A manufacturer’s production and pricing strategies with a salvage channel

We study a manufacturer’s production quantity and pricing decisions when the manufacturer has an opportunity to sell surplus inventory through a salvage channel. Before sales begin, the manufacturer determines the production quantity without knowing customer demand. After demand is realised, the manufacturer first satisfies the demand through primary channel while charging a fixed price or adjusting price to maximise profit. At the end of the selling season, the manufacturer resells surplus inventory through the salvage channel, which can be either integrated with or independent of the manufacturer. The manufacturer’s optimal production quantity and expected profit are investigated under different salvage channel structures. We show that the salvage channel improves the manufacturer’s profitability as well as the availability of the product to potential customers through both primary and salvage channels.     

Optimal advertising outsourcing strategy with different effort levels and uncertain demand

This paper studies the issue of advertising outsourcing and production planning for a manufacturer facing asymmetric advertising cost and uncertain market demand. To improve product sales, a manufacturer would hire an advertising agency to provide professional service on product advertising before the production takes place. A contract taking into account both advertising effort level and payment is introduced to incentivize the advertising agency to report the exact cost to the manufacturer. Furthermore, a model with the goal of maximising the manufacturer's net profit is proposed, in which both product demand and payment to the advertising agency are affected by the advertising effort level. Analytical solutions of the optimal strategies including the optimal advertising effort level and the optimal payment to the advertising agency are derived. Optimal retail price and the optimal production quantity are also obtained for the manufacturer in making managerial decisions.     

Coordination of joint pricing-production decisions in a supply chain

We consider the coordination of dynamic, joint pricing-production/ordering decisions in a decentralized supply chain where a manufacturer outsources her product distribution/retailing function to an independent distributor/retailer. The manufacturer produces and wholesales her product to the distributor who, after some further processing, sells the product to an external market. In a leader-follower setting with convex production/ordering cost functions, both parties make pricing and production/ordering decisions over a discrete, finite-time horizon (a selling season) to maximize their respective profits. For a given manufacturer's (the leader's) wholesale price schedule, we develop a simple forward algorithm to solve the distributor's problem optimally, and prove a planning horizon property of the solution. Our key result is to show the existence of a manufacturer's price schedule that induces distributor to adopt decisions in the decentralized setting to achieve the performance of a centralized supply chain. Based on this channel-optimal pricing policy we then develop an incentive scheme for the manufacturer to achieve channel coordination. A numerical example is provided to compare the performance of different policies and lo reinforce key managerial insights generated through analysis.     

Optimal policies in hybrid manufacturing/remanufacturing systems with random price-sensitive product returns

We study a production planning problem in which a manufacturer aims to meet a random market demand by manufacturing new product and remanufacturing returned product. The product returns are random and price-sensitive. To maximise his profit, the manufacturer needs to optimally decide on the acquisition price for the returned product as well as the quantities of the new product to be manufactured and the returned product to be remanufactured. We investigate two cases based on the relative lengths of the manufacturing and remanufacturing lead times. (1) In the case with a shorter manufacturing lead time, the manufacturer first decides his acquisition price for the returned product before the production starts, and then decides the quantities of manufacturing/remanufacturing after the product returns are realised. (2) In the case with a shorter remanufacturing lead time, the manufacturer first decides the manufacturing quantity and the acquisition price simultaneously, and then the remanufacturing quantity based on the quantity of manufactured and returned products. Each case is formulated as a two-stage stochastic optimisation problem, and the corresponding optimal polices of both are characterised and derived.     

Coordinating a supply chain under uncertain demand and random yield in presence of supply disruption

A two-echelon supply chain involving one manufacturer and one retailer for a single product is considered in this paper. The end customers’ demand is assumed to be random. The production of the manufacturer is subject to random yield, and there is a possibility of supply disruption in which case no item from her can reach the retailer. The retailer has a backup supplier who is costlier but perfectly reliable, and is having a limit up to which he may deliver. In addition to placing an order to the manufacturer, the retailer is allowed to reserve a quantity from the backup supplier in the ordering period; he may buy up to the reserved quantity after realising actual market demand in the trading period. Aiming at studying the effects of the various uncertainties involved in the chain on the optimal decisions, we develop and analyse centralised and decentralised models. We also propose a contract mechanism to coordinate the chain and find threshold conditions for which the coordinated model would collapse. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the developed model.     

A robust optimisation model for hybrid remanufacturing and manufacturing systems under uncertain return quality and market demand

In remanufacturing research, most researchers predominantly emphasised on the recovery of whole product (core) rather than at the component level due to its complexity. In contrast, this paper addresses the challenges to focus on remanufacturing through component recovery, so as to solve production planning problems of hybrid remanufacturing and manufacturing systems. To deal with the uncertainties of quality and quantity of product returns, the processing time of remanufacturing, remanufacturing costs, as well as market demands, a robust optimisation model was developed in this research and a case study was used to evaluate its effectiveness and efficiency. To strengthen this research, a sensitivity analysis of the uncertain parameters and the original equipment manufacturer’s (OEM’s) pricing strategy was also conducted. The research finding shows that the market demand volatility leads to a significant increase in the under fulfilment and a reduction in OEM’s profit. On the other hand, recovery cost reduction, as endogenous cost saving, encourages the OEM to produce more remanufactured products with the increase in market demand. Furthermore, the OEM may risk profit loss if they raise the price of new products, and inversely, they could gain more if the price of remanufactured products is raised.     

Impact of demand price elasticity on advantages of cooperative advertising in a two-tier supply chain

This paper focuses on pricing and vertical cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain. Using a Stackelberg game model where the manufacturer acts as the game leader and the retailer acts as the game follower, we obtain closed-form equilibrium solution and explicitly show how pricing and advertising decisions are made. When market demand decreases exponentially with respect to the retail price and increases with respect to national and local advertising expenditures in an additive way, the manufacturer benefits from providing percentage reimbursement for the retailer’s local advertising expenditure when demand price elasticity is large enough. Whether the manufacturer benefits from cooperative advertising is also closely related to supply chain member’s relative advertising efficiency. In the decision for adopting coop advertising strategy, it is critical for the manufacturer to identify how market demand depends on national and local advertisements. The findings from this research can enhance our understanding of cooperative advertising decisions in a two-tier supply chain with price-dependent demand.     

The power of coordinated decisions for short-life-cycle products in a manufacturing and distribution supply chain

This paper explores ways of conceptualizing and studying the power of coordination and strategic alliances within a manufacturing and distribution supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one distributor. The supply chain operates to meet price-sensitive random demand of a product with a short product life cycle. We derive closed-form multi-attribute measures of performance for the supply chain in the presence of and in the absence of coordination of pricing and production/ordering decisions. The optimal coordinated pricing and production/ordering policies, as well as each party's optimal policies in the absence of coordination, are developed. Our results yield insights into basic managerial issues for this type of manufacturing and distribution supply chains.     

Myopic vs. far-sighted behaviours in a revenue-sharing supply chain with reference quality effects

In this paper, we consider a dynamic supply chain where a manufacturer produces and distributes a featured product through an exclusive retailer to end consumers. The manufacturer decides the product quality and wholesale price, while the retailer sets the retail price in the presence of a revenue-sharing contract and consumers’ reference quality effects. The objective of this study is to investigate the impacts of myopic behaviour regarding the reference quality on the product quality and pricing strategies and profits of both members. Our results suggest that the manufacturer’s myopia leads to a higher quality, higher price strategy and a higher quality–price ratio which benefits consumers. Meanwhile, relative to the far-sighted behaviour, myopia results in a more quality-sensitive but less price-sensitive market demand. What’s more, we find that the manufacturer is apt to act in a far-sighted way, but the retailer isn’t always willing to cooperate with a far-sighted manufacturer. Taking myopic strategies for both members is likely to gain a high profit of the whole supply chain for a relatively high marginal contribution of product quality on demand and a relatively low revenue-sharing proportion.     

The bullwhip effect on inventory under different information sharing settings based on price-sensitive demand

Information sharing (IS) is proved to be a valid method to counter demand variability amplification along the supply chain, or bullwhip effect (BWE). Different from the traditional way of measuring the BWE based on order quantity, we measure the BWE on inventory in different IS settings and try to find the best IS approach. In this paper, the retailer will face the market demand which is price-sensitive, and the price follows a first-order autoregressive process. This demand model includes some indexes that can provide more useful managerial insights than previously studied parameters. Our study identifies the best IS setting under any conditions, and clarifies that the benefits of IS will be evident when the overall market product pricing process is highly correlated over time, the demand shocks to the retailer are high, the price sensitivity coefficient is small, the overall market shocks are low, the retailer’s lead-time is long and the manufacturer’s lead-time is short.     

Supply management in assembly systems with random yield and random demand

In this paper, we consider an assembly system where a firm faces random demand for a finished product which is assembled using two critical components. The components are procured from the suppliers who, due to production yield losses, deliver a random fraction of the order quantity. We formulate the exact cost function where the decision variables are the target level of finished products to assemble, and the order quantity of the components from the suppliers. Since the exact cost function is analytically complex to solve, we introduce a modified cost function and derive bounds on the difference in the objective function values. Using the modified cost function, we determine the combined component ordering and production (assembly) decisions for the firm. The benefit of coordinating ordering and assembly decisions is numerically demonstrated by comparing the results with two heuristic policies commonly used in practice. In an extension to the model, we consider the case when the firm has the added option of ordering both the components in a set from a joint supplier. First, we consider the case when the joint supplier is reliable in delivery and obtain dominance conditions on the suppliers to be chosen. The maximum price a firm would be willing to pay to ensure reliable supply of components is determined. Later, we consider the uncertainty in the deliveries from the joint supplier and determine conditions under which there is no diversification, that is, either the individual suppliers are used, or the joint supplier is used, but never both.     

The supplier–buyer integrated production-inventory model with random yield

This paper revisits the traditional supplier–buyer integrated production-inventory model which deals with the problem of a manufacturer (supplier) supplying a product to a retailer (buyer) serving the consumer market with constant stationary demand. The product is manufactured in batches at a finite rate. The supplier's production batch is depleted by the buyer's replenishment orders at periodic intervals. The buyer's inventory is then consumed by the market demand at a fixed rate. The problem is the simultaneous computation of the manufacturer's production lot-size and the buyer's replenishment order quantity, i.e. the integrated production-inventory policy parameters. The key characteristic considered in this paper is that the manufacturing process is imperfect, and, hence, there are defective items in each production lot. As a result, each replenishment order shipped to the buyer includes defective products and the non-defective percentage in each such shipment is random. Considering the case where the supplier replenishes the buyer via equal-sized shipments, we develop an analytical expression of the total expected cost for the supplier–buyer system under consideration, with and without a considerable inspection time. We first examine the case where the inspection time is negligible, and then we present a generalisation to consider the inspection time explicitly. Our goal is to model the impact of random yield on the system performance. Our findings are useful for computing the integrated production-inventory policy parameters while considering the supply uncertainty due to an imperfect manufacturing process. Through numerical examples, we quantify the impact of supply with random yield on the system performance and illustrate its relationship with the demand and production rate.     

Supply chain coordination with trade credit under the CVaR criterion

Trade credit is a popular payment method in the supply chain. However, it may transfer the market risk facing by the retailer to the manufacturer in the form of default risk. To reduce the default loss, we set up a modified newsvendor model incorporating random default probability. Under the goal of loss minimisation, the manufacturer’s optimal production quantity is derived with the criterion of conditional value at risk, and compared with the retailer’s optimal order quantity. It is found that, compared with traditional newsvendor setting, the setting of default possibility in trade credit can increase the order quantity but decrease the production quantity. If the risk aversion level and gross profit of product are low, the manufacturer may deliver below the quantity ordered. Although the default loss can be reduced by cutting order, the profits of both agents decrease, thereby leading to a deviation from the supply chain coordination. Trade credit coordinating the supply chain requires an extremely long credit period, which is not feasible. Moreover, quantity discount contract is able to improve the retailer’s order quantity, but insufficient to achieve coordination, which also depends on the manufacturer’s risk aversion level.     

Strategically decentralise when encroaching on a dominant supplier

A manufacturer may encroach on his suppliers by developing substitutable components. In the presence of encroachment, the manufacturer could assemble products using (high-end) components purchased from the supplier, and assemble products using (low-end) components produced in-house. Thus, the manufacturer must deliberate on how to manage the expanded organisation consisting of competing product divisions. In this paper, we examine the quintessential organisational structure decision – the centralisation versus decentralisation choice – from the perspective of the manufacturer. Our model assumes that the supplier is a dominant player, moving first by pricing the high-end component, and consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay of the product containing the high-end component. In such a context, we find that the manufacturer may encroach on the supplier even if producing the low-end component costs more than producing the high-end one. The supplier should strategically price to deter or accommodate downstream encroachment contingent on the manufacturer’s organisational structure decision. If the unit cost of low-end components is high enough, product-based decentralisation is preferred to centralisation due to the supplier’s lower wholesale price. Furthermore, the manufacturer’s strategic decentralisation always hurts the supplier, always benefits the customers and could benefit or hurt the entire supply chain under certain conditions.     

Dual-channel supply chain pricing decisions with a risk-averse retailer

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain with one risk-neutral manufacturer and one risk-averse retailer where there is only one perishable product with price-dependent stochastic demand. We choose Conditional Value-at-Risk criterion to measure the retailer’s risk-averse level, and assume that the manufacturer’s direct sales channel and the retailer’s traditional channel adopt a consistent pricing strategy. The model explores a Nash bargaining problem where the manufacturer and the retailer negotiate with each other on the wholesale price, the retail price and the order quantity when they have equal bargaining power. It is found that when demand uncertainty follows a uniform distribution, a Nash bargaining equilibrium exists and the retail price will decrease as the retailer becomes more risk averse. However, when the risk-averse indicator increases, the manufacturer’s profit on his direct channel will decrease, increase or first increase and then decrease, depending on the values of the related parameters. The profit shares of the manufacturer and the retailer under the Nash equilibrium model are related to the risk-averse indicator of the retailer. Furthermore, we perform three sets of numerical experiments to verify the effects of the retailer’s risk-averse indicator on decision-making and profit allocations under the different environmental parameters and gain several meaningful managerial insights.     

Configuring a manufacturing firm's supply network with multiple suppliers

Consider a supply network consisting of a manufacturer and its suppliers. The manufacturer produces different types of products, using a common set of inputs (e.g., raw materials and/or component parts) from the suppliers: but, each product needs a different mix of these inputs. The manufacturer sells its finished products to the market at the end of the current decision horizon, facing an uncertain market demand. In situations where a manufacturer has outsourced its parts production to contract manufacturers, the contract manufacturer's capacity available for the given manufacturer in a particular time period may be limited by “capacity reservation” agreements made in advance. Thus, in making production mix decisions for the current planning horizon, the manufacturer has to take into account both its own and the component suppliers' capacity restrictions. We develop a mathematical model and an iterative algorithm that helps the manufacturer solve its supply configuration problem, that is, how much of each raw material and/or component part to order from which supplier, given capacity limits of suppliers as well as the manufacturer. The model takes into account such factors as market demand uncertainty, costs and product characteristics. We present an numerical example to illustrate the interacting effects among critical parameters in the model, and apply the model to a real-world case of a computer manufacturer.     

基于讨价还价博弈的ATO供应链零部件生产及补货策略

通过建立ATO供应链中最终产品制造商与其两个供应商间的讨价还价合作模型,研究了ATO供应链的零部件生产补货策略和相应的利润分配策略,并探讨了供应链中各合作主体议价能力对最优解的影响。研究发现,ATO供应链应随着最终产品销售价格的提高而增加零部件产量,随最终产品组装成本或零部件生产成本的提高而减少零部件产量;随着最终产品制造商对其中一个供应商议价能力的增强,该供应商零部件的转移价格及其利润会降低,而另外一个供应商的零部件转移价格和利润会提高;若最终产品制造商比另外一个供应商的议价能力强,其期望利润会得到提高,反之,则会降低。     

Pricing and remanufacturing decisions in two competing supply chains

This paper considers the pricing and remanufacturing decisions in a duopoly market with two competing supply chains, which compete at both manufacturer and retailer levels. There are one manufacturer and one retailer in each supply chain, one manufacturer produces the new product directly from raw material, while the other manufacturer has incorporated a remanufacturing process for used product into the original production system. Based on different industry organisation structures and the chain members’ competing forms, five game decision models are established to explore the chain members’ optimal strategies on price and/or remanufacturing, and the corresponding equilibrium solutions are obtained. Finally, we carry out the sensitivity analysis through numerical studies of some key parameters for examining their influences on the pricing decisions and chain members’ maximum profits. On the basis of comparison and analysis, some managerial insights are derived.     

Pricing and ordering decisions in a supply chain with imperfect quality items and inspection under buyback of defective items

In this article, the economic production and inventory model in a three-layer supply chain including one distributor, one manufacturer and one retailer for a single-product and general demand functions under three scenarios is developed. We assume that during the production process, both healthy and defective items are generated. As the first scenario, we develop the first model, in which the defective items are not reworked and all considered as scrape, while in the second model, we assume that the defective items are reworked and are sold as perfect item. In the second scenario, we assume that defective item can be sold with lower price than the selling price. Moreover, raw materials with imperfect quality are sent back from a distributor to outside supplier under a lower price. Determining the order quantity of the distributor and the selling prices of the distributor and the manufacturer as well as the retailer was the goal of this article such that the total profit of each member is maximised. In order to solve the models, the Stackelberg approach is employed between the members, and the concavity of the profit functions is proved using several theorems. Then, closed form solutions are derived for the decision variables and a solution algorithm is proposed to determine the optimal solutions. Finally, a numerical example is presented to illustrate the applicability of the model.     

Joint product variety,pricing and scheduling decisions in a flexible facility

This paper studies a manufacturer’s optimal product variety, pricing and scheduling decisions in a single flexible production facility when customers have private information in their marginal valuations for product qualities. In addition to determining the product variety and price of each product, the manufacturer needs to optimise a detailed schedule of production (batch sizes and production sequences) to fully utilise the flexibility of this facility. To achieve the second-degree discrimination, the manufacturer provides multiple products and follows a priority rule in the production schedule. To obtain economies of scale, the manufacturer may offer a composite product targeting the whole population, or choose a dedicated product to serve a proportion of customers. Comparing these three production choices, we observe that the optimal product variety strategy is threshold controlled by the relative ratio of customer arrival rates, the relative difference between customers’ marginal valuations and the production technology.