Is social evolution a moral inversion?

Uses awareness of irony as a clue to understanding D. Campbell's (see record 1976-12046-001) ethical concerns about conflicts between biological and social evolution and between psychology and moral tradition. This epistemological consideration of Campbell's thesis is illuminated by the work of M. Polanyi (1958). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Haidt's Moral Intuitionist Theory: A Psychological and Philosophical Critique.

Jon Haidt's (2001) proposal (see record 2001-18918-008) for a moral intutionist theory of morality is criticized on psychological and philosophical grounds, including (a) the apparent reduction of social influence to one kind, overt compliance, and the virtual ignoring of the role of persuasion in moral and other decision making; (b) the failure to distinguish development of a psychological entity from its deployment or functioning; and (c) the failure to consider, in distinguishing cause and reason as explanatory concepts, the motivating power of reasons. Arguments for an evolutionary approach to morality are also faulted on the grounds that they assume that adaptation is served by nonmoral rather than moral (fairness- and benevolence-based) criteria. Finally, the authors suggest that an intuitionist approach such as that of Haidt may obscure important aspects of moral decision making. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Can research on morality be "scientific"?

Proposes a particular ground for moral formulation that is consistent with the consensually based scientific ethic. Researchers' acts of formulating investigatory designs constitute moral values, but these assumptions of value often go unnoticed because they violate the positivist mandate that science should be value neutral. Only a special kind of consensus is "scientific" (as opposed to ideological) because the scientific ethic accepts knowledge as truthful only when it is openly achieved after evenhanded consideration and tested in debate. Since truth in science is a moral issue, close examination should be made of science's moral grounds. The kinds of analyses typically performed by philosophers are an essential part of this empirical search. The author concludes that moral research cannot be "scientific" if this means being value neutral, but it can be scientific in the sense of impartially submitting all formulations to the full reality of people's moral consensuses and interactions in everyday life. (40 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

An unequivocal "yes" for morality study.

The author cites her own study (see record 1971-20823-001) and one by H. Hartshorne and M. May (1930) on cheating and the moral development of children to illustrate that morality can be studied objectively, a possibility that was addressed by N. Haan (see record 1983-22367-001). It is contended that these researchers investigated moral behavior without allowing their own value systems to contaminate the data. (5 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral judgment in delinquent and nondelinquent adolescents and their mothers.

Although considerable research effort has been devoted to the investigation of moral judgment in normal children, the relationship of the child's moral judgment to significant moral conduct as well as to parental antecedents has received scant empirical attention. In the current research, the level of moral judgment of 10 male 14-16 yr old delinquents and their mothers was compared to 10 nondelinquent males (matched on IQ and age) and their mothers, using L. Kohlberg's structured moral dilemmas. Mothers in both groups combined were higher in moral judgment than their sons. Nondelinquent adolescents used higher stages of moral judgment than delinquent adolescents. Similarly, mothers of nondelinquents manifested more mature moral judgment than did mothers of delinquents. Parental influences on the moral development of the child are discussed. (29 ref.) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The use of stories in moral development: New psychological reasons for an old education method.

Contemporary approaches to moral development and moral education emphasize propositional thinking and verbal discussion of abstract moral dilemmas. In contrast, this article proposes that narratives (stories) are a central factor in a person's moral development. Support for this position comes from recent theoretical contributions of Bruner, Sarbin, Spence, Tulving, and others, who have emphasized narrative thought as a major form of cognition that is qualitatively different from abstract propositional or scientific thinking. In addition, over the last 10 to 20 years psychologists investigating and conceptualizing moral development have come to emphasize such processes as empathy (Hoffman), caring and commitment (Gilligan), interpersonal interaction (Haan), and personal character and personality (Coles; Hogan; Staub; Rushton). It is proposed that narratives and narrative thinking are especially involved in how these processes lead to moral development and therefore that narrative should be rehabilitated as a valuable part of moral education. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Indigenous health: a special moral imperative

The provision of health services to Indigenous people is not perceived by many Australians to be a moral issue. Indigenous health, however, is not only a moral issue, it is a moral issue that deserves special consideration. In many sectors of society, the correct moral path is unclear, but the circumstances of Indigenous health warrant special consideration which policy makers and health care administrators are uniquely placed to render. The setting of Australia was at the expense of Indigenous flourishing. There is little doubt that many of the current poor health outcomes of Indigenous Australians result from their past impoverishment. We argue that each member of Australian society has inherited a collective moral responsibility, along with the social assets accrued at the expense of Indigenous Australians, irrespective of their personal complicity. Government, as representatives of the people, has a responsibility to repay some of this society's accrued moral debt through the allocation of resources independent of issues of equity.     

Stalking the missing link between moral development stages.

Studied the relationship between L. Kohlberg's (1971) stages of moral development and the process of decision making utilized by 214 persons, aged 14–63 yrs, during the resolution of hypothetical moral dilemmas. Stage of moral development, as determined by the Ethical Reasoning Scale, was used to classify Ss responding to the Preferential Reasoning Profile, an instrument requiring Ss to weight reasons for pursuing a course of action. A multiple discriminant analysis indicated that it was not possible to distinguish moral development stages on the basis of optimum differential weighting of the variables of the decision-making matrix. Results indicate that the method of adjudicating moral claims is informed by a consistent rationality and sense of fairness across stages of moral development. (11 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral education and domains in the classroom: Is nothing as practical as a good theory?

Reviews the book, Education in the moral domain by L. P. Nucci (see record 2001-06857-000). In his book Education in the Moral Domain, Nucci summarizes more than two decades of developmental research indicating that it is impossible to ignore children's active understanding of sociomoral rules in search of simple "habit formation." Instead, he argues, children routinely form complex conceptions of both sociomoral events and adults' legitimate roles in those events and if adults ignore these conceptions it will only undermine their attempts at moral education. In the past, ideas like these were seen as damaging because they suggested that children should "question authority." By contrast, the recent developmental research reviewed in this book indicates that, although children and adolescents do sometimes "question authority," there is a surprising amount of consensus in children's and adults' sociomoral understanding and behavior. This book provides an intellectually compelling summary of recent developmental research on children's sociomoral development with a clear eye on the implications of that work for classroom moral education and the larger moral climate of schools. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral valuation: a third domain of conscience functioning

OBJECTIVE: To assess development of moral valuation in normal children and adolescents, that is, how moral rules for living are derived and justified, and to examine the relationship of this progression with previously identified stages of conceptualization of conscience. METHOD: Using three semistructured questions from the Stilwell Conscience Interview, 132 normal volunteers between the ages of 5 and 17 years were assessed. All moral valuation responses were examined within three aspects of social reference: authority-derived, self-derived, and peer-derived. Each aspect was scaled for complexity into six anchored levels. RESULTS: The levels of all three aspects correlated positively with conceptualization stages as well as with each other. When the covariate, age, was taken into consideration, peer-derived valuation was significantly correlated with both age and stage. CONCLUSIONS: Moral valuation is a domain of conscience functioning in which moral rules and their justifications are socially referenced in relationship to authority, self, and peers. Anchored levels of these three aspects of moral valuation provide developmental guidelines for mental status examinations in patients between 5 and 17 years of age as well as providing criteria for future comparative studies in various diagnostic categories of psychopathology.     

An empirical study of moral intuitions: Toward an evolutionary ethics.

This study of moral intuitions used a questionnaire containing 2 moral dilemmas that were administered to university students. The dilemmas probed the underlying dimensions involved in moral intuitions. The results of both group- and individual-level analyses suggested that the most important dimensions were Speciesism, Abhorrent Political Philosophy (Nazism), and Inclusive Fitness, followed by Social Contract and Number of Individuals. The dimensions of Action–Inaction, Elite, and Endangered Species had significant but weak influences. The results are interpreted within an evolutionary framework and represent progress toward developing an understanding of the is on which it is possible to base the ought (a consideration of the moral imperatives when a legitimate conflict of interest exists between different living beings). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Rationality, possibility and difference as bases of moral development.

Discusses the bases of moral development, based on a review of relevant literature. L. Kohlberg's (1981) cognitive structural theory of moral development prescribes abstract egalitarianism as the ideal form of moral reasoning. It is argued that this conceptualization represents an overly modernist, individualist reading of Platonic moral philosophy. H. G. Gadamer (1986), in contrast, sees Plato teaching that virtue is learned implicitly, through exemplifying a virtuous person. Belief that virtue must be justified rationally leads to the dissolution of social, communal bases of moral learning. His view suggests a more humanly relevant rendering of Platonic moral reasoning than that suggested by Kohlberg. This view suggests the possibility that virtue is irreducibly social, seen in the meaningful differences that acts have for others, and in implicit interpersonal relatedness. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Where lies social responsibility?

L. Krasner's article, "Behavior Control and Social Responsibility" (see record 1963-00116-001) bypassed several points of view which might clarify some of the issues discussed, and at the same time tone down what seems to be an exaggerated claim for urgency in dealing with problems of social responsibility. In the matter of considering moral and ethical issues, it is important to proceed with calmness and careful consideration rather than to become overly excited about finding the "right" solution. Even the "psychologist-researcher" is human and when he turns his hand to such things as communicating to the lay public he may fall into the pattern of the "sensationalists and popularizers," though obviously not so crudely. First among three basic questions and answers presented by Krasner is that concerning whether or not human behavior is controllable. His answer is to the effect that there is overwhelming experimental evidence that human behavior is controllable. Such a statement seems exaggerated in the face of other evidence from both experimental and clinical impressions. Krasner states that there is a "subtle but important" difference between the "psychology of behavior control" and the science of psychology. There are several objections to some of Krasner's implications that the behavioral scientist is not or at least is less bound by an ethical and moral system. There seem to be no logical grounds for distinguishing in principle between an ethics for behavioral scientists and an ethics for behavior controllers. The atomic scientists produced a bomb as scientists employed by their government while at war. They did their job effectively. As informed private citizens they held some moral reservations as to the consequences of their scientific endeavors. The behavioral scientist and the behavior controller can also perform their professional tasks dispassionately and efficiently, but as people they might well look to the ethical and moral issues involved. They can choose to take appropriate ethical and moral action as private citizens who have the advantages of specialized knowledge. The behavioral scientist and the behavior controller are not to be compartmentalized into a patchwork of separate roles, rather they are to see themselves as integrated individuals functioning in various ways which on occasion may bring about a conflict in ethical and moral values. Then they should be enabled to resolve the conflicts for themselves on a rational basis. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Handbook of Moral Development.

Reviews the book, Handbook of Moral Development edited by Melanie Killen and Judith G. Smetana (see record 2005-11748-000). This is a big book on a big topic. Editors Melanie Killen and Judith Smetana have solicited 26 chapters on the topic of moral development, including many of the key authors and researchers currently working in the field. While the editors themselves share the perspective of "social domain" theory, the breadth of the current volume is much wider. Indeed it provides a representative overview of work ranging across the entire landscape of moral development research today. The 26 chapters are organized into six sections: structuralism and moral stages, social domain theory, conscience development and internalization, social interactional and comparative approaches, emotions and empathy, and moral education. In general, each chapter reviews recent work on a particular topic within these six areas, provides a theoretical context and overview of the research and typically discusses the author(s)' own research program in detail. Many of the chapters also consider, if only briefly, ideas and prospects for future research as well. The chapters are thus up-to-date, generally well-written, and approachable for advanced students and scholars within the field. This is as good an overview as we are likely to get from our current vantage point. It can be highly recommended for advanced-level students and scholars in the field alike. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The passion of justice: Comment on Gibbs and Schnell.

Responds to J. Gibbs and S. Schnell's (see record 1986-11382-001) article on moral development and socialization, arguing that moral responsibility rests finally in the hands of the actor, not in mindlessly obeying the letter of the law but rather in moving the family or society ahead with forward-looking ideas and a passion for justice. (5 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Social cognition and environmental structure: A critique of assimilation-side developmental psychology.

Summarizes 3 studies of social cognitive development to illustrate the role of the stimulus environment in shaping the developmental process. These studies build upon a conceptual framework and illustrate an investigative strategy intended to replace exclusively S centered, assimilation-side accounts with a more explicitly transactional model that focuses equal attention on the structural characteristics of both Ss and their social stimulus environments. These studies, which dealt with the experience of crowding (M. J. Chandler et al., 1977), the interpretation of psychological defense mechanisms (M. J. Chandler et al.; see record 1979-25577-001) and the process of moral deliberation (M. J. Chandler et al.; see record 1981-25546-001), followed a common format. The formal structure of children's cognitions and their relevant social environments were characterized, and then problem-solving competence was explored in relation to both of these structural dimensions. Results support the call for a more balanced consideration of the structural features of both subjects and their social environments. (French abstract) (24 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Moral development in Bahamian school children: A cross-cultural examination of Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning.

Individually interviewed 7-14 yr old Bahamian schoolchildren, utilizing 3 of L. Kohlberg's (1958) moral dilemmas. An age trend in moral development was obtained, supporting previous cross-cultural research with Kohlberg's moral development stages. The only sex difference was among 13-14 yr olds. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Gender, life experiences, and moral judgment development: A process-oriented approach.

The purpose of this study was to reexamine the issue of gender differences in moral development from a process-oriented perspective. We hypothesized that life experiences and value orientations toward those experiences would exert differential influences on the processes (but not necessarily the outcomes) of moral development for women and men. Ss were 52 men and 50 women (mean adult age?=?26.8 years) who were tested over a 10-year period spanning from high school (1973) to young adulthood (1983). We used path analysis (using ordinary least squares regression) to estimate the effects of education experiences, occupational experiences, and marriage of Ss' moral judgment development (assessed using J. R. Rest's, 1979, Defining Issues Test). Although we found no significant outcome differences between women's and men's adult levels of moral development, education, or occupational attainment, we did find that the process linking education, occupation, and marriage to adult moral development differed for men and women. We interpreted these results as reflecting the influence of contemporary patterns of sex role socialization on adult processes of moral development. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The existential concept of death.

Comments on B. Vandenburg's (see record 1992-12211-001) article on epistemology and an existentialist consideration of development. If the existentialist prospects of death are to be included in a beyond-epistemic consideration of developmental issues, it is necessary to examine the status of the concept of death as an existential given, not subject to developmental changes over the life span. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Relationship between moral and Piagetian reasoning and the effectiveness of moral education.

Assessed Piagetian and moral stages in 117 female and 111 male college students prior to a moral education program. As hypothesized, Ss who had not reached their highest possible stage of moral development given the limits set by their stage of Piagetian development changed significantly more than Ss who had reached their moral potentiality. Results are consistent with L. Kohlberg's (1977) assumption that Piagetian stage sets a limit or ceiling on moral development, and they further suggest that the relationship between Piagetian and moral stages should be considered in planning moral education programs. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)