Trust-embedded coordination in supply chain information sharing

This paper studies supply chain coordination with trust-embedded cost-sharing contract. In a two-tier supply chain, a retailer (she) and a supplier (he) make their private demand forecasting individually. The retailer places soft-orders, which are costless, non-verifiable and cancellable before shipping, to the supplier. After that, the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information to update his demand evaluation and prepare his capacity. How much the supplier relies on the retailer’s ordering information is specified by trust, which is a kind of psychological feeling and affected by multiple factors. When the supplier does not fully trust the retailer, he tends to prepare a conservative capacity to avoid over-production. To coordinate the supply chain, a two-stage coordination process is proposed. At the first stage, the supplier and retailer negotiate a cost-sharing rule to bind soft-orders. At the second stage, the retailer places a soft-order and decides whether or not to bind it referring to the cost-sharing rule. After that, the supplier determines his optimal production capacity. We show that the retailer and supplier value trust differently in the experimental studies. We also find that there is a threshold of negotiation power for the supply chain partners which means the supplier’s/retailer’s expected profit drops down if his/her negotiation power exceeds certain thresholds. The experimental studies also show that the proposed the two-stage coordination is effective.     

Information sharing in capacity constrained supply chains under lost sales

We present a modelling approach for quantifying the value of information in supply chains using Markov decision processes (MDP). The case where information sharing occurs is modelled using a completely observable MDP. A restricted observation MDP is used to model the case where no information sharing occurs. We illustrate the use of this framework on a two-stage capacity-constrained supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. We quantify the value of information sharing in this setting and construct several performance measures to identify the benefits to both the retailer and supplier as a result of the information sharing partnership.     

Determination of the optimal degree of information sharing in a two-echelon supply chain

Information sharing is beneficial for supply chains, but often has marginally decreasing impacts on profit due to the costly expense of collecting more detailed information. This study aims to determine the optimal degree of information sharing with consideration of the trade-off between the cost of collecting information and the benefits gained by utilising it to enhance the profit of a two-echelon supply chain. Based on the analytical results, the profit that the supplier gains from information sharing can stem from the decrease in inventory cost after having more accurate information about demand. Furthermore, the impacts that the cost of collecting information has on the optimal degree of information sharing are investigated, and the results show that the optimal degree of information sharing is positively correlated to the correlation of successive market demand, that is, when the demand for successive periods is more correlated, information sharing becomes more valuable, and hence the optimal degree of information sharing increases.     

服务供应链的信息共享机制及绩效研究

文章研究的服务供应链包含一个服务供应商和一个服务集成商信息共享机制问题。服务供应商提供原始服务产品或活动给服务集成商,而服务集成商依次以附加值集成服务出售给客户。在不确定性市场环境下,客户服务需求量带有价格敏感和随机性的特征。在服务供应商和服务集成商之间,探析服务供应链的不同信息传输方式下信息共享机制问题,评估服务供应链的绩效,其结果强调服务业开展信息共享的必要性。     

Channel coordination for multi-stage supply chains with revenue-sharing contracts under budget constraints

Real-life situations show that revenue-sharing (RS) contracts used in multi-stage supply chains have more complex structures than those that have been studied in recent research. In this paper, we study RS contracts in multi-stage supply chains where some members work with more than one upstream member. This general supply chain structure closely resembles those in actual practice under RS contracts. The literature on supply chain contracts has not adequately addressed contract design for supply chains with members who face budget constraints. We show that the RS contract could fail to coordinate supply chains when members are under particular budget constraints. In response, we propose a revenue-sharing with budget constraints (RSB) contract that adds no administrative cost. A properly designed RSB contract can be used to achieve supply chain coordination and to arbitrarily allocate profits in multi-stage supply chains. Our numerical results provide insights into ways supply chain coordination can be achieved under budget constraints through the RSB contract.     

Information sharing in supply chains: Incentives for information distortion

The existing literature on supply chain information sharing assumes that information is shared truthfully. Unless each party can verify the authenticity of the other party's information, manufacturers and retailers may divulge false information for their own benefit. These information distortions may reduce the benefit levels or even stop information sharing in supply chains. We analyze the incentives for manufacturers and retailers within a supply chain to distort information when they share it and propose a mechanism that results in truthful information sharing. We consider a make-to-order supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. The manufacturer and the retailer set prices based on their private forecasts of uncertain demand. If both parties share their forecasts truthfully, the manufacturer always benefits; however, the retailer benefits only if the manufacturer sets a lower wholesale price when information is shared compared to when information is not shared. However, we show that the manufacturer and the retailer, respectively, have an incentive to overstate and understate their forecasts while sharing information. The information distortion phenomenon is the direct result of each party exploiting its private information to appropriate the gains from information sharing. We show that the incentives to distort information are eliminated and both parties benefit from information sharing if the manufacturer and the retailer can agree on their relative profit margins prior to information sharing.     

The bullwhip effect in supply chains: a study of contingent and incomplete literature

The bullwhip effect (BWE) describes a phenomenon that involves the increasing amplification of demand variability along a supply chain (SC). The BWE has been a subject that has received continuous attention from researchers over the past 15 years and is a concern for SC managers because it is a major cause of efficiency and effectiveness loss in SCs. Information sharing between actors in an SC is usually considered to be one of the primary means to minimise the BWE. Approximately 50 articles published in major journals on these topics are studied in this article. An analytical framework is used to highlight the contingent character of the conclusions proposed by the authors. In this review, we identify the existence of significant gaps in the literature, especially concerning the BWE when it occurs in the productive part of the SC.     

Multi-period hedging and coordination in a prefabricated construction supply chain

In this paper, a multi-period buffer space hedging coordination between a building contractor (BC) and a logistics provider (LP) is investigated. In order to facilitate the application of the construction lead-time hedging (CLTH) strategy, adopted by the BC, extra buffer space needs to be reserved at LP’s intermediate warehouse for contingency usage. This strategy is defined as ‘buffer space hedging (BSH)’ and it increases the pressure of LP on involving extra storage and maintenance cost. Two coordination mechanisms are adopted for solving this BSH problem. One scheme is by introducing a cost-sharing term. A Nash game model is studied to find the individual optimal decisions. Another scheme is a cooperative game model with proper side-payments. We show that adjusting the BSH amount for each review period benefits the supply chain. Both coordination mechanisms enable a win–win outcome. Especially, if system resources are sufficient, the cooperative game outperforms the Nash game. Numerical experiments further demonstrate that the benefit of the proposed model is more significant under the case with lower unit enlarging/rearrangement cost, higher tardiness penalty and unpredictable and uncontrollable construction process-determined assembled and installed prefabs.     

供应链中的信息共享与合作

企业间的合作对于提升供应链绩效日益重要，而信息共享是合作协调的重要基础之一。对信息共享进行了分类，提出信息共享方式；从存储论角度证明了共享库存信息对降低供应链成本的作用，以及从仿真上验证了在共享库存信息供应链中可以利用（s,S)策略降低供应链成本。     

Decentralised decision-making with information sharing vs. centralised decision-making in supply chains

In recent years, implementing coordination mechanisms in decentralised supply chains to reduce the well-known negative effects of decentralisation, such as the ‘bullwhip effect’, has become a considerable challenge. Furthermore, with the dramatic developments in information and communication technologies, real-time information sharing has become increasingly easier to implement. In this work, we study a mono-product divergent supply chain composed of a supplier, a warehouse, retailers and customers in the context of decentralised and centralised decisions. The main objective of this study is to compare a decentralised supply chain combined with different scenarios of simultaneous upstream and downstream information sharing vs. a centralised supply chain. A mathematical model is developed to compare the logistics costs in the two decision contexts. The experimental results clearly show that the simultaneous sharing of customer demand and supplier-warehouse lead time information in a decentralised supply chain yields nearly equivalent logistics costs as the centralised supply chain context. However, the main beneficiary of the sharing is the warehouse, which receives approximately two-thirds of the benefit. Thus, incentives and revenue sharing contracts should be implemented to motivate and balance the benefits between supply chain partners.     

Adjustable Robust Optimisation approach to optimise discounts for multi-period supply chain coordination under demand uncertainty

In this research, a problem of supply chain coordination with discounts under demand uncertainty is studied. To solve the problem, an Affinely Adjustable Robust Optimisation model is developed. At the time when decisions about order periods, ordering quantities and discounts to offer are made, only a forecasted value of demand is available to a decision-maker. The proposed model produces a discount schedule, which is robust against the demand uncertainty. The model is also able to utilise the information about the realised demand from the previous periods in order to make decisions for future stages in an adjustable way. We consider both box and budget uncertainty sets. Computational results show the necessity of accounting for uncertainty, as the total costs of the nominal solution increase significantly even when only a small percentage of uncertainty is in place. It is testified that the affinely adjustable model produces solutions, which perform significantly better than the nominal solutions, not only on average, but also in the worst case. The trade-off between reduction of the conservatism of the model and the uncertainty protection is investigated as well.     

Demand information sharing and channel choice in a dual-channel supply chain with multiple retailers

In this paper, under a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and multiple retailers, we investigate vertical and horizontal information sharing in different channel structures and the manufacturer’s choice on whether or not to keep a direct channel. To this end, we first study the dual-channel structure where uncertain demand is a linear function of price with a generalised-distribution base demand and show that the retailers have incentives to share information horizontally but not vertically, while the manufacturer is better off with vertical information sharing but its expected profit is not affected by horizontal information sharing. We next examine the retail-channel structure and find the basic results remain unchanged. Finally, we provide closed-form internal and external conditions under which the manufacturer can benefit from owning a dual-channel structure. Our study extends the existing literature by combining information sharing and dual-channel choice, introducing channel difference, discussing the impact of channel structure on horizontal and vertical sharing as well as providing interesting managerial insights for channel choice.     

Simplicity is beauty: pricing coordination in two-product supply chains with simplest contracts under voluntary compliance

Pricing is an important topic in supply chains. In this paper, we explore the coordination challenge with the use of simplest contracts for the case with two products. To be specific, we consider a single-manufacturer single-retailer make-to-order supply chain. In the base model, we consider the case when the product demands are independent and derive the optimal pricing decisions under a decentralised setting. Comparing with the centralised setting, we show that double marginalisation in the decentralised setting reduces the supply chain efficiency by 25%. We then find that the simpler contracts such as the three-parameter two-part tariff (3P-TT) contract and the three-parameter revenue sharing (3P-RS) contract can coordinate the two-product supply chain. We extend the analysis in two cases: (i) the case when the products are substitutable and (ii) the case when the retailer is risk averse, and show that both the 3P-TT and 3P-RS contracts can coordinate the respective supply chain. We also find that the degrees of product substitution and retailer’s risk averse significantly influence the supply chain performance.     

Incentives for quality improvement efforts coordination in supply chains with partial cost allocation contract

In this paper, we consider quality improvement efforts coordination in a two-stage decentralised supply chain with a partial cost allocation contract. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one manufacturer, both of which produce defective products. Two kinds of failure cost occur within the supply chain: internal and external. The supplier and the manufacturer determine their individual quality levels to maximise their own profits. We propose a partial cost allocation contract, under which the external failure cost is allocated between the manufacturer and the supplier at different rates based on information derived from failure root cause analysis. If the quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are observable, we show that the partial cost allocation contract coordinates the supply chain, provided that the failure root cause analysis does not erroneously identify the manufacturer’s fault as the supplier’s, and the supplier does not take responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. In the single moral hazard model, where only the quality level of the supplier is unobservable, the optimal share rates require the supplier to take some responsibility for the manufacture’s fault. However, in the double moral hazard model, where quality levels of the supplier and the manufacturer are unobservable to each other, the optimal share rates require the supplier not to take responsibility for the manufacturer’s fault. It is noted that the root cause analysis conducted by the manufacturer may have its disadvantage in attributing the fault to the supplier when both sides are at fault. We also propose a contract based on the dual root cause analysis to reduce the supplier’s penalty cost. Numerical results illustrate that the partial cost allocation contract satisfies the fairness criterion compared with the traditional cost allocation contract.     

Revealing interfaces of supply chain resilience and sustainability: a simulation study

Dynamics of structures and processes is one of the underlying challenges in supply chain management, where multiple dimensions of economic efficiency, risk management and sustainability are interconnected. One of the substantiated issues in supply chain dynamics is resilience. Resilience has a number of intersections with supply chain sustainability. This paper aims at analysing disruption propagation in the supply chain with consideration of sustainability factors in order to design resilient supply chain structure in regard to ripple effect mitigation and sustainability increase. Ripple effect in the supply chain occurs if a disruption at a supplier cannot be localised and cascades downstream impacting supply chain performance. This simulation-based study helps to identify what sustainability factors mitigate the ripple effect in the supply chain and what sustainability factors enhance this effect. The results indicate that (i) sustainable single sourcing enhances the ripple effect; (ii) facility fortification at major employers in regions mitigates the ripple effect and enhances sustainability; and (iii) a reduction in storage facilities in the supply chain downstream of a disruption-risky facility increases sustainability but causes the ripple effect.     

Effects of information transparency and cooperation on supply chain performance: a simulation study

This research explores the effect of information transparency and cooperation among the front nodes of supply chains. Although published works in the supply chain (SC) domain underline the need for information transparency and cooperation for competitiveness of firms, the majority among these are conceptual or empirical. As such, the domain requires fresh effort towards analytical and simulation based research for validation. In the present work, simulation is used as the research methodology. The simulation platform is developed in ARENA®, which is based on simulation language SIMAN. It has the capability to model multi-product, multi-echelon supply chains. Cooperation is depicted in the form of demand pooling and accelerated delivery of consignments from cooperating SC nodes, when stock-out contingency occurs at a particular node. The modelling also explores the effects of full, partial and zero level of information transparency on the SC performance. The simulation results suggest that these initiatives improve SC service time performance. It is also observed that more advantages from cooperation and information transparency are obtainable when the SC is leaner. The studies also highlight that such SC initiative that motivates local optimisation at the nodes is counter-productive to SC wide performance.     

Entropy-based model for the ripple effect: managing environmental risks in supply chains

Due to increasing diversity and growing size of modern industrial supply chains, today problems of identification, assessment and mitigation of disruption risks become challenging goals of the supply chain risk management. In this paper, we focus on environmental (ecological) risks in supply chains which represent threats of adverse effects on living organisms, facilities and environment by effluents, emissions, wastes, resource depletion, etc. arising due to supply chain’s activities. Harmful environmental disruptions may ripple through the supply chain components like a wave. The paper presents the entropy-based optimisation model for reducing the supply chain model size and assessing the economic loss caused by the environmental risks subject to the ripple effect. A main advantage of the suggested entropy-based approach is that it permits to essentially simplify the hierarchical tree-like model of the supply chain, at the same time retaining the basic knowledge about main risk sources.     

Reducing the effects of demand uncertainty in single-newsvendor multi-retailer supply chains

Due to fierce competition in today’s global market, businesses are forced to provide customers with high service levels. Typically, vendors produce or order sufficient quantities at the beginning of a selling season to ensure reasonable service levels for the whole season. However, due to the probabilistic nature of demand, high service levels at the beginning of a selling season does not guarantee appropriate service levels during the course of consuming the item. Thus, revision of service levels during a selling season is important and ignoring such revision may lead to serious consequences for businesses like profit loss due to cancelled orders and reduction of the market share of the company. In this paper, we propose a model for a newsvendor supply chain with single vendor and multiple retailers where the vendor has two-ordering opportunities. At the beginning of a selling season, the retailer orders from a vendor a quantity such that a predetermined service level is achieved. At the second-ordering instant, the retailer learns more about the demand pattern and uses the new available demand data to update the coming demand using Bayesian approach. Based on the updated demand, the retailer evaluates the new service level for the remaining portion of the selling season. If this service level is lower than a specific value, a second batch is ordered. We develop the model for general demand distribution and determine the optimal quantities at the beginning of the selling season and at the second-ordering opportunity.     

Supply chain coordination under information asymmetry: a review

Aligning supply chain decisions of separate entities with independent objectives can be considered to be one of the difficulties of supply chain management. This difficulty becomes worse if the supply chains are characterised by an asymmetrical distribution of information. Although considerable research has recently been devoted to supply chain coordination, less attention has been paid to different information asymmetry settings to the mechanisms underlying it. This research attempts to help fill this gap by reviewing and classifying the literature based on supply chain features, applied methodology, coordination mechanisms, and types of information asymmetry. The proposed classification is used to highlight the ongoing issues in the area and identify the direction for future research.     

Conceptual framework for designing agri-food supply chains under uncertainty by mathematical programming models

Agri-food sector performance strongly impacts global economy, which means that developing optimisation models to support the decision-making process in agri-food supply chains (AFSC) is necessary. These models should contemplate AFSC’s inherent characteristics and sources of uncertainty to provide applicable and accurate solutions. To the best of our knowledge, there are no conceptual frameworks available to design AFSC through mathematical programming modelling while considering their inherent characteristics and sources of uncertainty, nor any there literature reviews that address such characteristics and uncertainty sources in existing AFSC design models. This paper aims to fill these gaps in the literature by proposing such a conceptual framework and state of the art. The framework can be used as a guide tool for both developing and analysing models based on mathematical programming to design AFSC. The implementation of the framework into the state of the art validates its. Finally, some literature gaps and future research lines were identified.