Causal explanation, teleological explanation: On radical particularism in attribution theory.

Examines the cause–reason distinction in attribution theory. Conceptual difficulties associated with previous interpretations of cause as opposed to reason are considered, and a reformulation is presented that shows how reason may refer to a specific type of explanation (notably, teleological) and cause may refer to the general case of explanation (the inclusive sense) or to the general case of nonteleological explanation (the exclusive sense). A. R. Buss's (see record 1980-09652-001) recent comments regarding teleological and nonteleological (causal) modes of naive explanation are examined, and it is noted that teleological (reason-type) explanation does indeed fall within the purview of attribution theory but is merely one among a number of possible explanatory types that belong in the attributional domain. It is concluded that a theory of naive epistemology might well rid itself of concern with lay concepts (such as cause and reason) that have figured frequently in attributional formulations. Such concepts may be thought of as the contents of knowledge, of which there may be an infinite variety. Instead, an epistemic theory should restrict itself to the process of knowledge acquisition assumed to be invariant across the diverse epistemic contents of possible interest to the layperson. (25 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Theoretical implications of the mnemonic benefits of perceptual interference.

How should interfering with the perception of items during study affect memory for those items? Recent research by J. Nairne (see, PA, Vol 76:7468) and E. Hirshman and N. Mulligan (see record 1991-26469-001) has demonstrated that backward pattern masking during study enhances later memory. This article examines whether traditional explanations of encoding benefits, including rehearsal, visual distinctiveness, and encoding effort, can account for this result. No evidence was found for any of these hypotheses. An explanation that focuses on the compensatory processing of higher level perceptual representations is proposed. This explanation provides a plausible explanation of the results of 7 experiments. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the explanation for perceptual priming and other manipulations of perceptual interference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Birth order, discrimination in admissions, and socioeconomic status.

Contends D. P. Campbell (see record 1972-11560-001) neglected an explanation for the finding that highly educated occupations have much higher proportions of firstborn children; this explanation could have been deduced from certain sociological generalizations. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Explanation and cognition.

Reviews the book, Explanation and cognition by Frank C. Keil and Robert A. Wilson (see record 2000-05066-000). The essays in this book address five basic questions about explanation as a large and natural part of our cognitive lives: (1) How do explanatory capacities develop, (2) are there kinds of explanation, (3) do explanations correspond to domains of knowledge, (4) why do we seek explanations and what do they accomplish, and (5) how central are causes to explanation? The volume’s various authors also introduce and explore a number of emerging perspectives on explanation from computer science, linguistics, and anthropology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Parts of activities: Reply to Fellbaum and Miller (1990).

If people believe that one activity is a kind of another, they also tend to believe that the second activity is a part of the first. For example, they assert that deciding is a kind of thinking and that thinking is a part of deciding. C. Fellbaum and G. A. Miller's (see record 1991-03356-001) explanation for this phenomenon is based on the idea that people interpret part of in the domain of verbs as a type of logical entailment. Their explanation, however, suffers from at least 2 deficiencies. First, it fails to account for parallel effects with nouns (e.g., a contest is a kind of an activity, and an activity is a part of a contest). Second, it contains a flaw that incorrectly predicts many activities to be parts of each other (e.g., coming is part of going and going part of coming). However, a hypothesis L. J. Rips and F. G. Conrad (see record 1989-24843-001) originally proposed for the kind–part reciprocal effect avoids both of these difficulties. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The broad applicability of memory bias and its coexistence with the planning fallacy: Reply to Griffin and Buehler (2005).

People chronically underestimate how long tasks will take. In their original article, the present authors (M. M. Roy, N. J. S. Christenfeld, & C. R. M. McKenzie, see record 2005-11504-008) suggested a simple, broadly applicable explanation: Biased predictions result from biased memories. In their comment article, D. Griffin and R. Buehler (see record 2005-11504-009) suggested that in many domains in which this memory-bias account appears to outpredict their own account, theirs actually makes no prediction at all. However, the present authors did not suggest that only 1 theory is right but that theirs is consistent with data that prior theories, including their own, cannot explain. Ignoring memories of past tasks is not a complete explanation for the phenomenon if the memories people could consult are themselves biased. Nonetheless, underestimating future task duration is almost certainly multiply determined, and thus our account and theirs can coexist. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Explanatory coherence in social explanations: A parallel distributed processing account.

Studied the impact of explanatory coherence on the evaluation of explanations. Tested were 4 principles of P. Thagard's (see record 1990-06642-001) model for evaluating the coherence of explanations. Study 1 showed that Ss preferred explanations that accounted for more data (breadth) and that were simpler (simplicity or parsimony). Study 2 demonstrated that Ss thought an explanation was stronger when it could, in turn, be explained. Study 3 showed that the evaluation of explanations is comparative, affected by the availability of good alternatives. Results were then successfuly simulated using Thagard's connectionist implementation of his model of explanatory coherence. The data and the simulation, taken together, strongly support the model. Two issues are then discussed: (1) the role of explanatory coherence in social explanation and (2) the relevance of parallel constraint satisfaction processes to social reasoning. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Emergenesis: Genetic traits that may not run in families": Comment.

Comments on the use of the term, emergenesis, by D. J. Lykken et al (see record 1993-16512-001) as a genetic explanation of concordance between monzoygotic (MZ) twins, based on anecdotes about MZ twins raised apart. It is concluded that it may be unwise for psychologists to adopt genetic terminology that is not used widely by geneticists. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Imagery as a dependent variable.

Discusses fallacies implicit in recent investigations of imagery, including B. R. Bugelski's (see record 1971-05299-001) article. While Bugelski concluded that deaf Ss mediate paired-associate learning by using imagery, an alternative explanation is the activation of incipient action schema. Thus, imagery may be a dependent cognitive skill. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"ESP and credibility in science": Response.

Responds to R. A. McConnell's (see record 1969-16553-001) concern that psychologists are uninterested in ESP from a physicist's point of view. A causal explanation in terms of physical interactions is needed to interest scientists in ESP, since explaining ESP requires the assumption of a new kind of force. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Attentional Theory Is a Viable Explanation of the Inverse Base Rate Effect: A Reply to Winman, Wennerholm, and Juslin (2003).

A. Winman, P. Wennerholm. and P. Juslin (2003; see record 2003-09575-025) have admitted that J. K. Kruschke (2001a; see record 2001-18940-005) cogently demonstrated the shortcomings of cumulative inference as an explanation of the inverse base rate effect, but they raise criticisms of Kruschke's attentionally based explanation. First, Winman et al. pointed out that attentional shifting does not improve learning performance in Kruschke's (1996) ADIT model, contrary to the claims that attentional shifting accelerates learning. This reply demonstrates that the deceleration of learning is a natural consequence when attentional shifts are not learned, as is the ca.se in ADIT; however, when attentional shifts are learned, as was assumed by the underlying theory and as is the case in the EXIT model (Kruschke, 2001a, 2001b), then performance is indeed accelerated by attentional shifts. Second, Winman et al. pointed out that, whereas EXIT captures essentially all of the notable effects in the transfer data, it fails to capture a small effect [viz., p(CΠC)>p(RΠR)]. This reply demonstrates that when this trend in the data is merely weighted more heavily in the model fitting, then the EXIT model accommodates it. EXIT accomplishes this by emphasizing base rate learning more strongly... (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Mind regained.

Reviews the book, Mind regained by Edward Pols (see record 1998-06466-000). In this text, Pols seeks to treat the difficult and perplexing question of the relationship between mind and body in a way that is nonetheless accessible to the non-professional philosopher. Pols takes issues with the position of many contemporary philosophers and psychologists that the brain provides the ultimate causal explanation of mind. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

E pluribus unum: Rursus? A comment on Loftus, Johnson, and Shimamura's "How much is an icon worth?"

Comments on the procedure to estimate the worth of an icon by G. R. Loftus et al (see record 1986-00309-001), suggesting that the explanation behind this procedure is questionable on empirical and conceptual grounds. The present author proposes an alternative account based on more traditional concepts of backward masking by pattern and on nonvisible schematic representations of visual displays. (27 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Learned expectancies are not adequate scientific explanations.

Responds to a comment by J. W. Fagen (see record 1994-08950-001) on the article by J. L. Gewirtz and M. Peláez-Nogueras (see record 1993-12989-001) on behavior theory as an explanation of the operant conditioning of infant behavior. Fagen's assertion that the principles of reinforcement are ususally not enough to explain infant learning and behavior is challenged. As an alternative to his suggested use of the concept of expectancy, an experimental analysis of the behavior–environment relations is proposed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Thoughts on Ahmed Fayek's article: "The centrality of the system Ucs in the theory of psychoanalysis": Setting the record straight.

Freud's first formulation about the structure of the mind was a tripartite theory of awareness--conscious, preconscious and unconscious--referred to as "the system unconscious." Fayek (see record 2006-00627-005) addresses the fate of this construct, pointing out that it is no longer used as Freud construed it. Fayek gives reasons for this eventuality: assertions I question. I offer an alternative explanation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Some uncertainty regarding uncertainty reduction.

Tryon (1991a) has proposed the definition of a scientific explanation as an explanation that reduces uncertainty, and relates this to the reduction of statistical variance. Lamiell (1991) criticizes Tryon on several grounds, arguing that the reduction of criterion variance does not yield knowledge of the sort Tryon desires. This paper comments on Tryon's proposal, including his reply (1991b) to Lamiell's criticisms. It is concluded that explanation as uncertainty reduction is a simple recapitulation of the Hempelian model of explanation at the theoretical level, and an erroneous conception of statistical epistemology at the methodological level. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Expanding racial identity theory to cover counseling process.

J. Pomales et al (see record 1986-15328-001) attempted to study the effects of Black racial identity on Ss' perceptions of culturally sensitive and culturally insensitive counselors. It is argued that attempts to assess racial identity via single variables trivialize the construct. It is further suggested that problems with the manner in which the racial identity attitude scale developed by T. A. Parham and the present author (see record 1981-21936-001) was used contributed to possible problems in scale reliability and interpretation. A theoretical explanation of the results of Pomales et al is offered. (19 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

More than a metaphor?

In response to K. S. Bowers's (see record 1988-16849-001) discussion of the unconscious, the present author suggests that what is in doubt about the unconscious is its specific content and organization, the extent to which it is better described by one model or another, and the extent to which it operates as a useful explanation. It is concluded that belief in the existence of the unconscious may indicate a wish for more organization in the brain than really exists. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Simultaneous multilevel analysis.

Comments on J. T. Cacioppo and G. G. Berntson's (see record 1992-42900-001) proposed concept of "social neuroscience" that would integrate information across multiple levels of data and explanation. A. B. Caldwell proposes a simultaneous analysis that identifies what is happening at the same time at each level (subjective, behavioral, and physiologic) and greatly sharpens constructs by weeding out the loose ones and refining and expanding the meaning of the ones that are retained. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)