基于策略消费者风险偏好的供应链协调研究

在传统的策略消费者的报童模型基础上,探讨了消费者风险偏好对供应链协调的影响,引入消费者风险偏好系数,证明了在此影响下销售商的最优定价和订货量会降低,从而减少了供应链的收益。为改善这种状况,提出两部定价法,同样考虑消费者的风险偏好,得出了在相同的风险偏好下,这种批发价格随着订货量递减的两部定价策略与单一线性价格策略相比,前者的销售商的最优订货量会增加,最优销售价格会降低,使消费者获得更多的剩余价值,从而使供应链整体的效益提高。通过算例对结论进行了验证。     

On the newsvendor model with conditional Value-at-Risk of opportunity loss

To manage the risk arising from uncertainty in market demand, this paper introduces the Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) measure into the decision framework of the newsvendor who aims to minimise his opportunity loss. It is found under the CVaR measure that the newsvendor’s optimal order quantity is increasing in the confidence level when the understock loss is bigger than the overstock loss. This implies that an over-ordering may be even more caused by the newsvendor’s risk aversion about opportunity loss than risk seeking behaviour. Under this optimal order quantity, it is proved that the newsvendor’s expected profit and expected opportunity loss are decreasing and increasing in the confidence level, respectively. Furthermore, some management insights are presented to facilitate the risk management of the newsvendor model.     

The value of trade credit with rebate contract in a capital-constrained supply chain

We investigate the value of an innovative trade credit with rebate contract (TCRC) model in a stylised supply chain. In this supply chain, the capital-abundant manufacturer offers an integrated contract involving trade credit, minimum ordering and sales rebate contract to a capital-constrained retailer. To highlight the value of the TCRC model, we compare it with a traditional trade credit financing (TTCF) model in a ‘selling to the newsvendor model’. First, we show that equilibrium strategies exist between the manufacturer and the retailer under the TCRC or TTCF model. Second, this study investigates equilibrium selection between the TCRC and TTCF models for the individual and the supply chain. Finally, we show the manufacturer’s pricing policy, wherein the TCRC model outperforms the TTCF model for the players. Furthermore, we conduct a set of numerical experiments to show evidence for theoretical analysis and measure the operation efficiency of the TCRC model for players in the supply chain.     

Supply chain coordination under trade credit and retailer effort

In this paper, we study the role of trade credit in coordinating a Capital Constrained Supply Chain in the presence of retailer Effort (CCSCE), essentially because of the impact of its related default risks on the relationship between the chain’s members. We consider a CCSCE consisting of a supplier and a retailer where the retailer may exert costly promotional efforts to increase the market demand but has limited capital and no access to bank financing due to low credit rating. Conversely, the supplier has adequate funds to offer trade credit to the retailer without borrowing from external channels. We then examine whether the existing coordination contracts can still coordinate the CCSCE under trade credit. Our result shows that these contracts can achieve coordination of the supply chain when the interest rate of trade credit is competitively priced. Nevertheless, this position cannot always be reached. That’s why we propose a generalised contract based on risk compensation to coordinate the CCSCE. Using our proposed coordinating contract, the supplier perfectly coordinates the retailer’s decisions for the largest joint profit, and arbitrarily allocates the maximised joint profit among supply chain members. Finally, the numerical study allows to verify this finding. From managerial insights, our results provide the supply chain managers with novel insights on how to combine trade credit with the existing coordination contracts in order to improve the profitability of the entire supply chain as well as the individual member.     

Optimal process mean and quality improvement in a supply chain model with two-part trade credit based on Taguchi loss function

The two-part trade credit policy is developed to accelerate cash inflow that can avoid bad debt risk in the earlier economic order quantity (EOQ) models allowing only one period of time for delay in payment. Taguchi loss function has proved to be a more realistic function for fitting the actual quality loss cost in economic product quantity (EPQ) model. To minimise quality loss, optimal process mean setting shifts process mean to balance the cost outside the specification limits, quality improvement applies investment to reduce process variation. Supply chain integration has been proved that it can be used to minimise the entire cost more effectively than independent EOQ or EPQ models. This paper improves the earlier studies by incorporating the above research topics that have not been simultaneously discussed before, develops a supply chain model based on the Taguchi loss function, which combines the trade strategy from the retailer’s perspective and the quality adjustments from the supplier’s perspective to maximise total supply chain profit. We find that the trade credit terms definitely affect suppliers and retailers’ optimal decisions, and numerical examples can provide decision references for supply chain managers to set a trade credit policy and control quality.     

Ordering and sales effort investment for temperature-sensitive products considering retailer’s disappointment aversion and elation seeking

We investigate a retailer’s optimal policy of ordering and sales effort investment for temperature-sensitive products in a stylised newsvendor setting considering the effects of the retailer’s disappointment aversion and elation seeking. We provide a function to describe the demand for temperature-sensitive products and a psychological utility function to capture the retailer’s perceived utility of disappointment aversion and elation seeking. Next, we construct four joint ordering and sales effort decision models by integrating the profit and psychological utility for high temperature-sensitive products, medium temperature-sensitive products, low temperature-sensitive products and high–low temperature-sensitive products, respectively. By solving the constructed models, we determine the optimal policy of order quantity and sales effort level. We find that the average temperature in the selling season, the temperature sensitivity parameter, disappointment aversion degree and elation seeking degree can affect the retailer’s optimal policy, and the trends and extents of the effects for each temperature-sensitive product may be different from those for the other temperature-sensitive products. Our models also suggest that the optimal policy for temperature-sensitive products is more conservative than the one for general non-temperature-sensitive products. The policy of a retailer who is primarily concerned with disappointment aversion is more conservative than the one of a disappointment-neutral retailer. The policy of a retailer who mainly focuses on elation seeking is more radical than the one of an elation-neutral retailer. Our results show that a retailer must consider the effects of temperature and psychological behaviour on policy and should make decisions regarding order quantity and sales effort level according to the temperature sensitivity type of selling products and degrees of disappointment aversion and elation seeking.     

基于均值-CVaR的回购契约供应链创新协调机制

为了研究制造商创新情形下回购契约供应链的订货及协调机制,构建了回购契约Stackelberg博弈模型,运用均值-CVaR的方法探讨了回购契约供应链创新协调问题。研究表明,均值-CVaR方法比CVaR度量准则更能提高零售商的订货量,指出零售商的风险规避程度影响供应链的创新和需求。当零售商喜好风险,将使制造商的创新投入度增大,供应链渠道的总需求增加。考虑到零售商过度订购的潜在风险,通过对回购商品数量的限制,改进制造商创新投入回购契约供应链,结果表明,改进的制造商创新投入回购契约能够降低零售商的订货量,同时,在一定条件下能够使供应链协调。最后通过数值算例分析了β和λ对最优订货量和创新投入度的影响。     

考虑制造商设备维修的制造—零售供应链决策与协调

设备可靠性是影响供应不确定的重要因素。为了研究企业内部的维修策略对整条供应链的运营策略产生的具体影响，在考虑设备维修的情况下，针对单个制造商和单个零售商构成的二级供应链，运用Stackelberg博弈的方法研究制造商的最优维修策略和定价策略以及零售商的最优订货量。研究结果表明，制造商的预防性维修次数存在上限且最大维修次数与设备可靠性无关；预防性维修策略有助于提高制造商的产量，降低产品的批发价格，但制造商的最优产出量不会达到企业的最大产能；收益共享契约能够实现供应链的协调；制造商在任何情形下都具有提高设备可靠性的动机，但零售商只会在市场规模较大时才存在为制造商提供设备改造资金的动机。     

零售商风险厌恶下的订货时机分析

由一个风险厌恶型零售商和一个风险中性制造商组成的供应链中,分析了供应链三种订货时机:预先订货、延迟订货、柔性订货,结果显示供应链将处于制造商不偏好的订货时机;调查了零售商风险厌恶对制造商的影响,发现在一定条件下零售商将削减订货量至少一半,制造商利润将减少至少一半;设计了利润保证契约这一供应链协调机制,发现通过该契约,制造商生产量将提高到原来的两倍以上,还对该契约的实施条件进行了全面分析。     

Coordinating loan strategies for supply chain financing with limited credit

In this paper, we design a supply chain financing (SCF) system with a manufacturer, a retailer and a commercial bank where the retailer is capital constrained under demand uncertainties. We formulate a multi-level Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader and the bank as the sub-leader. Considering the bankruptcy risks of the retailer, we analyze the optimal credit line for the commercial bank, the optimal order for the retailer and the optimal wholesale price for the manufacturer, respectively. Comparing the benchmark scenarios of no capital constraint and constrained capital without financing, interdependencies between the operational and financial decisions are explored, as well as coordination analysis of the wholesale price contract with different credit lines. Finally, by conducting numerical studies, interactions between the operational and financial decisions and the impacts of credit lines on contract coordination are illustrated. The results validate our theoretical analysis. Our analysis suggests that a suitable financing scheme with limited credit would motivate the capital-constrained retailer to order more and the wholesale price contract with finite loans would achieve coordination in the SCF system.     

基于风险规避的绿色供应链定价研究

为了解决风险规避型厂商在不同市场结构下的绿色供应链定价问题,首先以由一个风险规避的制造商和一个风险规避的零售商组成的二级绿色供应链为背景,考虑了消费者偏好、产品绿色度、厂商风险规避度等因素,构建厂商的期望效用函数,然后运用博弈论的方法建立了集中决策模型和三种分散决策模型。比较分析了这四种模型下的批发价格、产品绿色度和零售价格,并进一步分析了四种模型在制造商与零售商风险态度不同时的情况。最后通过MATLAB软件数值仿真研究了集中决策模型下的风险规避度对批发价格、产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响以及产品绿色度对供应链效用的影响。仿真结果表明：在一定市场条件下,制造商风险规避对批发价格的影响程度要大于零售商,而对于产品绿色度、零售价格和供应链效用的影响程度是相同的且负向相关;同时,在固定制造商和零售商的风险规避度为0.5时,最优产品绿色度在3.3~3.4之间,最大产品绿色度为7.8。     

Optimal order quantity and product modularity for a two-echelon returnable supply chain

This study considers a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, customers and a returnable and modular product with uncertain demand, in which customers return the unsatisfactory products to the retailer, and the retailer returns the unsold products to the manufacturer. We investigate the effects of the manufacturer’s refund for the retailer’s unsold products and the product modularity under the decentralised and the centralised strategies. We confirm that the order quantity and customer’s return probability both affect the optimal modularity level of the product, and that the optimal modularity level is related to the refund policy. Also, a strategic alliance between the supply chain members is more advantageous to product innovation based on modularity for a returnable chain. Finally, managerial insights and remarks are offered.     

风险规避与信用担保比例对供应链融资选择的影响

研究资金充足制造商和资金约束零售商构成的供应链的融资选择问题。运用CVaR方法,构建风险规避的制造商和零售商在贸易信用融资和核心企业部分信用担保融资下的风险收益模型,分析制造商和零售商的风险规避程度和制造商提供的信用担保比例对双方收益以及供应链融资选择的影响。结果表明,制造商与零售商的风险规避程度对收益起反向影响,且双方的收益对制造商的风险规避程度更敏感;制造商提供的担保比例或者银行利率越高,零售商收益越高,但是制造商收益越低;制造商风险规避度和提供的担保比例满足一定条件情况下,零售商和制造商都会选择内部融资方式。     

Impact of an emergency order opportunity on supply chain coordination

We consider a manufacturer-retailer supply chain in the pre-selling and selling seasons, whereby the manufacturer can offer the retailer an emergency order opportunity with a limited commitment quantity in addition to the regular order from the retailer before the selling season. Due to the short lead time for the emergency order, the manufacturer needs to prepare for it in the pre-selling season by producing more than the regular order or reserving its capacity for the responsive production. Through mathematically modelling and analyzing the supply chain, we found that, when the emergency order opportunity is provided, the manufacturer might be worse off, although the retailer is always better off. We derive the conditions whereby both the manufacturer and retailer can benefit from the emergency order, and the supply chain profit can be maximised. Further, we show that the supply chain can be coordinated by setting only the unit price and maximum commitment quantity for the emergency order. We also prove that Pareto improvement can be always achieved by setting the unit price for the regular order in addition to the unit price and maximum commitment quantity for the emergency order.     

不确定条件下供应链期权契约风险分担模型

供应链期权契约是应对市场需求不确定性的一种重要途径,然而期权价格又给供应链带来了新的风险。针对供应链期权契约的风险分担问题,提出了根据谈判能力协商确定期权价格从而达到风险分担的方法。在市场不确定条件下,以单个制造商和单个零售商组成的供应链为研究对象,建立了基于谈判能力的供应链期权契约风险分担模型,分析了谈判能力对供应链订购量、生产安排以及期望收益的影响。研究发现,期权契约可以提高供应链各成员的期望收益,随着制造商谈判能力的增强,零售商的订单数量增加,期权数量减少,制造商的谈判能力降低了供应链的总期望收益。通过数值仿真分析,进一步验证了通过谈判分担期权契约风险的有效性,获得了对制定供应链期权价格具有指导意义的研究结论。      

Dual-channel supply chain pricing decisions with a risk-averse retailer

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain with one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer where there is only one perishable product with price-dependent stochastic demand. We choose Conditional Value-at-Risk criterion to measure the retailer’s risk-averse level, and assume that the manufacturer’s direct sales channel and the retailer’s traditional channel adopt a consistent pricing strategy. The model explores a Nash bargaining problem where the manufacturer and the retailer negotiate with each other on the wholesale price, the retail price and the order quantity when they have equal bargaining power. It is found that when demand uncertainty follows a uniform distribution, a Nash bargaining equilibrium exists and the retail price will decrease as the retailer becomes more risk averse. However, when the risk-averse indicator increases, the manufacturer’s profit on his direct channel will decrease, increase or first increase and then decrease, depending on the values of the related parameters. The profit shares of the manufacturer and the retailer under the Nash equilibrium model are related to the risk-averse indicator of the retailer. Furthermore, we perform three sets of numerical experiments to verify the effects of the retailer’s risk-averse indicator on decision-making and profit allocations under the different environmental parameters and gain several meaningful managerial insights.     

Analysis of order timing tradeoffs in multi-retailer supply systems

We analyse the implications of order timing decisions in multi-retailer supply systems in a single period, newsvendor setting. Specifically, we investigate a supply chain with multiple retailers and a single supplier where one of the retailers is considered a preferred or primary customer of the supplier. In the base model (delayed commitment), customers order after observing demand and the supplier rations its production quantity to retailers according to a generalised uniform allocation rule. In the early-commitment model, the primary retailer commits to an order quantity prior to the selling season and receives her order in full. We compare the expected supplier and retailer profits under each of these strategies and specify conditions under which a particular commitment scheme benefits the supplier, the primary retailer, and the entire system. Our findings indicate that the supplier prefers early commitment under mild conditions, whereas the primary retailer's preference depends on the tradeoff between the supply risk and demand risk. We also compare our findings with a single-retailer system, and observe that both the supplier and the primary retailer benefit from the existence of additional customers under delayed-commitment in many contexts.     

政府干预下考虑双重行为偏好特征的闭环供应链决策与协调

将供应链成员双重行为偏好特征考虑到政府奖惩干预下的闭环供应链决策模型中,采用均值-标准差风险度量准则探讨了决策者行为偏好对闭环供应链最优决策和协调性的影响。结论表明：公平关切行为只是闭环供应链系统内部利润分配的一种手段,零售商和回收商公平关切行为会促使制造商出让部分利润,从而有利于自身利润的提高;回收商风险偏好行为影响回收转移价和回收价,当供应链成员以效用最大化为决策目标时,回收商越喜好风险,对制造商越不利,越厌恶风险,对零售商越不利;有效协调区域受到双重行为偏好特征的影响,供应链成员过度公平关切以及过度喜好风险或过度规避风险都将使收益共享-费用分担契约难以实现供应链协调,当供应链成员的行为偏好在各成员可接受的合理范围内,收益共享-费用分担契约能够实现闭环供应链Pareto改善。     

风险规避对制造商开通直销渠道的影响

研究了风险规避对制造商开通直销渠道的影响。运用博弈论中个人理性和激励相容原则建立单渠道和双渠道供应链需求模型,得出均衡情况下供应链各成员的最优决策及社会福利。研究发现,仅当决策者风险规避度和直销渠道销售成本满足一定条件时,制造商开通直销渠道有利可图;且直销渠道并非总侵蚀零售商效用。当决策者风险规避度较大且直销渠道成本适中时,供应链价值减少。社会福利总随着制造商风险规避度的增大呈现先减少后增加的趋势。     

随机需求下基于心理偏差的批发价格契约与协调

基于行为经济学中的社会比较理论,提出了正负心理偏差概念,建立了正负心理偏差情形下的供应链效应模型。分析了两类情形下的零售商最优订购策略以及正向心理偏差指数、零售商外生势力参数、负向心理偏差指数对两类情形下最优订购策略的影响。讨论了批发价契约使得供应链协调的条件。理论与算例分析表明,当零售商存在正向心理偏差时,零售商效应随正向心理偏差指数的增大呈现出U型变化特征,在特定条件下,批发价契约可以使得供应链得到协调;当零售商存在负向心理偏差时,订购量随负向心理偏差指数的增大而减少,随外生势力参数的增大而减少,无论负向心理偏差指数、制造商外生势力参数取何值,供应链均不能得到协调。探讨了决策过程中非理性因素对订购策略的影响,所得结论可为订购实践提供指导,丰富了行为运作研究。