The conscious, the unconscious, and familiarity.

This article examines the role of subjective familiarity in the implicit and explicit learning of artificial grammars. Experiment 1 found that objective measures of similarity (including fragment frequency and repetition structure) predicted ratings of familiarity, that familiarity ratings predicted grammaticality judgments, and that the extremity of familiarity ratings predicted confidence. Familiarity was further shown to predict judgments in the absence of confidence, hence contributing to above-chance guessing. Experiment 2 found that confidence developed as participants refined their knowledge of the distribution of familiarity and that differences in familiarity could be exploited prior to confidence developing. Experiment 3 found that familiarity was consciously exploited to make grammaticality judgments including those made without confidence and that familiarity could in some instances influence participants' grammaticality judgments apparently without their awareness. All 3 experiments found that knowledge distinct from familiarity was derived only under deliberate learning conditions. The results provide decisive evidence that familiarity is the essential source of knowledge in artificial grammar learning while also supporting a dual-process model of implicit and explicit learning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Readers' reliance on source credibility in the service of comprehension.

The current project examined the impact of knowledge about the credibility of sources on readers' processing of texts. Participants read texts in which information about characters was provided by either a credible or a noncredible source; this information suggested that the character potentially possessed a particular trait. A subsequent text episode offered the opportunity for participants to apply any inferred trait to their understanding of unfolding story events. In Experiment 1, participants' moment-by-moment reading times indicated strong expectations for characters to behave in trait-consistent ways, with little effect of credibility on those expectations. Experiments 2 and 3 provided participants with additional encouragement to attend to credibility during reading, but these experiments also revealed little influence of credibility. In Experiment 4, in addition to being given added encouragement, participants were explicitly asked to evaluate the likelihood of future text events; under these conditions, expectations for story outcomes were influenced by the credibility of information sources. This influence was mediated by the degree to which participants self-reported relying on credibility during the task. These findings have implications for contemporary accounts of text comprehension, persuasion, and individual differences in credibility assessment. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

How prior knowledge, WMC, and relevance of information affect eye fixations in expository text.

This study examined how prior knowledge and working memory capacity (WMC) influence the effect of a reading perspective on online text processing. In Experiment 1, 47 participants read and recalled 2 texts of different familiarity from a given perspective while their eye movements were recorded. The participants' WMC was assessed with the reading span test. The results suggest that if the reader has prior knowledge related to text contents and a high WMC, relevant text information can be encoded into memory without extra processing time. In Experiment 2, baseline processing times showed whether readers slow down their processing of relevant information or read faster through the irrelevant information. The results are discussed in the light of different working memory theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Metamemory judgments and the benefits of repeated study: Improving recall predictions through the activation of appropriate knowledge.

Correspondence between judgments of learning (JOLs) and actual recall tends to be poor when the same items are studied and recalled multiple times (e.g., A. Koriat, L. Sheffer, & H. Ma’ayan, 2002). The authors investigated whether making relevant metamemory knowledge more salient would improve the association between actual and predicted recall as a function of repeated exposure to the same study list. In 2 experiments, participants completed 4 study–recall phases involving the same list of items. In addition to having participants make item-by-item JOLs during each study phase, after the 1st study–recall phase participants also generated change-in-recall estimates as to how many more or fewer words they would recall given another exposure to the same study list. This estimation procedure was designed to highlight repeated study as a factor that can contribute to recall performance. Activating metamemory knowledge about the benefits of repeated study for recall in this way allowed participants to accurately express this knowledge in a free-recall context (Experiment 2), but less so when the memory test was cued recall (Experiment 1). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning of nondomain facts in high- and low-knowledge domains.

Research on expertise has repeatedly documented that experts learn new information better than do novices, but only when the information is relevant to the expert's domain. It was found in Experiment 1 that participants showed superior learning and recall of a large quantity of new, non-domain-relevant facts about concepts within their domain of high knowledge than about concepts for which they had low domain knowledge. Experiment 2 investigated whether the participants' superior recall of new facts related to concepts within their domain of high knowledge was due to the number of prior facts associated with the concept or to the prior frequency of repetition of those concepts. It was found that participants' recall of new facts was better for concepts with 5 prior associated facts than for concepts with a single prior association but that the number of previous repetitions of each concept did not affect the level of recall for the new facts. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Linguistic and Conceptual Influences on Adjective Acquisition in 24- and 36-Month-Olds.

Two hundred forty English-speaking toddlers (24- and 36-month-olds) heard novel adjectives applied to familiar objects (Experiment 1) and novel objects (Experiment 2). Children were successful in mapping adjectives to target properties only when information provided by the noun, in conjunction with participants' knowledge of the objects, provided coherent category information: when basic-level nouns or superordinate-level nouns were used with familiar objects, when novel basic-level nouns were used with novel objects, and-for 36-month-olds-when the nouns were underspecified with respect to category (thing or one) but participants could nonetheless infer a category from pragmatic and conceptual knowledge. These results provide evidence concerning how nouns influence adjective learning, and they support the notion that toddlers consider pragmatic factors when learning new words. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The semantic and episodic subcomponents of famous person knowledge: Dissociation in healthy subjects.

Fifty-two subjects between ages 40 and 79 years were administered a questionnaire assessing their ability to recall semantic information about famous people from 4 different decades and to recollect its episodic source of acquisition together with autonoetic consciousness via the remember-know paradigm. In addition, they underwent a battery of standardized neuropsychological tests to assess episodic and semantic memory and executive functions. The analyses of age reveal differences for the episodic source score but no differences between age groups for the semantic scores within each decade. Regardless of the age of people, the analyses also show that semantic memory subcomponents of the famous person test are highly associated with each other as well as with the source component. The recall of semantic information on the famous person test relies on participants' semantic abilities, whereas the recall of its episodic source depends on their executive functions. The present findings confirm the existence of an episodic-semantic distinction in knowledge about famous people. They provide further evidence that personal source and semantic information are at once distinct and highly interactive within the framework of remote memory. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Two mechanisms in implicit artificial grammar learning? Comment on Meulemans and Van der Linden (1997).

T. Meulemans and M. Van der Linden (see record 1997-05320-013) presented evidence for 2 distinct mechanisms involved in artificial grammar learning. They suggested that after training on 32 letter strings (Experiment 2A), participants classify test strings using knowledge of the distributional statistics of letter chunks, whereas after training on 125 letter strings (Experiment 2B) they classify on the basis of knowledge of the rules of the grammar. This article offers an alternative unitary account of Meulemans and Van der Linden's findings. The authors show that information about grammatical rules and chunk locations was confounded in the test strings used in Experiment 2B and then present evidence that all of the data can be explained in terms of distributional knowledge, provided this includes knowledge of the positional constraints on chunks. Finally, the authors question the utility of traditional finite-state grammars for investigating abstraction processes, and suggest alternative methods. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Global self-esteem and specific self-views as determinants of people's reactions to success and failure.

A critical question in self-esteem research is whether people's reactions to success and failure are guided by their global self-esteem level or by their more specific beliefs about their abilities and attributes. To address this issue, the authors led participants to experience success or failure on an alleged test and then assessed their cognitive and emotional reactions to these outcomes. In Experiment 1, specific self-views predicted participants' cognitive reactions to their performance outcomes, whereas global self-esteem predicted participants' emotional reactions to their performance outcomes. In Experiment 2, global self-esteem predicted participants' emotional reactions to their performance outcomes even after participants' beliefs about their more specific abilities and attributes were taken into account. These findings suggest that when it comes to understanding people's emotional reactions to success and failure, the effects of global self-esteem are not reducible to the way people think about their constituent qualities. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Regulatory fit as input for stop rules.

Three experiments show that the motivational effects of regulatory fit (consistency between regulatory state and strategic means) are context dependent. With no explicit decision rule about when to stop (Experiment 1) or an explicit enjoyment stop rule (Experiments 2 and 3), participants exerted more effort on tasks when experiencing regulatory fit than when experiencing regulatory nonfit. With an explicit sufficiency stop rule (Experiments 2 and 3), participants exerted less effort when experiencing regulatory fit than when experiencing regulatory nonfit. The interactive effect of regulatory fit and stop rules can be explained by misattribution of rightness feelings from regulatory fit; the effect was eliminated by drawing participants' attention to an earlier event as a source of rightness feelings (Experiments 1 and 3). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Feedback motivation and reactions to personality interpretations that differ in favorability and accuracy.

Personality feedback based on participants' actual test scores was systematically varied in terms of accuracy and favorability and presented to subjects for the purpose of comparing reactions to the various types of feedback information. Responses to the self-relevant information were related to individual differences in the recipient's general level of desire for personal feedback. For most subjects, ratings of feedback accuracy showed stronger endorsement for positive over negative feedback, and for accurate over inaccurate feedback. Raters who exhibited high levels of desire for feedback, however, did not discriminate between favorable and unfavorable accurate feedback, or between accurate and inaccurate favorable feedback. The results are discussed in terms of (a) the reliability of personal endorsements for results derived from psychological testing devices and (b) potential for personal adjustment indicated by higher levels of desire for personal feedback. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Stress affects the selection of relevant from irrelevant stimuli.

Two experiments were used to examine the effects of stress on latent inhibition (LI; poorer learning with a previously exposed irrelevant stimulus rather than a novel stimulus). In Experiment 1, stress was induced in college students by threatening participants' self-esteem with a difficult number series completion test that was related to intelligence. In Experiment 2, the participants were job seekers who were either informed or not that the LI test was part of the selection process. In both experiments, LI was attenuated in high- as compared with low-stressed participants. The results suggest that stress and/or anxiety impairs the inhibition of irrelevant-preexposed stimuli. Implications for understanding the impaired selective attentional processes in schizophrenia and schizotypy are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The persistent use of negative affect by anxious individuals to estimate risk.

Three experiments investigated how trait anxiety would influence individuals' assumptions about the relevance of their experiences of state anxiety for judgments of risk. Experiment 1 found that attributions of state anxiety to a judgment-irrelevant source reduced the risk estimates of low, but not of high, trait-anxious individuals. The results of Experiment 2 suggest that attribution manipulations reduce the influence of state affect on judgment only when the state affect is inconsistent with participants' trait affect. Experiment 3 revealed that these effects can be controlled by explicitly manipulating participants' assumptions about the relevance of their feelings. Regardless of the level of trait anxiety, attributions were effective at reducing mood effects when facts, but not feelings, were assumed to be the relevant basis for judgment. Overall, the results suggest that trait-consistent affect is more readily assumed to be informative and hence is more likely to be relied on than trait-inconsistent affect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Irrelevant Sound Phenomenon Revisited: What Role for Working Memory Capacity?

High-span individuals (as measured by the operation span [OSPAN] technique) are less likely than low-span individuals to notice their own names in an unattended auditory stream (A. R. A. Conway, N. Cowan, & M. F. Bunting, 2001). The possibility that OSPAN accounts for individual differences in auditory distraction on an immediate recall test was examined. There was no evidence that high-OSPAN participants were more resistant to the disruption caused by irrelevant speech in serial or in free recall. Low-OSPAN participants did, however, make more semantically related intrusion errors from the irrelevant sound stream in a free recall test (Experiment 4). Results suggest that OSPAN mediates semantic components of auditory distraction dissociable from other aspects of the irrelevant sound effect. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Recognition is used as one cue among others in judgment and decision making.

Three experiments with paired comparisons were conducted to test the noncompensatory character of the recognition heuristic (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002) in judgment and decision making. Recognition and knowledge about the recognized alternative were manipulated. In Experiment 1, participants were presented pairs of animal names where the task was to select the animal with the larger population. In Experiment 2, participants chose the safer 1 out of 2 airlines, and 3 knowledge cues were varied simultaneously. Recognition effects were partly compensated by task-relevant knowledge. The compensatory effects were additive. Decisions were slower when recognition and knowledge were incongruent. In Experiment 3, compensatory effects of knowledge and recognition were found for the city-size task which had originally been used to demonstrate the noncompensatory character of the recognition heuristic. These results suggest that recognition information is not used in an all-or-none fashion but is integrated with other types of knowledge in judgment and decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Me versus just us versus us all" categorization and cooperation in nested social dilemmas.

In its generic form, a social dilemma poses a conflict between private and collective interests. People are often faced, however, with a conflict between private, (sub)group, and collective interests. This study examines participants simultaneous weighing of these 3 nested interests. The results show that increasing the salience of social categorization of any level of the hierarchy (i.e., 6 individuals, 2 subgroups, 1 collective) increases participants' concern for and contributions to the corresponding levels of interest (Experiment 1). One can promote concern for and contributions to the collective interest, which are lowest under categorization as 2 subgroups, by individuating the members of the individuals' own subgroup and/or the opposing subgroup (Experiment 2) and by cross-categorization with the opposing subgroup (Experiment 3). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Deconfounding the effects of dominance and social acceptance on self-esteem.

Three studies examined the independent effects of social acceptance and dominance on self-esteem. In Studies 1 and 2, participants received false feedback regarding their relative acceptance and dominance in a laboratory group, and state self-esteem was assessed. Results indicated that acceptance and dominance feedback had independent effects on self-esteem. Study 2 showed that these effects were not moderated by individual differences in participants' self-reported responsivity to being accepted versus dominant. In Study 3, participants completed multiple measures of perceived dominance, perceived acceptance, and trait self-esteem. Results showed that both perceived dominance and perceived acceptance accounted for unique variance in trait self-esteem, but that perceived acceptance consistently accounted for substantially more variance than perceived dominance. Also, trait self-esteem was related to the degree to which participants felt accepted by specific people in their lives, but not to the degree to which participants thought those individuals perceived them as dominant. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Regulating affect interpersonally: When low esteem leads to greater enhancement.

We tested the hypothesis that low self-esteem persons use self-presentation to improve their affect. In Experiments 1–3, Ss high in self-esteem (HSE) and low in self-esteem (LSE) responded publicly or privately to positive or negative feedback from a computer "personality test" (Experiments 1 and 2) or from a peer (Experiment 3). In public, LSE Ss complimented positive sources and derogated negative sources more than their counterparts did. Experiment 2 showed that this was not due to another person's awareness of the feedback, ruling out a strict impression management interpretation. In Experiment 4, some Ss were coaxed to compliment the source of feedback and others were coaxed to derogate the source of feedback. When publicly complimenting positive feedback or derogating negative feedback, LSE Ss generally showed a rise in esteem relative to their counterparts. Based on these findings, a model of affect regulation in interpersonal relations is proposed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Investigating single-word syntactic primes in naming tasks: a recurrent network approach

Three experiments compared the qualitative pattern of participants' word-naming performance in a syntactic priming task with the qualitative pattern of performance generated by a recurrent network model. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that when participants had a 600-ms response deadline, the appropriateness of a syntactic prime affected their naming times for high-frequency words but not low-frequency words. However, Experiment 2 also demonstrated that participants made the most pronunciation errors when naming inconsistent low-frequency words (e.g., pint) that were preceded by an inappropriate prime. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that participants' naming times to both high- and low-frequency words are affected by syntactic primes when there is no response deadline. The implication of these findings for the study of syntactic priming in English and other languages is discussed.     

Variability in stepping direction explains the veering behavior of blind walkers.

Walking without vision results in veering, an inability to maintain a straight path that has important consequences for blind pedestrians. In this study, the authors addressed whether the source of veering in the absence of visual and auditory feedback is better attributed to errors in perceptual encoding or undetected motor error. Three experiments had the following results: No significant differences in the shapes of veering trajectories were found between blind and blindfolded participants; accuracy in detecting curved walking paths was not correlated with simple measures of veering behavior; and explicit perceptual cues to initial walking direction did not reduce veering. The authors present a model that accounts for the major characteristics of participants' veering behavior by postulating 3 independent sources of undetected motor error: initial orientation, consistent biases in step direction, and, most important, variable error in individual steps. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)