Investment in wind power and pumped storage in a real options model

Promoting renewable energy has been a key ingredient in energy policy seeking to de-carbonize the energy mix and will continue to do so in the future given the European Union's high ambitions to further curb carbon emissions. A wide range of instruments has been suggested and implemented in various countries of the EU. A prominent policy promoting investment in renewable technologies is the use of feed-in tariffs, which has worked well at large scale in, e.g. Germany, but which has only been implemented in a very limited way in countries such as the UK.Being subject to environmental uncertainties, however, renewables cannot be seen in isolation: while renewables-based technologies such as wind and solar energy, for example, suffer from uncertain loads depending on environmental conditions, hydropower allows for the storage of water for release at peak prices, which can be treated as a premium (partially) offsetting higher upfront investment costs. In addition, electricity prices will respond to changes in electric capacity in the market, which is often neglected in standard investment models of the electricity sector.This paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways: it provides a review of a renewables-based technology in a specific policy context and provides additional insight by employing a real options approach to investigate the specific characteristics of renewables and their associated uncertainties in a stylized setting taking explicitly into account market effects of investment decisions. The prices of the model are determined endogenously by the supply of electricity in the market and by exogenous electricity price uncertainty. The inclusion of market effects allows us to capture the full impact of public incentives for companies to invest into wind power and hydro pumped storage installations.     

Electricity regulation and electricity market reforms in China

The electricity industry of China has been in a process of reforms since the 1980s. This paper gives a review on the three main stages of reforms in China so as to trace out key features of various reform measures including those for power investment financing, the separation between government and power enterprises, and the division between power generation firms and power grids. The findings suggest that further regulatory change in China's electricity market reform is necessary when integration of the electricity markets and increased competition are paving the way ahead for a market-oriented structure. Prospective electricity regulation in the form of a strong legal system and effective institutions that protect market competition and promote appropriate incentives for efficiency are suggested in the paper.     

Electricity market-clearing prices and investment incentives: The role of pricing rules

Pricing rules in wholesale electricity markets are usually classified around two major groups, namely linear (aka non-discriminatory) and non-linear (aka discriminatory). As well known, the major difference lies on the way non-convexities are considered in the computation of market prices.According to the classical marginal pricing theories, the resulting market prices are supposed to serve as the key signals around which capacity expansion revolves. Thus, the implementation of one or the other pricing rule can have a different effect on the investment incentives perceived by generation technologies, affecting the long-term efficiency of the whole market scheme.The objective of this paper is to assess to what extent long-term investment incentives can be affected by the pricing rule implemented. To do so, we propose a long-term capacity expansion model where investment decisions are taken based on the market remuneration. We use the model to determine the optimal mix in a real-size thermal system with high penetration of renewable energy sources (since its intermittency enhances the relevance of non-convexities), when alternatively considering the aforementioned pricing schemes.     

South American reform lessons - twenty years of restructuring and reform in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile

South America is facing important challenges in electricity supply to allow for future economic development. Current electricity market designs are being reviewed to avoid supply difficulties and couple the existing outlook of primary energy resources and the investment interest by the private sector. While Brazil and Chile progress into a second stage of reforms with public power purchase agreement (PPA) auctions in a private environment, Argentina makes a backward movement to significant state intervention, as in the times previous to reform. This paper discusses the approaches to be used by each country to ensure sufficient capacity and investment to reliably serve their growing economies.     

The British Model in Britain: Failing slowly

In 1990, Britain reorganised its electricity industry to run on competitive lines. The British reforms are widely regarded as successful and the model used provides the basis for reforms of electricity industries worldwide. The main reason for this perception of success is major reductions in the real price of electricity with no reduction in service quality. This paper examines whether the reputation of the British reforms is justified. It concludes that the reputation is not justified and that serious fundamental problems are beginning to emerge. The central question is: have the British reforms resulted in the creation of efficient wholesale and retail markets? On this criterion, the reforms have failed. The wholesale market is dominated by obscure long-term contracts, privileged access to the market and self-dealing within integrated generator/retailers, leaving the spot markets with minimal liquidity and unreliable prices. The failure to develop an efficient wholesale market places the onus on consumers to impose competitive forces on electricity companies by switching regularly. Small consumers will not do this and they are paying too much for their power. For the future, there is a serious risk that the electricity industry will become a weakly regulated oligopoly with a veneer of competition.     

How does market power affect the impact of large scale wind investment in 'energy only' wholesale electricity markets?

In the short run, it is well known that increasing wind penetration is likely to reduce spot market electricity prices due to the merit order effect. The long run effect is less clear because there will be a change in new capacity investment in response to the wind penetration. In this paper we examine the interaction between capacity investment, wind penetration and market power by first using a least-cost generation expansion model to simulate capacity investment with increasing amounts of wind generation, and then using a computer agent-based model to predict electricity prices in the presence of market power. We find the degree to which firms are able to exercise market power depends critically on the ratio of capacity to peak demand. For our preferred long run generation scenario we show market power increases for some periods as wind penetration increases however the merit order counteracts this with the results that prices overall remain flat. Returns to peakers increase significantly as wind penetration increases. The market power in turn leads to inefficient dispatch which is exacerbated with large amounts of wind generation.     

Government procurement of peak capacity in the New Zealand electricity market

This paper analyzes the impact of government procurement of reserve electricity generation capacity on the long-run equilibrium in the electricity market. The approach here is to model the electricity market in a context where the supply companies have market power. The model is then used to analyze the impact of government direct supply of peak capacity on the market. We find that the firms build less peak-generation capacity when the government procures peak generating capacity. The long-run equilibrium with N firms and government capacity of K_G results in an increase of total peak generation capacity of K_G/(N+1) compared to the long-run equilibrium with no government capacity. Supply disruptions of baseline capacity during the peak time period are also considered. It is found that peak prices do not go up any further with (anticipated) supply disruptions. Instead the entire cost of the extra peakers is borne by customers on traditional meters and off-peak customers who face real-time pricing.     

Incentives of carbon dioxide regulation for investment in low-carbon electricity technologies in Texas

This paper compares the incentives a carbon dioxide emissions price creates for investment in low carbon dioxide-emitting technologies in the electricity sector. We consider the extent to which operational differences across generation technologies – particularly, nuclear, wind and solar photovoltaic – create differences in the incentives for new investment, which is measured by the operating profits of a potential entrant. First, astylized model of an electricity system demonstrates that the composition of the existing generation system may cause electricity prices to increase by different amounts over time when a carbon dioxide price is imposed. Differences in operation across technologies therefore translate to differences in the operating profits of a potential entrant. Then, a detailed simulation model is used to consider a hypothetical carbon dioxide price of $10–$50 per metric ton for the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) market. The simulations show that, for the range of prices considered, the increase in electricity prices is positively correlated with output from a typical wind unit, but the correlation is much weaker for nuclear and photovoltaic. Consequently, a carbon dioxide price creates much stronger investment incentives for wind than for nuclear or photovoltaic technologies in the Texas market.     

Impacts of a common green certificate market on electricity and CO2-emission markets in the Nordic countries

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of introducing a common Nordic system for tradable green certificates (TGCs) on the electricity market and a future market for tradable CO₂-emission permits (TEPs). In the analysis, the energy-system model generator MARKAL was used to model the electricity and district-heating supply systems in the four Nordic countries Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark. It is shown that the introduction of TGC quotas reduces wholesale electricity and TEP prices. The impact on the latter is very pronounced. Retail electricity prices may become lower or higher, depending on the TGC quota, than if obligations to fulfill TGC quotas were absent. The TGC scheme's efficiency in reducing a specific amount of CO₂ emissions is also compared to the corresponding efficiency of a TEP scheme involving a broader range of technologies. Furthermore, obligations to fulfill TGC quotas affect investment incentives for new non-renewable electricity supply. This seems especially true for gas-fired power plants. Finally, it is indicated that electricity supply based on biomass combustion dominates the TGC scheme, at least in the short run.     

Endogenous price zones and investment incentives in electricity markets: An application of multilevel optimization with graph partitioning

In the course of the energy transition, load and supply centers are growing apart in electricity markets worldwide, rendering regional price signals even more important to provide adequate locational investment incentives. In this paper, we focus on electricity markets with zonal pricing from a long-run perspective, i.e., we include capacity investment decisions. For a fixed number of zones, we endogenously derive the optimal configuration of price zones and available transfer capacities. We build on the multilevel mixed-integer nonlinear model with graph partitioning on the first level developed in Grimm et al. (2019) and adapt it to be able to solve the model to global optimality even for large instances. By applying the model to the German electricity market, we find that a considerable share of the maximum possible welfare gains can already be achieved by implementing a few (two or three) optimally configured price zones with restrictive inter-zonal ATCs. Moreover, ATCs between zones are an important influencing factor for the achievable welfare gains and investment incentives. Finally, our results show that hypothetical nodal prices are not a good guidance to partition nodes into optimal zones.     

Effects of regulatory reforms in the electricity supply industry on electricity prices in developing countries

Electric power sector reforms in the electricity supply industry have had an impact on industrial and household prices in developing countries in Latin America, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe. Using original panel data for 83 countries during the period from 1985 to 2002, we examine how each policy instrument of the reform measures influenced electricity prices for countries in the above regions. We found that variables such as entry of independent power producers (IPP), unbundling of generation and transmission, establishment of a regulatory agency, and the introduction of a wholesale spot market have had a variety of impacts on electricity prices, some of which were not always consistent with expected results. The research findings suggest that neither unbundling nor introduction of a wholesale pool market on their own necessarily reduces the electric power price. In fact, contrary to expectations, there was a tendency for the price to rise. However, coexistent with an independent regulator, unbundling may work to reduce electricity prices. Privatization and the introduction of foreign IPP and retail competition lower electricity prices in some regions, but not all.     

Analysis of competition and market power in the wholesale electricity market in India

The electricity reforms were initiated in India with the objective of promoting competition in the electricity market. In order to promote competition, the Electricity Act 2003 was enacted and various policy initiatives were taken by the Government of India. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) also facilitated competition through the regulatory framework of availability based tariff, Indian Electricity Grid Code, open access in inter-state transmission, inter-state trading and power exchanges. Despite these initiatives, electricity prices increased in the Wholesale Electricity Market in India (WEMI). This paper analyses the market structure and competitiveness in the WEMI. There are, of course, various potential reasons for the rise in the electricity price. This paper seeks to investigate, if market power was one of the reasons for increase in market prices. Concentration ratio, Herfindahl–Hirschman index, Supply Margin Assessment, and Residual Supply Index have been used to measure market power. This paper also uses the price–cost mark-up to examine, if exercise of market power led to higher margins. The analysis suggests that market power of firms may be part of the reason for the increase in electricity prices in WEMI. The study suggests various measures to increase competition in the WEMI.     

Abuse of dominance and antitrust enforcement in the German electricity market

In 2008, the European Commission investigated E.ON, a large and vertically integrated electricity company, for the alleged abuse of a joint dominant position by strategically withholding generation capacity in the German wholesale electricity market. The case was settled after E.ON agreed to divest 5 GW generation capacity as well as its extra-high voltage network. We analyze the effect of these divestitures on wholesale electricity prices. Our identification strategy is based on the observation that energy suppliers have more market power during peak periods when demand is high. Therefore, a decrease in market power should lead to convergence between peak and off-peak prices, after controlling for different demand and supply conditions as well as the change in generation mix due to the expansion of renewable technologies. Using daily electricity prices for the 2006–2012 period, we find economically and statistically significant convergence effects after the settlement of the case. In a richer specification, we show that the price reductions appear to be mostly due to the divestiture of gas and coal plants, which is consistent with merit-order considerations. Additional cross-country analyses support our results.     

Electricity prices and generator behaviour in gross pool electricity markets

Electricity market liberalisation has become common practice internationally. The justification for this process has been to enhance competition in a market traditionally characterised by statutory monopolies in an attempt to reduce costs to end-users. This paper endeavours to see whether a pool market achieves this goal of increasing competition and reducing electricity prices. Here the electricity market is set up as a sealed bid second price auction. Theory predicts that such markets should result with firms bidding their marginal cost, thereby resulting in an efficient outcome and lower costs to consumers. The Irish electricity system with a gross pool market experiences among the highest electricity prices in Europe. Thus, we analyse the Irish pool system econometrically in order to test if the high electricity prices seen there are due to participants bidding outside of market rules or out of line with theory. Overall we do not find any evidence that the interaction between generator and the pool in the Irish electricity market is not efficient. Thus, the pool element of the market structure does not explain the high electricity prices experienced in Ireland.     

Market power analysis for the Iranian electricity market

The market power problem in Iranian electricity market is addressed in this study. This paper by using various structural indices of market power and reviewing market results analyzes the intensity of competition in Iran’s electricity market and examines whether this market is functioning at an appropriate level of efficiency. In this article the most well-known indices of market power are calculated in two approaches for two different scenarios (current situation and future outlook of generation sector’s ownership in Iran’s power industry). Comparing the results of these scenarios promises more competitive market for the second scenario. Calculating Residual Supply Index for Iran’s power market shows despite admissible values of concentration ratios, due to supply scarcity during periods when the demand is close to the total available capacity, some suppliers can exercise market power even with a relatively small market share. The most important price and load indices like weighted average prices and load/price duration curves of Iranian electricity market during March 2007–March 2008 are also analyzed in this paper. These results imply the existence of economic withholding. The main limiting factors of competition and significant implemented countermeasures for market power mitigation in Iran’s electricity market are also mentioned.     

Modelling electricity storage systems management under the influence of demand‐side management programmes

Electricity storage systems (ESS) for bulk energy storage are principally used for load levelling purposes or for relieving the intermittency of renewables. Another use is electricity arbitrage through the rule of ‘buy low, sell high’. This operation tracks the market‐clearing price (MCP) profiles and produces profit by exploiting the differences between peak and off‐peak prices. The profits made in this way depend on technology characteristics and the market competition level. We investigate the influence of demand‐side management (DSM) on ESS profitability when the only income is from provision of electricity arbitrage services, by optimizing the time allocation of the charge and discharge operations. Two scenarios of DSM in the market have been selected for two management periods (MP): 1 day and 3 days. The longer MP is examined in order to investigate the potential for higher economic value when energy transfer to the next day is permitted. The key finding is that a very small load shifting from peaks to off‐peaks, due to DSM, significantly affects the ESS profit. The significant profit losses the ESS showed are a result of the high capital costs and the small difference of the peak and off‐peak electricity prices in the Greek market. Therefore, under the assumptions we have made for this research, any attempt to use ESS in ‘buy low, sell high’ operation is not profitable. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Forecasting the joint distribution of Australian electricity prices using dynamic vine copulae

We consider the problem of modelling and forecasting the distribution of a vector of prices from interconnected electricity markets using a flexible class of drawable vine copula models, where we allow the dependence parameters of the constituting bivariate copulae to be time-varying. We undertake in-sample and out-of-sample tests using daily electricity prices, and evidence that our model provides accurate forecasts of the underlying distribution and outperforms a set of competing models in their abilities to forecast one-day-ahead conditional quantiles of a portfolio of electricity prices. Our study is conducted in the Australian National Electricity Market (NEM), which is the most efficient power auction in the world. Electricity prices exhibit highly stylised features such as extreme price spikes, price dependency between regional markets, correlation asymmetry and non-linear dependency. The developed approach can be used as a risk management tool in the electricity retail industry, which plays an integral role in the apparatus of modern energy markets. Electricity retailers are responsible for the efficient distribution of electricity, while being exposed to market risk with extreme magnitudes.     

Mothballing in power markets: An experimental study

The deregulation of many electricity markets over the last two decades raises a number of issues, among which: securing adequate investments in capacity, and the possibility of cyclical behavior in capacity, are important for security of supply. A number of policies and market mechanisms aiming for capacity adequacy and market stability exist; in this paper we focus on one of these, mothballing of generation capacity. In electricity markets, mothballing is the possibility for a power generation company to temporarily withdraw generation capacity for a time, often for a year or more. Our hypothesis is that mothballing will help to stabilize markets, but at the same time increase prices. We test this hypothesis using laboratory experiments, with a simplified model of a generic electricity market. We report an experiment with twelve markets, where subjects make investment decisions; half of them had full capacity utilization (T1) and the other half had the option to mothball capacity (T2). The predictions of the effects of mothballing were confirmed in the experimental markets: prices and generation capacity exhibit clear cycles in T1, and damped cycles in the second set of experiments, T2. Furthermore, mothballing leads to higher prices on average.     

Modeling long-term dynamics of electricity markets

In the last decade, many countries have restructured their electricity industries by introducing competition in their power generation sectors. Although some restructuring has been regarded as successful, the short experience accumulated with liberalized power markets does not allow making any founded assertion about their long-term behavior. Long-term prices and long-term supply reliability are now center of interest. This concerns firms considering investments in generation capacity and regulatory authorities interested in assuring the long-term supply adequacy and the stability of power markets. In order to gain significant insight into the long-term behavior of liberalized power markets, in this paper, a simulation model based on system dynamics is proposed and the underlying mathematical formulations extensively discussed. Unlike classical market models based on the assumption that market outcomes replicate the results of a centrally made optimization, the approach presented here focuses on replicating the system structure of power markets and the logic of relationships among system components in order to derive its dynamical response. The simulations suggest that there might be serious problems to adjust early enough the generation capacity necessary to maintain stable reserve margins, and consequently, stable long-term price levels. Because of feedback loops embedded in the structure of power markets and the existence of some time lags, the long-term market development might exhibit a quite volatile behavior. By varying some exogenous inputs, a sensitivity analysis is carried out to assess the influence of these factors on the long-run market dynamics.     

Investment decisions in imperfect power markets with hydrogen storage and large share of intermittent electricity

This paper analyzes the impact of hydrogen as energy storage on production and investment decisions in an electricity market when individual participants behave strategically. We develop a game-theoretic model on investment and generation game à la Cournot under the open-loop information structure. This framework is implemented as a mixed complementarity problem and applied to the German case assuming the phase-out of the German nuclear power plants, rising renewable energy supply and increasing energy demand for electric vehicles. The numerical results of our analysis indicate that utilization of energy storage has a positive effect on energy systems with large amount of intermittent electricity and inelastic demand. We find that additional hydrogen storage capacities improve system reliability, increase overall welfare and decrease GHG emissions. Adding demand for hydrogen as a fuel for FCEVs allows for a synergetic use of the technology and changes the investment incentives for energy storage. Although the power-to-gas technology has a price-smoothing effect the overall generation capacity is higher with energy storage providing additional supply security in markets with a large amount of intermittent energy production.