一个VMI系统中的纳什讨价还价模型

研究一个单供应商单制造商的VMI系统.通过将纳什讨价还价(议价)引入零部件价格决策过程,我们发现,制造商的收益总是随着其议价能力的增强而增加,而供应商的收益却可能会随着其议价能力的增强而减少;存在使供应商利润最大化的供应商最优议价能力.同时,供应商最优议价能力受供应商物流决策的影响.具体而言,最优议价能力在运输业务外包时可能增加或减小,在库存业务外包时增加.此外,供应商最优议价能力也受需求函数特性的影响.     

OEM代工模式下品牌厂商的再制造策略

针对品牌厂商和其代工企业(original equipment manufacturer,OEM)构成的闭环供应链(closed-loop supply china,CLSC),考虑品牌厂商将新产品生产外包给OEM的前提下该采用何种再制造策略。基于Stackelberg博弈方法分别构建了外包再制造、授权再制造、OEM独立再制造三种模式下的CLSC决策模型,据此分析了消费者对三种模式下再制造产品存在偏好差异时品牌厂商和OEM的最优决策。研究表明:品牌厂商最好采用外包再制造模式,授权再制造模式次之,最不利的情形则是OEM独立再制造模式,而OEM的最佳选择却恰好相反。     

资金时间价值下质检不完备的生产-库存决策

采用贴现率来衡量资金的时间价值,将资金时间价值引入到JIT生产库存模型中,探讨了质检不完备条件下由一个品牌商与一个OEM供应商构成的JIT生产—库存决策问题。分别建立了通胀环境下的品牌商成本模型、OEM供应商成本模型及集成JIT生产—库存系统总成本模型。最后进行了算例分析,给出了最优供货次数和最优供货量。敏感性分析表明最小成本随贴现率的增大而减小;随犯质检一类误差的概率增大而增大,且呈现快速增大趋势;随犯质检二类误差的概率增大而减小,但最小成本对质检二类误差不敏感;随有限计划期的延长而增大。所获结论对企业管理者在通胀环境下做出扩大生产的决策提供了依据。     

OEM为什么如此盛行

OEM,是英文Original Equipment Manufacturer的缩写,中文译名:原始设备制造商。最初的含义指采用其它公司生产的原件组装产品,以自有品牌销售产品的公司。随着经济的发展,OEM的含义已经演变为委托生产或代工生产的方式,现在,OEM所涉及的内容脱离了最初的“原始设备制造”,而更加丰富和多样化了。在OEM过程中,存在着合作的双方:品牌厂商和供应商,品牌厂商利用自有品牌、销售渠道、核心技术和其它市场资源,将非自己擅长的生产环节交给别的企业去做,把有限的资源集中用于核心业务,以便提高自身的核心竞争力,供应商（OEM Supplier）根据品牌厂商的要求提供产品或组件,供应商可以自行生产产品,也可以将业务外包给合同制造商（Contract Manufacturer,缩写为CM）,同时,许多品牌厂商也是其它品牌厂商的供应商。     

存在绿色消费者的再制造模式选择策略

研究了绿色消费者对制造商（OEM）和再制造商（3PR）再制造模式选择的影响。在无绿色消费者和存在绿色消费者情况下,分别建立了两种斯塔克尔伯格博弈的再制造模型：再制造外包与授权再制造,得到了两种模型的均衡解及OEM和3PR利润。比较分析发现,当绿色消费者比例较高时,OEM和3PR均偏好于再制造外包模式。然而,当绿色消费者比例较低时,虽然OEM依然偏好于再制造外包模式,但是,当消费者对再制造产品估价较低时,3PR偏好于授权再制造模式。此外发现,无论绿色消费者比例高低,在再制造外包模式,消费者剩余与社会福利总是高于授权再制造模式。     

“机器换人”财政补贴方式和补贴策略优化

基于博弈论方法,研究了"机器换人"的两种财政补贴方式下政府补贴资金的最优分配及其效率。首先,分别在定比和定额两种补贴方式下建立了"政府-设备供应商-设备应用企业"三方序贯博弈模型,从而得出了在两种补贴方式下政府补贴资金在供应链成员即设备供应商和应用企业之间的最佳分配方案;然后在最优分配方案下对两种补贴的影响和补贴资金使用效率进行了分析和比较;最后,针对两种补贴方式的特点提出了"机器换人"财政补贴建议。研究表明,定比补贴下政府补贴资金在设备供应商和应用企业之间的最佳分配方案是将补贴全部分配给应用企业,而在定额补贴下政府可以将补贴以任意比例在设备供应商和应用企业之间分配;并且定额补贴的资金使用效率高于定比补贴。     

资金约束下集中型供应链数量柔性契约设计

以数量柔性契约为研究对象,以单一供应商和单一零售商组成的两级集中型供应链为基础,将供应链下游企业面临资金约束时的融资方式分为两种:供应链外部融资和供应链内部融资,并将供应链融资方式融入到资金约束集中型供应链中,通过理论证明得出相对于仅采用外部融资而言,当供应商信用较好时,采用内部融资不仅可以降低资金成本,而且有助于激励零售商订购更多的产品,使供应链绩效达到最优的结论。     

二部制契约下供应链内外部融资模式比较分析

主要对二级响应型供应链的内外部融资模式的对比分析。主要研究的是二级供应链由单一供应商和零售商组成和销售单一产品所面临的资金约束问题。运用数量柔性契约使供应链链条下游企业来考虑内外部融资方式并能够做出最优选择。研究得出,在二级供应链上,影响供应链企业融资的主要因素为供应商和零售商的综合信用。若供应商的信用较好,则采用的融资方式为内部融资,既有利于降低资金使用的成本又可以吸引零售商加大订购产品数量,从而达到供应链绩效整体最优。     

基于CVaR准则的风险规避供应商的融资策略

借助条件在险值(CVaR)准则构建了受资金约束的单一供应商和资金充足的单一零售商以及供应商开辟直销渠道的双渠道供应链系统中资金约束供应商的融资模型。分别研究了无资金约束与有资金约束下的银行贷款融资模型和零售商提前付款融资模型下的零售价格,直销价格和批发价格最优决策,以及供应商和零售商的风险偏好系数对最优决策的影响。最后通过数值分析进一步阐述了供应商和零售商的风险态度对最优决策的影响,并对两种融资方式下供应商的利润比较。研究结果表明,供应商的直销价格随着供应商的风险厌恶程度的增大而增大;供应商的批发价格随着供应商的风险厌恶程度的增大而增大,随着零售商的风险厌恶程度的增大而减小;零售商的零售价格随着供应商的风险厌恶程度的增大而增大,随着零售商的风险厌恶程度的增大而增大。不同的初始资金下,最优的融资方式也各不相同,一般当银行贷款和零售商提前付款融资模式都可行的情况下,供应商一般会首先选择提前付款的方式。但要达到双方互赢的局面,则需要供应商给零售商一个合适的价格折扣系数。     

整机与部件保修区间不一致的部件外包保修策略

生产商生产的装备产品整机和整机中由供应商提供的部件，两者保修区间不一致的问题，给生产商带来较高的维保费用，同时影响客户的使用。为了解决此问题，本文通过分析部件与整机两者保修区间不一致的几种情形，并考虑供应商的保修欺诈行为，在生产商与供应商之间制定了合适的部件外包保修服务策略。该策略以生产商的利润最大和供应商的效用最大为目标，通过求解双方的纳什均衡博弈模型，得到供应商的最优欺诈决策和生产商的最优检查决策。最后，通过理论分析和敏感性分析，讨论外包保修策略中的罚款和佣金率对最优解以及双方利润和效用的影响。     

Original equipment manufacturers (OEM) manufacturing strategy for network innovation agility: the case of Taiwanese manufacturing networks

Manufacturing companies in newly industrialized countries contribute substantially to their global innovation networks. Those manufacturers perform not only production and physical distribution functions, but also design and engineering functions in the processes of bringing new products world-wide. This paper examines the relationship between manufacturing strategy of those original equipment manufacturers (OEM) suppliers and network innovation agility. No single best strategy can fit all OEM suppliers. They can choose either to be dedicated OEM service providers or to sell their own-brand products. Either strategy can be effective in terms of innovation agility. However, once the OEM manufacturing strategy has been chosen, a manufacturer should adopt an appropriate way to manage its product innovation process. A dedicated OEM supplier should emphasize manufacturing flexibility and pursue a product modularity strategy to enhance network innovation agility, while cross-functional integration is the key for successful manufacturers with own-brand products. For both dedicated OEM suppliers and own-brand ones, market orientation is essential for network innovation agility. Managerial implications and future research directions are discussed.     

A robust optimisation model for hybrid remanufacturing and manufacturing systems under uncertain return quality and market demand

In remanufacturing research, most researchers predominantly emphasised on the recovery of whole product (core) rather than at the component level due to its complexity. In contrast, this paper addresses the challenges to focus on remanufacturing through component recovery, so as to solve production planning problems of hybrid remanufacturing and manufacturing systems. To deal with the uncertainties of quality and quantity of product returns, the processing time of remanufacturing, remanufacturing costs, as well as market demands, a robust optimisation model was developed in this research and a case study was used to evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency. To strengthen this research, a sensitivity analysis of the uncertain parameters and the original equipment manufacturer’s (OEM’s) pricing strategy was also conducted. The research finding shows that the market demand volatility leads to a significant increase in the under fulfilment and a reduction in OEM’s profit. On the other hand, recovery cost reduction, as endogenous cost saving, encourages the OEM to produce more remanufactured products with the increase in market demand. Furthermore, the OEM may risk profit loss if they raise the price of new products, and inversely, they could gain more if the price of remanufactured products is raised.     

Developing a resilient supply chain through supplier flexibility and reliability assessment

In this study, we examine the optimal allocation of demand across a set of suppliers in a supply chain that is exposed to supply risk and environmental risk. A two-stage mixed-integer programming model is used to develop a flexible sourcing strategy under disruptions. Our model integrates supplier selection and demand allocation with transportation channel selection and provides contingency plans to mitigate the negative impacts of disruptions and minimise total network costs. Finally, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the model and provide insights. The findings suggest that developing contingency plans using flexibility in suppliers’ production capacity is an effective strategy for firms to mitigate the severity of disruptions. We also show that flexibility and reliability of the suppliers and regions play a significant role in determining contingency plans for during disruption. Findings generally show that highly flexible suppliers receive less allocation, and their flexible capacity is reserved for disruptions. For firms that do not incorporate risk management into supplier selection and allocation, the recommendation is to source from fewer, more reliable suppliers with less risk of disruption. Our findings also emphasise that the type of disruption has important implications for supplier selection and demand allocation. This study highlights the supply chain risk management strategy of regionalising as a means for minimising the impact of environmental disruptions.     

Supply chain models with corporate social responsibility

Currently, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a critical issue because more than 88% of consumers think companies should try to achieve their business goals while improving society and the environment. This paper focuses on a CSR supply chain where an Original Equipment Manufacturer’s (OEM’s) sales can be significantly reduced because of its oversea supplier’s social misconduct. Specifically, as in a conventional wholesale price contract the supplier determines its wholesale price and the OEM decides its order quantity, but in a CSR supply chain, the supplier can autonomously change its CSR cost once a minimum requirement is satisfied. A higher CSR cost means that the supplier invests more in its corporate social responsibility and the OEM’s sales will be less likely to be influenced by negative CSR events. The equilibrium solutions show an important dilemma – although the supplier’s profit increases in the basic CSR requirement, the supplier will always use the minimum CSR cost under the conventional wholesale price contract, which eventually leads to a low supply chain profit. Thus, we introduce two different contracts to handle this problem: the flexible quantity contract and the wholesale price incentive contract, which are, respectively, a ‘tough’ way and a ‘beneficent’ way for the OEM to solve the problem. Although the two ways cannot (always) coordinate the supply chain, we show that they both will significantly improve the supply chain performance. Our results also show that in some conditions, one strategy will dominate, whereas in different conditions the other strategy dominates.     

TPL主导下的生鲜电商三级供应链决策分析

研究由TPL、生鲜电商、生鲜产品供应商组成的三级供应链系统,其中生鲜农产品的市场需求受网上零售价格、安全追溯系统可用性、新鲜度的影响。在TPL主导下,运用Stackelberg博弈模型,分析生鲜电商、生鲜产品供应商不同领导权下的最优决策和最大利润,得出以下结论:生鲜产品供应商作为第二领导下的TPL利润、安全追溯系统可用性、保鲜水平、市场需求均大于其作为第三领导时的情形;不同领导权对供应链企业的利润也会产生影响,利润偏向于领导权大的一方。然而不管哪种决策模型,其供应链利润均小于集中决策下的情形。     

Risk, risk aversion and the optimal time to produce

This paper studies the order-fulfillment process of a supplier producing a customized capital good. When they decide at what time to begin production, suppliers in these industries typically face the following dilemma. On the one hand, their customers expect them to be responsive and the time that they are prepared to wait for the product is much shorter than the time needed to produce and deliver it. On the other hand, it is risky for the suppliers to start production before the customers confirm their orders due to inventory holding costs and the possibility of order cancellation. We offer a model to help understand this dilemma and investigate the comparative statics effects of lead time, lead time uncertainty and the risk aversion of the supplier. Relative to existing work, our model has two novel components: demand distribution updating and the supplier's risk attitude. Previous empirical studies reveal that the supplier is very conservative when commencing the order fulfillment. The studies attribute this to high holding and cancellation costs relative to the delay cost. Our model provides two alternative explanations. First, other than costs, when the supplier starts to produce depends also on how the distribution of the demand arrival time is updated as time progresses. Second, although the effect of increasing risk aversion of the supplier on the optimal time to produce is ambiguous, we show that it plays a major role in the decision and thus it alone may have caused the supplier to be conservative.     

Omnichannel retail operations with ship-to-store and ship-from-store options under supply disruption

Omnichannel retailing strategies are widely used in practice and have been extensively studied in recent years, but few studies have explored omnichannel retailing operations in response to supply disruption in the post-pandemic era. To fill this gap, this study explores whether the adoption of omnichannel fulfillment options (i.e., ship-from-store and ship-to-store options) can mitigate the risk of supply disruption in a supply chain where a retailer orders products from a reliable supplier and a risky supplier, respectively. Under the omnichannel retailing strategy, the retailer’s order quantity from the risky supplier may increase or decrease while that from the reliable supplier may increase. Interestingly, it is possible to achieve a win–win–win outcome when the supply disruption risk is high and the market share of the channel offered by the risky supplier is low. Moreover, the entire supply chain benefits from the omnichannel retailing strategy even if it faces a high level of disruption risk.     

OEM订单响应能力与缩短订单周期的策略研究

针对订单生产务件下,缩短订单周期是赢得顾客订单,提高市场竞争能力的重要保证,本文构造了订单生产环境下2种典型的OEM生产方式的运作框架模型.对影响OEM企业的订单响应能力的因素进行了分析,探讨了OEM订单响应能力问题,提出了缩短订单周期的几个有效策略:压缩OEM订单流程、动态OEM排产系统、合作计划、柔性生产与交货系统...     

The impact of third-party remanufacturing on the forward supply chain: a blessing or a curse?

It is widely agreed that the entry of third-party remanufacturers (TPRs) hurts original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) because remanufacturing cannibalises the new product sales. In this paper, motivated by the practice of mobile phone remanufacturing, we develop a game theoretical model to revisit the impact of third-party remanufacturing on a forward supply chain in which one OEM purchases critical components from one dominant supplier. The OEM may operate the remanufacturing business as cost-efficient as the TPR. Our analytical results show that regardless of the OEM’s remanufacturing capability, third-party remanufacturing could be beneficial to the OEM in that the supplier would lower the wholesale price as a response to the entry of the TPR; in addition, compared with the case without remanufacturing, third-party remanufacturing is always detrimental to the supplier, but the supplier should not always attempt to deter the entry of the TPR because third-party remanufacturing could be less detrimental than the OEM’s in-house remanufacturing. Under certain conditions, the two players in the forward supply chain both prefer third-party remanufacturing over in-house remanufacturing. The key intuition driving this finding is that third-party remanufacturing makes the OEM and the supplier allied; while in-house remanufacturing makes them against each other.     

Pricing decisions in a strategic single retailer/dual suppliers setting under order size constraints

In this paper, we study a duopolistic market of suppliers competing for the business of a retailer. The retailer sets the order cycle and quantities from each supplier to minimize its annual costs. Different from other studies in the literature, our work simultaneously considers the order size restriction and the benefit of order consolidation, and shows non-trivial pricing behaviour of the suppliers under different settings. Under asymmetric information setting, we formulate the pricing problem of the preferred supplier as a non-linear programming problem and use Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions to find the optimal solution. In general, unless the preferred supplier has high-order size limit, it prefers sharing the market with its competitor when retailer’s demand, benefit of order consolidation or fixed cost of ordering from the preferred supplier is high. We model the symmetric information setting as a two-agent non-zero sum pricing game and establish the equilibrium conditions. We show that a supplier might set a ‘threshold price’ to capture the entire market if its per unit fixed ordering cost is sufficiently small. Finally, we prove that there exists a joint-order Nash equilibrium only if the suppliers set identical prices low enough to make the retailer place full-size orders from both.