Incentives for quality improvement efforts coordination in supply chains with partial cost allocation contract

In this paper, we consider quality improvement efforts coordination in a two-stage decentralised supply chain with a partial cost allocation contract. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, both of which produce defective products. Two kinds of failure cost occur within the supply chain: internal and external. The supplier and the manufacturer determine their individual quality levels to maximise their own profits. We propose a partial cost allocation contract, under which the external failure cost is allocated between the manufacturer and the supplier at different rates based on information derived from failure root cause analysis. If the quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are observable, we show that the partial cost allocation contract coordinates the supply chain, provided that the failure root cause analysis does not erroneously identify the manufacturer’s fault as the supplier’s, and the supplier does not take responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. In the single moral hazard model, where only the quality level of the supplier is unobservable, the optimal share rates require the supplier to take some responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. However, in the double moral hazard model, where quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are unobservable to each other, the optimal share rates require the supplier not to take responsibility for the manufacturer’s fault. It is noted that the root cause analysis conducted by the manufacturer may have its disadvantage in attributing the fault to the supplier when both sides are at fault. We also propose a contract based on the dual root cause analysis to reduce the supplier’s penalty cost. Numerical results illustrate that the partial cost allocation contract satisfies the fairness criterion compared with the traditional cost allocation contract.     

不同契约下考虑公平偏好的供应商创新投入研究

针对一个供应商和一个制造商组成的供应链,研究供应商公平偏好对其创新投入的影响。引入公平偏好理论,运用Stackelberg博弈,建立批发价格契约、研发成本分担契约和收益共享契约3种契约下的供应链决策模型,对比分析不同契约下公平偏好系数对供应链均衡信息的影响。研究表明,研发成本分担契约下的供应商创新水平、供应链中成员效用及供应链整体效用总高于其他2种契约;收益共享契约下的供应商创新水平和供应链整体效用高于批发价格契约;批发价格契约和收益共享契约下的制造商效用和供应商效用的大小与供应商公平偏好系数以及收益共享契约下的供应商保留效用的大小有关。     

Coordinating a supply chain under uncertain demand and random yield in presence of supply disruption

A two-echelon supply chain involving one manufacturer and one retailer for a single product is considered in this paper. The end customers’ demand is assumed to be random. The production of the manufacturer is subject to random yield, and there is a possibility of supply disruption in which case no item from her can reach the retailer. The retailer has a backup supplier who is costlier but perfectly reliable, and is having a limit up to which he may deliver. In addition to placing an order to the manufacturer, the retailer is allowed to reserve a quantity from the backup supplier in the ordering period; he may buy up to the reserved quantity after realising actual market demand in the trading period. Aiming at studying the effects of the various uncertainties involved in the chain on the optimal decisions, we develop and analyse centralised and decentralised models. We also propose a contract mechanism to coordinate the chain and find threshold conditions for which the coordinated model would collapse. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the developed model.     

多个损失厌恶零售商共存的一对多供应链 回购契约及其协调机理

为实现供应链的整体运作绩效最大,本文以一个风险中性的供应商和多个损失厌恶的零售商组成的两阶段供应链为研究对象,基于前景理论对损失厌恶的界定,采用考虑零售商损失厌恶系数的供应链回购契约模型。论证得出,多个存在竞争关系的损失厌恶零售商存在唯一的纳什均衡总订购量使其期望效用最大;在零售商的损失厌恶程度较大或者数量较少的情况下,通过供应链回购契约的协调,存在唯一的回购价格使得供应链的整体运作绩效最大,实现供应链协调。     

碳税情形下考虑低碳偏好的收益共享契约协调模型

研究考虑碳税和消费者具有低碳偏好情形的供应链碳减排的协调问题,得到实现供应链碳减排协调的必要条件。通过引入数量折扣策略,构建供应链碳减排的收益共享契约协调模型,解决纯粹的收益共享契约无法协调供应链碳减排的问题,并给出契约参数需要满足的条件。在消费者的低碳偏好以加法形式来影响市场需求时,通过模型优化,给出供应链的最优产品订购量和最优碳排放水平的确定方法。研究发现,在供应链协调时,供应商提供给制造商的批发价格是碳税的减函数,是碳排放水平的增函数;供应链系统的订购量与碳税成反比,而碳减排水平与碳税成正比,与碳减排系数成反比。     

Supply chain management using put option contracts with information asymmetry

We study the problem of hedging demand uncertainty in a supply chain consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer under a buyback contract. We use semi-variance of the possible profit values as a measure of the retailer’s risk attitude. We first study the setting where the supplier can observe the risk type of the retailer and find that in this case the supplier can design a buyback contract that extracts the maximum profit for the supplier. When the retailer’s type is unobservable, a new contract needs to be designed (the ‘option buyback contract’) and we show that in this case the retailers will self-select and chose an order quantity that maximises the total supply chain profit. Through numerical computations, we analyse the dynamics between the benefits of hedging risk, information rent and the retailer’s type, and outline cases when, depending on the shape of the reservation utilities of the retailers, it is too costly for the supplier to manage risk. In conclusion, our results show that whereas semi-variance has appealing properties as a measure of risk, its use introduces analytical challenges that can only be overcome through numerical computation.     

谎报行为下生鲜农产品供应链协调研究

目的研究存在生产商谎报生鲜农产品鲜活度信息的情况下,生鲜农产品供应链的协调问题。方法由单一生产商和单一零售商构成生鲜农产品供应链,其中产品的鲜活度信息为生产商私有信息;基于单周期报童模型,构建供应链各方的利润函数;应用Stackelberg博弈的基本思想,分析供应链上的定价订货决策,并引入收益共享契约进行供应链协调,同时用Matlab软件做数值仿真,以验证结论的有效性。结果生产商的谎报行为会损害供应链系统各方的利润,且谎报因子越低(谎报度越高)对供应链利润的影响越大。引入的收益共享比例在一定范围内时,收益共享契约可以有效地协调生鲜农产品供应链。结论收益共享契约不仅可以有效地协调生鲜供应链,也可以抑制生产商的谎报行为,实现帕累托改进,提高供应链的稳定性。     

需求和成本同时发生偏差时供应链协调研究

研究一个供应商和一个零售商组成的供应链,分别在一体化供应链、分散化供应链发生突发事件的情况下,使用收益共享合约协调该供应链。研究发现,收益共享合约在稳定条件下能实现该供应链的协调;当突发事件导致价格敏感系数和供应商的生产成本同时与其预测值发生偏差时,原有的协调被打破,改进的收益共享合约可协调价格敏感系数和成本偏差的分权供应链。     

考虑零售商过度自信的供应链决策与协调

将过度自信引入到供应链中,通过构建由一个供应商和一个过度自信的零售商组成的二级供应链模型,分析了过度自信的零售商与供应商的决策。结果表明,零售商过度自信能够实现供应链协调,但供应商的回购契约会破坏这种协调;当零售商接收到市场不利信息时供应商的回购契约失效,当零售商接收到市场有利信息时供应商利润随过度自信程度增加而减少。进一步在模型中引入收益共享契约,使得订购量和供应商的利润均增加,并实现了供应链协调。最后,通过数值算例验证并阐明了相关结论。     

两个零售商环境下数量柔性契约研究

在综合国内外研究成果的基础上,借鉴以单个供应商和单个零售商组成的两级供应链的研究,形成以单个供应商与两个零售商的两阶段供应链为基本研究对象,通过数字解析方法和量本利分析方法对供应链契约中常用的数量柔性契约进行分析。证明了这种灵活订货模型可以协调供应商和零售商之间的决策行为,使得供应链的整体利润达到最优,为多零售商的复杂供应链的研究提供参考。     

The value of buyback contract under price competition

We investigate the value of buyback contract by analysing a supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. Three scenarios, depending on whether buyback contracts are offered to neither, one, or both of the retailers, are considered. We first study the case when the manufacturer can only determine his buyback price. We show how the demand uncertainty, the competition level and the handling cost of buyback contract influence the profits of the manufacturer, the two retailers and the whole supply chain. Interestingly, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the buyback contract may intensify competition between the retailers, we show that offering the buyback contract to two competing retailers can benefit every channel member even if the competition level is high. Next, we study the return contract, a special type of buyback contract, and show the effect of competition level and industry outlook on supply chain parties' choices on return contract. We extend Padmanabhan and Png [1997. “Manufacturer's Returns Policies And Retail Competition.” Marketing Science 16 (1): 81–94] to the case with an asymmetric contract structure, i.e. one return contract and one whole-sale contract. We show that an asymmetric contract structure may better off both the retailers and the whole supply chain.     

零售商主导的供应商创新投入的模糊期权契约

考虑由一个供应商和一个零售商组成的两级供应链,在此供应链系统中建立了一种新型的期权契约机制。在此契约中,零售商处于供应链的领导地位,而供应商处于追随地位,零售商提出期权契约而供应商购买期权。在模糊环境下零售商和供应商之间通过共同分担供应商的创新投入成本的期权契约进行协调,首次提出了可信性函数的反函数表达式及其数学期望的表达式,并通过此期望值函数对此问题进行了优化。研究表明,创新投入共担的期权契约能够实现零售商主导下的供应链的协调。通过仿真验证了研究结论。     

Green supply chain contracts with eco-labels issued by the sales platform: profitability and environmental implications

Considering environmentally conscious consumers, a manufacturer, and a sales platform which provides eco-labels for qualified manufacturers, this paper develops a supply chain model to study how eco-labels affect green supply chain operations, from the profitability and environmental perspectives. The results show that the sales platform prefers the agency contract, but the manufacturer prefers the wholesale price contract. Considering the performance of the supply chain, the agency contract brings a higher profit while the wholesale price contract results in a bigger environmental improvement. An unexpected but interesting result is that when the agency contract is used and consumer green awareness increases, the sale price declines rather than increasing as it does under the wholesale price contract. This decline happens because the required marketing effort of the sales platform will be lower, which incentivises the platform to reduce the commission rate. Consequently, the manufacturer faces a lower commission rate and a higher margin when consumers display greater green awareness. Moreover, as the core and more powerful player of the supply chain, the sales platform can propose a platform-led revenue sharing contract to fully coordinate the supply chain, which improves the performance of the supply chain both in profitability and environmental perspectives.     

Supply chain models with corporate social responsibility

Currently, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a critical issue because more than 88% of consumers think companies should try to achieve their business goals while improving society and the environment. This paper focuses on a CSR supply chain where an Original Equipment Manufacturer’s (OEM’s) sales can be significantly reduced because of its oversea supplier’s social misconduct. Specifically, as in a conventional wholesale price contract the supplier determines its wholesale price and the OEM decides its order quantity, but in a CSR supply chain, the supplier can autonomously change its CSR cost once a minimum requirement is satisfied. A higher CSR cost means that the supplier invests more in its corporate social responsibility and the OEM’s sales will be less likely to be influenced by negative CSR events. The equilibrium solutions show an important dilemma – although the supplier’s profit increases in the basic CSR requirement, the supplier will always use the minimum CSR cost under the conventional wholesale price contract, which eventually leads to a low supply chain profit. Thus, we introduce two different contracts to handle this problem: the flexible quantity contract and the wholesale price incentive contract, which are, respectively, a ‘tough’ way and a ‘beneficent’ way for the OEM to solve the problem. Although the two ways cannot (always) coordinate the supply chain, we show that they both will significantly improve the supply chain performance. Our results also show that in some conditions, one strategy will dominate, whereas in different conditions the other strategy dominates.     

基于存货促销的供应链协调问题的研究

讨论了零售阶段需求依赖于货架展示量的供应链的协调问题,特别地,由于货架空间的稀缺,零售商的存货持有成本假设为非线性的成本函数。在一个零售商的情况下,给出了决策变量及供应链利润分配的显式解。当存在两个相同的零售商竞争时,给定市场份额按比例分配原则．证明此时存在唯一对称的Nash均衡解,供应商可以用相同的合同协调供应链。最后通过数值算例说明所得结果。     

公平偏好下基于Stackelberg博弈的回购契约研究

引入公平偏好,构建了供应商与零售商进行Stackelberg博弈的回购契约模型,采用逆向归纳法分析了批发价的制定、回购契约的协调性以及供应链成员的公平偏好行为对批发价的影响。研究表明：无论是否考虑公平偏好,回购契约都不能实现供应链协调且公平偏好行为不会影响零售商的最优订购量。此外,供应商提供的批发价随着零售商公平偏好系数的增加而降低,但随供应商公平偏好的增加而升高。     

基于回购合同的三级供应链协调

现有的研究表明回购合同能够很好地协调二级供应链网络,但对于一个三级供应链而言,协调是否仍然有效,尚无定论。为了回答这一问题,本文建立了由单个制造商、单个分销商、单个零售商组成的三级供应链网络,运用数学模型考察制造商与分销商以及分销商与零售商之间的回购合同对整条供应链的协调作用,结果表明合理设置回购合同参数能够有效增加供应链各成员利润,实现各成员间的“共赢”,并得到了实现“共赢”的条件。最后通过一个算例证明了该模型的有效性。     

不确定条件下供应链期权契约风险分担模型

供应链期权契约是应对市场需求不确定性的一种重要途径,然而期权价格又给供应链带来了新的风险。针对供应链期权契约的风险分担问题,提出了根据谈判能力协商确定期权价格从而达到风险分担的方法。在市场不确定条件下,以单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链为研究对象,建立了基于谈判能力的供应链期权契约风险分担模型,分析了谈判能力对供应链订购量、生产安排以及期望收益的影响。研究发现,期权契约可以提高供应链各成员的期望收益,随着制造商谈判能力的增强,零售商的订单数量增加,期权数量减少,制造商的谈判能力降低了供应链的总期望收益。通过数值仿真分析,进一步验证了通过谈判分担期权契约风险的有效性,获得了对制定供应链期权价格具有指导意义的研究结论。      

Coordination and performance analysis for a three-echelon supply chain with a revenue sharing contract

This paper focuses on a three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer for a single selling period. Based on a revenue sharing contract, the coordination of the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game or the leader–follower game is analysed. It is determined that the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game. Our analysis reveals that the revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the decentralised three-echelon supply chain with the leader–follower game except for a special situation. However, this result provides an opportunity to develop methodology and results that measure the potential improvement in supply chain performance that can be gained from utilising the revenue sharing contract. This is an important aspect of this paper.     

基于零售商代发货模式的双渠道供应链协调

提出了零售商代发货模式,构建了一个由制造商和网络零售商组成的代发货双渠道供应链模型,其中制造商拥有网络直销渠道,并将订单全部交给网络零售商,由网络零售商代发到顾客手中。分析、比较了集中式和分散式决策下制造商和网络零售商的最优均衡解,论证了逆向收益共享契约对这种代发货双渠道供应链协调的有效性。最后通过算例分析,发现存在一个共享因子变化范围能够实现这种代发货双渠道供应链的完美协调。