Setters and samoyeds: the emergence of subordinate level categories as a basis for inductive inference in preschool-age children

Basic level categories are a rich source of inductive inference for children and adults. These 3 experiments examine how preschool-age children partition their inductively rich basic level categories to form subordinate level categories and whether these have inductive potential. Children were taught a novel property about an individual member of a familiar basic level category (e.g., a collie). Then, children's extensions of that property to other objects from the same subordinate (e.g., other collies), basic (e.g., other dogs), and superordinate (e.g., other animals) level categories were examined. The results suggest (a) that contrastive information promotes the emergence of subordinate categories as a basis of inductive inference and (b) that newly established subordinate categories can retain their inductive potential in subsequent reasoning over a week's time.     

Similarity and property effects in inductive reasoning.

Three experiments investigated the proposal that inductive inferences about different properties depend on different measures of similarity. In Exps 1 and 2, Ss were given the premise that a category of animals has some property and judged the probability that another category of animals also has that property. Ss made the strongest inferences when the kind of property (anatomical or behavioral) corresponded to the kind of similarity between the animal categories (anatomical or behavioral). These results cannot be explained in terms of a single measure of similarity underlying induction. In Exp 3, Ss rated the similarity of animal pairs with respect to anatomy or behavior. Regression analyses showed that both behavioral and anatomical similarity influenced behavioral inferences, but only anatomical similarity influenced anatomical inferences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

From Covariation to Causation: A Test of the Assumption of Causal Power.

How humans infer causation from covariation has been the subject of a vigorous debate, most recently between the computational causal power account (P. W. Cheng, 1997) and associative learning theorists (e.g., K. Lober & D. R. Shanks, 2000). Whereas most researchers in the subject area agree that causal power as computed by the power PC theory offers a normative account of the inductive process. Lober and Shanks, among others, have questioned the empirical validity of the theory. This article offers a full report and additional analyses of the original study featured in Lober and Shanks's critique (M. J. Buehner & P. W. Cheng, 1997) and reports tests of Lober and Shanks's and other explanations of the pattern of causal judgments. Deviations from normativity, including the outcome-density bias, were found to be misperceptions of the input or other artifacts of the experimental procedures rather than inherent to the process of causal induction. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Elements of the Socratic method: II. Inductive reasoning.

The Socratic method uses systematic questioning and inductive reasoning to help clients derive universal definitions. In psychotherapy, inductive reasoning can be based on enumerative generalizations, analogical comparisons, and eliminative causal reasoning. Enumerative generalizations use pattern identification to support a conclusion about an entire group of events. Analogical comparisons help clients transfer knowledge from familiar to novel situations. Eliminative causal reasoning involves manipulating environmental conditions to examine possible causes of specific problematic events. After a probable cause has been identified, it can be modified through treatment. The clinical utility and fallacies of logical reasoning are discussed as they apply to each of the 3 forms of inductive reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The role of comparison in the extension of novel adjectives.

Previous research has documented that basic-level object categories provide an initial foundation for mapping adjectives to object properties. Children ranging from 21 months to 3 years can successfully extend a novel adjective (e.g., transparent) to other objects sharing a salient property if the objects are all members of the same basic-level category; if the objects are members of different basic-level categories, they fail to extend adjectives systematically (R. S. Klibanoff & S. R. Waxman, 2000a; S. R. Waxman & D. B. Markow, 1998). The present study proposed that the process of comparison is instrumental in children's ability to move beyond this foundation. To promote comparison, 2 target objects were introduced to 3-year-olds. In Experiment 1, the targets had contrastive properties (e.g., 1 transparent and 1 opaque object); in Experiment 2, the targets had consistent properties (e.g., 2 transparent objects). The results of both experiments illustrate that comparison—a general psychological process—operates in conjunction with naming to support the extension of novel adjectives to properties of objects from diverse basic-level categories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why dogs have puppies and cats have kittens: the role of birth in young children's understanding of biological origins

Three studies examined young children's understanding of the biologically causal role of birth in determining animal properties and species kind identity. In Studies 1 and 2, 4- to 7-year-olds and adults were told stories in which a baby was born to an animal of one species (e.g., a horse) but was adopted and raised by an animal of another species (e.g., a cow). In Study 1, children were asked to judge which parent the baby would resemble on a set of physical properties and beliefs. The majority of children were unable to say that the baby would resemble the birth parent on physical properties but share the beliefs of the adoptive parent. These results indicate that children were not using domain-specific causal understandings to reason about the origins of these properties. In Study 2, however, when asked to explicitly predict the kind of the baby, even 5-year-olds were able to reliably judge that the baby would be of the same species kind as the birth parent rather than the adoptive parent. This result suggests that children do understand at some level that birth determines species kind. Study 3 examined further the extent to which knowledge about birth influenced children's inferences about properties. Five-year-olds were asked to judge whether a baby would share a set of physical and nonphysical properties with its mother or its father. The results showed that children who knew the factual information about where babies come from (i.e., inside mommies' tummies) were more likely to attribute the mother's properties to the baby than the father's, regardless of whether the properties were physical or nonphysical. But this finding was true only if the property of one of the parents was not inherently more desirable or true than that of the other parent. In sum, the results of these 3 studies indicate that knowledge of birth does play a role in children's inferential reasoning, even for 5-year-olds, but that that role is not domain-specific. The implications for children's understanding of biological inheritance are discussed.     

Relative use of necessity and sufficiency information in causal judgments about natural categories.

Participants in 4 studies placed less emphasis on necessity information (instances when the event occurred but the target factor was absent) than sufficiency information (instances when the target factor was present but the event did not occur) when the target factor corresponded to a natural kind category (e.g., race or species) in comparison with an artificial category (e.g., preferences or facial features) or an artifactual category (e.g., product type). Results were not due to differences in familiarity, prior causal beliefs, or ease of imagining the class of instances, but instead derived from less willingness to search for alternative explanations when the target explanation was based on a natural kind category in comparison with artificial or artifactual categories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Generic language and speaker confidence guide preschoolers’ inferences about novel animate kinds.

We investigated the influence of speaker certainty on 156 four-year-old children’s sensitivity to generic and nongeneric statements. An inductive inference task was implemented, in which a speaker described a nonobvious property of a novel creature using either a generic or a nongeneric statement. The speaker appeared to be confident, neutral, or uncertain about the information being relayed. Preschoolers were subsequently asked if a second exemplar shared the same property as the first. Preschoolers consistently extended properties to additional exemplars only when properties were described in a generic form by a confident or neutral speaker. If a speaker appeared to be uncertain or if statements were made in a nongeneric form, properties were not consistently extended beyond the first exemplar. The findings demonstrate that children integrate the inductive cues provided by generic language with social cues when reasoning about abstract kinds. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning and retention through predictive inference and classification.

Work in category learning addresses how humans acquire knowledge and, thus, should inform classroom practices. In two experiments, we apply and evaluate intuitions garnered from laboratory-based research in category learning to learning tasks situated in an educational context. In Experiment 1, learning through predictive inference and classification were compared for fifth-grade students using class-related materials. Making inferences about properties of category members and receiving feedback led to the acquisition of both queried (i.e., tested) properties and nonqueried properties that were correlated with a queried property (e.g., even if not queried, students learned about a species' habitat because it correlated with a queried property, like the species' size). In contrast, classifying items according to their species and receiving feedback led to knowledge of only the property most diagnostic of category membership. After multiple-day delay, the fifth-graders who learned through inference selectively retained information about the queried properties, and the fifth-graders who learned through classification retained information about the diagnostic property, indicating a role for explicit evaluation in establishing memories. Overall, inference learning resulted in fewer errors, better retention, and more liking of the categories than did classification learning. Experiment 2 revealed that querying a property only a few times was enough to manifest the full benefits of inference learning in undergraduate students. These results suggest that classroom teaching should emphasize reasoning from the category to multiple properties rather than from a set of properties to the category. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Blickets and babies: The development of causal reasoning in toddlers and infants.

Previous research has suggested that preschoolers possess a cognitive system that allows them to construct an abstract, coherent representation of causal relations among events. Such a system lets children reason retrospectively when they observe ambiguous data in a rational manner (e.g., D. M. Sobel, J. B. Tenenbaum, & A. Gopnik, 2004). However, there is little evidence that demonstrates whether younger children possess similar inferential abilities. In Experiment 1, the authors extended previous findings with older children to examine 19- and 24-month-olds' causal inferences. Twenty-four-month-olds' inferences were similar to those of preschoolers, but younger children lacked the ability to make retrospective causal inferences, perhaps because of performance limitations. In Experiment 2, the authors designed an eye-tracking paradigm to test younger participants that eliminated various manual search demands. Eight-month-olds' anticipatory eye movements, in response to retrospective data, revealed inferences similar to those of 24-month-olds in Experiment 1 and preschoolers in previous research. These data are discussed in terms of associative reasoning and causal inference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Mechanisms of predictive and diagnostic causal induction.

In predictive causal inference, people reason from causes to effects, whereas in diagnostic inference, they reason from effects to causes. Independently of the causal structure of the events, the temporal structure of the information provided to a reasoner may vary (e.g., multiple events followed by a single event vs. a single event followed by multiple events). The authors report 5 experiments in which causal structure and temporal information were varied independently. Inferences were influenced by temporal structure but not by causal structure. The results are relevant to the evaluation of 2 current accounts of causal induction, the Rescorla-Wagner (R. A. Rescorla & A. R. Wagner, 1972) and causal model theories (M. R. Waldmann & K. J. Holyoak, 1992). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Effects of relatedness and number of distractors on attribute judgments in Alzheimer's disease.

Participants made judgments about the relative salience of category exemplars (e.g., fruit: apple or grape) or parts (e.g., plane: wings or seats). Mildly affected Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients were as accurate but slower than normal controls, and their response times increased more for related (e.g., apple, grape, or fig) than unrelated (e.g., apple, gym, bandit) choices as the number of alternatives was increased from 2 to 3. Performance (accuracy and response times) of moderate-severely affected patients was poorer still, but number of distractors and relatedness did not interact. In combination with previous findings (e.g., M. K. Johnson, A. M. Hermann, & J. L. Bonilla, 1995), these results suggest that the reflective processes necessary for deciding among competing alternatives show disruption early in the disease process. Such processing deficits would compound any difficulties arising from a degrading semantic structure. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Thematic relations in adults' concepts.

Concepts can be organized by their members' similarities, forming a kind (e.g., animal), or by their external relations within scenes or events (e.g., cake and candles). This latter type of relation, known as the thematic relation, is frequently found to be the basis of children's but not adults' classification. However, 10 experiments found that when thematic relations are meaningful and salient, they have significant influence on adults' category construction (sorting), inductive reasoning, and verification of category membership. The authors conclude that concepts function closely with knowledge of scenes and events and that this knowledge has a role in adults' conceptual representations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessment of behavioral chaos with a focus on transitions in depression.

This article is the second of three in a special section on chaos theory and psychological assessment. The purpose of this article is to address implications for the measurement of some unstable, transitional human behaviors. One early hallmark of behavioral assessment is the idiographic measurement of temporal, causal, and target factors (e.g., M. R. Goldfried & R. N. Kent, 1972). This is the same basic measurement approach used in chaos theory testing. In addition, behavioral theories have posited nonlinear relations among variables (e.g., J. D. Cone, 1981). However, theory testing often involves investigation of linear relations among episodic and averaged indexes of the variables (e.g., M. J. Marr, 1989). The study of unstable behaviors and chaotic transitions could revive the use of unaveraged single-subject, time series measurement approaches. A rationale for a subtype of chaotic depression (e.g., L. Glass & M. C. Mackey, 1988) and its measurement is offered. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Necessity and natural categories.

Our knowledge of natural categories includes beliefs not only about what is true of them but also about what would be true if the categories had properties other than (or in addition to) their actual ones. Evidence about these beliefs comes from three lines of research: experiments on category-based induction, on hypothetical transformations of category members, and on definitions of kind terms. The 1st part of this article examines results and theories arising from each of these research streams. The 2nd part considers possible unified theories for this domain, including theories based on ideals and norms. It also contrasts 2 broad frameworks for modal category information: one focusing on beliefs about intrinsic or essential properties, the other focusing on interacting causal relations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A psychophysiological investigation of the selection and the use of partial stimulus information in response choice.

Two alternative explanations were examined for why selective response activation sometimes starts before stimulus identification is complete (e.g., J. O. Miller & S. A. Hackley, 1992) and sometimes starts only after stimulus identification is complete (e.g., R. De Jong, M. Wierda, G. Mulder, & L. J. M. Mulder, 1988). Distinct psychophysiological methods related to stimulus identification and response selection provided evidence suggesting that partial stimulus information is identified but is or is not used before the stimulus is identified more fully, depending on task requirements. This result (a) suggests strategic adaptation of task performance, (b) is inconsistent with particular discrete and continuous models of information processing, and (c) shows the existence of a central selection mechanism that can prevent the automatic activation of responses associated with preliminary available stimulus information. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Labeling Bias and Categorical Induction: Generative Aspects of Category Information.

When a person is characterized categorically with a label (e.g., Linda is a feminist), people tend to think that the attributes associated with that person are central and long lasting (S. Gelman & G. D. Heyman, 1999). This bias, which is related to category-based induction and stereotyping, has been thought to arise because a category label (e.g., feminist) activates the dominant properties associated with the representation of the category. This explanation implies that categorical information influences inferential processes mainly by conjuring up main attributes or instances represented in the category. However, the present experiments reveal that this attribute-based explanation of induction does not provide a complete picture of inferential processes. The results from 3 experiments suggest that category information can affect inferences of attributes that are not directly related to the category, suggesting that categories not only activate likely attributes but also help integrate unlikely or even unrelated attributes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal relations and feature similarity in children's inductive reasoning.

Four experiments examined the development of property induction on the basis of causal relations. In the first 2 studies, 5-year-olds, 8-year-olds, and adults were presented with triads in which a target instance was equally similar to 2 inductive bases but shared a causal antecedent feature with 1 of them. All 3 age groups used causal relations as a basis for property induction, although the proportion of causal inferences increased with age. Subsequent experiments pitted causal relations against featural similarity in induction. It was found that adults and 8-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, preferred shared causal relations over strong featural similarity as a basis for induction. The implications for models of inductive reasoning and development are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Causal knowledge and categories: The effects of causal beliefs on categorization, induction, and similarity.

Despite the recent interest in the theoretical knowledge embedded in human representations of categories, little research has systematically manipulated the structure of such knowledge. Across four experiments this study assessed the effects of interattribute causal laws on a number of category-based judgments. The authors found that (a) any attribute occupying a central position in a network of causal relationships comes to dominate category membership, (b) combinations of attribute values are important to category membership to the extent they jointly confirm or violate the causal laws, and (c) the presence of causal knowledge affects the induction of new properties to the category. These effects were a result of the causal laws, rather than the empirical correlations produced by those laws. Implications for the doctrine of psychological essentialism, similarity-based models of categorization, and the representation of causal knowledge are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)