The impact of third-party remanufacturing on the forward supply chain: a blessing or a curse?

It is widely agreed that the entry of third-party remanufacturers (TPRs) hurts original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) because remanufacturing cannibalises the new product sales. In this paper, motivated by the practice of mobile phone remanufacturing, we develop a game theoretical model to revisit the impact of third-party remanufacturing on a forward supply chain in which one OEM purchases critical components from one dominant supplier. The OEM may operate the remanufacturing business as cost-efficient as the TPR. Our analytical results show that regardless of the OEM’s remanufacturing capability, third-party remanufacturing could be beneficial to the OEM in that the supplier would lower the wholesale price as a response to the entry of the TPR; in addition, compared with the case without remanufacturing, third-party remanufacturing is always detrimental to the supplier, but the supplier should not always attempt to deter the entry of the TPR because third-party remanufacturing could be less detrimental than the OEM’s in-house remanufacturing. Under certain conditions, the two players in the forward supply chain both prefer third-party remanufacturing over in-house remanufacturing. The key intuition driving this finding is that third-party remanufacturing makes the OEM and the supplier allied; while in-house remanufacturing makes them against each other.     

考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链订货决策

考虑零售商的公平关切行为特征,研究鲜活农产品供应链最优订货决策问题。引入公平关切度和参考依赖因子,构建基于零售商公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链订货决策模型。理论分析与数值算例表明：分散式决策中,零售商考虑公平关切时的订购量少于其无公平关切时的订购量,批发价随着公平关切程度的上升而下降;批发价契约下考虑公平关切的鲜活农产品供应链无法实现协调,但订购量、供应链成员的利润均随着公平关切程度的上升而减少。     

Green supply chain contracts with eco-labels issued by the sales platform: profitability and environmental implications

Considering environmentally conscious consumers, a manufacturer, and a sales platform which provides eco-labels for qualified manufacturers, this paper develops a supply chain model to study how eco-labels affect green supply chain operations, from the profitability and environmental perspectives. The results show that the sales platform prefers the agency contract, but the manufacturer prefers the wholesale price contract. Considering the performance of the supply chain, the agency contract brings a higher profit while the wholesale price contract results in a bigger environmental improvement. An unexpected but interesting result is that when the agency contract is used and consumer green awareness increases, the sale price declines rather than increasing as it does under the wholesale price contract. This decline happens because the required marketing effort of the sales platform will be lower, which incentivises the platform to reduce the commission rate. Consequently, the manufacturer faces a lower commission rate and a higher margin when consumers display greater green awareness. Moreover, as the core and more powerful player of the supply chain, the sales platform can propose a platform-led revenue sharing contract to fully coordinate the supply chain, which improves the performance of the supply chain both in profitability and environmental perspectives.     

不同契约下考虑公平偏好的供应商创新投入研究

针对一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链,研究供应商公平偏好对其创新投入的影响。引入公平偏好理论,运用Stackelberg博弈,建立批发价格契约、研发成本分担契约和收益共享契约3种契约下的供应链决策模型,对比分析不同契约下公平偏好系数对供应链均衡信息的影响。研究表明,研发成本分担契约下的供应商创新水平、供应链中成员效用及供应链整体效用总高于其他2种契约;收益共享契约下的供应商创新水平和供应链整体效用高于批发价格契约;批发价格契约和收益共享契约下的制造商效用和供应商效用的大小与供应商公平偏好系数以及收益共享契约下的供应商保留效用的大小有关。     

考虑销售价格变动的服装行业供应链契约研究

考虑销售价格变动对服装行业供应链的影响,以博弈论为基础,建立了单次订购两阶段销售模型,通过对单一契约以及组合契约对服装供应链协调性分析,得出：组合契约优于单一契约,当供应链系统最优时,单一契约参数的设计依赖于企业的生产成本和市场需求结构,组合契约的参数设计与市场需求无关;通过设计合理的批发价格和契约参数,组合契约能够协调服装供应链;销售价格的变动会对组合契约的参数设计产生影响;特权使用费的转移支付有助于协调服装供应链。最后通过某一服装企业案例作了实证研究。     

Supplier credit guarantee loan in supply chain with financial constraint and bargaining

This paper adopts a multiunit bilateral bargaining framework on financial decision. In a two-echelon supply chain, the supplier sells products through a financial constraint retailer. If needed, the retailer gets a short-term financing from a bank by supplier credit guarantee loan (CGL). Through applying the Nash bargaining framework, we formulate two-level game models, i.e. Retailer-Supply System negotiation and Supplier-Bank negotiation. In this paper, we study and discuss the equilibrium order quantity which is affected by initial working capital and interest rate, the retailer-supply system negotiation and upstream wholesale price effects for supply chain performance, the supplier-bank negotiation and interest rate decisions with different capital markets. The results show: (i) there exists loan size limit for financial constraint retailer under CGL. (ii) The upstream wholesale price increase will weaken retailer’s bargaining position, and the supply system may gain or lose depending on the bargaining power. (iii) There exists unique equilibrium sharing ratio in supply system, which means CGL can achieve risk sharing. (iv) Within a supply system, the upstream wholesale price advantage will weaken bank’s profit, whereas supplier may gain or lose depending on his bargaining power.     

Coordination of a dual-channel supply chain after demand or production cost disruptions

Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain could not only achieve the integrated profit of the supply chain but also alleviate the channel conflict. Although some researches addressed this area, there is scant literature to discuss the coordination issue in the situations of disruption. To fill this void, we utilise a contract with a wholesale price, a direct channel’s price and a lump sum fee to coordinate a dual-channel supply chain under the cases of demand disruptions and production cost disruptions. After deriving the optimal contract for each case, we find that the manufacturer can achieve coordination of the disrupted supply chain by adjusting the parameters of the coordination contract used in a normal environment. We also show that after disruptions, there exists a contract adjustment benefit zone, in which both the manufacturer and the retailer can benefit from the adjustment of coordination contract when demand increases or production cost decreases. A further analysis of the production and distribution strategies in the coordinated dual-channel supply chain after disruptions suggests that the adjustment of the total production and sales of each channel depends heavily on the level of disruptions and the degree of consumers’ loyalty to both channels.     

Supply chain management using put option contracts with information asymmetry

We study the problem of hedging demand uncertainty in a supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer under a buyback contract. We use semi-variance of the possible profit values as a measure of the retailer’s risk attitude. We first study the setting where the supplier can observe the risk type of the retailer and find that in this case the supplier can design a buyback contract that extracts the maximum profit for the supplier. When the retailer’s type is unobservable, a new contract needs to be designed (the ‘option buyback contract’) and we show that in this case the retailers will self-select and chose an order quantity that maximises the total supply chain profit. Through numerical computations, we analyse the dynamics between the benefits of hedging risk, information rent and the retailer’s type, and outline cases when, depending on the shape of the reservation utilities of the retailers, it is too costly for the supplier to manage risk. In conclusion, our results show that whereas semi-variance has appealing properties as a measure of risk, its use introduces analytical challenges that can only be overcome through numerical computation.     

不同碳排放政策下考虑碳减排投入的供应链协调

在考虑碳减排技术投入下,为了实现不同碳排放政策下的供应链协调,通过建立集中式和分散式决策下的供应链模型,根据供应链协调的条件,给出了供应链实现协调的契约形式及契约参数。为了确定不同碳排放政策下的最优订货量和最优碳减排率,通过对博弈模型进行优化,提出了具体的求解方法。数值计算结果表明：随着碳排放政策的变化,供应链的最优订货量、最优碳减排率和供应链的利润也将发生相应的变化,而生产成本、缺货损失、产品残值、销售价格、批发价格等参数变化不仅会影响最优订货量、最优碳减排率和供应链利润,还会影响收益共享比例、碳减排技术投入和碳排放成本的分摊比例。     

Incentives for quality improvement efforts coordination in supply chains with partial cost allocation contract

In this paper, we consider quality improvement efforts coordination in a two-stage decentralised supply chain with a partial cost allocation contract. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, both of which produce defective products. Two kinds of failure cost occur within the supply chain: internal and external. The supplier and the manufacturer determine their individual quality levels to maximise their own profits. We propose a partial cost allocation contract, under which the external failure cost is allocated between the manufacturer and the supplier at different rates based on information derived from failure root cause analysis. If the quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are observable, we show that the partial cost allocation contract coordinates the supply chain, provided that the failure root cause analysis does not erroneously identify the manufacturer’s fault as the supplier’s, and the supplier does not take responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. In the single moral hazard model, where only the quality level of the supplier is unobservable, the optimal share rates require the supplier to take some responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. However, in the double moral hazard model, where quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are unobservable to each other, the optimal share rates require the supplier not to take responsibility for the manufacturer’s fault. It is noted that the root cause analysis conducted by the manufacturer may have its disadvantage in attributing the fault to the supplier when both sides are at fault. We also propose a contract based on the dual root cause analysis to reduce the supplier’s penalty cost. Numerical results illustrate that the partial cost allocation contract satisfies the fairness criterion compared with the traditional cost allocation contract.     

Pricing decisions for a supply chain with refurbished products

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer where a fixed portion of new products sold will be returned to the retailer and then be repaired and resold as refurbished products at a lower price. Using the utility model, we formulate how consumers will make their choices when facing both new and refurbished products. Then, using the divide-and-conquer method, we derive the supplier and retailer's equilibrium decisions, including the supplier's wholesale price and the retailer's prices for both the new and refurbished products. The main findings include the following. First, refurbished products will be sold in the market only when the refurbishing cost is small. In this situation, as the refurbishing cost increases, most of the negative impact on the retailer will be transferred to the supplier. Second, in the same condition, as the refurbishing cost increases, the wholesale price and retail price of the new product will change in opposite directions. This result contrasts with the traditional pass-through effect. Third, when the repair cost is moderate, the retailer will eventually not sell refurbished products, but its profit can be significantly improved and the double marginalisation effect can be mitigated.     

Joint pricing and inventory strategies in a supply chain subject to inventory inaccuracy

This paper focuses on pricing strategies, inventory policies for a supply chain when Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology is adopted to cope with inventory inaccuracy. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer, in which the RFID tag price is shared between the supplier and the retailer. We present and compare the performance differences between a wholesale price contract and a consignment contract when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader and the supplier is the follower. Based on the optimal pricing and inventory decisions, an interesting observation of contract selection is that there are two critical values of inventory available rate such that when the inventory availability is less than the lower value, both the supplier and the retailer prefer a consignment contract; when the inventory availability is greater than the upper value, a wholesale price contract is their best choice; when the inventory availability is between the two values, the supplier prefers a wholesale price contract and the retailer prefers a consignment contract. Additionally, there exist threshold values of RFID tag price and sharing rate to determine the contract preference for the retailer. Furthermore, the profits of both the supplier and the retailer are independent of the RFID tag price sharing rate in a wholesale price contract, and the supplier has the incentive to invest in RFID tag cost in a consignment contract.     

The impact of retailers’ alliance on manufacturer’s profit in a dual-channel structure

When a manufacturer adds a direct sales channel to its existing retail channel, retailers may cooperate with one another to respond to this new competition. Our study develops a Cournot competition model in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple retailers. In a Stackelberg decision model, the manufacturer first sets the direct sales quantity and wholesale price, and then the retailers decide the order quantities. The results indicate that forming an alliance is not always beneficial for retailers. When direct sales cost is high, there is less likelihood for retailers to collaborate. On the other hand, retailers will form an alliance when direct sales cost is sufficiently low. This will likely reduce the manufacturer’s profit. As such decreasing direct sales cost is not necessarily beneficial for the manufacturer because of the retailers’ possible collaborative efforts. In addition, the study finds that when demand fluctuation increases or the manufacturer’s information accuracy decreases, it is more likely that retailers will form an alliance. After relaxing the assumption of homogeneous retailers, our numerical study validates the possibility of partial alliance. If some retailers’ marginal costs are sufficiently high, we could see the formation of a partial alliance.     

公平偏好下考虑双边保鲜努力的生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

针对供应商主导的生鲜农产品供应链,建立Stackelberg博弈模型;在考虑供应商、零售商双边保鲜努力水平影响生鲜农产品新鲜度和市场需求的情况下,分析零售商公平偏好对生鲜农产品供应链双边保鲜努力水平和供应链协调性的影响;采用委托代理模型对“批发价格 + 转移支付”的组合契约协调机制进行研究,旨在增加供应链整体利益及其稳定性,更好地协调成员之间的利益。研究表明,无论是否考虑零售商公平偏好,批发价格契约均无法实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,且零售商公平偏好会进一步降低双边保鲜努力水平、使供应链偏离最优。最后基于“批发价格 + 转移支付”的组合契约不仅能使双边保鲜努力水平达到集中决策下最优,实现生鲜农产品供应链协调,还能实现供应链成员利润的帕累托改进。     

基于第三方的一类闭环供应链协调问题研究

在零售商负责产品销售、第三方负责废旧品回收情况下,研究了闭环供应链系统的利润模型.利用Stackelberg博弈理论,分析了分散决策情况下节点企业如何确定产品的批发价格、零售价格、废旧品回收价格和废旧品回收率.在传统的双方收入分享契约的基础上,将契约形式扩展到三方,提出了基于三方协调问题的收入-费用分享契约的协调机制,使包含三方的供应链系统得到了协调,并用具体算例验证了结论的正确性.     

公平偏好下基于Stackelberg博弈的回购契约研究

引入公平偏好,构建了供应商与零售商进行Stackelberg博弈的回购契约模型,采用逆向归纳法分析了批发价的制定、回购契约的协调性以及供应链成员的公平偏好行为对批发价的影响。研究表明：无论是否考虑公平偏好,回购契约都不能实现供应链协调且公平偏好行为不会影响零售商的最优订购量。此外,供应商提供的批发价随着零售商公平偏好系数的增加而降低,但随供应商公平偏好的增加而升高。     

考虑激励模式的动态回收闭环供应链最优决策与协调研究

考虑由单一的制造商和零售商组成的闭环供应链,制造商不仅通过正向供应链销售新产品,还通过激励措施从消费者那里回收旧产品,且将动态回收过程、HJB阶段控制纳入到供应链中。除探讨不同情形下均衡决策外,还设计激励成本分担契约来促进废旧产品的回收。研究表明:集中决策较分散决策供应链系统利润更高,产品回收率更高,回收激励强度更高;产品的销售价格、批发价格、零售商收益、制造商收益与回收率呈正相关,回收激励强度与回收率呈负相关;激励成本分担契约下,制造商的回收强度、回收率达到集中决策的水平,有趣的是激励成本分担契约下,产品的批发价格、销售价格均略高于分散决策的水平,制造商的收益实现帕累托改进,零售商的收益只有在一定情形下才会实现帕累托改进,供应链系统的整体收益实现帕累托改进。此外,还探讨了激励成本分担情形下零售商不出现破产的条件。最后给出算例分析验证了相关结论。     

考虑零售商延期付款的供应链协调机制研究

在由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链中,供应商允许零售商进行延期付款,研究了零售商所采取的单期订购决策及供应链协调问题.研究表明,允许零售商延期付款的斯塔克博格模型存在角点解均衡,供应商会占有所有供应链利润.分析得出了允许零售商延期付款的订购合同优于批发价格合同的条件以及供应链达到整体协调的条件.最后还研究了供应商提供零利率延期付款的合同,得出了供应商提供零利率延期付款的合同所实现的供应链利润优于允许零售商延期付款的斯塔克博格模型合同的条件.研究表明通过延期付款,供应商和零售商可以设计一个线性转移支付实现供应链效率的提升以及供应链协调.     

价格随机条件下的应急双向期权数量弹性契约

旨在用期权应对批发价格波动的风险,用数量弹性契约来应对市场价格和市场需求随机波动带来的风险,探索双向期权数量弹性契约协调供应链的内在规律。将双向期权契约与数量弹性契约相融合,协调批发价、市场价格和市场需求均随机波动的供应链,寻找最优的供应链决策,并进行了算例仿真。研究结果表明：在批发价格波动时,采用双向期权弹性契约比采用基准数量弹性契约效果更好。双向期权弹性契约可以协调批发价格和市场价格均随机的供应链。     

存在尾货处理渠道的服装行业回购契约研究

考虑销售价格变动以及是否存在尾货处理渠道对服装行业供应链的影响,以博弈论为基础,在回购契约框架下建立了单次订购两阶段销售模型,通过分析不同时点回购契约对供应链协调性影响,得出：仅仅采用期末回购或期中回购不能实现供应链协调,通过设置合理的批发价格和回购价格,同时采用期末和期中回购能实现供应链系统协调;当供应链系统拥有对过季服装的处理渠道,并以合理价格对服装进行处理时,采用处理点策略能有效提高供应链系统整体效益。最后通过算例分析验证了相关结论的有效性。