externality and variable network-externality contingent on return amount to discuss the retailer’s selling price, refund and inventory policies. Our analysis derives the optimal policies and shows that they take the form of contingence model in which the policies depend on consumer initial return and NE return. We also examine the influence of the consumer return NE effect on buy-back contracts of the supply chain and show that while the traditional buy-back contract fails to coordinate the supply chain, the NE effect does not render the differentiated buy-back contract less effective. Finally, we extend our study to a heterogeneous consumer case.     

Quick response strategy with cleaner technology in a supply chain: coordination and win-win situation analysis

Quick response strategy (QRS) has been widely adopted in a supply chain where members collect timely market information for better forecasting, and then respond promptly to the market changes by adjusting initial inventory decision. After adopting the QRS, sustainability issues such as greenhouse gas emission and energy waste may be more serious as production lead time is shorter. In this study, due to this dilemma, we develop a two-stage quick response supply chain with cleaner technology, where the manufacturer determines the cleaner technology investment and afterwards the retailer decides the ordering quantity. Based on Bayesian theory, we depict an information updating process for the QRS with cleaner technology. First, we find that the inventory service level significantly affects both manufacturer’s and retailer’s performance under the QRS with cleaner technology. Moreover, our analytical results indicate that the performance of centralised supply chain system is always better than the decentralised one. As a result, we propose two supply chain contracts, minimum ordering quantity (MOQ) and MOQ with buyback (MOQ-BB) to achieve supply chain coordination. Comparing with the MOQ, the MOQ-BB is more flexible to allow better allocation of the ‘additional’ expected profit between the channel members through the buyback price negotiation.     

Analysing the interaction of factors for resilient humanitarian supply chain

Emergencies and disasters place an exceptional demand on the managerial skills of the humanitarian aid community. Most of the developing countries lack in such kind of resilience and effective humanitarian supply chain. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to identify and analyse the factors to develop the resilience in the humanitarian supply chain. Based on the literature review, total 12 factors related to resilient humanitarian supply chain have been identified. Some of these factors are process oriented and some are result oriented. Interpretive structural modelling with Fuzzy MICMAC analysis is used to develop structural relationships among these factors and to find the driving and the dependence power of these factors. Government support, strategy and capacity planning; and continuous assessment of project progress have emerged as the major drivers for the development of resilient humanitarian supply chain. By managing these driving factors, humanitarian aid programme can be made resilient and agile. The findings will be useful for the humanitarian aid agencies to develop effective and sustainable aid relief programme.     

Random yield and coordination mechanisms of a supply chain with emergency backup sourcing

This paper considers a supply chain in which a buyer purchases finished items from a contracting supplier to satisfy a stochastic market demand, where the supplier’s production is subject to random yield. We assume that the buyer can make up the shortage by sourcing from an emergency backup supplier. We develop two Stackelberg game models, i.e. buyer-Stackelberg (BS) model and supplier-Stackelberg (SS) model, and find that the decentralised BS model results in a higher stocking factor of supplier’s input than the decentralised SS model. Compared with BS model, the buyer in SS model performs more explicit order plan, and we find that only when the actual yield of the supplier is insufficient, the buyer would use emergency backup sourcing to make up the shortage. When the manufacturing operation of the supplier is in the good state, the buyer only orders a certain amount and has some leftover. When the actual yield of the supplier is moderate, the buyer uses up every item produced from the supplier regardless of the yield rate. Comparing both channel structures, SS operation is a more effective way of controlling both inventory cost and backup sourcing cost, and it can be beneficial for each player as well as for the whole channel. Finally, we develop the coordination mechanism for each channel to investigate the issues of risk handling and risk sharing for uncertain demand and uncertain yield.     

Divergence control of a one-level supply chain replenishment rule

We present a general control and improvement strategy for a one-level supply chain based on maintaining the divergence of the system close to zero at each time step. The online implementations as well as the results obtained are shown for a logistic chain model with an Order-Up-To policy using several demand patterns. The divergence can be obtained using the state-space volume calculated with all the state variables of the model. However, it is also possible to calculate the divergence by applying state-space reconstruction techniques using only one state variable. The results obtained with both approaches show that this strategy allows the reduction in the total cost.     

Contract negotiation and risk preferences in dual-channel supply chain coordination

This study employs profit-sharing contracts to coordinate dual-channel supply chains and examines the selection of profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit gained from coordination. We characterise the Pareto-optimal contracts for the two- and three-stage dual-channel supply chains, by developing and maximising system utility function related to risk preferences and negotiating power. Under the optimal profit-sharing parameter in a two-stage supply chain, both members are reluctant to cooperate; however, in a three-stage supply chain, under the optimal two profit-sharing parameters selected by optimising the system utility function, the retailer is always reluctant to cooperate, but the distributor or the supplier may have incentives to deviate from cooperation. In this case, the distributor and the supplier will negotiate again as in a two-stage supply chain so that all three members can benefit from coordination with profit-sharing contracts. Besides acting independently, the distributor, in the process of contract negotiation, may choose to form an alliance with the upstream supplier or the downstream retailer, which means the relationship among the three members involving profit allocation after coordination is quite different from that for a two-stage supply chain and is not necessarily interest-contrary. In the contract negotiation, in any kind of scenario, risk aversion and negotiation power have a significant impact on the selection of optimal profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit. One member’s risk aversion or its negotiation power may be advantageous to the other. Mathematical examples are illustrated to clarify the contract negotiation process.     

Optimal pricing strategy for the perishable food supply chain

This research investigates the optimal pricing strategy for the perishable food supply chain. Using the setting of a two-echelon supply chain including a supplier and a retailer, we apply the game theory approach to derive the equilibriums for both a single pricing strategy and a two-stage pricing strategy. Through a comparison of the equilibriums, we explore how the two pricing strategies affect the supply chain’s decisions and supplier’s and retailer’s performance individually and collectively. The results of the analysis show that the optimal choice of pricing strategy depends on the price markdown cost and its relationship with the two critical thresholds that are determined by a combination of factors including the potential market size, the price and quality sensitivity factors, the initial quality, the unit product cost, and the quality deterioration rate.