Supply chain financing with advance selling under disruption

We study a financing problem in a supply chain (SC) consisting of one supplier and one buyer under supply disruption. The supplier could face a disruption at its end which could effectively reduce its yield in case of disruption, thereby resulting in supply yield uncertainty. The retailer can finance the supplier using advance selling that can help mitigate the impact of disruption. We model this problem as a Stackelberg game, where the supplier as the leader announces the wholesale price and the retailer responds by deciding its optimal order quantity given stochastic demand and an exogenous fixed retail price. The supplier then commences production and a disruption can happen with a known probability. We assume that under disruption the quantity delivered is a fraction of the initial quantity ordered by the retailer. The retailer loses any unmet demand. We analyze three different scenarios of the Stackelberg game, namely no advance selling with disruption, advance selling without disruption, and advance selling with disruption. Our results indicate that advance selling can be used to mitigate the impact of supply disruption and at the same time could lead to an increase in the overall SC profit.     

Pharmaceutical supply chain networks with outsourcing under price and quality competition

In this paper, we present a pharmaceutical supply chain network model with outsourcing under price and quality competition, in both equilibrium and dynamic versions. We consider a pharmaceutical firm that is engaged in determining the optimal pharmaceutical flows associated with its supply chain network activities in the form of manufacturing and distribution. In addition to multimarket demand satisfaction, the pharmaceutical firm seeks to minimize its total cost, with the associated function also capturing the firm's weighted disrepute cost caused by possible quality issues associated with the contractors. Simultaneously, the contractors, who compete with one another noncooperatively in prices in the manner of Bertrand, and in quality, seek to secure manufacturing and distribution of the pharmaceutical product from the pharmaceutical firm. This game theory model allows for the determination of the optimal pharmaceutical product flows associated with the supply chain in‐house and outsourcing network activities and provides the pharmaceutical firm with its optimal make‐or‐buy decisions and the optimal contractor selections. We state the governing equilibrium conditions and derive the equivalent variational inequality formulation. We then propose dynamic adjustment processes for the evolution of the product flows, the quality levels, and the prices, along with stability analysis results. The algorithm yields a discretization of the continuous‐time adjustment processes. We present convergence results and compute solutions to numerical examples to illustrate the generality and applicability of the framework.     

具有风险规避型零售商的闭环供应链网络均衡分析

在随机需求条件下研究了由多个相互竞争的供应商、制造商、零售商和消费市场组成,且零售商具有风险规避特性的再制造闭环供应链网络均衡问题.通过对不同决策层级最优化行为的分析,分别得到各层级和整个供应链网络实现均衡的条件,并建立相关的变分不等式模型.运用拟牛顿算法对变分不等式进行求解,通过仿真分析了随机再制造率和零售商的风险规避程度对网络成员最优行为和闭环供应链网络均衡的影响.     

具有损失规避零售商的模糊供应链网络均衡

针对模糊市场需求情形,研究具有损失规避行为零售商的无缺货成本的供应链网络均衡问题。利用模糊事件的可信性测度理论,推导具有分段线性效用函数损失规避零售商的模糊期望效用模型,揭示其凹性性质。利用变分不等式理论,描述制造商、零售商和消费者的最优行为,进而构建网络均衡模型。为了简化网络均衡条件,揭示了制造商与零售商内生交易定价机制的等价关系。最后,利用数值分析表明了市场需求的模糊性和损失规避系数对网络均衡的影响。     

A Closed-Loop Supply Chain Equilibrium Model with Random and Price-Sensitive Demand and Return

This paper proposes a decentralized closed-loop supply chain network model consisting of raw material suppliers, manufacturers, retailers, and recovery centers. We assume that the demands for the product and the corresponding returns are random and price-sensitive. Retailers and recovery centers face penalties associated with shortage demand and supply, respectively. We derive the optimality conditions of the various decision-makers, and establish that the governing equilibrium conditions can be formulated as a finite-dimensional variational inequality problem. The qualitative properties of the solution to the variational inequality are discussed. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the effects of demand and return uncertainties on quantity shipments and prices.     

损失概率厌恶和损失厌恶行为零售商的供应链网络均衡

研究零售商的损失概率厌恶和损失厌恶有限理性行为对供应链网络均衡的影响. 利用变分不等式和互补理论刻画制造商的最优行为和需求市场的供需均衡; 基于累积前景理论建立零售商的凹前景值函数, 并利用变分不等式刻画零售市场均衡. 零售商有限理性行为对其均衡行为的比较静态分析结果表明: 零售商的最大损失重视程度越大, 其均衡订购量越小; 零售商的最大获利重视程度越大, 其均衡订购量越大; 零售商的损失概率敏感度越大, 其均衡订购量越小; 零售商的损失厌恶程度越大, 其均衡订购量越小.

     

供应链网络双渠道均衡

研究了制造商通过分销商实体链和电子商务直销渠道,将其产品经由零售商销售给具有随机需求的消费市场的供应链网络双渠道均衡问题.利用有限维变分不等式理论,分别刻画了存在生产能力限制的供应市场、分销市场、零售市场以及存在限定性价格上限的消费市场的均衡,建立了整个供应链网络双渠道均衡模型,并且设计了供应链网络双渠道均衡的投影收缩算法.数值算例结果表明:当政府对竞争市场实行限制性价格上限时,将造成消费市场中的商品短缺,并导致制造商、分销商以及零售商的总利润减少,当存在产能约束时情况更为严重.     

Pricing and production decisions in dual-channel supply chains with demand disruptions

This paper develops a two-period pricing and production decision model in a one- manufacturer-one-retailer dual-channel supply chain that experiences a disruption in demand during the planning horizon. While disruption management has long been a key research issue in supply chain management, little attention has been given to disruption management in a dual-channel supply chain once the original production plan has been made. Generally, changes to the original production plan induced by a disruption may impose considerable deviation costs throughout the supply chain system. In this paper, we examine how to adjust the prices and the production plan so that the potential maximal profit is obtained under a disruption scenario. We first study the scenario where the manufacturer and the retailer are vertically integrated with demand disruptions. Then we further assume that the manufacturer bears the deviation costs and obtain the manufacturer’s and the retailer’s individual optimal pricing decision, as well as the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity in a decentralized decision-making setting. We derive conditions under which the maximum profit can be achieved. The results indicate that the optimal production quantity has some robustness under a demand disruption, in both centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chains. We also find that the optimal pricing decisions are affected by customers’ preference for the direct channel and the market scale change, in both centralized and decentralized dual-channel supply chains.     

A Cooperative Coalitional Game in Duopolistic Supply-Chain Competition

Cooperative coalitional games study the selection of chain partners, the formation of supply chains and outcome allocations. The chain value of a coalition depends on the outcome of inter-chain competition. Subsequently, chain partners may accept their payoffs or decide to defect to another coalition that has made a higher tender offer. The formation and defection continues until a stable Cournot-Nash equilibrium is reached. This is the state where no player may unilaterally defect to another coalition and earn a higher profit. We formulate the cooperative coalitional game as a variational inequality problem and propose an iterative diagonalization algorithm to determine the steady state for the game. The computational results illustrated that (1) supply-chain competition may not necessarily preserve the same level of social welfare; (2) internalization of resources and costs may distort the general competition economy; and (3) wielding the power in a supply chain does not necessarily translate into higher profits.     

基于随机需求的区域血液供应系统优化

从供应链一体化的角度对区域血液供应网络建模。采用多目标规划的方法,将血液采集风险成本、系统运作成本、供给过多与过少的惩罚成本最小作为目标,考虑血液报废量与时间成正比的特性,将过期报废血液处理费用考虑在内,建立了随机需求的四种血型的区域供需网络均衡模型。通过证明所建模型是凸的,进一步导出了血液供需网络平衡的变分不等式。运用修改的拟牛顿法,求得了随机需求下血液供应链供需平衡的解。最后,通过成都某区供血系统进一步验证了模型的适用性。     

随机需求下闭环供应链网络设施竞争选址模型研究

利用均衡理论和变分不等式研究工具,建立了随机需求情形下多层竞争型闭环供应链网络均衡模型,并在此基础上,构建了均衡约束数学规划模型,即设施竞争选址模型.利用均衡模型来捕捉由新进设施的进入所引起的网络均衡状态的变化,并将其引入位置决策过程.根据模型特点,提出了遗传算法与修正投影算法相结合的求解策略.最后利用提出的模型和求解算法对算例进行计算与分析,得到了网络竞争趋势变化情况、新设施的位置策略及其生产运营决策.     

A cooperative advertising collaboration policy in supply chain management under uncertain conditions

Many industries are facing big challenges to design supply chains in a way to maximize the profit and meet the heightened expectations of the customer. This new era entirely relies on the dynamic advantages of competition and the role played by the collaboration policy. A global economy and increasing demand have put a huge pressure on supply chain partners to build a collaboration policy based on price, order quantity, and advertising. Companies are adopting the idea of ”shaking hands” to obtain more profit instead of taking risks through competition. Cooperative (co-op) advertising is a significant policy of centralized supply chain management (SCM) to boost the revenues generated by the supplier, manufacturer, and retailers. The uncertain costs associated with the supply chain management also create obstacles in economic analysis and feasibility. These uncertainties are associated with the basic costs of all supply chain partners, which are represented using a signed distance formula. This paper develops the concept of co-op advertising among the supplier, manufacturer, and retailers with a variable demand driven by selling price and advertising costs, where all basic costs are considered as fuzzy. The profit is optimized by considering variable cycle time, shipments, pricing and advertising costs for the decision support system of the supply chain management. The optimal results of the co-op advertisement ensured an increase in the revenue of whole supply chain.     

Supply chain model with price- and trade credit-sensitive demand under two-level permissible delay in payments

This article develops a single-manufacturer and single-retailer supply chain model under two-level permissible delay in payments when the manufacturer follows a lot-for-lot policy in response to the retailer's demand. The manufacturer offers a trade credit period to the retailer with the contract that the retailer must share a fraction of the profit earned during the trade credit period. On the other hand, the retailer provides his customer a partial trade credit which is less than that of the manufacturer. The demand at the retailer is assumed to be dependent on the selling price and the trade credit period offered to the customers. The average net profit of the supply chain is derived and an algorithm for finding the optimal solution is developed. Numerical examples are given to demonstrate the coordination policy of the supply chain and examine the sensitivity of key model-parameters.     

需求不确定性对混合条件风险价值约束供应链系统的影响

运用随机占优研究风险偏好和需求不确定性对混合条件风险价值约束供应链系统的影响.证明在批发价和收益共享契约下零售商的最优订货量和利润随风险偏好系数的增加而减小;只有在零售商为风险追求型时,批发价契约才能实现供应链协调;无论零售商的风险偏好如何,收益共享契约都能实现供应链协调.在收益共享契约下,随机大需求将导致零售商获得较高的最优利润;当零售商为风险中性或风险厌恶时,其最优利润随需求可变性的增加而减少.     

两竞争推广商与酒店的合作协调研究

随着酒店市场竞争的日趋激烈,酒店为了提高入住率,纷纷与第三方推广商开展合作.酒店如何通过与推广商合作来提高利润率成为酒店业重点关注的话题.本文分析市场上存在一个占主导地位的酒店以及和酒店合作的两家推广商,利用博弈论构建了酒店和推广商的利润函数模型.为此,首先分析了分散决策下博弈三方的最优策略,进而分析了集中决策下三方的最优策略,并刻画了影响酒店和推广商最优策略的影响因素.并进一步提出了能实现整体最优并能实现双方Pareto改善的协调契约.本文的研究发现以下现象:1)酒店的价格增加,两推广商的利润均有提升;2)当推广商间的竞争激烈程度增大时,推广商会压低利润水平并提升推广力度.从而,酒店的利润会不断提升,并且供应链的协调程度也在不断增加.数值例子也验证了所设计的协调契约对整体协调的有效性.     

供应链间竞争下绿色广告决策研究

通过构建两条供应链中的零售商横向竞争和制造商横向竞争模型研究分散和集中两种决策下的绿色广告决策问题,分析绿色广告成本系数和绿色广告敏感系数对绿色广告效应以及供应链成员利润的影响。研究结果表明：集中式供应链绿色广告效应更大;绿色广告成本系数较小时会对供应链成员利润产生显著影响且微小变动会引起需求市场剧烈变动;集中式决策下绿色产品供应链优势明显,而普通产品供应链的决策方式受绿色广告效应敏感系数的影响。     

基于不同交货期决策权下的供应链交货期和定价决策研究

基于对价格和交货期敏感的需求,针对一个制造商与一个零售商构成的两阶段供应链,以最大化期望利润为目标,分别建立供应链交货期由制造商和零售商控制的决策模型,以得到相应的最优解和最大期望利润.通过比较,探讨了不同交货期决策权对供应链最优交货期和最大期望利润的影响,得到了为实现期望利润最大化,针对顾客需求特性,供应链系统应在保证一定交货期服务水平的基础上选择由制造商控制供应链交货期的结论.     

基于延迟定价策略的供应链分散与集中决策

针对消费者市场需求不确定性大的特征, 采用延迟定价策略应对需求波动和实现产品售罄. 基于供应商和零售商的两级供应链, 探讨最优零售价格的确立, 分别建立分散决策下的零售商利润函数模型和集中决策下的供应链系统利润函数模型, 通过函数单峰性分析证明最优订货量的存在性和唯一性, 并求得最优解. 比较和数值分析表明, 在分散决策下, 采用延迟定价策略虽然未必能达到集中决策时的供应链系统最优, 但相比固定售价, 可以显著提高供应链的总利润.

     

A supply chain disruption recovery strategy considering product change under COVID-19

A recent global outbreak of Corona Virus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) has led to massive supply chain disruption, resulting in difficulties for manufacturers on recovering their supply chains in a short term. This paper presents a supply chain disruption recovery strategy with the motivation of changing the original product type to cope with that. In order to maximize the total profit from product changes, a mixed integer linear programming (MILP) model is developed with combining emergency procurement on the supply side and product changes by the manufacturer as well as backorder price compensation on the demand side. The model uses a heuristic algorithm based on ILOG CPLEX toolbox. Experimental results show that the proposed disruption recovery strategy can effectively reduce the profit loss of manufacturer due to late delivery and order cancellation. It is observed that the impact of supply chain disruptions is reduced. The proposed model can offer a potentially useful tool to help the manufacturers decide on the optimal recovery strategy whenever the supply chain system experiences a sudden massive disruption.     

Stackelberg game for two-level supply chain with price markdown option

Vendor–retailer collaboration has an important role in supply chain management. Although vendor–retailer collaboration results in better supply chain profit, collaboration is difficult to realize. This is because most vendors and retailers try to optimize their own profit. This paper applies the Stackelberg game with stochastic demand for the vendor–retailer system. The vendor as a leader determines the product price, and the retailer decides order quantity and frequency of price markdown. This study develops example and sensitivity analyses to illustrate the theory. Results show that the price markdown option has a better total supply chain profit than without a price markdown policy, and the vendor receives more benefit. For different demand variances, the retailer profit is more sensitive than the vendor profit.