Pricing and effort decisions for a supply chain with uncertain information

This paper analyses the pricing and effort decisions of a supply chain with single manufacturer and single retailer. The manufacturer produces a kind of product and then wholesales the product to the retailer, who in turn retails it to customers over a single selling season. The retailer can influence demand through her sales effort. This research depicts the consumer demand, the manufacturing cost and the sales effort cost as uncertain variables. Considering the demand expansion effectiveness of sales effort, one centralised and three decentralised game models are built on the basis of the expected value criterion, and the equilibrium solutions are obtained. We investigate the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the pricing and effort decisions. The results indicate that the manufacturer benefits from improvement in demand and cost uncertainties when he has at least bargaining power in the supply chain. The results also imply that the uncertainty degree of sales effort elasticity has an outstanding influence on the pricing and effort decisions, whereas the uncertainty degree of price elasticity has a modest impact on these decisions. We also study the effects of the parameters’ uncertainty degrees on the supply chain from the consumers’ perspective. The results suggest that with a power retailer, the retail price should always be on the high end. Consequently, consumers do not necessarily benefit from a power retailer. When the manufacturer and the retailer have equal bargaining power, consumers do not necessarily benefit from the supply chain, either.     

考虑制造商设备维修的制造—零售供应链决策与协调

设备可靠性是影响供应不确定的重要因素。为了研究企业内部的维修策略对整条供应链的运营策略产生的具体影响，在考虑设备维修的情况下，针对单个制造商和单个零售商构成的二级供应链，运用Stackelberg博弈的方法研究制造商的最优维修策略和定价策略以及零售商的最优订货量。研究结果表明，制造商的预防性维修次数存在上限且最大维修次数与设备可靠性无关；预防性维修策略有助于提高制造商的产量，降低产品的批发价格，但制造商的最优产出量不会达到企业的最大产能；收益共享契约能够实现供应链的协调；制造商在任何情形下都具有提高设备可靠性的动机，但零售商只会在市场规模较大时才存在为制造商提供设备改造资金的动机。     

需求依赖于价格环境下的批发价格契约

研究需求依赖于价格环境下的批发价格契约,建立了由单个零售商和单个制造商组成的供应链模型。该模型中零售商决定商品的订货量和销售价格,制造商决定商品的批发价格。以集中决策系统下供应链的利润、销售价格和销售量作为基准,研究分散情况下供应链的效率、销售价格以及销售量的变化,同时考虑在此情况下制造商提供的批发价格构成,在此基础上进一步探讨价格弹性对供应链效率和供应链利润分配比例的影响。     

不确定条件下供应链期权契约风险分担模型

供应链期权契约是应对市场需求不确定性的一种重要途径,然而期权价格又给供应链带来了新的风险。针对供应链期权契约的风险分担问题,提出了根据谈判能力协商确定期权价格从而达到风险分担的方法。在市场不确定条件下,以单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链为研究对象,建立了基于谈判能力的供应链期权契约风险分担模型,分析了谈判能力对供应链订购量、生产安排以及期望收益的影响。研究发现,期权契约可以提高供应链各成员的期望收益,随着制造商谈判能力的增强,零售商的订单数量增加,期权数量减少,制造商的谈判能力降低了供应链的总期望收益。通过数值仿真分析,进一步验证了通过谈判分担期权契约风险的有效性,获得了对制定供应链期权价格具有指导意义的研究结论。      

Supply chain coordination with trade credit under the CVaR criterion

Trade credit is a popular payment method in the supply chain. However, it may transfer the market risk facing by the retailer to the manufacturer in the form of default risk. To reduce the default loss, we set up a modified newsvendor model incorporating random default probability. Under the goal of loss minimisation, the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity is derived with the criterion of conditional value at risk, and compared with the retailer’s optimal order quantity. It is found that, compared with traditional newsvendor setting, the setting of default possibility in trade credit can increase the order quantity but decrease the production quantity. If the risk aversion level and gross profit of product are low, the manufacturer may deliver below the quantity ordered. Although the default loss can be reduced by cutting order, the profits of both agents decrease, thereby leading to a deviation from the supply chain coordination. Trade credit coordinating the supply chain requires an extremely long credit period, which is not feasible. Moreover, quantity discount contract is able to improve the retailer’s order quantity, but insufficient to achieve coordination, which also depends on the manufacturer’s risk aversion level.     

Consumer search,transshipment, and bargaining power in a supply chain

We study a decentralised supply chain with one manufacturer and two symmetric retailers who could transship their excess inventory between each other. Without transshipment, the retailer’s unsatisfied customers search and buy the product at the other retailer with some probability. With transshipment, the retailer can transship the other retailer’s excess inventory to fulfil its own unmet demand. However, a transshipment price is often charged by one retailer for transshipping goods to another. We show the retailer’s profit is unimodal in the transshipment price, and the manufacturer’s profit increases in the customer search probability. Although the retailer’s preference over transshipment depends on the magnitude of search probability and transshipment price, the retailer may always prefer the transshipment no matter their magnitude. We then study the effect of bargaining power over the transshipment decision (whether to transship between retailers and at what transshipment price). Our analysis suggests that the manufacturer always prefers to control the transshipment price rather than to control whether to transship, while the retailer can prefer both. We also find that increasing bargaining power always benefits the manufacturer but could hurt the retailer. We finally check the robustness of our results by investigating the case with asymmetric retailers     

基于消费者接受程度的双渠道产品价格和质量决策研究

在消费者对直销渠道和零售渠道接受程度有差异的情形下,研究了产品质量为内生的双渠道供应链中价格和质量联合决策问题。分别构建传统单一零售渠道模型、双渠道分散决策模型和双渠道集中决策模型。比较制造商和零售商在3种模型下的定价均衡决策、产品质量水平和利润,分析零售商和制造商的渠道策略和最优定价。结果表明：与传统单一零售渠道情形相比,在集中决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道不改变零售价格,但是能够提高产品质量水平和供应链整体利润;在分散决策情形下,制造商开通直销渠道将降低产品批发价、零售价以及产品质量水平;另外当消费者对直销渠道接受程度适中时,制造商和零售商可实现帕累托改进。     

基于退货策略的供应链合作研究

分别研究了分散决策与集中决策对供应链性能的影响;建立了在信息共享的前提下基于零售商退货价格激励的供应链合作模型.结果表明,在退货价格激励下,制造商接受使供应链整体利润最大化的产量决策.此时,合作双方达到＂双赢＂,系统达到帕雷托最优;最后,进行了数例分析,证明了结果的有效性.     

Coordination and performance analysis for a three-echelon supply chain with a revenue sharing contract

This paper focuses on a three-echelon supply chain composed of a manufacturer, a distributor and a retailer for a single selling period. Based on a revenue sharing contract, the coordination of the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game or the leader–follower game is analysed. It is determined that the revenue sharing contract can coordinate the decentralised supply chain with the simultaneous move game. Our analysis reveals that the revenue sharing contract cannot coordinate the decentralised three-echelon supply chain with the leader–follower game except for a special situation. However, this result provides an opportunity to develop methodology and results that measure the potential improvement in supply chain performance that can be gained from utilising the revenue sharing contract. This is an important aspect of this paper.     

Pricing and ordering decisions in a supply chain with imperfect quality items and inspection under buyback of defective items

In this article, the economic production and inventory model in a three-layer supply chain including one distributor, one manufacturer and one retailer for a single-product and general demand functions under three scenarios is developed. We assume that during the production process, both healthy and defective items are generated. As the first scenario, we develop the first model, in which the defective items are not reworked and all considered as scrape, while in the second model, we assume that the defective items are reworked and are sold as perfect item. In the second scenario, we assume that defective item can be sold with lower price than the selling price. Moreover, raw materials with imperfect quality are sent back from a distributor to outside supplier under a lower price. Determining the order quantity of the distributor and the selling prices of the distributor and the manufacturer as well as the retailer was the goal of this article such that the total profit of each member is maximised. In order to solve the models, the Stackelberg approach is employed between the members, and the concavity of the profit functions is proved using several theorems. Then, closed form solutions are derived for the decision variables and a solution algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal solutions. Finally, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the applicability of the model.     

考虑公平关切的双渠道供应链平台合作决策

为探讨制造商与转销型以及与代销型平台的合作问题,应用制造商主导下的Stackelberg博弈模型针对零售商具有横向、纵向和双向3种公平关切情况的供应链进行决策分析。以算例形式比较不同公平关切系数对供应链成员定价及利润的影响情况,进一步讨论制造商的平台选择策略。研究表明,零售商公平关切倾向并不总是有利于提高自身的利润;从绝对利润来看,横向公平关切越大,对于与转销型平台合作的制造商更有利;纵向公平关切越大,制造商与代运营型平台合作更有利。从相对利润来看,高横向−低纵向公平关切下,制造商倾向于与转销型平台合作;低横向−高纵向公平关切下,制造商倾向于与代销型平台合作。     

A manufacturer’s production and pricing strategies with a salvage channel

We study a manufacturer’s production quantity and pricing decisions when the manufacturer has an opportunity to sell surplus inventory through a salvage channel. Before sales begin, the manufacturer determines the production quantity without knowing customer demand. After demand is realised, the manufacturer first satisfies the demand through primary channel while charging a fixed price or adjusting price to maximise profit. At the end of the selling season, the manufacturer resells surplus inventory through the salvage channel, which can be either integrated with or independent of the manufacturer. The manufacturer’s optimal production quantity and expected profit are investigated under different salvage channel structures. We show that the salvage channel improves the manufacturer’s profitability as well as the availability of the product to potential customers through both primary and salvage channels.     

Quick response strategy with cleaner technology in a supply chain: coordination and win-win situation analysis

Quick response strategy (QRS) has been widely adopted in a supply chain where members collect timely market information for better forecasting, and then respond promptly to the market changes by adjusting initial inventory decision. After adopting the QRS, sustainability issues such as greenhouse gas emission and energy waste may be more serious as production lead time is shorter. In this study, due to this dilemma, we develop a two-stage quick response supply chain with cleaner technology, where the manufacturer determines the cleaner technology investment and afterwards the retailer decides the ordering quantity. Based on Bayesian theory, we depict an information updating process for the QRS with cleaner technology. First, we find that the inventory service level significantly affects both manufacturer’s and retailer’s performance under the QRS with cleaner technology. Moreover, our analytical results indicate that the performance of centralised supply chain system is always better than the decentralised one. As a result, we propose two supply chain contracts, minimum ordering quantity (MOQ) and MOQ with buyback (MOQ-BB) to achieve supply chain coordination. Comparing with the MOQ, the MOQ-BB is more flexible to allow better allocation of the ‘additional’ expected profit between the channel members through the buyback price negotiation.     

随机需求条件下基于期权交易的供应链协调模型

〖HT5”H〗摘要： 〖HTSS〗期权契约作为一种供应链契约能使供应链达到协调。论文从基本的零售商订货模型出发,引入可交易的看涨期权,通过比较零售商的最优订货量和期权购买量,以及供应链整体的最优订货量和期权购买量,发现引入期权交易时,供应链达到最优订货时的利润总是大于零售商达到最优订货时的利润。并得出供应商可以通过调整期权契约参数来促使零售商主动将其最优订货量调节到协调时的供应链总体订货量水平的结论。     

Contract design for cooperative product service system with information asymmetry

This paper studies how to effectively provide product service system (PSS) in the supply chain with asymmetric information for service-oriented manufacturing (SOM). With a PSS, the manufacturer chooses the product quality, and the retailer, who possesses private cost information, is responsible for adding necessary value-added service based on the basic product. The analytical underpinnings of our work are provided by the principal-agent paradigm. In the paper, we develop three types of contracts and conduct a detailed comparison among the three contract models. With these studies, we find that: (i) the wholesale price contract is dominated by the other two contracts, (ii) The retail price maintenance contract can always generate a higher profit for the manufacturer and a higher welfare for the consumers, whereas the franchise fee (FF) contract can always generate a higher profit for the retailer and (iii) The FF contract can always stimulate more service from the retailer. Our theoretical and numerical results show that there are significantly different effects when the three types of contracts are utilized in the supply chain for SOM with asymmetric information, and which of them is the most attractive will depend largely on the power structure of the supply chain and/or their cost information types.     

不同市场结构下绿色闭环供应链决策分析

为了分析不同市场结构对绿色闭环供应链成员决策以及绩效的影响,引入环保参数,采用Stackelberg博弈法,比较了三种市场结构下渠道成员的决策、利润和渠道总利润。研究结果表明：制造商主导市场时批发价、零售价和制造商利润最高;零售商领导市场时回收水平、单位利润和零售商利润最高;环保水平和渠道总利润在垂直纳什市场结构下最高。理论上无领导者的垂直纳什结构最理想,但考虑实际情况,零售商控制市场时较好。     

Analysis of order timing tradeoffs in multi-retailer supply systems

We analyse the implications of order timing decisions in multi-retailer supply systems in a single period, newsvendor setting. Specifically, we investigate a supply chain with multiple retailers and a single supplier where one of the retailers is considered a preferred or primary customer of the supplier. In the base model (delayed commitment), customers order after observing demand and the supplier rations its production quantity to retailers according to a generalised uniform allocation rule. In the early-commitment model, the primary retailer commits to an order quantity prior to the selling season and receives her order in full. We compare the expected supplier and retailer profits under each of these strategies and specify conditions under which a particular commitment scheme benefits the supplier, the primary retailer, and the entire system. Our findings indicate that the supplier prefers early commitment under mild conditions, whereas the primary retailer's preference depends on the tradeoff between the supply risk and demand risk. We also compare our findings with a single-retailer system, and observe that both the supplier and the primary retailer benefit from the existence of additional customers under delayed-commitment in many contexts.     

Dual-channel supply chain pricing decisions with a risk-averse retailer

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain with one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer where there is only one perishable product with price-dependent stochastic demand. We choose Conditional Value-at-Risk criterion to measure the retailer’s risk-averse level, and assume that the manufacturer’s direct sales channel and the retailer’s traditional channel adopt a consistent pricing strategy. The model explores a Nash bargaining problem where the manufacturer and the retailer negotiate with each other on the wholesale price, the retail price and the order quantity when they have equal bargaining power. It is found that when demand uncertainty follows a uniform distribution, a Nash bargaining equilibrium exists and the retail price will decrease as the retailer becomes more risk averse. However, when the risk-averse indicator increases, the manufacturer’s profit on his direct channel will decrease, increase or first increase and then decrease, depending on the values of the related parameters. The profit shares of the manufacturer and the retailer under the Nash equilibrium model are related to the risk-averse indicator of the retailer. Furthermore, we perform three sets of numerical experiments to verify the effects of the retailer’s risk-averse indicator on decision-making and profit allocations under the different environmental parameters and gain several meaningful managerial insights.     

零售商风险厌恶下的订货时机分析

由一个风险厌恶型零售商和一个风险中性制造商组成的供应链中,分析了供应链三种订货时机:预先订货、延迟订货、柔性订货,结果显示供应链将处于制造商不偏好的订货时机;调查了零售商风险厌恶对制造商的影响,发现在一定条件下零售商将削减订货量至少一半,制造商利润将减少至少一半;设计了利润保证契约这一供应链协调机制,发现通过该契约,制造商生产量将提高到原来的两倍以上,还对该契约的实施条件进行了全面分析。     

突发事件且非对称信息下的供应链回购契约模型

考虑由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的供应链,在随机市场需求下,分析了回购契约对供应链的协调作用;探讨了突发事件导致市场需求和零售商边际成本同时变化且变化后的零售商边际成本是不对称信息时回购契约对供应链的协调作用,研究表明：基准的回购契约对突发事件下的供应链不再发挥协调作用,为此,给出了供应链应对突发事件的最优应对策略,并调整了原来的回购契约使其具有抗突发事件性。用一个算例对比加以说明。 