State transitions in physiologic systems: a complexity model for loss of consciousness

Complex physiologic systems in which the emergent global (observable) behavior results from the interplay among local processes cannot be studied effectively by conventional mathematical models. In contrast to traditional computational methods which provide linear or nonlinear input-output data mapping without regard to the internal workings of the system, complexity theory offers scientifically and computationally tractable models which take into account microscopic mechanisms and interactions responsible for the overall input-output behavior. This article offers a brief introduction to some of the tenets of complexity theory and outlines the process involved in the development and testing of a model that duplicates the global dynamics of the induction of loss of consciousness (LOC) in humans due to cerebral ischemia. Under the broad definition of complexity, we view the brain of humans as a complex system. Successful development of a model for this complex system requires careful combination of basic knowledge of the physiological system both at the local (microscopic) and global (macroscopic) levels with experimental data and the appropriate mathematical tools. It represents an attempt to develop a model that can both replicate human data and provide insights about possible underlying mechanisms.     

On the evolution of reality--some biological prerequisites and evolutionary stages

The discussion of the evolutionary origins of consciousness has largely been concentrated to the human mind, and it is only in recent years that a comparative ethological view has come into play. Even here, a tendency has been to look mainly at the primates. There is a vast literature that discusses the differences between human consciousness and cognition, compared with that of the other primates, but much less attention has been given to the fact that evolutionary gaps-fulgurations, emergencies, new systems-have occurred at many stages in the evolution of cognition. More especially, the complexity of rather simple cognitive systems in lower animals has been underestimated, as well as the necessary prerequisites for a cognition worthy of the name to exist. Of particular interest in the discussion has been the views from evolutionary epistemology and radical constructivism, since they support the ethologically founded view that mind representations do not depict reality, but are adaptations for a successful way of behaving in the physical world, that reality in this sense is in the mind, that there are many realities, varying for different species-rich or poor in complexity-but all of them basically of the same nature. Even such human achievements as mathematics or logic may thus be seen as specific cognitive adaptions in our species, not as independent aspects of the physical world.     

Review of Between conviction and uncertainty: Philosophical guidelines for practicing psychotherapists.

Reviews the book, Between conviction and uncertainty: Philosophical guidelines for practicing psychotherapists by Jerry N. Downing (see record 2000-08722-000). In this book, the author aims to provide a meta-analysis of the array of theories available to the practicing psychotherapist: that is, to provide a "theory about theories" in the hope of giving the psychotherapist a guide for better understanding what it is that goes on in therapy. Downing begins by working through several basic questions. First, he considers what therapists actually know about therapy. Downing concludes that theories of psychotherapy are likely to continue to evade scientific proof, mainly because they do not easily lend themselves to disproof. This bleak view of what we actually know about what we do in psychotherapy leads Downing to reflect on what it is that we could possibly discover or know about therapy, and here his inquiry turns epistemological. Downing suggests that therapists are guided by a kind of epistemology in action. That is, therapists may best be described as loosely following an organizing scheme throughout a therapy. Downing refers to these six schemes as lived modes of knowing. Downing then discusses each of the six, providing illustrations of what they might mean in practice. Downing presents a plausible account of what may occur in therapy and of how many therapists may work. However, his argument seems to be unnecessarily drawn out. Unfortunately, rather than lend support and inform, the breadth of topics and issues obscures his project. And, beneath it all, we are left wondering what we actually know about psychotherapy. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Common dances, uncommon therapies: Response to Ryder.

Comments on the article by Robert Ryder (see record 1989-01372-001). In an article titled "The Common Dance," Ryder offers two fundamental truths about the nature of all human relationships. He also provides an epistemological position that limits the validity (i.e., universality) of these claims. It is the intention of this response to comment both on the reality/truth (i.e., ontological) claims themselves and on the epistemological (i.e., limits of knowledge) framework in which they are propounded. Ryder evidently adopts the "antirealist" or "subjective" epistemology fashionable in many disciplines, including the family systems movement. Having adopted this epistemology, Ryder goes on to assert his two truths about human relationships-truths which, he cautiously argues, are to be taken only as relative to his stand, that is, relative to his definition of the term relationship. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The medium is not the message in preattentive vision.

One of the oldest problems in visual perception is the definition of the basic elements of form, shape, and texture. In the past 20 years the question has been focused by the observation that human vision can be separated into two systems. Neisser first made popular the terms preattentive and attentive to characterize this division. The psychophysical experiments I have conducted over the past two years have probed the preattentive system to determine if it is as simple-minded as present theories suggest. One implication of this research involves rethinking theories of preattentive vision. To date this system is thought to be directly linked to what Marr called the "primal sketch" (a retinal-based image-intensity map of visual features such as blobs and blob intersections). My research suggest that it may be more closely tied to Marr's "2 1/2D sketch" (a retinally-based relief map of object-features such as surfaces slanted in depth). A second implication of this research concerns the neural implementation of detectors for slant based on shading and texture. So far we know a great deal about the tilt (two-dimensional orientation) sensitivity of single units in visual cortex, but the sensitivity of neurons to slant remains to be investigated. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Why methodological behaviorism is mentalistic.

To be familiar with Skinner's radical behaviorism is to be familiar with its objections to both methodological behaviorism and mentalism. However, the relation between methodological behaviorism and mentalism is often not clear. Methodological behaviorism is generally held to be an attempt to explain behavior in terms of inter subjectively verifiable phenomena, whereas mentalism is generally held to be an attempt to explain behavior in terms of inner causes. The central issue is why does methodological behaviorism adopt the position that observable data constitute the leverage by which to speak meaningfully and respectably of phenomena that are not publicly verifiable. The answer to this question deals with the epistemology of the scientist, and will reveal at least three ways in which methodological behaviorism is mentalistic: its view of language, its conventional interpretation of operationism, and its view of logic. These topics are discussed, along with the non-mentalistic epistemology of radical behaviorism. Although radical behaviorism does share some of the same history as methodological behaviorism, it is clear that it seeks a nonmentalistic, behaviorally consistent epistemology that is very different from that of methodological behaviorism. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

What's in a name? Many fascinating things.

Reviews the book, Names for Things: A Study of Human Learning by John Macnamara (1982). The reviewer commends Macnamara for writing a convincing book that undermines most of the popular psychological and philosophical approaches to meaning, reference, language learning and cognitive development. The major subject matter of this book is how children learn the names for things. Macnamara dismisses the view that children are unable to arrange related ideas into adult-like hierarchical orders, as Piaget claims. The reviewer feels the weakest part of the book is the author's chapter on the definition of "meaning", but does admit to having a much richer concept of what meaning is not. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learning-forgetting independence, unidimensional memory models, and feature models: Comment on Bogartz (1990).

In his recent articles, R. S. Bogartz (see record 1990-09037-001) offered a definition of what it means for forgetting rate to be independent of degree of original learning. He showed that, given this definition, independence is confirmed by extant data. Bogartz criticized G. R. Loftus's (see record 1986-05498-001) proposed method for testing independence. In this commentary, we counter Bogartz's criticisms and then offer 2 observations. First, we show that Loftus's horizontal-parallelism test distinguishes between 2 interesting classes of memory models: unidimensional models wherein the memory system's state can be specified by a single number and multidimensional models wherein at least 2 numbers are required to specify the memory system's state. Independence by Loftus's definition is implied by a unidimensional model. Bogartz's definition, in contrast, is consistent with either model. Second, to better understand the constraints on memory mechanisms dictated by the mathematics of the models under consideration, we develop a simple but general feature model of learning and forgetting. We demonstrate what constraints must be placed on this model to make learning and forgetting rate independent by Loftus's and by Bogartz's definitions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Coherence in thought and action.

Reviews the book, Coherence in thought and action by Paul Thagard (see record 2001-16098-000). This volume is a comprehensive presentation of the latest work of Paul Thagard and his research group on coherence theory, an area of inquiry to which the author has made ground-breaking contributions for over a decade. Coherence theory is a peculiar synthesis of philosophy and cognitive science that approaches problems in terms of the satisfaction of multiple constraints within networks of highly interconnected elements. The main aim of the present work is to extend the reach of coherence theory beyond its usual applications in cognition and epistemology to questions of ontology, ethics, politics, emotion, social consensus, and probabilistic reasoning. Thagard makes a persuasive if not wholly convincing argument that all of these domains can be thought about in roughly similar ways. Despite the complexity of the issues it treats, this is not at all a difficult book to read. Thagard has the knack for explaining difficult ideas in readily understandable language. However, his frequent crossing of disciplinary boundaries makes it a challenging task at times to evaluate his theory. Is it primarily a theory of human cognition, of philosophical epistemology, or is it mainly intended as a new procedure for addressing philosophical questions? It is perhaps all of these at once. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Complexity and human health: the case for a transdisciplinary paradigm

Transdisciplinary thinking is an emerging philosophy underpinning health social science. We advance a definition of transdisciplinary thinking and link it with complexity theory. Complexity theory's concern with non-linear relationships, interactive causality and emergent properties of systems compels researchers to adopt a transdisciplinary perspective. We construct a generic framework for analyzing health processes from diverse disciplines and apply it to coronary heart disease in the Australian Coalfields. Insights from this analysis support our argument that transdisciplinary thinking maximizes understanding of the complexity of human health.     

Chaos, complexity, and psychoanalysis.

In this article, the principles embodied by chaos and complexity theories are applied to the psychoanalytic enterprise. The patient and the analyst are conceptualized as complex adaptive systems of mental schemas whose interaction creates the complex adaptive system of the analytic dyad. Psychoanalysis is described as a transformational process that takes place within the creation and evolution of the complex adaptive system of the analytic dyad. Transference, countertransference, psychopathology, and the processes of mutative change are explicated in terms of how complex adaptive systems self-organize, develop, and evolve. What emerges from this analysis is a holistic psychoanalytic theory that brings under 1 set of principles the concepts and techniques that have hitherto been described by a number of conflicting theories. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Transgenic and knockout analyses of the role of TNF in immune regulation and disease pathogenesis

Transgenic mutagenesis in whole animals has become without doubt the most rewarding approach to analyse gene structure, expression, and function. In the TNF field, much of what we now question about TNF/TNF receptor function is based, to a large extent, on what we have already learned by overexpressing these molecules in transgenic mice or by ablating their expression in knockout systems. In addition, a clearer view of the involvement of these molecules in disease pathogenesis has emerged, and useful models for human disease have been generated. In this overview, we summarise our experience with TNF transgenic and knockout systems, and highlight advances made in our understanding of the role played by TNF and its receptors in immune regulation and in the pathogenesis of infectious, inflammatory, and autoimmune disease.     

顾及指标权重变化的露天矿边坡稳定性评价系统的设计与实现

快速、有效地评价露天矿边坡稳定性程度,对保障施工设备及人员的安全具有重要的理论意义和实际价值。论文针对露天矿边坡稳定性影响因素复杂、不确定,指标权重受主观经验影响,以及评价模型计算复杂、效率低等问题,依据信息熵和未确知测度理论的方法,建立了顾及指标权重变化的露天矿边坡稳定性的评价模型,不仅解决了评价指标数据不确定的问题,还充分考虑了评价指标权重动态变化的特性;在此基础上,采用Windows窗体应用程序开发模式,结合C#编程语言,开发了一套边坡稳定性智能评价系统,避免了人为计算繁杂,提高了工作效率。论文以越堡露天矿边坡为研究对象,研究结果表明:边坡稳定性智能评价系统对稳定性评价的结果与边坡实际情况基本一致,其具有较强的实用性、可靠性和可行性。      

Models Quantify the Total Maximum Daily Load Process

Mathematical models have been used for many years to assist in the management of water quality. The total maximum daily load (TMDL) process is no exception; models represent the means by which the assimilative capacity of a water body can be quantified and a waste load allocation can be determined such that the assimilative capacity is not exceeded. Unfortunately, in many TMDLs, the use of models has not always adhered to the best modeling practices that have been developed over the past half-century. This paper presents what are felt to be the most important principles of good modeling practice relative to all of the steps in developing and applying a model for computing a TMDL. These steps include: Problem definition and setting management objectives; data synthesis for use in modeling; model selection; model calibration and, if possible confirmation; model application; iterative modeling; and model postaudit. Since mathematical modeling of aquatic systems is not an exact science, it is essential that these steps be fully transparent to all TMDL stakeholders through comprehensive documentation of the entire process, including specification of all inputs and assumptions. The overriding consideration is that data richness and quality govern the level of model complexity that can be applied to a given system. The model should never be more complex than the data allow. Also, in applying a model, one should always attempt to quantify the uncertainty in predictions. In general, quantifying uncertainty is easier with simple models, which is another reason to begin with a simple framework.     

The state of the state mental hospital 1996

OBJECTIVES: This analytical review is intended to update the author's earlier writings on the position of the state mental hospital within the spectrum of services for long-term mental patients and to provide perspective for the next generation of service planners. METHODS: Findings and commentary are organized around four major questions. First, what is the prevailing view of state mental hospitals today, and how does it compare with the view that existed in the first half of this century? Second, what individuals tend to be served in state mental hospitals today? Third, what has been the fate of mentally ill persons who are no longer served in state mental hospitals? Fourth, what is an appropriate role for the state mental hospital in today's uncertain and rapidly changing systems of care? Source material consists of periodical articles suggested in MEDLINE searches, plus newspaper reports, recent books on mental health service systems, and a variety of writings found in the "fugitive" literature generally not indexed in traditional archives. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS: Individual state mental hospitals vary in the composition of their resident populations, the content of their services, and the overall quality of their care. Although they have been superseded by community-based service structures in some places, they continue in general, as the result of their multifunctionality, to occupy a critical place in systems of care. Renewed efforts to integrate them as full partners within those systems must be undertaken.     

Social constructionism: Homogenizing the world, negating embodied experience.

While recognizing its positive contributions, the authors argue both that social constructionism is based on faulty assumptions and that it has far more kinship with objectivism than is generally acknowledged: it repudiates the possibility of universally valid knowledge while holding as universal truth that human nature is socially constructed; claims to have overcome a Western scientific view of the world while failing to recognize its own distinctly Western and parochial character; rejects an objective epistemology only to embrace its subjectivist mirror-opposite. Finally, it presents the "self" as a reflection of cultural frameworks, thus failing to attend to personal experience or to account for creativity, and overlooks humans' relationship to nature, thereby sustaining objectivism's dichotomy between the social and the natural world. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Existentialism and epistemology.

Comments on B. Vandenberg's (see record 1992-12211-001) article on epistemology and an existential consideration of development, taking exception with both his definition of existentialism and his characterization of Piaget's work. Existentialism, it is argued, is not an alternative to epistemology, but a particular style of responding to philosophic questions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The times, they are a changing: A review of Raising children in a socially toxic environment.

Reviews the book, Raising children in a socially toxic environment by J. Gabarino (1995). In this book, Garbarino sets out to offer his views on what childhood ought to be, how children map their own worlds (thus define, themselves), what their basic needs are, the levels in which those needs are being met, as well as offer suggestions for ways in which readers can change the "toxic environment" to aid in the healthy development of children and youth. The book is challenging to read because it is true. Although the pages are not replete with "hard data," they are filled with factual accounts that paint a discouraging, in fact depressing picture of the life of children in our communities. The book is powerful because, if successful, we are forced to accept the fact that this is American society today. There is no question that the issues articulated by Garbarino in this book, such as teenage homicide, gang warfare, domestic violence, and child abuse, are real. The influences of Urie Bronfenbrenner (1977) and ecological systems theory provide the conceptual framework for this book. Accordingly, development is the result of complex interactions among child and family systems and the social environment in which they function. Related to the ecological orientation is the notion that "it takes a village" to effect change. In other words, there is an implicit message that successful, healthy childrearing is the shared responsibility of individuals, groups, communities, external forces, and broad-based sanctions and regulations. As such, readers who take this book seriously will be forced to look at it not only as a professional resource with "good information," but as a call to accept a role for working within their individual and community contexts to influence change. Although the book falls short in providing concrete directives for change, it sends a strong message that we are all responsible, and a more subtle message that change is possible. If each and every reader could make one or two changes in their own behaviors and priorities as an outcome of reading this book, it will have served an invaluable service. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Essential tremor: a review of pathogenic mechanisms

INTRODUCTION: Essential tremor (ET) is the commonest involuntary movement observed and is seen when a given posture is maintained. Although it does not affect life expectancy, it may cause considerable functional disability and serious psychological effects in the affected person. DEVELOPMENT: ET is a heterogeneous clinical condition. Its physiopathology is still not known, is very complex and involves many mechanisms, both structural and biochemical, although as yet there is no theory to include them all. In view of what is known at present, it may be accepted that there is a central oscillator at olive-cerebellar-thalamic-cortical-spinal level, which is the primary generator of ET, modulated by a peripheral component. The tremor results from interaction between increased central excitability and peripheral regulation, which in turn reinforces the central overactivity. It may also be that the monoaminergic system (catecholaminergic and serotoninergic), adrenoreceptors (especially the B2 muscular adreno-receptors) and the bodily structure itself, amongst other factors, may influence the pathogenic mechanism of ET. It is likely that there is a multifactorial genetic disorder which predetermines this physiopathogenic process, although this has not yet been determined. CONCLUSIONS: In this paper we review the various hypotheses and existing knowledge related to the aetiopathogenesis of TE.