Pricing decisions for a supply chain with refurbished products

This paper considers a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer where a fixed portion of new products sold will be returned to the retailer and then be repaired and resold as refurbished products at a lower price. Using the utility model, we formulate how consumers will make their choices when facing both new and refurbished products. Then, using the divide-and-conquer method, we derive the supplier and retailer's equilibrium decisions, including the supplier's wholesale price and the retailer's prices for both the new and refurbished products. The main findings include the following. First, refurbished products will be sold in the market only when the refurbishing cost is small. In this situation, as the refurbishing cost increases, most of the negative impact on the retailer will be transferred to the supplier. Second, in the same condition, as the refurbishing cost increases, the wholesale price and retail price of the new product will change in opposite directions. This result contrasts with the traditional pass-through effect. Third, when the repair cost is moderate, the retailer will eventually not sell refurbished products, but its profit can be significantly improved and the double marginalisation effect can be mitigated.     

A pricing/ordering model for a dyadic supply chain with buyback guarantee financing and fairness concerns

The paper investigates pricing/ordering issues in a dyadic supply chain, in which a core supplier sells products through a budget-constrained retailer. The retailer faces stochastic demand and is fairness-concerned as well. If needed, the retailer can get financing support from bank by means of buyback guarantee financing (BGF) mode, which is often used in China. By introducing Nash bargaining solution as the fairness reference point, we formulate the retailer’s fairness-concerned utility function and develop a two-echelon pricing/ordering game model. We then study the combined impacts of fairness concerns and BGF on two members’ equilibrium strategies and supply chain performance. We also discuss the corresponding issues under no budget constraint, no financing service and bank financing. Our results show that: (1) two members’ equilibrium strategies are significantly influenced by the retailer’s fairness-concerned behaviour and initial budget; (2) as compared to no budget constraint, BGF can bring the whole supply chain more performance, which means that BGF can yield value-added; (3) When the retailer takes the risk of uncertain market solely, the retailer’s fairness concerns are beneficial for supply chain to improve the performance.     

Pricing and remanufacturing decisions in two competing supply chains

This paper considers the pricing and remanufacturing decisions in a duopoly market with two competing supply chains, which compete at both manufacturer and retailer levels. There are one manufacturer and one retailer in each supply chain, one manufacturer produces the new product directly from raw material, while the other manufacturer has incorporated a remanufacturing process for used product into the original production system. Based on different industry organisation structures and the chain members’ competing forms, five game decision models are established to explore the chain members’ optimal strategies on price and/or remanufacturing, and the corresponding equilibrium solutions are obtained. Finally, we carry out the sensitivity analysis through numerical studies of some key parameters for examining their influences on the pricing decisions and chain members’ maximum profits. On the basis of comparison and analysis, some managerial insights are derived.     

Dual-channel supply chain pricing decisions with a risk-averse retailer

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain with one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer where there is only one perishable product with price-dependent stochastic demand. We choose Conditional Value-at-Risk criterion to measure the retailer’s risk-averse level, and assume that the manufacturer’s direct sales channel and the retailer’s traditional channel adopt a consistent pricing strategy. The model explores a Nash bargaining problem where the manufacturer and the retailer negotiate with each other on the wholesale price, the retail price and the order quantity when they have equal bargaining power. It is found that when demand uncertainty follows a uniform distribution, a Nash bargaining equilibrium exists and the retail price will decrease as the retailer becomes more risk averse. However, when the risk-averse indicator increases, the manufacturer’s profit on his direct channel will decrease, increase or first increase and then decrease, depending on the values of the related parameters. The profit shares of the manufacturer and the retailer under the Nash equilibrium model are related to the risk-averse indicator of the retailer. Furthermore, we perform three sets of numerical experiments to verify the effects of the retailer’s risk-averse indicator on decision-making and profit allocations under the different environmental parameters and gain several meaningful managerial insights.     

Review of supplier diversification and pricing strategies under random supply and demand

Uncertainties of supply and demand are two major sources of risk in any supply chain. As a result, the companies are implementing different strategies to mitigate the effects of these risks. Supplier diversification and responsive pricing are two of the main strategies that are used to mitigate the supply and demand risks. In supplier diversification, a firm uses multiple channels of sourcing while in responsive pricing, a firm manipulates demand through pricing to mitigate supply and demand risks. In this paper, we review lot-sizing problems when supply and demand are random. We focus on studies that have considered supplier diversification or responsive pricing as a mitigation strategy. We classify the studies based on their main assumptions and summarise their major findings. Finally, we present some directions for future research. Part of what we have found is that most studies that use multiple decision makers have focused on cases where information is complete and non-cooperative. There is a need to consider more realistic situations when there is information asymmetry between the decision makers. In addition, we have found that there is a lack of studies that look at the impact of joint ordering and pricing in the existence of multiple suppliers.     

Pricing and warranty decisions in a two-period closed-loop supply chain

For a two-period closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, Stackelberg game analyses are conducted to examine pricing and warranty decisions under two warranty models depending on who offers warranty for new and remanufactured products and the corresponding benchmark models with a warranty for new products only. Next, we identify the conditions under which warranty for remanufactured products is offered and investigate how this warranty affects the CLSC operations. Subsequently, comparative studies are carried out to examine equilibrium decisions, profitability and consumer surplus of the CLSC between the two warranty models. Analytical results show that offering warranty for remanufactured products does not affect new product pricing in period 2, but influences the pricing of new products in period 1 and remanufactured products in period 2, thereby enhancing remanufacturing, individual and channel profitability, and consumer surplus. Compared to the retailer warranty for remanufactured products, the manufacturer warranty can attain a more equitable profit distribution. If the warranty cost advantage of the manufacturer (retailer) is significant relative to that of the retailer (the manufacturer), the manufacturer (retailer) arises as a natural choice to offer warranty for remanufactured products as this decision enhances both profitability and consumer surplus.     

Pricing and ordering decisions in a supply chain with imperfect quality items and inspection under buyback of defective items

In this article, the economic production and inventory model in a three-layer supply chain including one distributor, one manufacturer and one retailer for a single-product and general demand functions under three scenarios is developed. We assume that during the production process, both healthy and defective items are generated. As the first scenario, we develop the first model, in which the defective items are not reworked and all considered as scrape, while in the second model, we assume that the defective items are reworked and are sold as perfect item. In the second scenario, we assume that defective item can be sold with lower price than the selling price. Moreover, raw materials with imperfect quality are sent back from a distributor to outside supplier under a lower price. Determining the order quantity of the distributor and the selling prices of the distributor and the manufacturer as well as the retailer was the goal of this article such that the total profit of each member is maximised. In order to solve the models, the Stackelberg approach is employed between the members, and the concavity of the profit functions is proved using several theorems. Then, closed form solutions are derived for the decision variables and a solution algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal solutions. Finally, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the applicability of the model.     

Balanced and synchronized ordering in supply chains

This paper considers a supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers in which base stock policies are practiced. Specifically, we consider two replenishment strategies: synchronized ordering and balanced ordering. We present compelling results to explain how the supplier may benefit from synchronized ordering under fixed order intervals and examine numerically the cost impact to the retailers under the two strategies. We also compare the results of synchronized ordering with randomized ordering times.     

Joint optimisation of tracking capability and price in a supply chain with endogenous pricing

Tracking systems have been widely used to resolve the issues of product recall and food safety. Thus far, few researches have been done on designing the tracking capability from the perspective of supply chain. In this paper, using the traceable unit size at the manufacturer level to measure the tracking capability, we propose a non-convex non-linear programming to jointly optimise the tracking capability and price considering the tracking cost and recall cost in a supply chain with endogenous pricing. Results show that, in both centralised and decentralised supply chains, there is a unique tracking capability and retailing/wholesale price with closed-form solutions to optimise the supply chain profit. When the cost ratio (unit tracking cost/unit recall cost) is sufficiently large and small, the optimal tracking strategy is barcode tracking and unit tracking, respectively, and otherwise, the optimal tracking strategy is batch tracking with an economic traceable unit size which depends on the cost ratio, quality inspection threshold, supply defection rate and the supplier’s tracking capability. Furthermore, in the context of large and small cost ratio, we find that improving tracking capability will enlarge and mitigate the effect of double marginalisation, respectively. In particular, we find that the strict tracking regulation policy is more robust than the subsidy policy to improve the supply chain tracking capability.     

Parallel importation and price competition in a duopoly supply chain

Nowadays, diversion of products distribution from authorised channels to the gray markets is one of the main challenges of manufacturers. Suppose an international supplier distributes the products in several countries with different prices. In parallel importation, there are unauthorised distributers who supply products with a lower price and import them to a higher price market. The problem of parallel importation considering a manufacturer and a competitor is analysed using the game theory approach in this article. We investigate the pricing strategy for manufacturers and the effect of unauthorised distributer on price, market share and profit. We also investigate the performance of different policies in a numerical study and show managerial insights.     

Managing supply disruption through procurement strategy and price competition

When facing supply disruptions, the emergency procurement strategy and the optimal allocation procurement strategy are widely used strategies to manage supply risks. In this paper, buyers use these types of procurement strategies under the threat of supply disruption and engage in price competition. The structural properties of the procurement strategies are characterised by their reliability thresholds. We find that reliability thresholds play a critical role in buyer procurement strategy choices, which are related to the sales price, underage cost and differentials in unit procurement cost. A solution procedure is proposed to determine the equilibrium strategy profile. The effects of reliability levels and costs on the equilibrium prices, expected profits and equilibrium strategy profiles are explored. We extend the basic model to investigate the case of symmetric competition where buyers can freely choose their procurement strategy. The results show that in most cases, the competing buyers will choose the same strategy, whether an optimal allocation strategy with single sourcing or an emergency procurement strategy with dual sourcing. In a special parameter setting, the buyers will choose either strategy because they yield identical expected profits; this leads to multiple equilibria. We also find the equilibrium to be Pareto efficient.     

Equilibrium markup pricing strategies for the dominant retailers under supply chain to chain competition

Markup pricing policies have been widely employed in the retailing industry. Under such policies, a retailer requires a retail margin over the wholesale price charged by the supplier to guarantee her profitability. This paper investigates and compares the performance of two commonly used markup pricing policies, namely, fixed-dollar markup and percentage markup, for the dominant retailers facing chain-to-chain competition. Our results demonstrate that the equilibrium pricing strategy for the dominant retailers seeking to maximise their respective profits is [PP]-strategy (i.e. both retailers select the percentage markup pricing policy), no matter what the demand curve and the level of chain-to-chain competition are. Unfortunately, this equilibrium will get in the prisoner’s dilemma since the percentage markup pricing strategy might yield lower profits for the retailers and suppliers compared to its fixed-dollar counterpart when the level of chain-to-chain competition is high enough under the linear demand, which is contrast to the literature. If the criteria for the dominant retailers to select which markup pricing policy to offer is the whole channel’s profit obtained under the decentralised decision-making scenario instead of themselves, [PP]-strategy is the dominant strategy and the unique Nash equilibrium of the pricing policy choice game regardless of the competitive intensity under the iso-elastic demand. This result holds true for the linear demand only when the level of chain-to-chain competition is below certain threshold; otherwise, both [FF] (i.e. both retailers select the fixed-dollar markup pricing policy) and [PP] can be the equilibrium pricing strategy.     

Developing a resilient supply chain through supplier flexibility and reliability assessment

In this study, we examine the optimal allocation of demand across a set of suppliers in a supply chain that is exposed to supply risk and environmental risk. A two-stage mixed-integer programming model is used to develop a flexible sourcing strategy under disruptions. Our model integrates supplier selection and demand allocation with transportation channel selection and provides contingency plans to mitigate the negative impacts of disruptions and minimise total network costs. Finally, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the model and provide insights. The findings suggest that developing contingency plans using flexibility in suppliers’ production capacity is an effective strategy for firms to mitigate the severity of disruptions. We also show that flexibility and reliability of the suppliers and regions play a significant role in determining contingency plans for during disruption. Findings generally show that highly flexible suppliers receive less allocation, and their flexible capacity is reserved for disruptions. For firms that do not incorporate risk management into supplier selection and allocation, the recommendation is to source from fewer, more reliable suppliers with less risk of disruption. Our findings also emphasise that the type of disruption has important implications for supplier selection and demand allocation. This study highlights the supply chain risk management strategy of regionalising as a means for minimising the impact of environmental disruptions.     

Enhanced joint pricing and lotsizing problem in a two-echelon supply chain with logit demand function

In retail supply chains, ordering and pricing policies for the retailer and shipment plan for the supplier are the most important decisions. These policies are often conducted either individually or sequentially with poor overall performance for the whole supply chain resulting to extra inventory and other deficiencies. In this paper, an integrated marketing-inventory model in a two-echelon supply chain model is developed involving discount promotion, customer behaviour more realistically and operations aspects to determine optimal ordering, shipping and pricing quantities simultaneously. An efficient analytical solution procedure and a Particle Swarm Optimisation solution algorithm are also developed. Finally, a number of numerical tests are conducted to approve the interesting theoretical results of the analytical approach.     

Pricing decisions in closed-loop supply chains with marketing effort and fairness concerns

We investigate closed-loop supply chains (CLSCs) under four reverse channel structures where a central planner, a manufacturer (M), a retailer (R) or a third party (T), respectively, serves as the collector of used product and demand depends on R’s marketing effort. We derive supply chain profitability under both the centralised and decentralised CLSCs and furnish the optimal marketing effort, collection rate and pricing decisions for the supply chain members. We then extend the base models along two directions: the first extension incorporates R’s distributional fairness concerns into the M collection model and the second extension considers potential recycle cost advantages by R and T compared to the M collection model.     

Military supply chains and closed-loop systems: resource allocation and incentives in supply sourcing and supply chain design

The US military operates some of the largest and most complex supply chains in the world and their experience provides insight into a variety of supply chain issues. This paper taps that experience to study how the design of a supply chain is influenced by its economic environment. Consider these circumstances: the military is not a profit-seeking enterprise, they want to achieve a particular state of readiness and cost is secondary to that goal. Modern weapons systems are complex, expensive, push the envelope of technology, and the volume requisitioned is often small such that few manufacturers can afford to be in the business; and these expensive weapons systems operate in harsh operating conditions where wear and tear is substantial, consequently remanufacturing of systems and parts is a critical source of supply. Focusing on the supply chain of the US Army, this paper uses an economic model to study their responses to these conditions, how supply chain design is affected by these conflicting goals, and how those designs affect cost and efficiency.     

Impact of demand price elasticity on advantages of cooperative advertising in a two-tier supply chain

This paper focuses on pricing and vertical cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain. Using a Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as the game leader and the retailer acts as the game follower, we obtain closed-form equilibrium solution and explicitly show how pricing and advertising decisions are made. When market demand decreases exponentially with respect to the retail price and increases with respect to national and local advertising expenditures in an additive way, the manufacturer benefits from providing percentage reimbursement for the retailer’s local advertising expenditure when demand price elasticity is large enough. Whether the manufacturer benefits from cooperative advertising is also closely related to supply chain member’s relative advertising efficiency. In the decision for adopting coop advertising strategy, it is critical for the manufacturer to identify how market demand depends on national and local advertisements. The findings from this research can enhance our understanding of cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain with price-dependent demand.     

Coordination of pricing,inventory, and production reliability decisions in deteriorating product supply chains

In this article, we study a two-level supply chain model for deteriorating items, in which the supplier’s production system is unreliable and the retailer’s demand is price-sensitive. The supplier’s production line may randomly shift from the in-control state to the out-of-control state. When the production line is in the out-of-control state, a proportion of the produced products will have bad quality. To mitigate the out-of-control risks, the supplier can improve the production line reliability by investing in high-quality machines, highly skilled workers, or advanced maintenance technologies. We start with the study of pricing and inventory problems concerning endogenous reliability in the integrated and decentralised scenario. To better illustrate the proposed models, two applicable algorithms are designed to determine the optimal production reliability, ordering quantity, and prices. Then, a cooperative reliability investment and revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate the supply chain. Numerical examples and sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium strategies and coordinating results on key system parameters (e.g. deterioration rate, production rate, etc.) are given to verify the effectiveness of the contract, and meanwhile get some managerial insights.     

Coordinating and pricing decisions in two competitive reverse supply chains with different channel structures

This paper addresses coordination and competition problem in two reverse supply chains each having its own exclusive retailer and manufacturer. The chains have various collecting channel structures so that one of them uses the advantages of dual channels, where the consumer can return their e-waste through direct or traditional channels, while its competitor collects obsolete products only through its traditional channel. The willingness to return in each channel is a function of self- and cross-discounts of the competitors. Four decision scenarios are investigated; the first and second chain respectively select, Decentralised-Decentralised, Centralised-Centralised, Centralised-Decentralised or Decentralised-Centralised scenario. The closed-form optimal solution of each channel is derived based on the Stackelberg game when the second chain acts as a leader. The most economical scenario is determined by using a Non-Zero-Sum game when each chain plays as a single player in the game. To coordinate the members’ decisions and to convince unsatisfied members, two coordination contracts are offered. Numerical investigations reveal that direct channel suggests more discount and obtains more share of market. The results show that Centralised-Centralised scenario is the best decision from the SCs’ perspective which proposing contracts are able to persuade members to change their strategy to a global decision.