共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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Wenfang Shang 《国际生产研究杂志》2013,51(16):4837-4856
This study employs profit-sharing contracts to coordinate dual-channel supply chains and examines the selection of profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit gained from coordination. We characterise the Pareto-optimal contracts for the two- and three-stage dual-channel supply chains, by developing and maximising system utility function related to risk preferences and negotiating power. Under the optimal profit-sharing parameter in a two-stage supply chain, both members are reluctant to cooperate; however, in a three-stage supply chain, under the optimal two profit-sharing parameters selected by optimising the system utility function, the retailer is always reluctant to cooperate, but the distributor or the supplier may have incentives to deviate from cooperation. In this case, the distributor and the supplier will negotiate again as in a two-stage supply chain so that all three members can benefit from coordination with profit-sharing contracts. Besides acting independently, the distributor, in the process of contract negotiation, may choose to form an alliance with the upstream supplier or the downstream retailer, which means the relationship among the three members involving profit allocation after coordination is quite different from that for a two-stage supply chain and is not necessarily interest-contrary. In the contract negotiation, in any kind of scenario, risk aversion and negotiation power have a significant impact on the selection of optimal profit-sharing parameters and the allocation of extra system profit. One member’s risk aversion or its negotiation power may be advantageous to the other. Mathematical examples are illustrated to clarify the contract negotiation process. 相似文献
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This paper adopts a multiunit bilateral bargaining framework on financial decision. In a two-echelon supply chain, the supplier sells products through a financial constraint retailer. If needed, the retailer gets a short-term financing from a bank by supplier credit guarantee loan (CGL). Through applying the Nash bargaining framework, we formulate two-level game models, i.e. Retailer-Supply System negotiation and Supplier-Bank negotiation. In this paper, we study and discuss the equilibrium order quantity which is affected by initial working capital and interest rate, the retailer-supply system negotiation and upstream wholesale price effects for supply chain performance, the supplier-bank negotiation and interest rate decisions with different capital markets. The results show: (i) there exists loan size limit for financial constraint retailer under CGL. (ii) The upstream wholesale price increase will weaken retailer’s bargaining position, and the supply system may gain or lose depending on the bargaining power. (iii) There exists unique equilibrium sharing ratio in supply system, which means CGL can achieve risk sharing. (iv) Within a supply system, the upstream wholesale price advantage will weaken bank’s profit, whereas supplier may gain or lose depending on his bargaining power. 相似文献
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Quick response strategy (QRS) has been widely adopted in a supply chain where members collect timely market information for better forecasting, and then respond promptly to the market changes by adjusting initial inventory decision. After adopting the QRS, sustainability issues such as greenhouse gas emission and energy waste may be more serious as production lead time is shorter. In this study, due to this dilemma, we develop a two-stage quick response supply chain with cleaner technology, where the manufacturer determines the cleaner technology investment and afterwards the retailer decides the ordering quantity. Based on Bayesian theory, we depict an information updating process for the QRS with cleaner technology. First, we find that the inventory service level significantly affects both manufacturer’s and retailer’s performance under the QRS with cleaner technology. Moreover, our analytical results indicate that the performance of centralised supply chain system is always better than the decentralised one. As a result, we propose two supply chain contracts, minimum ordering quantity (MOQ) and MOQ with buyback (MOQ-BB) to achieve supply chain coordination. Comparing with the MOQ, the MOQ-BB is more flexible to allow better allocation of the ‘additional’ expected profit between the channel members through the buyback price negotiation. 相似文献
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研究了供应链订货与营销渠道的协调问题,考虑了零售商具有订货成本缩减和营销投资成本,建立了供应链订货与营销渠道协调的Stackelberg主从对策模型.这一模型中,主方零售商具有产品零售价格和投资决策权,从方供应商具有产品批发价格决策权.分析了零售商四种投资策略,针对每种投资策略下的协调模型进行了数值仿真,结果表明在零售商订货成本缩减和营销之间进行投资协调能够同时增加零售商和供应商利润. 相似文献
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In this paper, we study the role of trade credit in coordinating a Capital Constrained Supply Chain in the presence of retailer Effort (CCSCE), essentially because of the impact of its related default risks on the relationship between the chain’s members. We consider a CCSCE consisting of a supplier and a retailer where the retailer may exert costly promotional efforts to increase the market demand but has limited capital and no access to bank financing due to low credit rating. Conversely, the supplier has adequate funds to offer trade credit to the retailer without borrowing from external channels. We then examine whether the existing coordination contracts can still coordinate the CCSCE under trade credit. Our result shows that these contracts can achieve coordination of the supply chain when the interest rate of trade credit is competitively priced. Nevertheless, this position cannot always be reached. That’s why we propose a generalised contract based on risk compensation to coordinate the CCSCE. Using our proposed coordinating contract, the supplier perfectly coordinates the retailer’s decisions for the largest joint profit, and arbitrarily allocates the maximised joint profit among supply chain members. Finally, the numerical study allows to verify this finding. From managerial insights, our results provide the supply chain managers with novel insights on how to combine trade credit with the existing coordination contracts in order to improve the profitability of the entire supply chain as well as the individual member. 相似文献
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The paper investigates pricing/ordering issues in a dyadic supply chain, in which a core supplier sells products through a budget-constrained retailer. The retailer faces stochastic demand and is fairness-concerned as well. If needed, the retailer can get financing support from bank by means of buyback guarantee financing (BGF) mode, which is often used in China. By introducing Nash bargaining solution as the fairness reference point, we formulate the retailer’s fairness-concerned utility function and develop a two-echelon pricing/ordering game model. We then study the combined impacts of fairness concerns and BGF on two members’ equilibrium strategies and supply chain performance. We also discuss the corresponding issues under no budget constraint, no financing service and bank financing. Our results show that: (1) two members’ equilibrium strategies are significantly influenced by the retailer’s fairness-concerned behaviour and initial budget; (2) as compared to no budget constraint, BGF can bring the whole supply chain more performance, which means that BGF can yield value-added; (3) When the retailer takes the risk of uncertain market solely, the retailer’s fairness concerns are beneficial for supply chain to improve the performance. 相似文献
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This research investigates the optimal pricing strategy for the perishable food supply chain. Using the setting of a two-echelon supply chain including a supplier and a retailer, we apply the game theory approach to derive the equilibriums for both a single pricing strategy and a two-stage pricing strategy. Through a comparison of the equilibriums, we explore how the two pricing strategies affect the supply chain’s decisions and supplier’s and retailer’s performance individually and collectively. The results of the analysis show that the optimal choice of pricing strategy depends on the price markdown cost and its relationship with the two critical thresholds that are determined by a combination of factors including the potential market size, the price and quality sensitivity factors, the initial quality, the unit product cost, and the quality deterioration rate. 相似文献
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研究在VMI环境下存货影响销售量的单供应商、单零售商的两阶段供应链的协调问题。建立了集中决策下的供应链模型,求出了整体供应链的利润函数;在分散决策下,采用收益共享契约对供应链进行协调,按Stackelberg博弈方式进行建模分析,发现收益共享契约无法协调供应链,即在利益分配上,与供应商相比,零售商获得了更多的供应链收益,而且分散式系统的收益始终低于集中决策下的水平;采用Nash协商对VMI供应链进行协调,完成了供应商和零售商收益的帕累托改进,不仅实现供应链的协调,而且达到了集中决策下的水平,最后通过算例进行了验证。 相似文献
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Yusen Xia 《国际生产研究杂志》2016,54(7):1938-1950
This paper considers a one-retailer and one-supplier supply chain and addresses the question of how a retailer should use its ordering and pricing decisions to respond to its supplier’s temporary price discounts. The paper considers a hybrid environment – somewhere between deterministic and stochastic modelling approaches – that is, the retailer does not know when the next promotion from its supplier will occur but, once the promotion is announced, all its details are deterministic and often there is some time remaining before the promotion actually starts. We include in the objective function penalties on deviations from the original plan and explore the properties of the retailer’s ordering and pricing decisions under fixed and flexible set-up scenarios. We show that, when the set-up epochs are fixed, the retailer’s order quantities are monotonic and non-decreasing in situations where retail prices can be either fixed or flexible. When the set-up epochs are flexible, the ordering cycle is identical. Finally, we use some numerical examples to illustrate the proposed approach. 相似文献
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Trust widely works in supply chain practices and deeply affects supply chain decisions. Full trust in transactions and inaccurate demand forecasts are most likely to lead to biased decisions and low supply chain performances. Therefore, we propose a trust updating model to quantify decision-maker’s trust. The model presents the variation of trust over time and is helpful to evaluate decision-maker’s trust level in each transaction. In the model, a coordination mechanism with contract is designed to mitigate each supply chain partner’s ordering risk. Optimal order strategies of both manufactures and retailers in a supply chain under a bidirectional option contract are analysed in this paper. We find the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity is positively affected by penalty price in the contract and its bounds are given by simulation analysis. Our findings in this paper indicate that the proposed coordination mechanism with bidirectional option contract is profitable to all supply chain partners in long-term transactions. Meanwhile, the coordination mechanism helps the supply chain partners to catch up with marketing fluctuations and enhances the supply chain trust and partnerships. Finally, some simulation experiments are employed to obtain more observations. 相似文献
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基于行为经济学中的社会比较理论,提出了正负心理偏差概念,建立了正负心理偏差情形下的供应链效应模型。分析了两类情形下的零售商最优订购策略以及正向心理偏差指数、零售商外生势力参数、负向心理偏差指数对两类情形下最优订购策略的影响。讨论了批发价契约使得供应链协调的条件。理论与算例分析表明,当零售商存在正向心理偏差时,零售商效应随正向心理偏差指数的增大呈现出U型变化特征,在特定条件下,批发价契约可以使得供应链得到协调;当零售商存在负向心理偏差时,订购量随负向心理偏差指数的增大而减少,随外生势力参数的增大而减少,无论负向心理偏差指数、制造商外生势力参数取何值,供应链均不能得到协调。探讨了决策过程中非理性因素对订购策略的影响,所得结论可为订购实践提供指导,丰富了行为运作研究。 相似文献
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This paper studies a game-theoretical capacity allocation problem in a two-echelon supply chain comprised of one supplier and N retailers. With demand fluctuating seasonally and significantly, supply is sufficient in low-demand periods but is insufficient in high-demand periods, especially when the supplier’s capacity decreases in high-demand periods. Retailers compete for the supplier’s capacity in high-demand periods, but do not want to absorb the supplier’s redundant capacity in low-demand periods. A turn-and-earn allocation scheme is proposed to encourage retailers to increase their order quantity in low-demand periods. Under the turn-and-earn allocation scheme, in high-demand periods, the supplier is willing to offer a guaranteed portion of supply capacity for the primary retailer. The remaining capacity in high-demand periods is allocated based on orders retailers placed in low-demand periods. In response, the retailers will decide how much they should order in low-demand periods. Then, a competitive game based on Nash equilibrium among the supplier and her retailers is analysed. In order to solve the problem of unreasonable distribution of interest caused by competition, a contract is designed to make it possible for subsidy to be transferred from the supplier to the retailers. Usually, the supplier and her primary retailer can both be better off under turn-and-earn allocation compared with fixed allocation, and the system efficiency in Nash solution is close to it in optimal solution. A numerical study is also conducted to discuss the parties’ sensitivity to different demand level and guaranteed allocation portion of capacity. 相似文献
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在收入共享契约下,借助条件风险值理论研究风险规避零售商和风险中性供应商组成的二级供应链协调定价模型,推导出随机需求受价格影响的零售商最优零售价格、库存因子以及供应商最优批发价格。讨论风险规避系数、市场弹性系数和收入共享系数对分散供应链系统以及各成员运作绩效的影响。最后,进行数值算例,数值结果表明,随着零售商风险规避程度的增加,零售商和供应商运作绩效呈递减趋势,但采用收入共享契约可以有效的减少供应链系统以及各成员独立运作的绩效损失;当收入共享系数一定时,需求价格弹性系数越大,供应商和零售商运作绩效越小;然而零售商和供应商运作绩效并不受成本比例系数的影响。 相似文献
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To attain the general form of stable coalition structure, this paper addressed the problem of retailers’ coalition stability in a two-stage supply chain consisting of one supplier and multiple retailers. A profit gain function was established via introducing market gain coefficient and coalition cost coefficient for different coalition structures. Based on the function, the profit of each retailer in all kinds of coalition structures was analysed, and the general feature of a stable coalition structure was attained by the largest consistent set method and the stable set method. Furthermore, some insights were obtained. For example, stable coalition structures are equidistributed or approximate equidistributed; with supplier’s cost increasing, the size of the retailers’ coalition increases. Finally, the above conclusions are verified by numerical simulation. The results of this paper provide a reference for retailers’ coalition in a supply chain, such as automobile or Information Technology supply chain. 相似文献