Restructuring the Russian electricity sector: Re-creating California?

The Russian Federation has begun restructuring its electricity sector, following the standard restructuring model of complete vertical separation of generation from transmission, with the aim of creating competition in regional generation markets. This paper examines the structure of the six principal regional generation markets that are in their early stages of development and argues that they are likely to be characterized by high levels of market power on the part of individual privatized generation companies, especially during the peak winter demand season. These levels—considerably higher than those that caused competitive problems in California—seem to create a serious risk of price spikes in deregulated wholesale electricity markets, and thus of significant price increases to consumers of electricity.     

Measuring the competitiveness benefits of a transmission investment policy: The case of the Alberta electricity market

Transmission expansions can increase the extent of competition faced by wholesale electricity suppliers with the ability to exercise unilateral market power. This can cause them to submit offer curves closer to their marginal cost curves, which sets market-clearing prices closer to competitive benchmark price levels. These lower wholesale market-clearing prices are the competitiveness benefit consumers realize from the transmission expansion. This paper quantifies empirically the competitiveness benefits of a transmission expansion policy that causes strategic suppliers to expect no transmission congestion. Using hourly generation-unit level offer, output, market-clearing price and congestion data from the Alberta wholesale electricity market from January 1, 2009 to July 31, 2013, an upper and lower bound on the hourly consumer competitiveness benefits of this transmission policy is computed. Both of these competitiveness benefits measures are economically significant, which argues for including them in transmission planning processes for wholesale electricity markets to ensure that all transmission expansions with positive net benefits to electricity consumers are undertaken.     

Welfare implications of capacity payments in a price-capped electricity sector: A case study of the Texas market (ERCOT)

The aim of this paper is to analyze the welfare consequences of introducing capacity compensation payments in restructured and liberalized electricity markets. For that purpose, we set up a two-stage framework in which two kinds of electricity generators, peak load and base load generators, choose their capacity investment levels first and then compete on the basis of bids in a centralized market to sell electricity to consumers. We use data from the Texas ERCOT to evaluate consumers' welfare. We find that the introduction of capacity payments has two countervailing effects. On the one hand, it increases the wholesale electricity price. On the other hand, it reduces price volatility and increases the reliability of the system. We find that capacity payments are more beneficial for consumers in a perfectly competitive market than in the presence of certain degree of market power.     

Consumer preference not to choose: Methodological and policy implications

Residential consumers remain reluctant to choose new electricity suppliers. Even the most successful jurisdictions, four US states and other countries, have had to adopt extensive consumer education procedures that serve largely to confirm that choosing electricity suppliers is daunting. Electricity is not unique in this respect; numerous studies find that consumers are generally reluctant to switch brands, even when they are well-informed about product characteristics. If consumers prefer not to choose, opening regulated markets can reduce welfare, even for some consumers who do switch, as the incumbent can exploit this preference by raising price above the formerly regulated level. Policies to open markets might be successful even if limited to industrial and commercial customers, with residential prices based on those in nominally competitive wholesale markets.     

Screening instruments for monitoring market power — The Return on Withholding Capacity Index (RWC)

While markets have been liberalized all over the world, incumbents often still hold a dominant position, e.g. on energy markets. Thus, wholesale electricity markets are subject to market surveillance. Nevertheless, consolidated findings on abusive practices of market power and their cause and effect in these markets are scarce and non-controversial market monitoring practices fail to exist. Right now, the Residual Supply Index (RSI) is the most important instrument for market monitoring. However, a major drawback of this index is its focus on just one specific aspect of market power in wholesale electricity markets whereas different consequences of market power are possible. Hence, markets could be distorted in several ways and we propose the “Return on Withholding Capacity Index” (RWC) as a complementary index to the RSI. The index is a measure of the firms' incentive to withhold capacity. The benefits and practicability of the RWC are shown by an application on data for the German-Austrian electricity wholesale market in 2016.     

On the evaluation of market power and market dominance—The Nordic electricity market

This paper studies different concentration and dominance measures using structural indexes used to initially screen the competitive situation in a market. The Nordic and Swedish electricity markets are used as the empirical cases. Market concentration issues in the Nordic electricity market in general and in Sweden in particular have been, at least in initial screenings, approached by the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI). This article uses an alternative measure to HHI, which is based on market shares of the two largest firms in the market. The results shows that only the Swedish wholesale market has a firm that can be regarded as dominant, but only during very short periods. The results from a hypothetical merger between the second and third largest company in the Swedish wholesale market shows that when the dominant position of the largest firm is reduced, by increasing the size of the second largest firm, the threshold value indicates that competition actually will increase (contradicting to the HHI).     

Competitive energy markets and nuclear power: Can we have both,do we want either?

In 1987, the UK Conservative Party was re-elected promising to transform the electricity industry into a privatised competitive industry and to promote an expansion of nuclear power. Fulfilling both objectives was not possible. The nuclear plants were withdrawn from the sale and plans to build new plants were abandoned, but privatisation proceeded. In 2007, the Labour government began a new attempt to build nuclear plants to operate in the competitive electricity market, promising that no subsidies would be offered to them. By 2010, the utilities that were planning to build nuclear plants were beginning to suggest that ‘support’ in some form would be needed if they were to build new plants. More surprisingly, the energy regulator, Ofgem, cast doubt on whether a competitive wholesale electricity market would provide security of supply. In 1990, the UK government opted for a competitive electricity market over expanding nuclear power. Now, the option of opting for a competitive electricity market may not exist. However, this might not leave the way open for new nuclear plants. The expected cost of power from new nuclear plants is now so high that no more than one or two heavily subsidised plants will be built.     

Behavioral aspects of regulation: A discussion on switching and demand response in Turkish electricity market

Electricity sector has been transformed from state-owned monopolistic utilities to competitive markets with an aim to promote incentives for improving efficiency, reducing costs and increasing service quality to customers. One of the cardinal assumptions of the liberalized and competitive electricity markets is the rational actor, and decision-makers are assumed to make the best decisions that maximize their utility. However, a vast literature on behavioral economics has shown the weakness of economic theory in explaining and predicting individuals’ decision-making behavior. This issue is quite important for competition in electricity markets in which consumers’ preferences have a significant role. Despite its importance, this issue has almost been neglected in Turkey, which has taken major steps in electricity sector restructuring. Therefore, this paper aims to examine switching and demand response behavior in Turkish electricity market by using multiple correspondence and panel data analysis, and findings are discussed in light of the neoclassical and behavioral economics literature. Analyses’ results show that consumers’ switching and demand response behavior is consistent with the neoclassical literature to some extent; however, behavioral factors are also affecting consumers’ decisions. Furthermore, there are systemic problems that hinder effective functioning of the electricity market and restrict competition.     

Reenergizing the grid: greater regulatory, legislative certainty needed

The North American Electric Reliability Council's (NERC) new reliability standards are an important milestone for the council and the electric power industry. They clarify existing NERC reliability standards, and they create the foundation for adopting enforceable standards. The grid ensure that the nation's retail electricity customers enjoy reliable and affordable electricity service, and it enables the country's evolving wholesale electricity markets. To support both functions in the future, the grid will require more investment. The nation's shareholder-owned electric utilities recognize this need and are building transmission facilities. Even with this new spending, the continually growing demand for electricity, coupled with the expanding number of wholesale market transactions, means that more investment will be necessary. To encourage it, a number of regulatory and legislative policies should be adopted at both the federal and the state level to improve investor certainty and cost recovery.     

Cross-border integration in the European electricity market. Evidence from the pricing behavior of Norwegian and Swiss exporters

This paper examines the electricity market integration process in two European areas based on the pricing behavior of Norwegian and Swiss exporters. The aim is to gain evidence for the period after the adoption of the “Second Legislative Package” (2003). The pricing behavior of Norwegian exporters indicates that the wholesale markets for Denmark and Sweden are highly integrated. Moreover, results are fully compatible with the existence of a very competitive marketplace for electricity. This clearly contrasts with the evidence provided by Swiss exporters. In this last case, analysis revealed differences in pricing-to-market behavior between Italy, France and Germany, which indicates that exporters take advantage of international market segmentation and divergences between market structures. This outcome provides a reasonable explanation as to why price differences between countries cannot be fully attributed to transmission costs, as has been claimed in previous research. We also found cross-country convergence in levels of markups and in pricing-to-market behavior of the Swiss exporters for the first part of the period that was analyzed. The evidence is fully consistent with an initial impulse toward market integration originated by reforms implemented at the beginning of the last decade.     

Buying and selling power in the age of competition

The American electric power industry is currently in the throes of striving for workable competition. Driven by the converging forces of deregulation, technological revolution, and evolving customer expectations, electric utilities are having to compete as never before at both the wholesale and retail levels. At times, the transition has been particularly wrenching, with some utilities going through painful internal restructuring and others being caught up in external consolidation. Increasingly, the key to success in this more competitive environment is anticipating and actively responding to the forces that are shaping the new markets for electric power. Here, the author describes how such market management is the subject of pioneering research being conducted in EPRI's Utility Resource Planning and Management Program. On the wholesale side, this research centers on the development of powerful analytical methods to support utility decisions regarding new opportunities in the bulk power market. Research on retail market management is concentrated on developing innovative price-differentiated services that can enhance the value of electricity to customers and also foster a utility's long-term financial competitiveness     

The grin of the Cheshire cat

Throughout the 1990s, privatisation, liberalisation, de-regulation, in short, the ‘British Model’ dominated the policy agenda for electric utilities. At the heart of these reforms was a desire to transform the electricity industry from a monopoly into a competitive market so that electricity could be bought and sold like other commodities and products. However, from 2001 onwards, cracks in this policy became visible. Rather than admit the policy's failings, its advocates have tried to ‘fix’ the model by re-introducing planning. As planning replaces competition, increasingly, all that is left of the competitive element of the model is the free market rhetoric: ‘the grin of the Cheshire cat.’ But when supply security can no longer be guaranteed, politicians will be forced to act. For developed countries, the problems will be significant but they willingly opted for liberalisation and have the financial resources to deal with these problems, so sympathy must be limited. By contrast, developing countries often had little choice but to comply with the wishes of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs). Their industries have often suffered serious under-investment in the privatised market. It is these countries that the developed world has a duty to help and the IFIs must urgently re-assess their policies, and widely acknowledge their mistakes.     

Resource externalities and the persistence of heterogeneous pricing behavior in an energy commodity market

In competitive product markets, repeated interaction among producers with similar economic characteristics would be expected to result in convergence of their behaviors. If convergence does not occur, it raises fundamental questions related to the sustainability of heterogeneous competitive strategies. This paper examines the prices submitted to the British wholesale electricity market by four coal-fired plants, separately owned, approximately of the same age, size and efficiency, and located in the same transmission network zone. Due to the repetitive nature of the spot market, one would expect convergence in strategies. Yet, we find evidence of persistent price dispersion and heterogeneous strategies. We consider several propositions for these effects including market power, company size, forward commitments, vertical integration and the management of interrelated assets.     

Demand response resources: Who is responsible for implementation in a deregulated market?

Demand response resources (DRR) have potential to offer substantial benefits in the form of improved economic efficiency in wholesale electricity markets. Those benefits include better capacity factors for existing capacity, reductions in requirements for new capacity, enhanced reliability, relief of congestion and transmission constraints, reductions in price volatility, mitigation of market power and lower electricity prices for consumers. However, DRR has been slow to penetrate. There has been substantial disagreement as to which entities in a restructured market should promote the expanded implementation of DRR. This paper contends that no single entity can perform this function. But rather, wider implementation will need to accrue from coordinated actions along the electricity supply chain.     

Did residential electricity rates fall after retail competition? A dynamic panel analysis

A key selling point for the restructuring of electricity markets was the promise of lower prices. There is not much consensus in earlier studies on the effects of electricity deregulation in the U.S., particularly for residential customers. Part of the reason for not finding a consistent link with deregulation and lower prices was that the removal of transitional price caps led to higher prices. In addition, the timing of the removal of price caps coincided with rising fuel prices, which were passed on to consumers in a competitive market. Using a dynamic panel model, we analyze the effect of participation rates, fuel costs, market size, a rate cap and switch to competition for 16 states and the District of Columbia. We find that an increase in participation rates, price controls, a larger market, and high shares of hydro in electricity generation lower retail prices, while increases in natural gas and coal prices increase rates. We also find that retail competition makes the market more efficient by lowering the markup of retail prices over wholesale costs. The effects of a competitive retail electricity market are mixed across states, but generally appear to lower prices in states with high participation rates.     

Efficient pricing and investment in electricity markets with intermittent resources

Facing growing technological and environmental challenges, the electricity industry needs effective pricing mechanism to promote efficient risk management and investment decisions. In a restructured electricity market with competitive wholesale prices and traditionally regulated retail rates, however, there are technical and institutional barriers that prevent dynamic pricing with price responsive demand. In regions with limited energy storage capacity, intermittent renewable resources present special challenges. This could adversely affect the effectiveness of public policies causing inefficient investments in energy technologies. In this paper, we present an updated economic model of pricing and investment in restructured electricity market and use the model in a simulation study for an initial assessment of renewable energy strategy and alternative pricing mechanisms. A key objective of the study is to shed light on the policy issues so that effective decisions can be made to improve efficiency.     

Welfare and competition effects of electricity interconnection between Ireland and Great Britain

This study analyzes the effects of additional interconnection on welfare and competition in the Irish electricity market. I simulate the wholesale electricity markets of the island of Ireland and Great Britain for 2005. I find that in order for the two markets to be integrated in 2005, additional interconnection would have to be large. The amount of interconnection decreases for high costs of carbon, since this causes the markets to become more similar. This suggests that in the absence of strategic behavior of firms, most of the gains from trade derive not from differences in size between countries, but from technology differences and are strongly influenced by fuel and carbon costs. Social welfare increases with interconnection, although at a decreasing rate. As the amount of interconnection increases, there are also positive effects on competition in Ireland, the less competitive of the two markets. Finally, it is unlikely that private investors will pay for the optimal amount of interconnection since their returns are significantly smaller than the total social benefit of interconnection.     

Integration of multiple national markets for electricity: The case of Norway and Sweden

During the second part of the 1990s the Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) countries have created a unique multinational market for electricity. This paper aims to analyse the degree of integration of the different national markets that constitute the Nordic electricity market. In particular the Norwegian and Swedish wholesale and retail electricity markets are analysed. The results suggest that the wholesale markets are well integrated. Thus prices differ significantly only during periods with unusually high or low supply of hydropower. However, the retail markets are not integrated to the same degree. Thus retail prices and trade margins differ significantly. Differences in the national electricity market legislation seem to be a key factor behind these differences.     

Imperfect competition: modeling and analysis of oligopolyelectricity markets

The aim of this letter is to provide an analysis of oligopoly electricity markets, such as the British electricity spot market. A model is developed under certain assumptions, first to describe the behavior of such a type of market. The main objective is to reveal how the behavior of suppliers affects each other's profit-maximization. The effectiveness of the proposed methodology is demonstrated on a test electricity industry that contains three different suppliers     

Electricity regulation and electricity market reforms in China

The electricity industry of China has been in a process of reforms since the 1980s. This paper gives a review on the three main stages of reforms in China so as to trace out key features of various reform measures including those for power investment financing, the separation between government and power enterprises, and the division between power generation firms and power grids. The findings suggest that further regulatory change in China's electricity market reform is necessary when integration of the electricity markets and increased competition are paving the way ahead for a market-oriented structure. Prospective electricity regulation in the form of a strong legal system and effective institutions that protect market competition and promote appropriate incentives for efficiency are suggested in the paper.