Industry Front Groups: A Tobacco Case Study

We consider how industries use front groups to combat public health measures by relating the history of “Get Government Off Our Back”, a coalition created by the tobacco industry to fight government regulation. Using tobacco industry documents, contemporaneous media reports, journal articles, and press releases, we review the establishment by RJ Reynolds of an industry front group, Get Government Off Our Back (GGOOB) in 1994. The group’s goal was to advocate against U.S. federal regulation of tobacco. By keeping its involvement secret, RJ Reynolds was able to draw public and legislative support toward limiting government regulation of tobacco without having to address the tobacco industry’s reputation for misrepresenting evidence. Unfortunately, the tobacco industry”s use of front groups is not unique; other industries use front groups to fight measures designed to protect public health. Research on the background and funding of advocacy organizations could help identify industry front groups and make them less useful to their creators.     

Tobacco lobby political influence on US state legislatures in the 1990s

BACKGROUND: Throughout the 1990s the tobacco lobby was a potent political force in US state legislatures advancing its pro-tobacco agenda. OBJECTIVE: To describe the market and political motivations of the tobacco lobby and the strategies they use to achieve these goals in US state legislatures. DESIGN: This study is a content analysis and summary overview of recently released historical tobacco industry documents; tobacco related government documents; and recent state tobacco control policy reports. RESULTS: In the 1990s, the tobacco lobby engaged in a comprehensive and aggressive political effort in state legislatures to sell tobacco with the least hindrance using lobbying, the media, public relations, front groups, industry allies, and contributions to legislators. These efforts included campaigns to neutralise clean indoor air legislation, minimise tax increases, and preserve the industry's freedom to advertise and sell tobacco. The tobacco lobby succeeded in increasing the number of states that enacted state pre-emption of stricter local tobacco control laws and prevented the passage of many state tobacco control policies. Public health advocates were able to prevent pre-emption and other pro-tobacco policies from being enacted in several states. CONCLUSIONS: The tobacco lobby is a powerful presence in state legislatures. Because of the poor public image of the tobacco lobby, it seeks to wield this power quietly and behind the scenes. State and local health advocates, who often have high public credibility, can use this fact against the tobacco lobby by focusing public attention on the tobacco lobby's political influence and policy goals and expose links between the tobacco lobby and its legislative supporters.     

Use of corporate sponsorship as a tobacco marketing tool: a review of tobacco industry sponsorship in the USA, 1995-99

OBJECTIVE: To describe the nature and extent of tobacco company sponsorship in the USA during the period 1995-99 and analyse this sponsorship in a marketing context. DESIGN: A cross-sectional study of tobacco company sponsorships identified through a customised research report from IEG Inc, and from internet web site searches. METHODS: First, a customised report was received from IEG Inc, which identified sponsorship activities for Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, and US Tobacco for the years 1997 and 1998. Second, the internet was systematically searched for tobacco industry sponsorships during the period 1995-99 by the same parent companies and their respective brands. RESULTS: During the period 1995-99, tobacco companies sponsored at least 2733 events, programmes, and organisations in the USA. Sponsorships involved all 50 states and the District of Columbia, and the minimum total funding amount of these sponsorships was $365.4 million. Tobacco corporate sponsorships involved numerous small, community based organisations, both through direct funding and through grants to larger umbrella organisations, and many of these organisations were part of the public health infrastructure. CONCLUSIONS: Tobacco corporate sponsorship serves as an important marketing tool for tobacco companies, serving both a sales promotion and public relations function. Public health practitioners need to develop better surveillance systems for monitoring tobacco sponsorship, to seek out alternative funding sources for tobacco company sponsored events and organisations, and to consider promoting a ban on tobacco sponsorship, possibly linking such regulation to the creation of alternative funding sources.     

Tobacco industry strategies to undermine the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health

Objective: To demonstrate that Philip Morris and British American Tobacco Company attempted to initiate a wide ranging campaign to undermine the success of the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health held in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in 1992.

Data sources: Publicly available tobacco industry documents housed in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA; Guilford, UK; on-line document websites; and telephone interviews with informed parties.

Study selection: Those documents determined to be relevant to the companies' campaigns against the 8th World Conference on Tobacco or Health.

Data extraction: Revision of chapter VIII of the July 2000 WHO report by a committee of experts, entitled: Tobacco company strategies to undermine tobacco control activities at the World Health Organization: report of the committee of experts on tobacco industry documents.

Data synthesis: Internal documents describe proposed media and science orientated campaigns developed by BAT, Philip Morris, and their consultants to divert attention away from the conference.

Results and conclusion: This work shows that the tobacco industry has the resources and vested interest to combat perceived threats in its regional operating markets, in this case its Latin American market. It is important for the worldwide public heath community to become aware of the numerous ways in which the tobacco industry and its front groups can work against international tobacco control meetings, even including the manipulation of or working with other public health groups to oppose tobacco control efforts. Future world conference planners and participants should be aware that the tobacco industry is likely to continue to employ such methodology. There is no reason to think that the industry is paying less attention to such conferences in the present or future. Rather, it is likely the industry will adopt and expand strategies that were successful while abandoning those that were not effective. Required disclosure of financial support by all participants at all tobacco scientific conferences is recommended. For the tobacco control community, we also recommend careful coalition building and networking with other public health groups on the ways tobacco is implicated in other public health issues.

     

Tobacco industry successfully prevented tobacco control legislation in Argentina

Objective: To evaluate how transnational tobacco companies, working through their local affiliates, influenced tobacco control policymaking in Argentina between 1966 and 2005. Methods: Analysis of internal tobacco industry documents, local newspapers and magazines, internet resources, bills from the Argentinean National Congress Library, and interviews with key individuals in Argentina. Results: Transnational tobacco companies (Philip Morris International, British American Tobacco, Lorillard, and RJ Reynolds International) have been actively influencing public health policymaking in Argentina since the early 1970s. As in other countries, in 1977 the tobacco industry created a weak voluntary self regulating code to avoid strong legislated restrictions on advertising. In addition to direct lobbying by the tobacco companies, these efforts involved use of third party allies, public relations campaigns, and scientific and medical consultants. During the 1980s and 1990s efforts to pass comprehensive tobacco control legislation intensified, but the organised tobacco industry prevented its enactment. There has been no national activity to decrease exposure to secondhand smoke. Conclusions: The tobacco industry, working through its local subsidiaries, has subverted meaningful tobacco control legislation in Argentina using the same strategies as in the USA and other countries. As a result, tobacco control in Argentina remains governed by a national law that is weak and restricted in its scope.     

Mongoven,Biscoe & Duchin: destroying tobacco control activism from the inside

Mongoven, Biscoe & Duchin, a specialist firm based in Washington DC, has honed a niche as expert intelligence gatherers, helping tobacco companies such as Philip Morris and RJ Reynolds to damage tobacco control efforts, including the WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.     

Tobacco industry litigation strategies to oppose tobacco control media campaigns

Objective

To document the tobacco industry''s litigation strategy to impede tobacco control media campaigns.

Methods

Data were collected from news and reports, tobacco industry documents, and interviews with health advocates and media campaign staff.

Results

RJ Reynolds and Lorillard attempted to halt California''s Media Campaign alleging that the campaign polluted jury pools and violated First Amendment rights because they were compelled to pay for anti‐industry ads. The American Legacy Foundation was accused of violating the Master Settlement Agreement''s vilification clause because its ads attacked the tobacco industry. The tobacco companies lost these legal challenges.

Conclusion

The tobacco industry has expanded its efforts to oppose tobacco control media campaigns through litigation strategies. While litigation is a part of tobacco industry business, it imposes a financial burden and impediment to media campaigns'' productivity. Tobacco control professionals need to anticipate these challenges and be prepared to defend against them.     

Understanding Philip Morris's pursuit of US government regulation of tobacco

Objective: To investigate Philip Morris's support of US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulation of tobacco products and analyse its relationship to the company's image enhancement strategies.

Data sources: Internal Philip Morris documents released as part of the Master Settlement Agreement.

Methods: Searches of the Legacy Tobacco Documents Library (http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu) beginning with such terms as "FDA" and "regulatory strategy" and expanding to include relevant new terms.

Results: Philip Morris's support for government regulation of tobacco is part of a broader effort to address its negative public image, which has a damaging impact on the company's stock price, political influence, and employee morale. Through regulation, the company seeks to enhance its legitimacy, redefine itself as socially responsible, and alter the litigation environment. Whereas health advocates frame tobacco use as a public health policy issue, Philip Morris's regulatory efforts focus on framing tobacco use as an individual choice by informed adults to use a risky product. This framing allows Philip Morris to portray itself as a reasonable and responsible manufacturer and marketer of risky products.

Conclusions: Philip Morris's ability to improve its image through support of FDA regulation may undermine tobacco control efforts aimed at delegitimising the tobacco industry. It may also create the impression that Philip Morris's products are being made safer and ultimately protect the company from litigation. While strong regulation of tobacco products and promotion remain critical public health goals, previous experiences with tobacco regulation show that caution may be warranted.

     

Comprehensive smoke-free legislation in England: how advocacy won the day

Objective

To examine how a government committed to a voluntary approach was forced by an effective advocacy coalition to introduce comprehensive smoke‐free legislation.

Methods

A diary was kept from the start of the campaign in 2003, backed up by journal and press articles, and information downloaded from the web. Regular public opinion polls were also carried out to supplement government surveys and polls conducted by the media.

Results

The 1997 Labour Government was committed to a voluntary approach to deal with the problem of secondhand smoke. By 2003, efforts to persuade government to introduce regulation of workplace secondhand smoke through a health and safety code of practice with exemptions for the hospitality trade, had failed. Despite a lack of support from the government, including the health minister, a new strategy by health advocates focusing on comprehensive workplace legislation was able to succeed.

Conclusions

In a democracy it is crucial to develop public knowledge and belief in the extent of the risks of secondhand smoke. Gaining public and media support for the issue can ensure that government has to take action and that the legislation will be enforceable. The interests of the tobacco industry and the hospitality trade differ and this can be used to gain hospitality trade support for comprehensive national legislation in order to ensure a level playing field and protection from litigation.     

Push or be punished: tobacco industry documents reveal aggression against businesses that discourage tobacco use

OBJECTIVE: To learn how the tobacco industry reacted to businesses' voluntarily enacting policies to discourage tobacco use and minimise exposure of employees and patrons to secondhand smoke. DATA SOURCES: Internal tobacco industry documents discovered among those posted on the internet. Approximately 24 million documents have been posted as of this writing. Information in this article was culled from among these documents, which have been made public as a unique requirement of the state of Minnesota's settlement with the industry. STUDY SELECTION: Those documents were used that offered insight into, and which gave a perspective on, the industry's attitudes and reactions toward other businesses as they adopted tobacco-free policies. CONCLUSIONS: In the wake of widespread acceptance that tobacco use causes illness and death, many individual businesses (and even entire industries) took positive steps to eliminate employees', customers', and facilities' exposure to tobacco smoke. Steps were also taken to discourage tobacco use among employees. Internal tobacco industry documents show that the industry reacted with aggression, and in some cases with retribution, against businesses that voluntarily adopted policies to discourage tobacco use. The intent of these actions appears to be to reverse these policies, with a broader goal of neutralising large scale public and private trends that reflect the decreasing social acceptability of tobacco use.     

Tobacco interests or the public interest: 20 years of industry strategies to undermine airline smoking restrictions

Objectives

To understand the evolution of 20 years of tobacco industry strategies to undermine federal restrictions of smoking on aircraft in the United States.

Design

We searched and analysed internal tobacco industry records, public documents, and other related research.

Results

The industry viewed these restrictions as a serious threat to the social acceptability of smoking. Its initial efforts included covert letter‐writing campaigns and lobbying of the airline industry, but with the emergence of proposals to ban smoking, the tobacco companies engaged in ever increasing efforts to forestall further restrictions. Tactics to dominate the public record became especially rigorous. The industry launched an aggressive public relations campaign that began with the promotion of industry sponsored petition drives and public opinion surveys. Results from polling research that produced findings contrary to the industry''s position were suppressed. In order to demonstrate smoker outrage against a ban, later efforts included the sponsorship of smokers'' rights and other front groups. Congressional allies and industry consultants sought to discredit the science underlying proposals to ban smoking and individual tobacco companies conducted their own cabin air quality research. Faced with the potential of a ban on all domestic flights, the industry sought to intimidate an air carrier and a prominent policymaker. Despite the intensification of tactics over time, including mobilisation of an army of lobbyists and Congressional allies, the tobacco industry was ultimately defeated.

Conclusions

Our longitudinal analysis provides insights into how and when the industry changed its plans and provides public health advocates with potential counterstrategies.     

Tobacco industry strategy to undermine tobacco control in Finland

Objective: To identify and explain tobacco industry strategy in undermining tobacco control measures in Finland and results of these interferences in tobacco policy development during the 1980s and early 1990s.

Methods: Tobacco industry documents, which have been publicly available on the internet as a result of litigation in the USA, were analysed. Documents were sought by Finland and by names of organisations and tobacco control activists. Documents were accessed and assessed between September 2000 and November 2002. Tactics of the tobacco industry activities were categorised as presented by Saloojee and Dagli.

Results: The international tobacco companies utilised similar strategies in Finland as in other industrial markets to fight tobacco control and legislation, the health advocacy movement, and litigation. These activities slowed down the development and implementation of the Tobacco Act in Finland. However, despite the extensive pressure, the industry was not able to prevent the most progressive tobacco legislation in Europe from being passed and coming into force in Finland in 1977 and in 1995.

Conclusion: Denying the health hazards caused by tobacco—despite indisputable scientific evidence—decreased the credibility of the tobacco industry. Strategy of denial was falsely chosen, as health advocacy groups were active both in society and the parliamentary system. The strong influence of the tobacco industry may have in fact increased the visibility of tobacco control in Finland as the litigation process was also drawing attention to negative health effects of tobacco. Therefore the tobacco industry did not manage to convince public opinion. However, the tobacco industry did obtain experience in Finland in how to object to tobacco control measures.

     

A formative examination of messages that discourage tobacco use among junior enlisted members of the United States military.

Smoking prevalence among junior enlisted members of the United States armed forces significantly exceeds that of civilians. Furthermore, nearly 40% of junior enlisted who smoke reported they initiated smoking after joining the military. Although the tobacco industry has attempted to develop messages that encourage military members to use tobacco, no research has examined messages that would counteract industry messages and effectively discourage military members from using tobacco. This study conducted 24 focus groups on four Air Force and two Army installations (N = 189 personnel) to discover effective messages that discourage tobacco use among junior enlisted personnel. Four message themes were identified that hold promise for tobacco control efforts in the military: (a) smoking harms one's ability to positively influence others, (b) smoking increases the chance a military member will be discharged from the military prematurely, (c) smoking lowers readiness to fight and win wars, and (d) smokers are not as productive as other military personnel. In contrast, messages focusing on manipulation by the tobacco industry and the health effects of tobacco use were not strongly supported by military personnel.     

Youth smoking prevention and tobacco industry revenue

Objectives

Epidemiological surveys make it clear that youth smoking contributes to both current and future tobacco industry revenue: over 80% of adult smokers reportedly began smoking before age 18. This paper estimates annual and lifetime revenue from youth smoking, and highlights the association between declines in youth smoking and declines in tobacco industry revenue.

Main outcome measures

This paper reports the amount of tobacco industry revenue generated by youth smoking at two points in time (1997 and 2002), and describes the distribution of youth generated tobacco income among the major tobacco companies. The authors project the amount of tobacco industry revenue that will be generated by members of two cohorts (the high school senior classes of 1997 and 2002) over the course of their lifetimes.

Results

In 1997, youth consumed 890 million cigarette packs, generating $737 million in annual industry revenue. By 2002, consumption dropped to 541 million packs and revenue increased to nearly $1.2 billion. Fifty eight per cent of youth generated revenue goes to Philip Morris USA, 18% to Lorillard, and 12% to RJ Reynolds. The authors project that, over the course of their lives, the 1997 high school senior class will smoke 12.4 billion packs of cigarettes, generating $27.3 billion in revenue. The 2002 high school senior class is projected to smoke 10.4 billion packs, generating $22.9 billion in revenue over the course of their lives.

Conclusions

Cigarette price increases from 1997 to 2002 have resulted in greater revenue for the tobacco industry, despite declines in youth smoking prevalence. However, in the absence of further cigarette price increases, declines in youth smoking are projected to lead ultimately to a loss of approximately $4 billion in future tobacco industry revenue from a single high school cohort.     

Tobacco industry consumer research on socially acceptable cigarettes

Objective: To describe tobacco industry consumer research to inform the development of more "socially acceptable" cigarette products since the 1970s. Methods: Analysis of previously secret tobacco industry documents. Results: 28 projects to develop more socially acceptable cigarettes were identified from Philip Morris, RJ Reynolds, British American Tobacco, and Lorillard tobacco companies. Consumer research and concept testing consistently demonstrated that many smokers feel strong social pressure not to smoke, and this pressure increased with exposure to smoking restrictions. Tobacco companies attempted to develop more socially acceptable cigarettes with less visible sidestream smoke or less odour. When presented in theory, these product concepts were very attractive to important segments of the smoking population. However, almost every product developed was unacceptable in actual product tests or test markets. Smokers reported the complete elimination of secondhand smoke was necessary to satisfy non-smokers. Smokers have also been generally unwilling to sacrifice their own smoking satisfaction for the benefit of others. Many smokers prefer smoke-free environments to cigarettes that produce less secondhand smoke. Conclusions: Concerns about secondhand smoke and clean indoor air policies have a powerful effect on the social acceptability of smoking. Historically, the tobacco industry has been unable to counter these effects by developing more socially acceptable cigarettes. These data suggest that educating smokers about the health dangers of secondhand smoke and promoting clean indoor air policies has been difficult for the tobacco industry to counter with new products, and that every effort should be made to pursue these strategies.     

African American leadership groups: smoking with the enemy

BACKGROUND: Among all racial and ethnic groups in the USA, African Americans bear the greatest burden from tobacco related disease. The tobacco industry has been highly influential in the African American community for decades, providing funding and other resources to community leaders and emphasising publicly its support for civil rights causes and groups, while ignoring the negative health effects of its products on those it claims to support. However, the industry's private business reasons for providing such support were unknown. OBJECTIVE: To understand how and for what purposes the tobacco industry sought to establish and maintain relationships with African American leaders. METHODS: Review and analysis of over 700 previously secret internal tobacco industry documents available on the internet. RESULTS: The tobacco industry established relationships with virtually every African American leadership organisation and built longstanding social connections with the community, for three specific business reasons: to increase African American tobacco use, to use African Americans as a frontline force to defend industry policy positions, and to defuse tobacco control efforts. CONCLUSION: As the tobacco industry expands its global reach, public health advocates should anticipate similar industry efforts to exploit the vulnerabilities of marginalised groups. The apparent generosity, inclusion, and friendship proffered by the industry extract a price from groups in the health of their members. Helping groups anticipate such efforts, confront industry co-optation, and understand the hidden costs of accepting tobacco industry largesse should be part of worldwide tobacco control efforts.     

British Columbia capital regional district 100% smokefree bylaw: a successful public health campaign despite industry opposition

Objective: To describe how the British Columbia Capital Regional District successfully passed, implemented, and enforced a 100% smokefree bylaw in all public places, including restaurants and bars, despite an aggressive campaign by the tobacco industry (acting through the hospitality industry) to stop it. Methods: Information was obtained from news reports, internal tobacco industry documents, reports, public documents, and interviews with key players. Tobacco industry documents were accessed between February and April 2002. This project was approved by the University of California San Francisco committee on human research. Results: As in the USA and elsewhere in the world, the tobacco industry in British Columbia, Canada, recruited and created hospitality associations to fight against the district smokefree bylaw. They used the classic industry rhetoric of individual rights and freedoms, economic devastation, and ventilation as a solution. Public health authorities were able to counter industry strategies with a strong education campaign, well written bylaws, and persistent enforcement. Conclusion: It is possible to overcome serious opposition orchestrated by the tobacco industry and develop and implement a 100% smokefree bylaw in Canada. Doing so requires attention to detail in drafting the bylaw, as well as a public education campaign on the health dangers of secondhand smoke and active enforcement to overcome organised resistance to the bylaw. Jurisdictions considering smokefree bylaws should anticipate this opposition when developing and implementing their bylaws.     

Differences in prevalence of tobacco use among Indian urban youth: the role of socioeconomic status

This study examined whether the distribution of tobacco use and related psychosocial risk factors among youth in urban India vary by socioeconomic status (SES). Data were derived from a cross-sectional survey of students enrolled in the 6th and 8th grades in 32 schools in Delhi and Chennai (N = 11,642). The survey was conducted in 2004, before the implementation of a program designed to prevent and reduce tobacco use (MYTRI). Mixed-effect regression models were used (a) to determine the prevalence of tobacco use among private (higher SES) and government (lower SES) school students, (b) to investigate whether certain psychosocial factors were associated with increased tobacco use, and (c) to determine how these factors varied by school type. Ever-use of multiple forms of tobacco (e.g., gutkha, bidis, and cigarettes) was more prevalent among government school students than private school students. After adjusting for city, gender, grade, and age, we found the prevalence rate for ever-use of any tobacco product to be 18.9% for government school students, compared with 12.2% for private school students (p<.01). Students in government schools scored lower than private school students on most psychosocial risk factors for tobacco use studied here, indicating higher risk. Government school students scored the lowest for refusal skills, self-efficacy, and reasons not to use tobacco. Social susceptibility to chewing tobacco and social susceptibility to smoking were strong correlates of current tobacco use among government school students. Exposure to tobacco advertising was also a strong correlate of current tobacco use for government school students but not private school students. In two large cities of India, students attending government schools are using many forms of tobacco at higher rates than private school students. The psychosocial risk profile of government school students suggests they are more vulnerable to initiation and use and to outside influences that encourage use.     

Taking it to the streets: responses of African American young adults to internal tobacco industry documents.

Since the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998 between 46 states and the major tobacco companies forced the release of over 30 million pages of previously secret internal tobacco industry documents, researchers have been exploring how information in the documents can be useful for advancing public health efforts. Previous research shows that the tobacco industry has made massive efforts to target marginalized communities, not only through typical advertising channels but also through establishing financial and other ties with influential leadership groups. However, no previous studies have explored how members of targeted groups might respond at the grassroots level to actual internal tobacco industry documents about such targeting. This exploratory focus group study, which invited urban African American participants to comment on previously secret internal tobacco industry documents, suggests that such documents may be useful in efforts to socially denormalize tobacco use, promote critical reflection about community targeting, and mobilize individuals toward quitting.