Is the "forgotten distinction" between psychology and phenomenology still forgotten? Reply to comments.

Responds to D. M. Snyder's (see record 1988-28275-001) 3 main criticisms of J. L. Jennings's (see record 1987-05956-001) discussion of E. Husserl's (1931) concept of phenomenological investigation. J. L. Jennings and C. A. Lucca also reject T. Henley's (1988) opinion on looking beyond Husserl, since they believe Husserl continues to stand as the clearest statement of the most important and "forgotten" distinction between psychology and phenomenology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Views from the inside and outside.

Replies to comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" (see record 2005-05480-003). Four (see records 2006-03947-010; 2006-03947-011; 2006-03947-012; and 2006-03947-013) of the five comments on my article were critical of my treatment of psychology and phenomenology. I will try to identify the sources of these disputes, but not with the intention of demonstrating the superiority of one discipline over the other. In an attempt to compare and contrast psychology and phenomenology, I analyze three concepts: objectivity, values, and falsifiability. Reber's comments (see record 2006-03947-014) were agreeable to read because of the common methodological orientation we share. Reber's optimism about humanity sharing common moral commitments appears to be contradicted by history and current events. Cloonan's (see record 2006-03947-010) plea for a "methodological pluralism" (p. 255) in psychology sounds appealing but is basically destructive for psychology and society. You can't play chess and checkers on the same board at the same time! (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Clarifications with respect to psychology and phenomenology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). The comment author discusses the original article from three perspectives: the issue of subjectivity in phenomenology that he raised, the relevance of American phenomenological psychology to the topic to which Kendler oddly made no reference, and the promotion of and reservations about the "naturalization" of phenomenology in relation to psychology. Kendler advocated the "moral pluralism" of democracy. A similar position of advocacy for "methodological pluralism" is required (cf. Farber, 1967, p. 6). Recognition and respectful consideration of other methodologies in psychology advance the discipline and safeguard against intellectual parochialism and prejudice. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Idols of the psychologist: Johannes Linschoten and the demise of phenomenological psychology in the Netherlands.

Before and after World War II, a loose movement within Dutch psychology solidified as a nascent phenomenological psychology. Dutch phenomenological psychologists attempted to generate an understanding of psychology that was based on Husserlian interpretations of phenomenological philosophy. This movement came to a halt in the 1960s, even though it had been exported to North America and elsewhere as "phenomenological psychology." Frequently referred to as the "Utrecht school," most of the activity of the group was centered at Utrecht University. In this article, the authors examine the role played by Johannes Linschoten in both aspects of the development of a phenomenological psychology: its rise in North America and Europe, and its institutional demise. By the time of his early death in 1964, Linschoten had cast considerable doubt on the possibilities of a purely phenomenological psychology. Nonetheless, his own empirical work, especially his 1956 dissertation published in German, can be seen to be a form of empiricism inspired by phenomenology but that clearly distanced itself from the more elitist and esoteric aspects of Dutch phenomenological psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A hermeneutics of exploration: The interpretive turn from binswanger to gadamer.

The interpretive turn in psychology is strongly indebted to the hermeneutic philosophies of Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer. What is less known is the degree to which the interpretive turn is already initiated in the 1920s by the Swiss psychiatrist, Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1965). For Binswanger, the objective of psychology and psychopathology is to understand how the person exists and relates to others in the world—and this can only be achieved through a situated understanding of the person in his or her life-world. Binswanger is one of the first to recognize and work out the contributions of Husserl's and Heidegger's philosophies for psychology. Using an approach that combines elements from phenomenology, hermeneutics and dialogical philosophy, Binswanger views the person not as an object, but as fundamentally immersed in a world of human relating. Yet Binswanger is not a Heideggerian, and does not identify his work as existential. Instead, he develops a dialogical perspective on human experience that parallels important aspects of Gadamer's hermeneutics. Drawing chiefly on untranslated texts, I maintain that Binswanger's hermeneutics of exploration forms an important, if relatively unknown chapter of the interpretive turn in psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Husserl revisited: The forgotten distinction between psychology and phenomenology.

Argues that as phenomenology attracts growing attention in current psychology, it is increasingly important for psychologists to understand that phenomenology encompasses much more than a mere appreciation for subjective self-report data. The ideas of E. Husserl, the so-called founder of phenomenology, are reexamined to enlighten psychologists about phenomenology's contrasting approach to the study of consciousness. Whereas psychology studies actual subjective responses to actual environmental events (empirical data), phenomenology studies the essential character of consciousness in meaning-conferring acts (essential knowledge). Husserl proposed phenomenology as a positive alternative to the experimental methods of the new scientific psychology. Husserl believed phenomenology was needed to clarify the essential, but unanalyzed, pre-understandings of mental phenomena that guide psychology's experimental investigations. (36 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Phenomenological Research Methods for Counseling Psychology.

This article familiarizes counseling psychologists with qualitative research methods in psychology developed in the tradition of European phenomenology. A brief history includes some of Edmund Husserl's basic methods and concepts, the adoption of existential-phenomenology among psychologists, and the development and formalization of qualitative research procedures in North America. The choice points and alternatives in phenomenological research in psychology are delineated. The approach is illustrated by a study of a recovery program for persons repeatedly hospitalized for chronic mental illness. Phenomenological research is compared with other qualitative methods, and some of its benefits for counseling psychology are identified. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Leo Rangell and I: Where do we differ?

Leo Rangell (see record 2006-05420-002), in his article on the evolution of psychoanalytic theory, indicates where he feels that I have a differing view, both of present circumstances and of projected directions. Our perspectives do indeed differ, but I feel that his presentation seriously misunderstands and misrepresents my views. I do not feel, as he contends, that all theoretical perspectives have "equal valence and validity." Rather, I have stated that they all claim complete explanatory comprehensiveness on a theoretical level and at least comparable effectiveness on a clinical level, and I feel that we have no scientific warrant at this time for claiming the established greater validity of any one approach over the others. This is not to say that all do have "equal valence and validity." Rangell feels that his preferred approach, which he calls "total composite psychoanalytic theory," is superior (more encompassing and more correct) to the others. I feel that we cannot make judgments about validity at this point in the evolving development of our discipline. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The ideology of logic in contemporary psychology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler sought to resolve the methodological issue that divides much of contemporary psychology--namely, the difference between natural science and human science in their respective views of psychological life. Whereas Kendler provided an evocative historical account of conflicts over how psychology has interpreted consciousness, the force of his analysis depends on the extent to which the proverbial "is/ought" distinction, invoked any time the question of "science" is at stake, can have any meaningful purchase in the face of a radical phenomenology like that of Martin Heidegger. Regrettably, Kendler's position in the end eclipses any intention to clarify our understanding of the relationship between "natural" and "human" science. The consequence of his article will not likely resolve the controversy he put before us, but if it does nothing more than provoke further discussion, Kendler will have provided our profession with an opportunity to understand more fully this business we call psychology. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Existential—phenomenological perspectives in psychology.

Reviews the book, Existential — phenomenological perspectives in psychology edited by Ronald S. Valle and Steen Hailing (1989). This collection shows careful selection and editing by the two editors. Each of the articles is well-written, admirably clear, and articulate. The authors have succeeded in making the tenants of phenomenology accessible to those who do not have prior knowledge, however, the content is also of interest to people who are already familiar with the basics, but who wish to see phenomenological research in action. As such, the book could well serve as a text for an undergraduate or graduate level course entitled "existential-phenomenological perspectives in psychology", or as an adjunct text for a course which looks more broadly at various theoretical and methodological positions within the discipline. The editors have thoughtfully compiled the index with a view to the use of the book as a reference. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Lived body and fantasmatic body: The debate between phenomenology and psychoanalysis.

Neither the lived body, taken up by Merleau-Ponty after Husserl, nor the libidinal body theorised by psychanalysts after Freud, can be reduced to the counted, measured, physical body, apprehended only from outside. Both phenomenology and psychoanalysis set forth the priority of a global subjective lived body, approached "from within". However, their perspectives seem to differ when it comes to the conception of the interiority of this lived body, which psychoanalysis deems as imaginary. This paper examines the similarities and discrepancies between the Merleau-Pontyan phenomenological body and the Freudian erogenous body. It attempts to show how the very categories of perception and imagination are reversed when moving from one discipline to the other. It concludes by proposing some lines along which the comparison could be prolonged. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A clarification of Heidegger's phenomenology.

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). This article calls for clarifications regarding its characterization of Heideggerian phenomenology. Kendler drew on his admittedly "limited understanding" (p. 322) of Heidegger and rested his critique upon a critical confusion that pervaded his presentation--a confusion of the ontological and ontic dimensions of Heidegger's work. In his depiction of authenticity as an objective set of values that form "a universal ethical system that is right for all humanity" (Kendler, 2005, p. 321), Kendler made the mistake of taking an ontological structure to instead prescribe an ontically particular way of living these structures out. Beyond the confusion of ontological structure with ontic particulars, Kendler's (2005) characterization of phenomenological inquiry as "naive" calls for a response. Indeed, whether one agrees with the epistemology of the co-constitution of phenomena or not, the epistemological rigor with which phenomenological psychologists consider approach--a term which "denote[s] the ways a science's basic presuppositions are intimately interrelated with the content it takes up and the methods it evolves" (von Eckartsberg, 1998, p. 4)--belies this charge (see also Giorgi, 1970, 1985; Giorgi & Giorgi, 2003). (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

"Husserl revisited: The forgotten distinction between psychology and phenomenology": Comment on Jennings.

Comments on J. L. Jennings' (see record 1987-05956-001) discussion of E. Husserl's (1931) concept of phenomenological investigation, suggesting a distinction between Husserl's goal of absolute knowledge and the psychological researcher's goal of relativistic knowledge. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Discovering existence with Husserl.

Reviews the book, Discovering existence with Husserl by Emmanuel Levinas, translated by Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith (1998). The work of Emmanuel Levinas represents one of the most innovative and influential expositions of twentieth-century phenomenology. His thought represents a radically new interpretation of the phenomenological project, the meaning of ethics, and the role of ontology and metaphysics in our discussion of the Other and the Good. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Methods of theoretical psychology.

Reviews the book, Methods of theoretical psychology by André Kukla (see record 2001-18914-000). This comprehensive survey of the tools of theoretical psychology is the culmination of the author's previous writings (e.g., Kukla 1989, 1995) wherein he tried to "convince psychologists that our discipline had suffered from a gross and systematic underestimation of the scope, variety, and import of theoretical work" and "persuade my colleagues that there are many important theoretical issues the resolution of which does not call for empirical research" (p. xi). This is not a book in theoretical psychology (the author cites as examples the volumes by Marx and Hillix, and Wolman), but a book about theoretical psychology, the "types of theoretical activities" that "require nothing but thinking" (p. xi). Notable is the book's epigraph, a quotation from Jerry Fodor claiming that the distinction between psychological and philosophical theorizing is merely heuristic, and issuing the moral challenge for a plurality of argument styles that transcends disciplines. For Kukla has written a book about the logic of science, or what was traditionally referred to as the philosophy of science, and, as might be expected, examples are strewn throughout from the natural sciences as well as some classic theoretical problems in psychology, most notably, cognitive science. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

The Social Architect.

A recent report of the APA Ad Hoc Committee on the role of the APA in Mental Health Programs and Research (Amer. Psychologist, 1959, 14, 820-825) carries the assertion that "The most recently recognized task of mental health is to bring about individual well being by modifying communities and larger units of society". Still more recently, E. Lowell Kelly (Division 12 Newsletter, 1961, 14) has discussed most provocatively the "image" (and, to me at least, sad future) of clinical psychology. In the course of his presentation he has advanced his personal view that clinical psychology, in order to realize its unique professional potential, might well adopt the Architect rather than the Physician as its model. Psychological "Consultants on Living," in addition to their efforts in relation to psychopathology, would make themselves available "to assist normal people to lead more fulsome lives". While Kelly's general remarks suggest that his Consultants on Living would find their prospective clients among individuals and possible family groups, I see his position as quite compatible with the position taken by the ad hoc committee if we conceive of the "Social Architect" role as including the possibility of assisting people to lead more satisfying lives through their spontaneous association with other people, that is, in the context of their natural groupings in ordinary community life. While I personally believe that the Consultant on Living role calls for broader perspectives than are usually encompassed by the single discipline of psychology, I am unreservedly with Kelly in his ideal. Kelly offered his suggestion of the Architect image for clinical psychology as an expression of a minority view, and my guess is that his appraisal is correct. However, I suspect that there may be among psychologists generally, and even among clinicians, an appreciable number to whom this concept--with its implied direction of evolution--is appealing. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

James J. Gibson: An appreciation.

J. J. Gibson (see PA, Vol 29:5103; see also PA, Vol 81:28168) conceived of a perceptual psychology very different from that taken by mainstream research work in vision over the past 30 yrs. Placing psychology in a biological and physical context and avoiding traditional disciplinary definitions, Gibson outlined a physics relevant to animate life. From this flowed his theory of affordances, his preoccupation with surfaces, and his interest in animal locomotion. Visual motion played a decisive role in rounding out these views. His work here was prophetic, anticipating neurophysiological discoveries on motion sensitivity and directly inspiring more recent studies on higher order aspects of motion encoding. Gibson scrupulously avoided mention of internal representation. Yet, those researchers interested in such internal processes remain deeply indebted to his enduring contributions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Review of Collective reflexology: The complete edition.

Reviews the book, Collective reflexology: The complete edition by V. M. Bekhterev, edited by Lloyd H. Strickland, and translated by Eugenia Lockwood and Alisa Lockwood (see record 2001-18070-000). Bekhterev's view of the individual as a system of energy transformation and exchange has obvious affinities with Freud's views. In his foreword to Part 2, Strickland (pp. 278-281) notes that Bekhterev himself was aware of this similarity. However, Behterev attempted to distinguish himself from Freud in several ways, most notably by claiming to be more "objective" in his approach. For Bekhterev, the objective study of the mind meant observing its products (e.g., speech, social affiliation). For this reviewer, reading Bekhterev is refreshing because it harks back to a time when psychology was still a young and optimistic science. The confidence with which Bekhterev puts forth his views may in hindsight be na?ve, but it must have been wonderful to imagine oneself at the forefront of a new discipline, as Bekhterev so clearly did. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Bias and obfuscation in Kendler's (2005) "clarification."

Comments on the article "Psychology and Phenomenology: A Clarification" by H. H. Kendler (see record 2005-05480-003). In this article, Kendler misrepresented contemporary existential-humanistic psychology and conventional (or natural) scientific psychology. With regard to the former, he presented a confused, unwittingly biased, and all-too-stereotypic picture. Aside from failing to cite virtually any contemporary existential-humanistic theorists (with the possible exceptions of Polkinghorne and Smith), he profoundly mischaracterized the phenomenological perspective on which existential-humanistic principles are based (e.g., see Cain & Seeman, 2002, Giorgi, 1970, and Schneider, Bugental, & Pierson, 2002, for an elaboration). To cite but a few problems to which Kendler (2005) fell victim, I consider first his characterization of phenomenological philosophy and psychology as "purely subjective" and "free of any scientific consideration or interpretation" (p. 318). With regard to Kendler's (2005, p. 322) characterization of conventional (or natural scientific) psychological inquiry as "objective" and amoral, there are several problems. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)